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The emergence and rapid evolution of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market 
in the early 1980s revolutionized the whole landscape of finance. OTC derivatives 
are financial products that are transnational in their nature. These products do 
not follow any jurisdictional lines nor theoretical boundaries focusing on state-
made law. They transcend them. The central argument of this research is that legal 
scholarship requires a legal theoretical approach capable of recognizing private 
normativity and that accepts that it is not only nation states and organizations 
that derive their powers from states that can produce law. Transnational method 
allows the observer to acknowledge the transnational elements of finance and then 
set them into a legal theoretical structure.
This research retells the evolution of the OTC derivatives market through the 
application of transnational method. Instead of building a narrative emphasizing the 
de- and reregulation policies and politics, the research focuses on early beginnings 
of the largest capital market in the world, the so-called eurobond market of the 
1960s. Through legal innovation, this market developed its own transnational rules. 
In the 1980s, this market became integrated with the rapidly growing market for 
swaps, a type of OTC derivative. Seeing the demand for contractual standardization, 
a handful of financial institutions became organized through a trade organization 
today known as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA). 
The main product of ISDA, the ISDA Master Agreement architecture, had become 
by far the most used standard agreement in the OTC derivatives market already 
before the 1990s. Post financial crisis of 2008, this transnational contract still holds 
a central position in a very different regulatory environment than that of the 1980s.
Transnational method identifies the supply and demand for financial and legal 
innovation, and the facilitative role that nation states and international organizations 
can play in enhancing private normativity and the transnationalization of law. 
The results that transnational method tells are first and foremost descriptive. The 
application of transnational method requires a functional, rather than formal, 
understanding of ‘law’ because this allows private normativity to be recognized 
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1. GENERAL REMARKS ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Standardized financial contracts that ‘are used across the globe’ are the manifestation 
of the modern lex mercatoria of finance.1 The ISDA Master Agreement, a standardized 
contract architecture published by a private trade organization, International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) is a manifestation of the lex mercatoria 
of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) market.2 The OTC derivatives market 
is not only one of the largest if not the largest financial market in the world, but 
it is interlinked to all other areas of finance. The market is based on derivative 
structures that are ‘ancient ideas’ that have existed for centuries.3 Both public and 
private entities use the ISDA Master Agreement, from nation states to transnational 
financial institutions and transnational corporations. A contractual term and a 
particular type of set-off mechanism that came to be known as bilateral close-out 
netting was first introduced in the early version of the ISDA Master Agreement 
architecture in the 1980s. In a short period of time, this contractual clause became 
‘an integral indeed a central part of the standardized industry documentation for 
OTC derivatives and of the lex mercatoria of the financial markets in general’.4 
Before the 1980s, bilateral close-out netting did not exist. It has transnational, 
private origins. Through international financial regulation, the use of master 
agreement architecture in the OTC derivatives market became virtually mandatory 
for financial instutions and, through this, also for the end-user corporations. The 
enforceability of bilateral close-out netting in insolvency situations eventually 
became explicitly recognized in many key jurisdictions, including the US, the UK, 
and the EU. The enforceability of bilateral close-out netting evolved from simple 
market practice into a public policy requirement and a debated cornerstone of 
modern finance.
The primary purpose of this research is to capture the interaction between 
transnational law of the OTC derivatives market and state-made law and regulation 
by approaching the phenomena from a legal theoretical perspective. Essentially, this 
1 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2nd edition, OUP 2015) para 15.14.
2 Francesca C Villata, ‘Remarks on the 2012 Greek sovereign debt restructuring: between choice-of-law 
agreements and new EU rules on derivative instruments’ Rivista di diritto internazionale privato  
e processuale – N. 2–2013, 325, 348.
3 Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) paras 1–08–10.
4 Marcel Peeters, ‘On Close-out Netting’ in Thomas Keijser (ed), Transnational Securities Law (OUP 2014) 
paras 3.01–3.05.
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research seeks to anwer the question ‘what transnational law is?’ and how to study 
it. In this analysis, two interconnected markets, the so-called “eurobond market”, 
which paved the way for the OTC derivatives market already in the 1960s, and the 
OTC derivatives market serve as a medium in answering this question. Essentially, 
these markets transcend the borders of state law and are not easily put into the 
more traditional categories of law or legal theories that focus on state-made law. 
In transnational law, acknowledging and understanding private normativity and 
the evolutionary nature of law are key. Quite tellingly, while not referring to or 
discussing anything about legal theory or transnational law, Schuyler Henderson 
describes the OTC derivatives market as being ‘everywhere and nowhere’ as it affects 
every other financial market but has no fixed location. These markets are ‘very large, 
very important and little understood’ and there were few rules regarding how OTC 
derivatives could be structured and used prior to 2010.5 
1.2 TRANSNATIONAL METHOD
Transnational law has a rich scholarly tradition which offers a legal theoretical 
construct consisting of autonomously, spontaneously, and privately created 
norms that form a transnational legal order. Transnational method that studies 
transnational law as a distinct research area dates at least to the 1950s and has 
an ever-growing body of interest also in contemporary legal theoretical studies. 
Similar observations about the evolutionary nature of private normativity have 
been made outside the more-traditional transnational legal studies. According to 
Simon Deakin, contemporary research on financial regulation tells us that both 
state law and markets coevolve, that they are both adaptive systems and, although 
interrelated, the state has its limits in reshaping market outcomes. From a public 
policy perspective, an ‘explicitly evolutionary conception of the law-finance relation’ 
should be the next step. 6 
Philip Jessup is a primer for much of the literature on transnational law. However, 
the evolutionary aspect inherent in his definition is perhaps not known by many. 
This research is much about the evolutionary aspects of law and putting these 
aspects into a legal theoretical framework in this tradition. In his 1956 response 
to Professor Alf Ross, who had in 1947 attempted to introduce a new concept of 
‘private international law’, Jessup wrote: 
5 Schuyler Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (2nd edition, LexisNexis 2010) paras 1.1, 2.1.
6 Simon Deakin, ‘The Evolution of Theory & Method in Law & Finance’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, 
Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (CUP 2013) 25–28, 37. 
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I shall use, instead of ‘international law,’ the term ‘transnational law’ to 
include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are 
other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.7 
Enforceable, binding contract is law that regulates private actions between 
contracting parties and events that demonstrably transcend national frontiers. 
Since such a phenomenon was not easily placed into existing categories of law, 
they were referred to being transnational in their ontology. Following the creation of 
the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law in 1961, Jessup went on to describe the 
term ‘transnational’ as a widely used term to describe legal problems that transcend 
national frontiers and for which existing legal thinking is unable to identify let alone 
be able to give answers to. The core of transnational law is ‘the interrelationships 
between the multiple factors which contribute to the unending processes of legal 
evolution’.8 It was already during that time, when the same concept of spontaneous 
formation of law, private regulation through contract, and the alike sharing the same 
notion of non-national law saw the light in academic legal discourse.9 Going back 
further in history, at the end of the 19th century, Oliver Wendell Holmes described 
the law as being the outcome of spontaneous growth.10 
The definition introduced by Jessup has been criticized for being too broad since 
its introduction.11 If that critique is combined with the claim that transnational law 
lacks legitimacy, for one reason or another, it can ‘deprive us of the capacity to 
define transnational law in abstracto, which in turn makes it impossible to map 
out actual phenomena as transnational law in practice’.12 This is a problem in legal 
theory, which is addressed in Chapter 2. 
Moving to the early 1980s, the concept of legal pluralism was introduced as 
a descriptive theory of law that challenged legal centralism of legal positivism 
7 Philipp Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press 1956) 1.
8 Philip Jessup, ‘The Concept of Transnational Law: An Introduction’ (1963) 3 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 1–2 
(emphasis added).
9 Klaus Peter Berger, ‘The new law merchant and the global market: a 21st century view of transnational 
commercial law’ (2000) 3 Int.A.L.R. 91.
10 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1997) 110 Harv.L. Rev 991, 1000: 
 The development of our law has gone on for nearly a thousand years, like the development of a plant, each 
generation taking the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth.
11 FA Mann, ‘The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons’ (1959) 35 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 
34, n 2: 
 The term [transnational law] is not unattractive, but it must be doubted whether there is any advantage 
in advocating transnational law, unless the scope of its application and the method of ascertaining it are 
explained with precision. Only when this is done will it be possible to say whether and to what extent the 
idea of a ‘transnational law’ is in any way different from and superior to traditional legal conceptions.
12 Matej Avbelj, The European Union under Transnational Law – A Pluralist Appraisal (Hart Publishing 
2018) 9.
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and its ideological groundings. In legal centralism, other normative orderings are 
subordinate to the exclusive law of the state, whereas legal pluralism challenged the 
exclusiviness aspect by describing how more than one legal order can exist in the 
same social field at the same time.13 This academic notion was made over twenty 
years after the largest capital market in the world, the so-called eurobond market, 
had come into existence with its own transnational rules, transnational actors from 
corporations to financial institutions, and private regulatory mechanisms operating 
on a transnational plane discussed further in Chapter 3. The legal and regulatory 
framework of the 1960s and early 1970s was not open to cross-border capital 
movements. As counterintuitive as it may sound, the evidence indicates that this was 
also an era of financial, legal, and technological innovation that interconnected the 
global financial markets. This phenomen transcended virtually all state boundaries 
long before the era of de- and reregulation characteristic of the 1980s. The history of 
eurobonds and the emergence of modern capital markets in the early 1960s needs 
to be revisited before assessing the emergence of the OTC derivatives markets in 
the 1980s because the latter was founded on the former through swaps, a financial 
product that further revolutionized the financial markets and rendered national 
exchange controls on capital flows more or less meaningless. This revolution is 
described and discussed in Chapter 5 through the lens of transnational contracts 
and their evolution.
Transnational method allows transnational law to be conceptualized. An 
established legal theoretical construct exists, which defines transnational law in 
the abstract and which is used in this research.14 Individuals engaging in repeated 
interactions can create normative orders that are unplanned and a creation of 
spontaneous action.15 In practical terms, transnational actors exist and, through 
repeated interactions, they create norms and rules recognizable not only by their 
respective private business communities that engage in these interactions, but also 
by outside observers. These interactions produce material and observable artefacts, 
transnational contracts. One of these is the ISDA Master Agreement architecture, 
a creation of private market participants that has evolved through time since its 
beginning in the mid-1980s towards universally recognized and criticized standard 
in the OTC derivatives market to date.16 By using legal theoretical method, this 
13 John Griffiths, ‘What is legal pluralism?’ (1986) 24 J Legal Plur 1.
14 JH Dalhuisen, ‘Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and 
Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria’ (2006) 24(1) Berk J Intl 129, 180–81.
15 Jan M Smits, ‘European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order’ in Deirdre M Curtin, Andre 
Klip, Jan Smits, Joseph A McCahery (eds), European integration and law; Four Contributions on the 
Interplay between European Integration and European and National Law (Intersentia 2006) 55. In 
economics, Yong Tao, ‘Spontaneous economic order’ (2016) 26 J Evol Econ 467, concluding that ‘[i]
f a competitive economy is sufficiently fair and free, an unplanned economic order will spontaneously 
emerge’ 496.
16 Tony Porter, ‘Transnational private regulation and the changing media of rules’ (2012) 13 German L.J. 
1508, 1509. 
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research attempts to capture the ontology of this particular transnational contract. 
First, it is placed into a normative structure of transnational law in Chapter 2, and 
then investigated in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Before analyzing transnational 
contracts, one needs to be familiar with the idea of transnationalisation of law. 
This is the purpose of Chapter 3. 
ISDA Master Agreement, as a manifestation of transnational law, has demonstrably 
had a profound influence on court praxis and vice versa especially in English case-
law, state laws, and financial regulations across various jurisdictions and on a 
transnational plane. It is not ‘only’ a transnational contract but a form of private 
regulatory mechanism through which market participants can regulate privately the 
action or inaction of their respective counterparties of the transactions they make. 
The OTC derivatives market became subject to extensive public financial regulation 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. Chapter 6 summarizes the 
critical observations made concerning top-down financial regulation and pushes 
forward the question what transgovernmental regulators are, what do they do and 
why.
Private rules may spontaneously emerge or be intentionally designed. The 
question of whether private rules can be qualified as transnational law, and if so 
to what extent, leads to an endless scholarly discussion and debate. This has been 
especially prevalent in legal research concerning international arbitration, a field 
that has attracted much discussion on the ontology of transnational law and modern 
lex mercatoria in which it is acknowledged that market participants create market 
practices which lead to the formation of private rules that, in turn, the market 
participants start to interpret and apply themselves. In this research area, Thomas 
Schultz has summarized:
Calling something law has profound consequences (…) A definition of 
law could possibly extend so far as to include every possible social norm, 
or be so restrictive as to regard as laws only highly complex public 
regimes approved by thinkers of the liberal-democratic tradition. In the 
sand between these two rocks we shall draw a line.17 
In this research, private norms in the form of contracts qualify as transnational 
law if state courts enforce them. In other words, enforceable contracts are law 
absent evidence to the contrary. They often qualify as law in the eyes of the state 
(even explicitly as discussed in subchapter 2.2) but parties to a contract cannot 
override local public policy requirements or create obligations for third parties. Put 
simply for this introduction, for example, a state court applying national law will 
17 Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality. Stateless Law and International Arbitration (OUP 2014) 8. 
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not enforce a contract for murder, nor validate a marriage between an adult and 
a minor. Enforcing such contracts would go against public policy of protecting life 
and minors, respectively. A state court will also not enforce a financial contract if a 
party to transaction lacked the authority to enter into a binding financial contract. In 
practice, as is discussed in Chapter 5, this can be the case even if such a court ruling 
would render a whole segment of over-the-counter derivatives transactions, worth 
hundreds of millions of pounds sterling, void overnight. Nor will a court enforce a 
contract that might favour one group of creditors over others if the debtor becomes 
insolvent since it would be unfair against the other creditors. It is a public policy 
choice not to give enforceability to some types of contracts. Enforceability is key in 
determining what type of norm qualifies as ‘law’. Again, put simply, norms of an 
organized crime syndicate, regardless of how observable for outsiders and obeyed 
these norms might be within such community, will not be enforceable. Contrary 
to this, much of this research is about the transformation of national black-letter 
insolvency laws through international cooperation as to facilitate over-the-counter 
derivatives trading which might, in the ordinary application of insolvency laws, go 
against prevailing public policy choices. The interactions between transnational law 
and state-made law are used as a medium to explain what transnational law is and 
what transnationalisation processes mean in finance. 
The legal scholars of the 1960s were able to identify and conceptualize the 
interactions in business and how they produce their own rules. They understood 
that in order to have a legal angle to something that demonstrably transcends the 
state, it is necessary to have a functional rather than formal understanding as to 
what constitutes law. If for nothing else, this conceptual choice could bring private 
normativity for legal scholars to study. Transnational law, in the form of transnational 
contracts is spontaneous and autonomous as to its emergence, existence, and 
evolution. Ttransnational method is a conceptualizing tool that is descriptive or 
epistemic, rather than normative in its application, even if the method uses the 
word ‘law’ liberally. The identification of verifiable facts and conceptualizing and 
placing them in a transnational legal order is not to be read as an outright normative 
statement. It is easy to agree with Matej Avbelj in that what transnational law means 
is ultimately a conceptual choice,18 with César Arjona and others in that ‘[i]t is always 
worthwhile to try to find the best and most precise description of world realities 
without actually implying a positive or negative normative conclusion’,19 and with 
18 Avbelj (n 12) 9.
19 César Arjona, Joshua Anderson, François Meier, Sierra Robart, ‘What law for transnational legal 
education? A cooperative view of an introductory course to transnational law and governance’ (2015) 6 
TLT 253, 278.
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Jan Dalhuisen in that ‘[i]n legal scholarship all is free’, and that experimentalism 
in legal research has inherent value.20 
1.3 TYPOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
Finance interacts with legislation and financial regulation, and the theory of 
transnational law helps to identify these interactions by conceptualizing them. Put 
into a legal theoretical context, transnational law can be conceptualized in many 
forms, including both wider and a narrower meaning. Transnational law in its wider 
meaning refers to public, administrative, and private transnational law. It is useful 
to repeat the typology drawn by Avbelj in order to summarize the main research 
areas in this field. The following table serves the purpose of placing this research 
somewhere between administrative and private transnational law. These regimes 
interact, and in this research, this is illustrated through the interactions between a 
trade organization, ISDA, and international financial regulators.
Transnational law21
Public Administrative Private
International law Public New lex mercatoria
Regional  
supranational law







In this typology, this research is about private transnational law. It definitely is 
not public transnational law which views transnational law as something where 
states hold power over the transnational law-making processes. This definition 
encompasses any laws whose effects extend beyond the state but which are still 
exclusively created by public entities. In other words, research made in this area 
may have a wholly differing view of what is transnational law since there is no room 
for the very concept of private normativity. It is a problematic approach not only 
20 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, The 
Transnationalisation of Commercial and Financial Law and of Commercial, Financial and Investment 
Dispute Resolution. The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources. Volume 1 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 135–36.
21 Avbelj (n 12) 10.
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because it deviates significantly from existing research on transnational law and 
may add only to confusion, as argued in Chapter 2, but also because much of what is 
seemingly created by public entities originates de facto from private market activity. 
Administrative transnational law can be characterized as something of an 
evolutionary step from public transnational law since it identifies the existence and 
role of private actors, their interaction with public actors, and the normative power 
they hold.22 Under this categorization, private actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations, can involve and influence the decision-making and the decision-
making procedures of states. Without a doubt, private trade organizations do this. 
But again, this categorization does not place private normativity at the forefront of 
academic inquiry. In contrast, private administrative transnational law recognized 
private decision-making processes from which public entities are absent but which 
nevertheless ‘regulate through acceptance the collective practices of numerous 
entities in designated sectors without their prior assent to these rules’.23 This 
definition captures what trade organizations in finance do when they standardize 
contracts. Bilateral close-out netting is a collective practice in the OTC derivatives 
markets and its use is virtually mandatory for financial institutions, and indirectly 
through this, to entities wishing to enter into OTC derivative transactions with the 
former.
A characteristic feature of transnational law is that it is contract- and practice-
based and that it involves an evolutionary or spontaneous element as to its 
emergence, application and codification.24 While often labeled as something purely 
technical, functional, and ‘apolitical’, transnational private law can be viewed as a 
‘central and crucial mediator of domestic and global political/legal orders in that 
it enables the extraterritorial application of national laws as well as the domestic 
application of transnational commercial law’.25 In this research, private transnational 
law is referred to as transnational law since this categorization is in line with the 
historical roots and existing studies of the whole concept.
Transnationalisation of law is understood along the lines of Jan Dalhuisen: 
[a] process and way of thinking characterized by the operation of 
autonomous nonstatist sources of law subject to a hierarchy established 
in a separate and autonomous legal order (the transnational commercial 




25 Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political 
Economy (CUP 2003) 4. 
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requirements, which, depending on the facts of the case, compete with 
relevant domestic legal orders.26
Bilateral close-out netting derives from a nonstatist source of law, a transnational 
contract. In addition to this, the use of bilateral close-out netting is a public policy 
requirement in financial regulation. The process that leads to transnationalisation 
of law can be identified by following evidence. Contract is a nonstatist source of law 
and transnational financial contracts do operate in a somewhat autonomous legal 
order with their own public policy concepts, such as financial stability. To draw an 
analogy, not unlike transnational law of finance, transnational law of professional 
sports is: 
[a] world-apart, self-regulated by its own rules, and through its own 
politicial processes: a private society that sets its own guiding principles 
in apparent isolation of municipal legal systems. 27
1.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
It has become a truism to associate derivatives to the global financial crisis of 2008 
the economic and regulatory repercussions of which are felt today. As summarized 
by Adam J Levitin, ‘[w]hat the financial crisis has wrought remains to be seen, […] 
it is spurring a major and much-needed rethinking about law, institutions, and 
society’.28 Calls for more and sometimes better financial regulation are common 
after any financial crisis. This discourse seems to be stuck in a repetitive loop.29 
Transnational law might bring forward a nuanced understanding how finance and 
law interact for lawyers. The indirect contribution to ethics stems from research 
that might offer some guidance as to how finance and its transnational laws, the 
laws of states and regulation interact. 
26 Dalhuisen (n 20) 7.
27 Antoine Duvall, ‘Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law’ (2013) 19 ELJ 822, 827–28; Jo 
Braithwaite, ‘Law After Lehmans’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 11/2014 London School 
of Economics and Political Science Law Department. Braithwaite describes the lasting legacy of the largest 
bankruptcy in US history, the fall of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on 15 September 2008 and how the 
court interpretations of the ISDA Master Agreement can have far reaching impact across the financial 
markets far beyond the litigants and creditors concerned. 
28 Adam J Levitin, ‘The Crisis without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 63 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 999, 1010. 
29 James R Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr, Ross Levine, Guardians of Finance – Making Regulators Work for Us 
(The MIT Press 2012) 147–57.
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Joanna Gray, among many others, have put forward the question whether 
lawyers should pay regarding the stability of the financial system by not acting 
only in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations but also beyond it. 
Lawyers can be seen as the de facto ‘legal engineers’ of many financial products 
that contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008. Gray’s answer is that yes, they 
should pay more attention.30 David Kershaw and Richard Moorhead have similarly 
put forward the question of whether transactional lawyers should bear responsibility 
when their competent actions facilitate unlawful activity by their client? Their answer 
is also yes, they should bear responsibility. The policy measure suggested is that 
the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the regulatory body for solicitors in England 
and Wales, should include in its Handbook a provision requiring lawyers not to 
assist clients if it creates a ‘foreseeable likelihood’ of breach of criminal law, civil 
law, or regulation.31 The evidence from the eurobond market suggests that market 
participants used all the legal efforts in ensuring that every aspect of trading is 
in compliant with any actual and even possibly applicable state laws. Market 
participants, both public and private, self-regulated the market and identified the 
potential legal risks. The same applies to the ISDA Master Agreement architecture. 
The evidence gathered tell that its designers were conscious of the national legal 
boundaries and their possible impact on OTC derivatives transactions from the 
perspective of criminal law, civil law, and financial regulation. 
As summarized by James R Barth and others, financial innovation can bring 
forth progress and it can bring calamity, it is always in state of flux, it is part of 
long-run economic progress, and limiting it unnecessarily will have major negative 
consequences for economic growth. History demonstrates that technology, 
telecommunications, and medicine are all areas where corporations struggled 
to raise capital from commercial banks as they were, while potentially lucrative, 
still unable to cover loan payments and pay the salaries of their employees at the 
same time. Financial innovation and the creation of specialized investment banks 
helped to circumvent these problems by creating new types of finance unknown to 
traditional commercial banks. Financial innovation can boost productivity, foster 
specialization, and lower transaction costs. It is equally true that financial innovation 
can be abused in a socially harmful way. One thing the regulators can do is not 
create regulations that encourage the creation of harmful financial innovation.32 
According to Avinash Persaud, it is extremely difficult and possibly even futile 
to try to trace the blame to any acting individuals or find accountability or grounds 
30 Joanna Gray, ‘Lawyers and systemic risk in finance: could (and should) the legal profession contribute to 
macroprudential regulation?’ (2016) 19(1) Legal Ethics 122.
31 David Kershaw, Richard Moorhead, ‘Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers 
and the Regulation of the Legal Profession’ (2013) 76(1) MLR 26.
32 Barth and others (n 29) 45–49.
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for restitution for even illegal activities for the same for any financial turmoil as 
morally wrong as it may feel.33 Similarly, Steven L Schwartz and Lucy Chang note 
that the risks and financial crises may be due to outdated customs. Criminalizing 
such custom let alone establishing a criminal intent in individual cases would be 
difficult and even questionable given that the effects, positive or negative, of a certain 
type of activity are unforeseeable.34 For example, market manipulation is a criminal 
offence and following the global financial crisis, the UK introduced new regulations 
making it a criminal offence for senior managers to cause a financial institution 
to fail. The intention of the changes can be seen as well-intentioned in the hope 
that they would curb privatized gains at the expense of the taxpayers. In practice, 
however, it can prove to be very hard to uncover a potential offence, let alone for 
an investigation leading to a conviction, due to the high threshold of certainty that 
must be met in any criminal proceedings. In finance, the obstacle is only exacerbated 
in a boom phase where individuals turn into a horde of people with a tendency to 
underestimate risks and especially the bust phase when there are many forces at 
play other than the action of individual managers.35 
The descriptive parts that indicated how to structure a transaction in a manner 
that renders laws and regulations meaningless are drawn from peer-reviewed legal 
journals, books written by the most eminent scholars and industry practitioners, 
and from publicly available industry publications from the 1960s onwards. To 
the author’s understanding, none of the cases of ‘financial engineering’, ‘legal 
innovation’, and ‘arbitrage’, and many other concepts that may generally raise 
suspicion among legal scholars, referred to in this research were in breach of any 
criminal law, civil law, or financial regulation. It might be that some were, but 
it is not the purpose of this research to investigate such occurrences. There is a 
multitude of existing research on these wrongdoings already. All the innovations 
from eurobonds to OTC derivatives were originally private constructs but their use 
was eventually encouraged by states and international organizations, even when 
it was risky from a legal standpoint to do so. In this legal environment, while still 
risky or perhaps even riskier than ever, market customs, practices, and transnational 
contracts evolved to something that is part of everyday financial transactions today. 
Transnational law does not mean advocation of one public policy over the other – 
unless one wishes to read it as such. 
33 Avinash Persaud, Reinventing Financial Regulation – A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk (Apress 
2015) 169–70; Martin Gelter, ‘Risk-shifting through issuer liability and corporate monitoring’ (2013) 14 
EBOR 497, noting the insufficient incentives for deterrence in securities fraud and discussing possible 
ways of promoting enhanced ways of monitoring this risk.
34 Steven L Schwartz, Lucy Chang, ‘The Custom-to-Failure Cycle’ (2012) 62 Duke Law Journal, 767, 787–88.
35 Persaud (n 33) 163–70, concluding that ‘[t]he grim reality is that we must place our greatest hope of 
moderating the behavior that lies behind financial crashes in the reinvention of financial regulation’.
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1.5 CONTENTS
Chapter 1 introduces the general concepts of transnational law and its evolutionary 
nature that derives from private normativity. Much research about transnational law 
and how since its inception transnational law has been about private normativity and 
law that does not originate from states. The argument is built futher in Chapter 2 that 
includes the theoretical foundations of the research. Transnational method is about 
acknowledging and identifying private normativity as a non-statist source of law that 
can be constructed in the form of a transnational legal order. Private normativity 
creates private regulatory mechanisms such as transnational contracts. As long as 
these private regulatory mechanisms do not violate local public policies reflected 
in national laws, the private rules they produce are generally enforceable and can 
be equated with state-enacted ‘hard’ law. The chapter includes a case-study on a 
transnational insolvency of a financial institution in the 1970s, which demonstrates 
how a transnational legal order can exist despite lacking state legislation and 
regulation on transnational insolvency. The same case study also demonstrates how 
this particular insolvency triggered the era of international financial regulation that 
would stimulate market behaviour, lead to financial engineering, and which would 
play an elemental role in the formation of the OTC derivatives market in the 1980s.
Chapter 3 revisits the pre-liberalization era on capital flows of the 1960s. This 
is because the transnationalisation of finance can be said to if not begun then 
rapidly accelerated at that time, about two decades before the emergence of the 
OTC derivatives market. Back then, the legal and regulatory environment was geared 
against cross-border capital flows. Public policies of states were prohibitive towards, 
or at the very least not facilitative for, cross-border capital movements. Yet, it was 
during this era when transnational prcosesses accelerated through the introduction 
of eurobonds, a type of debt security, and the eurodollar market, which gave rise 
to modern banking in an uncoordinated and unplanned manner. Transnational 
customary law ensued. In the 1980s, the eurobond market converged with the 
OTC derivatives market also in a process best described as being spontaneous in 
its development because no authority planned or could have planned or designed 
such a market.
Chapter 4 explains the nature of transnational contracts and how they form the 
modern lex mercatoria of finance through repeated interactions. Quite far from being 
secretive and unpenetrable for outsiders, these transnational contracts, private rules 
that market participants obey and interpret, have a long history of interacting with 
state laws, financial regulation, and national courts. The ISDA Master Agreement, 
by far the most used transnational contract in the OTC derivatives market, is 
governed by default either by English law or the laws of the state of New York and 
the jurisdiction English courts or the courts of the state of New York, respectively. 
13
The reasons for the popularity of these jurisdictions are summarized. A case study 
describes how not even a major breakdown of the OTC derivatives trading under 
English law was not enough to deter market participants from choosing English law 
and English courts as their choice of law and jurisdiction, respectively. Chapter 4 also 
describes the regulatory environment of the early days of the OTC derivatives market 
and lays out simple examples of how the most common types of OTC derivatives 
are structured and how they can lead to the erosion of existing financial regulation 
without necessarily any formal act of deregulation by states.
Chapter 5 describes how the trade organization ISDA and the ISDA Master 
Agreement came into existence and why, as well as analyzes the emergence and 
the evolution of bilateral close-out netting. Originally a mere contractual term, it 
soon evolved into a mandatory regulatory requirement for transnational financial 
institutions and, through this requirement, also for transnational corporations 
engaging in OTC derivatives trading. The chapter also includes a case-study of 
transnational private regulatory regime that played a pivotal role in the debt crisis 
of 2012 involving the sovereign default of the Hellenic Republic on its debt and 
eventually the whole future of the Euro currency area. Chapter 6 includes a summary 
and critical analysis of the regulatory framework of the OTC derivatives market after 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. A market once privately self-regulated 
through transnational contracts became regulated through transgovernmental 
cooperation. The regulatory framework has attracted much criticism in legal 
scholarship. Chapter 7 includes research findings and reflections on the research.
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2. TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF FINANCE
2.1 TRANSNATIONAL LAW IS ABOUT INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
Transnational law is about private normativity and the notion that enforceable 
contracts are one source of law. Transnational method is the legal theory that 
acknowledges, emphasises, and conceptualizes private normativity. Transnational 
law is not revolutionary but complementary in its nature. Transnational law is not 
to contradict but to complete other viewpoints by offering a conceptual framework 
for private normativity that demonstrably transcends state boundaries. 1 As noted 
by Jaakko Husa, historical dimension is valuable in studies on legal globalization as 
well as modern lex mercatoria. However, one needs to be careful in drawing parallels 
between the past and the present.2 Both in the past and in the present, market 
participants have relied and continue to rely on pre-existing public institutions. 
Private normative orders do not form independently from their surrounding 
societies.3 Spontaneously-created law operates in a legal framework or other type 
of order.4 
The existence of a purely independent, anational, spontaneous private legal 
order that would consist of a homogenous and universal merchant practice has 
been contested both in legal history as well as in contemporary legal research. 
An independent historical lex mercatoria applied uniformly in different merchant 
courts across Europe probably never existed during earlier times. There is evidence, 
however, of courts that could develop rules that were receptive to the needs of 
some merchants. Market participants have never operated independently in 
a transnational vacuum outside the reach of rulers, whether they were ancient 
kingdoms or modern nation states, but transnationalisation processes and private 
normativity are real. From the Maghribi traders of the Mediterranean in the 11th 
1 In this research, ‘state’ refers generally to all institutions of the nation state, structures of cooperation 
under public international law, local supranational arrangements such as the European Union, and 
transgovernmental actors such as the G20, unless otherwise defined where the context so requires.
2 Jaakko Husa, Advanced Introduction to Law and Globalisation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 78.
3 Amitai Aviram, ‘Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering’ (2014) Mich. St. L. Rev. 29.
4 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, The 
Transnationalisation of Commercial and Financial Law and of Commercial, Financial and Investment 
Dispute Resolution. The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources. Volume 1 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 154.
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century5 to the Champagne fairs in the 12th and 13th century6 and from the merchants 
in St. Ives of Medieval England,7 to the eurobonds and OTC derivatives markets,8 
market participants and local rulers interact, and contract enforcement is left for 
public authorities. 
Stephen E Sachs has concluded that no autonomous legal order consisting of 
merchant practice and mercantile customs has ever existed. Furthermore, attempts 
to regulate or even model international commerce with an argument supported 
by historical research suggesting otherwise simply has no historical foundation on 
which to build on. Rather than building on such romantic thesis, as Sachs coins it, 
evidence supports the view that ‘[l]ex mercatoria’ was a general phrase for whatever 
law was appropriate to mercantile transactions, not necessarily a term for a specific 
body of principles actually applied to them’.9 In contemporary finance, transnational 
contracts are a manifestation of the lex mercatoria and a source of law. 10 
Rulers can accommodate the desires and needs of merchants in addition to 
providing the necessary legal infrastructure for contract enforcement.11 Different 
5 Jeremy Edwards, Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: The Maghribi 
traders reappraised’ (2012) 65(2) Economic History Review 421, noting, 439, ‘Studies of Genoa, Florence, 
Germany, and the Netherlands thus all find merchants enforcing agency relations using reputation and 
informal sanctions within social networks’, but making the observation that agreements are enforced by 
local rulers: ‘In not a single case can private order enforcement of agency agreements through collective 
ostracism by a Maghribi coalition be observed in operation’.
6 Jeremy Edwards, Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘What lessons for economic development can we draw from the 
Champagne fairs?’ (2012) 49 Explorations in Economic History 131, summarizing, 132:
 The evidence shows that contract-enforcement at the fairs did not take the form of private-order or 
corporative mechanisms, but was provided by public institutions. More generally, the success and decline 
of the Champagne fairs depended, for good or ill, on the policies adopted by the public authorities.
7 Stephen E Sachs, ‘From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant’’ 
(2006) 21 Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 685; on historical lex mercatoria generally, Leon E Trakman, ‘A Plural 
Account of the Transnational Law Merchant’ (2011) 2 TLT, 309, 313–14; Emily Kadens, ‘Order within 
Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law’ (2004) 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 39, 
noting, 48: 
 To make their territory more attractive to astute merchants […] lords early on granted merchants certain 
privileges that made commerce in their lands less precarious and more remunerative. These privileges 
included safe-conducts, trading rights and protections, and extraordinary remissions of normal laws; Leon 
E Trakman, ‘The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage’ (1980) 12 J.Mar.L.& Com.
8 John Biggins, Colin Scott, ‘Public-private relations in a transnational private regulatory regime: ISDA, 
the state and OTC derivatives market reform’ (2012) 13 EBOR 309, discussing the very same topic as this 
research, although from a critical and prescriptive angle, 345:
 [t]he dominant transnational private regulatory body in the OTC derivatives markets, ISDA, has 
penetrated public legislative processes in order to enshrine safe harbours for OTC derivatives. These safe 
harbours have offered insulation from the full force of bankruptcy and gambling laws in the jurisdictions 
where they have been transposed to date.
9 Sachs (n 7) 788. 
10 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2nd edition, OUP 2015) para 15.14; Francesca C Villata, ‘Remarks on the 2012 Greek sovereign 
debt restructuring: between choice-of-law agreements and new EU rules on derivative instruments’ (2013) 
2 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 325, 348.
11 Charles C Donahue, Jr, ‘Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio 
Diabolica’ (2004) 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 21.
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governmental, civil society, and economic actors interact and influence each other, 
and through this process, normative values are capable of becoming institutionalized 
on a transnational level.12 Both common law and civil law provided a framework 
for private economic agents and contracts before modern notions of democracy.13 
Contracts and contracting practices, the historical lex mercatoria, and cross-
border trade precede notions of sovereignty of the state.14 Market participants act 
autonomously but not independently from their surrounding societies. 
2.2 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LEGAL POSITIVISM
As noted by Julie Dickson, scholars advocating the use of the concept of transnational 
law may have a tendency to only cursorily refer to more traditional state-based 
legal theoretical models that focus on black-letter laws typically the outcome of an 
electoral process. Based on a somewhat shallow analysis, they deem the latter to 
be somehow outdated and inadequate in explaining ‘novel’ legal phenomena. At 
a closer inspection, many of the phenomena are not novel and they can be placed 
into positivist theoretical frameworks.15 Newer entrants to scholarship may also 
claim that the established authors are misfocused on ‘systemic’ and ‘statist’ aspects 
of legal orders rendering their findings more or less useless for legal practice, and 
in any case, historically outmoded and too abstract.16 
This research does not focus on a comparative analysis between different schools 
of thought. Even with this limitation, the research could be read as an any legal 
theory claiming that law-creation is exclusive to a state. For this reason, some 
comparative remarks need to be made in order to steer away from unnecessary 
legal theoretical clashes. The exclusion of non-state law is perhaps characteristic of 
the more classical branch of legal positivism but also of its modern version.17 The 
paradigm that a centralized power in the 19th century was a nation state and in the 20th 
and 21st century has been more likely an international or supranational organization 
based on a treaty or a transgovernmental organization (discussed in subchapter 
6.1.7) which all derive their powers from nation states. These are the only legitimate 
12 Olaf Dilling, ‘From Compliance to Rulemaking: How Global Corporate Norms Emerge from Interplay with 
States and Stakeholders’ (2012) 13 German L.J. 381, 413–14.
13 Raouf Boucekkin, Fréderic Docquier, Fabien Ngendakuriyo, Henrik Schmigelow, ‘Contract Rules in Codes 
and Statutes: Easing Business Across the Cleavages of Legal Origins’ in Michèle Schmiegelow, Henrik 
Schmiegelow (eds), Institutional Competition between Common Law and Civil Law – Theory and Policy 
(Springer 2014) 44.
14 Husa (n 2) 78.
15 Julie Dickson, ‘Who’s afraid of transnational legal theory? Dangers and desiderata’ (2015) 6 TLT 565, 
568–69, 574.
16 Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, ‘Why teach legal theory today?’’ (2015) 16 German L.J. 781, 795–96.
17 Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality. Stateless Law and International Arbitration (OUP 2014) 73–74.
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source of law to which all other non-legal normative systems are subordinate to in 
a given territory, which remains paradigmatic. Attempts have been made to impose 
positivism and prescriptivism on transnational phenomena that simply do not fit 
into such categorizations.18 The argument against the existence of transnational 
law is extensive not to mention the scepticism towards it.19 As noted by Richard 
E Epstein, many who are against the existence of law merchant implicitly assume 
legal positivist theory. This research is not about resolving academic disputes, or 
in other words, ‘[w]e can let any reader choose the definition that he or she finds 
most congenial’.20 It is the exclusivity aspect of legal positivism that transnational 
method challenges, not the supremacy of state laws over transnational law.
To think of transnationalisation as an autonomous and spontaneous legal order 
based on nonstatist sources of law, such as contracts, may collide with two classical 
legal positivist taboos. Originally probably summarized by Gunther Teubner21 and 
further discussed by Klaus Peter Berger22 these taboos are: 
1. Private agreements cannot produce law without authorization or control 
by the states; and
2. Law cannot exist and cannot be applied beyond the realm of formal legal 
acts of a nation state without a ‘global rule of recognition’.
In finance, state control comes largely from enforceability of contracts, and the 
contracting parties are largely free to choose which laws govern their contracts. They 
cannot, however, override local public policy requirements with contracts since then 
the contract risks becoming unenforceable. According to Jan Dalhuisen, there is no 
grundnorm à la Hans Kelsen nor is there a ‘global rule of recognition’ à la HLA Hart 
18 Roderick A MacDonald, ‘When Lenders Have Too Much Cash and Borrowers Have Too Little Law – The 
Emergence of Secured Transactions Transnational Legal Orders’ in Terence C Halliday, Gregory Shaffer 
(eds), Transnational Legal Orders (CUP 2015) 114, 126. 
19 David Charny, ‘Illusions of a spontaneous order: ‘norms’ in contractual relationships’ (1995–1996) 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1841.
20 Richard A Epstein, ‘Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of the Law Merchant’ 
(2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law, 1, 3:
 The persons who deny the independent existence of the Law Merchant are those who adopt, often 
implicitly, some version of the Austinian theory that marks law as a general command of the sovereign.
21 Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Gunther Teubner (ed) 
Global Law Without a State (Brookfield 1997) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=896478> accessed 1 June 
2019; Gunther Teubner, ‘Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law’ (2000) 9 Social and 
legal studies 399, 402. Teubner, while highly critical of the phenomena, does acknowledge the existence of 
lex mercatoria similarly as it is understood in this research: 
 ‘Lex mercatoria and other types of rules are basically law without the state. They are the product of a 
number of highly specialized governance regimes that develop autonomous political and legal orders 
independently from the law of the nation state and public international law.’
22 Klaus Peter Berger, ‘The new law merchant and the global market: a 21st century view of transnational 
commercial law’ (2000) 3 Int.A.L.R. 91.
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in transnational law, but this poses no academic problem.23 Marcelo Dias Varella 
describes the issue of transnational private norms from a traditional positivist 
viewpoint. Private norms such as contracts are an exercise or manifestation of private 
autonomy. The state remains central in producing law as well as in recognition 
and enforcement of private contracts. Since private norms emerge independently 
from states, and the state does not participate nor legitimate their creation, they 
do not qualify as law. The problem is that private autonomy, transnational private 
norms, and normativity exist regardless of their legal theoretical characterization, 
and thus ‘The Kelsenian pyramid vision and Hart’s rule of recognition do not explain 
contemporary legal phenomenon’.24 Transnational law, both private normativity 
and legal theory studying private normativity, is an anomaly not easily explained 
nor fitted into positivist legal theoretical framework. At worst, attempts to impose 
positivist notions on transnational law may potentially lead to unnecessarily 
complicated explanations.25 Transnational law, in its original meaning combining 
the idea of plan-less character and the evolution of law and legal pluralism, may 
offer an analytical framework to overcome such problems. 
It is worth noting that many state laws equate private contract explicitly with 
law. Through this explicit authorization, contracts can produce law. For example, 
the codification of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the US was to allow a 
non-temporal creation of lex mercatoria by adding ‘usage’ in addition to ‘custom’.26 
The eligibility for contracts being treated as ‘customary law’ requires that custom 
has developed over time, maybe immemorial in its use, and state recognition, in 
order to qualify as law. Adding ‘usage’, which did not impose such requirement, to 
the UCC allowed for a more spontaneous law creation to take place.27 The French 
23 JH Dalhuisen, ‘Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and 
Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria’ (2006) 24(1) Berk J Intl 129, 168.
24 Marcelo Dias Varella, Internationalization of Law Globalization, International Law and Complexity 
(Springer-Verlag 2014) 252–53.
25 ibid 343:
 [t]he terms constitutionalization of international law, global democracy, participation, or representation 
still do not make much sense on a global scale, except when their meaning is substantially altered. Such a 
change of meaning to fit into a specific category is not justified, serving only to cause confusion.
26 UCC § 1–103
 (a) The Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies, which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and 
agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
 (b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and 
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or 
invalidating cause supplement its provisions. (emphasis added).
27 Cristián Gimenez Corte, ‘Lex Mercatoria, International Arbitration and Independent Guarantees: 
Transnational Law and How Nation States Lost the Monopoly of Legitimate Enforcement’ (2012) 3 TLT 
345, 354–55.
19
Civil Code also equates explicitly private contracts with law.28 In the EU, Rome I 
Regulation allows parties to incorporate ‘by reference into their contract a non-
State body of law or an international convention’.29 While the existence of this 
non-State body of law is recognized in Rome I Regulation, such non-State body of 
law is still subject to state law including lex contractus, that is, the law applicable 
to the assessment of the rights and obligations arising from the contract, lex fori, 
thus the law of the court in which the action is brought, or the overriding mandatory 
provisions ‘crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests’ under Article 
9 of Rome I Regulation.30 
Perhaps the characterization by H Patrick Glenn can capture the ontology of 
state as a legal and normative tradition based on accumulated information.31 If the 
accumulated information suggests that state law is exclusive in its nature, there is no 
room for the conception that private contract is, or equals, law. Tradition prohibits 
it, if nothing else, and transnational contracts can facilitate compliance with local 
legislation reflecting these traditions as discussed in Chapter 4. Transnational legal 
studies, in turn, are, and have been since the 1960s familiar and comfortable with the 
idea of law originating from private sources, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, typically 
arising from contracts which can become transnationalised as further described 
in Chapter 5. Under certain circumstances, private actors can spontaneously or 
through intentional acts create laws that transcend state boundaries.32 Emmanuel 
Gaillard suggested already in the mid-1990s that the expression of lex mercatoria 
is there to challenge the notion of exclusive state law:
28 C. Civ. art. 1134 (74e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1974–75) (Fr.), ‘Agreements lawfully entered into take the 
place of the law for those who have made them’, English translation by Georges Rouhette, Anne Rouhette-
Berton <https://legifrance.gouv.fr> accessed 1 June 2019.
29 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16, recital (13) (emphasis added).
30 ibid Article 9; Villata (n 10) 348.
31 H Patrick Glenn, ‘The State as Legal tradition’ (2013) 2(4) C.J.I.C.L. 704, 708–14, describing transnational 
private regulation as ‘often industry specific and industry-created, accepted by the state when it has no 
effective instruments of its own to deal effectively with the regulation required’, 714, n 31; Ariel Meyerstein 
‘Transnational private financial regulation and sustainable development: an empirical assessment of the 
implementation of the equator principles’ (2012–2013) 45 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 487, claiming that 
private transnational regulations are ‘direct responses to a series of missed opportunities by state actors to 
collectively create effective regimes of global international business regulation’ 528. 
32 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and 
Society 20, noting the important role of private trade associations such as ISDA as de facto regulators of 
their members; Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘The many features of transnational private rule-making: unexplored 
relationships between custom, jura mercatorum and global private regulation’ (2014–2015) 36 U. Pa. 
J. Int’l L. 875, noting that such private regulators work in collaboration rather than in competition with 
public regulators, 890–92. This collaboration extends to public financial regulators who, in turn, can 
be claimed to have an impulse towards collaboration rather than domination, and who, in their former 
capacity, can facilitate already existing market practices, Annelise Riles, Collateral knowledge: legal 
reasoning in the global financial markets (University of Chicago 2011) 106–08.
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[B]y suggesting that it is necessary to have rules specifically tailored 
to the merchant community, the use of the expression lex mercatoria 
seems to imply that domestic legal systems are inadequate for the 
purposes of regulating international commercial relationships.33 
The history of eurobonds, the rise of central securities depositories as well as the 
spontaneous development witnessed in the OTC derivatives market suggests that 
national laws can be inadequate in many respects from the viewpoint of transnational 
actors, including states and market participants. This is why there was a demand for 
rules specifically tailored to the transnational community, again, both public and 
private. The local legislation enacted in the 1960s and early 1970s in the Netherlands 
and Belgium imitated equity, a branch of English law, concept of trust but they were 
a unique creation borne out of supply and demand for a certain type of state law that 
would enhance legal certainty. Soon afterwards, technological advancement in the 
form of book-entry securities rendered these national laws outdated. What followed 
was the transnationalisation of book-entry securities into transnational customary 
law. Later on, in the 1980s, national insolvency laws were deemed inadequate by 
both private market participants as well as international regulators. They both saw 
a demand for ensuring the legal enforceability of bilateral close-out netting clauses 
used in the OTC derivatives market on public policy grounds as further discussed 
in Chapter 5.
2.3 LAW AND ECONOMICS ON PRIVATE NORMATIVITY
Law and economics tell that parallel normative networks co-exist, evolve, and 
interact; and that private norms may require but are not necessarily dependant 
on institutional support from a centralized power, were that power church, king, or 
parliament. Game theory acknowledges that repeated interaction between members 
of a small group can create a stable customary order. Within the sphere of this 
customary order, communication between its members serves as a governance 
scheme that also sets a sanctioning mechanism for non-compliance. The observations 
made by Robert D Cooter on the evolution and efficiency of social norms are as 
relevant as ever. Norms emerge from repeated interactions, and these norms can 
be imposed upon the members of a community. It is self-interest through which 
these norms are enforced privately. State courts can enforce these private norms, 
33 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of Transnational 
Rules’ (1995) 10 ICSID Review 208, 209.
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and through this, increase their efficiency. Backed by the coercive power of states, 
these social norms can be elevated to a level of law through courts.34 
According to Bryan H Druzin, it is even possible, at least theoretically, to 
intentionally cultivate the process of private normativity and to create a customary 
order. This can be achieved through creating an environment where a small group 
can enter into repeated interactions.35 The key element in understanding the creation 
of private norms lies in repeated interaction, in economic terms equilibrium 
convention, that leads to internalized belief that ‘[t]hese practice are considered 
necessary for social well-being and are treated as proper legal custom, often 
entering the legal system as primary sources of law’ as summarized by Francesco 
Parisi.36 Internationalization processes may not be yet fully-known.37 Spontaneous 
development of private legal systems occurs in phases and the ability of such systems 
to regulate the behavior of its members takes time.38 In order to be enforceable, 
customary rules evolved in trade need to fulfil a quantitative requirement and a 
qualitative element. It depends on the legal system on how long it takes for customary 
rules and usages to become enforceable. Generally, enforceability requires that 
customs and usages represent a socially desirable or necessary social conduct.39 The 
history of eurobonds and bilateral close-out netting is much about the evolution 
and transformation of market practices into transnational customary law.
2.4 STATE ACTORS ARE MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
Market participants of any given market surely recognize the existence of rules of 
conduct and the benefits of adhering to them. One important source of such rules 
of conduct can be found from transnational contracts. Market activity can also 
create a demand for certain type of state law that recognizes the rules of any given 
particular market. It can even reshape a whole financial regulatory framework in 
interaction with international organizations as discussed in Chapter 5. However, it 
is important to note that ‘market participants’ should be understood broadly as to 
include both private and public entities. States have many roles in finance in that 
34 Robert D Cooter, ‘Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law’ 
(1994) 14 International Review of law and Economics 215, 226. 
35 Bryan H Druzin, ‘Planting Seeds of Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use Customary Law’ 
(2014) Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 373 <https://works.bepress.com/bryan_
druzin/13/> accessed 1 June 2019.
36 Francesco Parisi, ‘Spontaneous emergence of law: customary law’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert, Gerrit de Geest 
(eds), Encyclopedia of Law & Economics Vol. 5 (Edward Elgar 2000) 603, 604.
37 Dalhuisen (n 23) 166.
38 Amitai Aviram, ‘A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems’ (2004) 22 
YLPR 1 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=421500> accessed 1 June 2019.
39 Parisi (n 36) 605–06.
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they act both as regulators and market participants. The phenomena examined is not 
new. It remains true that ‘[a] very high degree of global contractual standardization 
and consensus as to appropriate market practice was achieved by the early 1980s’. 
States were actively involved in the transnationalisation of finance both in their 
capacity as market participants as well as its public facilitators.40
States finance their operations in the very same financial markets, use the 
same financial products transactions, and trade with the same private entities 
they seek to regulate41 and may use the same transnational contracts as discussed 
in subchapter 5.2.6. In addition, states themselves are often the very owners of 
transnational corporations that transcend state boundaries in many ways and 
which are further discussed in subchapter 3.3.1.42 It is important to note, also in 
legal theory, the multitude of roles that states have and its impact on the creation 
and evolution of transnational law.43 As the evidence from the eurobond market in 
the 1960s and further along the line the OTC derivatives market that emerged in 
the 1980s demonstrates, nation states have often been the facilitators and catalysts 
of transnational law. 
Law and finance interact, and transnational legal theory can help to identify 
how and why they interact. This may bring practice and theory closer to each other. 
Currently, legal practice and academic work are unfortunately seen as separate 
and remote from each other.44 Both can be said to suffer from state-centric views 
lacking the intellectual framework for understanding transnational modern lex 
mercatoria and its operation.45
40 Joanna Benjamin, David Rouch, ‘The international financial markets as a source of global law: the 
privatisation of rule-making?’ (2008) 2 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 78, 78–80.
41 Stephen Kim Park, Tim R Samples, ‘Towards Sovereign Equity’ (2015–2016) 21 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 240, 
277: W Mark C Weidemaier, Anna Gelpern, ‘Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation’ (2014) 31 (1) Yale 
Journal on Regulation 189, 190, ‘[c]ourts can inconvenience sovereigns; they cannot make them pay’; for a 
contractual analysis of the wave of sovereign defaults in the early 1980s, Anthony Mauger, ‘Sovereign debt 
restructuring: the practical background’ (1986) 1 J.I.B.L. 100.
42 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Andrew Inkpen, Aldo Musacchio, ‘Governments as owners: State-owned 
multinational companies’ (2014) 45 Journal of International Business Studies, 919. In 2011, 19 of the 
largest transnational corporations out of 100 were owned by states, UNCTAD 2011, ‘World investment 
report 2011’, 28, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development <http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
43 For the privileges and immunities of states and the tensions they bring to the market, Stephen Kim Park, 
‘Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating State-Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance’ 
(2014) 16 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 739, 786–87.
44 Sarah Paterson, Rafal Zakrzewski (eds), McKnight, Paterson and Zakrzewski on the Law of International 
Finance (2nd edition, OUP 2017) xi. 
45 Dalhuisen (n 23) 135.
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2.5 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND  
TRANSNATIONAL LAW
The system of rules in private international law (or in common law countries, 
conflicts of law) revolves around questions such as which law is applied in a legal 
situation where there is a cross-border element. Following these rules, a local 
judiciary is faced with essentially three questions. First the court is to decide whether 
it has the competence to hear the case (the question of jurisdiction). Second, if the 
court has the competence, it has to decide what law is applicable to the case (the 
governing law question). Third, the question may be whether a foreign judgment 
can be enforced by a domestic court.46 These are factors in any finance transaction 
involving a cross-border element. Finance is, from a legal standpoint, ultimately 
about the enforceability of contracts in a court. However, private international law 
offers little direction as to how the black-letter law itself came into existence. In 
finance, the origins are in private normativity. 
Transnational law touches upon private international law and conflict of laws 
through transnational contracts that seek to provide a contractual answer to 
problems that are settled with private contractual mechanisms. It is well established, 
as noted by Georges GR Delaume, that through contractual drafting, the terms and 
conditions of the contract can delocalize a transaction to a degree that transnational 
contracts are capable of ‘transcending not only the borders of several countries, 
but also the confines of their economies and their legal systems’.47 The stipulation 
of applicable law and forum can ‘considerably reduce the chance of controversies 
between the contracting parties or at the very least make the outcome of possible 
disputes reasonably predictable’. Trade usages and accumulated experience 
manifested in transnational contracts co-exist and supplement domestic laws but 
‘cannot be expected to eliminate altogether the application of those rules’. 48 Instead 
of arguing in a court or in arbitration, the parties can restructure a transaction, 
typically by rescheduling repayments and then refinancing the maturities of existing 
borrowings.49 Generally, arguing is costly and if market participants can avoid it, 
they generally will. In doing so, as behavioural economics tells us, private parties 
are capable of creating spontaneously private governance mechanisms that can 
substitute as well as complement public governance mechanisms.50 
46 Paul Sebastianutti, ‘What is This Thing Called International Financial Law – Part 2’ (2009) 3 Law & Fin. 
Mkt. Rev. 155, 156.
47 Georges GR Delaume, Law and practice of transnational contracts (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1988) 98.
48 ibid 98–101.
49 P Durand-Barthez, ‘The “governing law” clause: legal and economic consequences of the choice of law in 
international contracts’ (2012) 5 I.B.L.J. 505, 514.
50 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Institutional change in globalization: transnational commercial law from an 
evolutionary economics perspective’ (2008) 9 German L.J. 411, 423–24.
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2.6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW IS ABOUT ACKNOWLEDGING 
BOTTOM-UP LAW MAKING 
Much of the ‘hard law’ in finance has transnational origins and is thus the outcome 
of bottom-up law-making processes from financial collateral to bilateral close-out 
netting. Finance and law interact, and we do not have the foresight on this evolution. 
For example, should one have started to write about financial regulation governing 
the OTC derivatives market in 2007, almost everything would have had to been 
rewritten in 2009 given changes in the regulatory frameworks. Research is often too 
late to address urgent public policy questions.51 Transnational contracts with their 
highly technical terms and conditions are obviously the end-product of conscious 
design. The spontaneous and often unknown element is in the evolution of these 
contracts, or more specifically, the financial instruments they govern. No one could 
have known what the first eurobond issue in 1963 could have led to in terms of 
technological and legal innovations that came with it. Nor could anyone have known 
the impact of the first interest rate swap executed in 1984 on the eurobond market 
and local exchange controls seeking to control cross-border capital movements. No 
one could have predicted the private regulatory mechanisms that the first credit 
default swap, designed and executed in 1994, would eventually give rise to. Nor 
would anyone have predicted the evolution of private governance mechanisms and 
the decisive role they would play close to two decades later in perhaps the largest 
financial turmoil ever witnessed when the Hellenic Republic defaulted on its debt.
Transnational law as a theory is the ‘fourth category of law’ alongside national, 
private international, and public international law. Transnational law evolves and 
transcends states through private ordering, social convenience, and non-legal 
conventions.52 Private norms and state-made law interact, as Bo Yuan notes when 
summarizing earlier findings made in law and economics:
[t]he interaction between social and legal norms can diminish their 
differences and creates a common basis for them to complement each 
other in guiding individuals’ behaviour and maintaining social order.53
51 Henry T Hu, ‘Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism’ (1993) 102 (6) Yale Law Journal, 1457, 1499: 
 [T]he ephemeral nature of financial truths would not be problematic for regulators if, consistent with the 
openness norm, knowledge of new theoretical developments spread quickly to regulators. Unfortunately, 
this is unlikely to be the case with much of the relevant financial science. The refereed academic journal, 
the primary source for the spread of new theoretical knowledge in science, is not a timely regulatory tool.
52 Lars Klohn, ‘Transnational financial markets regulation – a conference’ (2010) 11 E.B.O.R. 
53 Bo Yuan, ‘A Law and Economics Approach to Norms in Transnational Commercial Transactions: 
Incorporation and Internalisation’ (2016) 9 Erasmus L. Rev. 5, 8.
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Further, private norms can evolve into legal norms through ‘incorporation process 
[which] reflects a bottom-up approach to law-making, through which selected social 
norms become more coercive and systematic’.54 To further elaborate what bottom-up 
law-making means, Christián Gimenez Corte uses independent contract guarantees 
as an example of this phenomena. 55 Janet Koven Levit notes that there can be a 
great many legitimacy and accountability problems in law made bottom-up. She 
concludes: 
[t]o embrace bottom-up lawmaking, or cosmopolitanism, is not to 
condemn well worn international law paradigms-those rooted in the 
state-as legal relics left to fossilize. It is merely to recognize that they 
alone do not tell the whole story and to offer a more complex, more 
nuanced, and multidimensional view of law.56 
This is exactly the argument put forward also in this research. Analyzing transnational 
contracts from the point of state laws and regulations will tell little about how 
the over-the-counter derivatives market actually operates. Transnational method 
offers a more complex, nuanced, and multidimensional answer to the question 
what transnational law is. According to Husa, such conceptions on transnational 
law are not even ‘fundamentally radical because they do not gravely challenge the 
centrality of the state’ even while accommodating the idea that transnational legal 
phenomen are real.57 Perhaps the radical claim is that transnational law, as a way 
of looking at law, does not challenge the centrality of the state at all per se. 
Transnational law emphasizes the importance of understanding the underlying 
transnationalisation processes which emerge from bottom-up law making. 
Transnational law holds an eclectic meaning, in that it can incorporate mixtures 
from different research areas. The benefit of eclecticism, as noted by Henry TC 
Hu, is that it can bring researchers closer to important findings made in other 
54 ibid 9.
55 Gimenez Corte (n 27) 367: 
 [w]ith the incorporation of independent contract guarantees into the interplay between the substantive 
lex mercatoria and international commercial arbitration, this transnational law has detached itself from 
national and international laws, and has thus become a truly autonomous transnational law system, 
independent of both national and international law; 
 DV Snyder, ‘Private Lawmaking’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 371, arguing that a significant amount 
of law is privately made and how also such laws can be made subject to the same kinds of standards as 
state-made law; Janet Koven Levit, ‘Bottom-up lawmaking through a pluralist lens: The ICC banking 
commission and the transnational regulation of letters of credit’ (2007–2008) 57 Emory L.J. 1147; Janet 
Koven Levit, ‘A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance 
Instruments’ (2005) 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 125.
56 Janet Koven Levit, ‘A cosmopolitan view of bottom-up transnational law making: the case of export credit 
insurance’ (2005) 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1193 (emphasis added). 
57 Husa (n 2) 35.
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disciplines.58 For this reason, this research relies on findings made in legal theory, 
legal history, and law and economics in describing what bottom-up law-making 
is. Stepan Wood and others have emphasized the demand for various theoretical 
approaches that could shed light on and capture the dynamics of, among others, 
market participants and states.59 In contract law:
[T]he constant and widespread repetition of this method of negotiating 
and drafting contracts, and the reiteration of this practice of 
incorporating similar clause types into similar contract types, began to 
generate usages of trade and commercial customary usages.60 
This type of contractual standardization may occur in the absence of any central 
legislative authority ‘in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion with specific reference 
to law of a commercial nature’ following the concept of network effect used in 
economics. Put simply, it refers to the effect of that the more users a good or service, 
or a language, has, the more valuable it becomes.61 Much of what is said about 
transnational contracts can be attributed to this phenomen as further discussed 
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
The study of private normativity and its interaction with states has been the object 
of scholarly interest also under the concept of transnational business governance. As 
Burkard Eberlein and others have described, the emergence of private normativity 
is a creation of supply and demand. First, typically driven by business itself to reduce 
transaction costs and second, through evolution, to reduce negative externalities 
the business may create. This evolution can lead to the development of industry 
best practices, codes of conduct, and other transnational arrangements that do not 
originate from states. The self-governance of business is typically the outcome of non-
national processes involving heterogenous actors from individual technical experts 
to large business entities which may or may not interact with government agencies.62 
Transnational contracts do not originate from states. As noted by Peer Zumbansen, 
lawyers are required to understand and appreciate the relevance of highly specialized 
58 Henry TC Hu, ‘Systemic Risk and Financial Innovation – Toward a “Unified” Approach’ in Joseph G 
Haubrich, Andrew W Lo (eds), Quantifying systemic risk (University of Chicago Press 2013) 15.
59 Stepan Wood, Kenneth W Abbott, Julia Black, Burkard Eberlein, Errol Meidinger, ‘The interactive 
dynamics of transnational business governance: A challenge for transnational legal theory’ (2015) 6 TLT 
333.
60 Gimenez Corte (n 27) 353, n 23.
61 Bryan H Druzin, ‘Towards a Theory of Spontaneous Legal Standardisation’ (2016) J.I.D.S. 1, 2.
62 Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger, Stepan Wood, ‘Transnational 
business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis’ (2014) 8 Regulation & 
Governance.
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and technical areas and their norms central to different governance regimes, both 
public and private.63 
Some legal theories may have difficulties identifying private normativity and 
the role and power that transnational contracts possess. Sandeep Gopalan argues: 
Functionalism, liberal theories, and realism have serious limitations in 
explaining the design of international commercial agreements. These 
theories assume that states are the primary actors, that law is binding 
and non-excludable, and that soft law is inferior to hard law. None of 
these assumptions apply to transnational commercial law.64 
The same could be said about the transnational law of the OTC derivatives 
market. Private market participants were and are the primary actors in the OTC 
derivatives market, state law is binding but in can be asked which state law applies 
to transnational arrangements, and transnational law is not inferior but different 
in its ontology in comparison to state law. ‘Soft-law’ is a problematic concept that 
cannot be discussed further in this research.65 However, it is noted that discussion 
and disputes around the definition of ‘soft-law’ seem to suffer from the same kind 
of definitional disputes that hinder the discussion on factual and observable legal 
phenomena that demonstrably transcend the borders of states. It could be that 
especially Chapter 6 on transgovernmental organizations could contribute to this 
discussion.
Fabien Gelinas notes how both private and public entities operate in a 
transnational normative universe that is not based on public international law nor 
private international law:
They are actors in a normative universe that is real but that transcends 
some of the traditional legal categories. This universe generates 
customs, and those customs give meaning to and govern agreements 
that would otherwise seem adrift on uncharted seas.66
What is known is that bilateral close-out netting existed in contract and generated a 
transnational custom in the OTC-derivatives market and gave particular meaning to 
the relevance of the ISDA Master Agreement architecture. Contract standardization, 
63 Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Ins and Outs of Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Legitimacy, 
Accountability, Effectiveness and a New Concept of “Context” 13 (12) German L.J. 1269, 1278–79.
64 Sandeep Gopalan, ‘A demandeur-centric approach to regime design in transnational commercial law’ 
(2007–2008) 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 327, 379 (emphasis added).
65 Harri Kalimo, Tim Staal, ‘“Softness” in international instruments: the case of transnational corporations’ 
(2014–2015) 42 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 363, 384–391.
66 Fabien Gélinas, ‘Arbitration as transnational governance by contract’ (2016) TLT 1, 9.
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the spontaneous development of shared language of lawyers, and the role that 
private market participants play in the creation of transnational contracts was 
witnessed already in the eurobond market in the late 1960s.67 It could be argued 
that the purpose of transnational contracts is also to ensure adherence to any actual 
and even possibly applicable laws and regulations of states to any given financial 
transaction. Further, transnational contracts capture the ontology of transnational 
finance, transform it into legal language, and conceptualize the phenomena. They 
form the observable element of the modern lex mercatoria of finance. In the words of 
Corte, ‘[t]o understand the nature of the lex mercatoria it is necessary to understand 
how these [international] contract practices have contributed to its development’.68 
This is what Chapters 4 and 5 are focused on.
The argument put forward by Nicola Dalla Guarda is that states may not 
change their traditional legal paradigms and political tools to address transnational 
problems. To the contrary, states stay allegiant to their old ways even if this allegiance 
is the reason why public policy responses might not work or be ineffective against 
‘denationalized threats operating in a borderless environment’.69 It would seem that 
Guarda is speaking of ‘historical path dependence’ or some very similar phenomena 
discussed further in subchapter 2.9.2.
2.7 CONTRACT AS A PRIVATE REGULATORY MECHANISM
The existence of transnational contracts is an empirically verifiable fact as is the 
normative force they hold. Private regulatory mechanisms exist in many different 
business sectors. They are a form of self-regulatory rules that can operate 
independently from states,70 can be adopted, implemented, and enforced outside 
any formal context of delegation,71 and, if and more likely, when the private 
mechanisms are made subject to public regulation, such governance structures 
are likely created between private actors and international and intergovernmental 
organizations without even the need for states’ legislative intermediation.72 In this 
67 Norbert Horn, ‘A Uniform Approach to Eurobond Agreements’ (1977) 9 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 753, 759, 
762–63, 773; the language barrier between lawyers and professionals from other disciplines can be still 
considerable, Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012), 
paras 2–30–31.
68 Gimenez Corte (n 27) 354–55.
69 Nicola Dalla Guarda, ‘Governing the Ungovernable: International Relations, Transnational Cybercrime 
Law, and the Post-Westphalian Regulatory State’ (2015) 6 TLT 211, 241.
70 Tony Porter, Karsten Ronit, ‘Implementation in International Business Self-regulation: The Importance of 
Sequences and their Linkages’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 413.
71 Deirde Curtin, Linda Senden, ‘Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: Chimera or 
Reality’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 163, 164, also claiming that attempts to make these private 
mechanisms somehow more democratic is naïve.
72 Cafaggi (n 32, 2011) 21.
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research, transnational contracts are also referred to as a form of private regulatory 
mechanism, alongside the private trade organizations that create them, since they 
fulfil these characteristics.
‘Private regulatory mechanism’ is a useful term for the purposes of this research. 
Perhaps it is useful to summarize some of the central findings of the latter Chapters 
of this research already at this point. Bilateral close-out netting was originally a self-
regulatory rule that could be read in black-and-white from transnational contracts. 
It was adopted by market participants voluntarily into their respective contracts 
without any formal context of delegation from states. From early on, OTC derivative 
transactions were subject to governance structures created in interaction between 
private market participants and a international organization, the Basel Committee, 
first without at least direct state intermediation. The enforceability of bilateral close-
out netting evolved from being a market practice into a public policy issue. States 
facilitated the use of bilateral close-out netting by enhancing legal certainty over 
its enforceability in national legal orders. What began as bottom-up law making 
by private market participants, ended up in top-down regulation bt international 
organisations, then legislation by states and, post-global financial crisis (GFC), 
regulations of transgovernmental organizations. 
According to Gralf-Peter Calliess and others, several case studies suggest that 
the trend towards private regulatory mechanisms is accelerating globally. Private 
governance may produce the normative good of legal certainty on its own both 
for international and domestic transactions. Private regimes do not take over the 
responsibilities of states but simply take the operational and regulatory role for the 
purposes of producing legal certainty in areas where legislation and public regulation 
is more or less absent. Transnational private regimes and their fostering by states 
are an essential part of the evolution of governance that can be fostered through 
non-intervention or affirmative regulation.73 Transnational private actors such as 
ISDA play an important part not only in the creation of private regulation but often 
is an elemental part of the processes leading to public regulation.74 One illustrating 
example of the power of private trade organizations is that they draft model laws 
for states to implement if they wish to do so.75 Private regulatory mechanisms, both 
73 Gralf-Peter Calliess, Thomas Dietz, W Konradi, H Niewswandt, F Sosa, ‘Transformations of Commercial 
Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for Globalized Exchange Processes?’ in Achim Hurrelmann, Stephan 
Leibfried, Kerstin Martens, Peter Mayer (eds), Transforming the golden age nation state (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007) 83, 100–02. 
74 Gabriel V Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein, ‘Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC 
Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform’ (2013–2014) 54 Va. J. Int’l L. 9; 
Stephen M Maurer, ‘Public Problems, Private Answers: Reforming Industry Self-Governance Law for the 
21st Century’ (2013–2014) 12 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 297. 
75 John Biggins, Colin Scott ‘Licensing the Gatekeeper? Public Pathways, Social Significance and the ISDA 
Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees’ (2015) 6 TLT, 370, referring to the ‘Model Netting Act’ 
published by ISDA, 379–80, n 59. Currently, this privately created Act is in its 2018 version <https://
www.isda.org/2018/10/16/isda-publishes-updated-model-netting-act/> accessed 1 June 2019.
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the ISDA Master Agreement architecture as well as a private committee, played an 
elemental role in the sovereign default with the largest repercussions perhaps ever 
witnessed as discussed in subchapter 5.10.3.
According to Kathryn Collard, it would be even advisable for public financial 
regulators to co-regulate the OTC derivatives market together with a private trade 
organization, ISDA, a trade organization which has regulated the OTC derivatives 
market privately through contract since the 1980s.76 Private regulatory mechanisms 
can bind private and public organizations alike.77 Taking into consideration that 
regulating the OTC derivatives market from top-down, without decisive input from 
the private sector, indeed brings many problems. It cannot be ruled out that Collard’s 
suggestion might one day become reality out of practical necessity. A simplified 
categorization might be useful to explain the interactions between private regulatory 
regimes and states. States can interact with private norms on three levels: 1) they 
can choose to recognize and ignore private norms; 2) incorporate private norms 
into state legislation; or 3) by recognizing a private body as the regulator.78 ISDA, 
for example, has thus far operated mainly at the first two of these levels79 although 
this could be an understatement considering the role it has in this market.
It is worthwhile to note that private regulatory mechanisms can complement or 
even displace arbitration, a traditional discussion area also for transnational law. 
For example, the Panel of Recognised International Market Experts in Finance 
(P.R.I.M.E.) offers a private mediation service. P.R.I.M.E. focuses on disputes 
concerning particularly complex financial transactions that typically involve 
derivatives and which require the interpretation of the ISDA MA architecture. The 
goal of the mediation proceedings is to reach a settlement agreement between 
disputing parties80 possibly in an expedited and less-costly procedure than other 
types of dispute resolutions.81 The current legal uncertainty surrounding the 
regulatory framework applicable to OTC derivatives market and the very possibility 
of a regulatory collision may well create a demand for such mediation services 
76 Kathryn Collard, ‘Advantages of a co-regulatory OTC derivatives regime’ (2014–2015) 46 Geo. J. Int’l L. 
877.
77 Barnabas Reynolds, Ellerina Teo, ‘Early Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) Experiences: 
Lessons Learned from Greece’ (2016) 31 J.I.B.L.R. 2016, 359, 361; Mark Jewett, ‘Approaches to Sovereign 
Debt Resolution: Recent Developments’ (2015) 30 B.F.L.R. 311; Rainer Kulms, ‘Private creditors and 
sovereign default: from Argentina to Greece’ (2012) Annals Fac. L. Belgrade Int’l Ed 65; RM Auerback, 
‘Sovereign debt – default and restructuring of debts owed to private creditors’ (2003) 18 J.I.B.L.R. 2003 
440. 
78 Lawrence A Cunningham, ‘Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of 
Accounting’, (2005) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 291. 
79 Rauterberg, Verstein (n 74) n 8, 24.
80 Camilla J Meijer, ML Perera-de Wit, ‘P.R.I.M.E. Finance: A New Dispute Resolution Facility for Conflicts 
Relating to Complex Financial Products’ (2013) 14 No. 2 Bus. L. Int’l 153; Piergiuseppe Pusceddu, 
‘Mediation of international financial disputes’ (2015) 30 J.I.B.L.R. 661, 666–70.
81 Peter Cresswell, Stuart Dutson, Conor Redmond, ‘Towards an expedited and cost-effective arbitration 
award in financial services disputes’ (2016) 82 Arbitration 306.
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such as those offered by P.R.I.M.E.82 The evolution may even be leading towards 
private regulatory mechanisms that do not touch upon state institutions at all but 
which operate independently. 
2.8 LEGAL RISK IN FINANCE
According to Alaistair Hudson, who describes the role of derivatives lawyer 
essentially as being that of managers of legal risk which also this research is much 
about, ‘Our roles as lawyers is not to think ourselves above or beyond the law, but 
rather to understand how finance and law interact’.83 States and public regulators 
are one risk factor in finance. Since legal risk affects the dynamics and interactions 
between different normativities, it is useful to explore the concept in some detail 
also in legal theory. The European Central Bank defines legal risk as follows:
[t]he risk of a loss being incurred on account of the unexpected 
application of a law or regulation, or because a contract cannot be 
enforced. This often manifests itself in an unforeseen interpretation 
of either the system’s contractual basis or the legislation on which the 
contracts between the parties are based – e.g. in connection with a court 
ruling.84
The concept of legal risk is relevant also for legal theory since it is this particular 
risk that drives transnationalisation processes in finance. Much of the history of 
both eurobonds as well as the OTC derivatives market was about attempts to reduce 
legal risk through contractual means. In time, through repeated interactions, these 
contracts became transnationalised as were these particular markets themselves. 
To draw a contemporary example, legal risk remains highly topical in the European 
Union where the exercise of bail-in powers of public regulators over distressed 
financial institutions may unduly interfere with the human right to private property 
of the creditors of such financial institutions. The exercise of these powers can be 
seen as a form of legal risk.85 More generally, national laws can be used as disguised 
82 Colleen M Baker, ‘When regulators collide: financial market stability, systemic risk, clearinghouses, and 
CDS’ (2015–2016) 10 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 343, 384–85. 
83 Hudson (n 67) paras 0–40–42. 
84 European Central Bank, ‘The Payment System: payments, securities and derivatives, and the role of the 
Eurosystem’ (2010) 127, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsystem201009en.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
85 Marco Lamandini, David Ramos, Javier Solana, ‘The European Central Bank (ECB) Powers as a Catalyst 
for Change in EU Law, Part 2: SSM, SRM, and Fundamental Rights’ (2017) 23 Colum. J. Eur. L. 199; 
Tracy Chiyedza Maguze, ‘EU bank recapitalisation and the bail-in option: an analysis of the effects of 
mandatory bail-in on creditors’ property’ (2016) 5 UCLJLJ 207, 218–21; Matthias Haentjens, ‘Party 
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expropriation, nationalization or other types of interference on private property. 
Therefore, market participants also manage and reduce political risk, a wider 
concept that includes legal risk, on their investment programmes through bilateral 
investment treaties, as well as contractual arrangements and legal structures like 
transnational trustee companies.86
All market participants, from individual consumers to states, from startups to 
large transnational corporations, operate in an environment that is unpredictable. 
Risk is at the core of any profit seeking, for which reason the members of different 
communities adapt to their environment and create laws that shield them and the 
trade itself from at least those risks that are identifiable. Whereas states enact laws 
in black-letter, private market participants form trade organizations and private 
regulatory mechanisms.87 States can be a risk not only to market participants but 
on a systemic scale to the whole financial system.88 It might be this way because 
of the modern credit culture that promotes easy access to credit for all regardless 
of their creditworthiness, both in good and bad economic times. It is the public 
policy of our time regardless of who is in political charge, and ‘Banks are never 
stronger than their clients’.89
2.9 PRIVATE NORMATIVITY AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW
2.9.1 EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF PRIVATE NORMATIVITY 
Michael Torrance has noted how transnational norms are private in origin, and 
how the frameworks they compose share many of the same systemic and structural 
characteristics of state-based positive law.90 Jan M Smits sees an evolutionary 
aspect in transnational law. He asks that if positivist theory cannot explain the 
developments in private law, could the application of evolutionary theory help us 
to understand these developments. He describes:
Autonomy, Public Policy and European Bank Insolvency Law’ (May 21, 2015) Leiden Law School Research 
Paper; Hazelhoff Research Paper Series No. 7, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608903> accessed 1 June 
2019. 
86 Richard Hay, ‘Protecting assets from political risk’ (1997) 3 P.C.B. 152.
87 Rauterberg, Verstein (n 74) discussing also the limitations of private regulation in the OTC derivatives 
market, 40–42.
88 Kulms (n 77) 65.
89 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
Volume 3 Financial Products, Financial Services and Financial Regulation (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 551–54.
90 Michael Torrance, ‘Persuasive authority beyond the state: a theoretical analysis of transnational corporate 
social responsibility norms as legal reasons within positive legal systems’ (2011) 12 German L.J. 1573, 
1574.
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[w]hat the evolutionary perspective has to offer is an external account of 
how law develops. It does not inform us about the contents of law, but 
only explains why the law develops as it does.91 
This research is an external account of how the law around eurobonds and OTC 
derivatives evolved and why. As a side product, the research also informs about the 
contents and evolution of law of the past. Similarly, Wolfgang Kerber notes how 
the evolution has led to ‘new governance solutions’ in the form of increasing choice 
of law, private governance instead of private law, and relying on private arbitration 
instead of public courts.92 There might not be market demand for common European 
private law imposed in black-letter and from top-down by states.93 When asked, 
over 90 per cent of market participants responded that they have never used the 
Principles of European Contract Law or incorporated these principles into their 
contracts as the governing law.94 One reason for this may be that the calls for 
harmonization of private law are driven by ideological objectives.95 
Smits divides his insights drawn from evolutionary theories into three parallel 
arguments. First, he notes that organisms are to a large extent path dependent. In 
a legal context, codified rules may become somewhat unable to adapt to change. 
As an example, he describes how the courts of continental European countries may 
have become unable to invoke certain legal rules once law became equated with 
codified law. Pre-existing rules or doctrines not codified were no longer viewed as 
legal rules because they were not codified into black-letter law.96 This observation 
begs the question of can, and if yes, how, transnational norms be transformed into 
codified laws and financial regulation. The short answer is yes, transnational norms 
can become codified as described in Chapter 5. Bilateral close-out netting created 
in the market through repeated interactions between merchants can demonstrably 
be transformed into and reflected in state law and financial regulation. This takes 
91 Jan M Smits, ‘Darwin at work: how to explain legal change in transnational and European private law’ in 
Peer Zumbansen, Gralf-Peter Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2011) 322, 324–25.
92 Kerber (n 50) 412. 
93 Jan M Smits, ‘European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order’ in Deirdre M Curtin, Jan M 
Smits, A Klip, JA McCahery (eds), European integration and law; Four Contributions on the Interplay 
between European Integration and European and National Law (Intersentia 2006) 74–78.
94 The Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
‘Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law – A 
Business Survey’ (2008), Question 26 < https://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/
uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
95 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘The Need for Codified Guiding Principles and Model Rules in European 
Contract Law’ in Roger Brownsword (ed), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing 
2011) 79.
96 Jan M Smits, ‘Applied evolutionary theory: explaining legal change in transnational and European 
private law’ (2008) 9 German L.J. 477, 482–84, referring to a Roman law doctrine of laesio enormis 
(extraordinary injury) that became extinct following the codification of private law.
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place in interaction between a private trade organization and public international 
organizations. It might even be said that when bilateral close-out netting became 
part of public financial regulation and codified law, it became so institutionalized 
that it is now part of the ‘DNA’ of modern finance and thus resistant to change.
The second observation of Smits notes how the adaptation of a species can bend 
towards simplicity rather than complexity. In the law market, market participants 
favour certain governing laws and jurisdictions over others.97 It is true that some 
jurisdictions are favoured over others and one reason out of many might be that in 
relative terms the former jurisdictions offer simplicity in comparison to the latter. 
Finally, Smits makes the argument that the evolutionary insight can provide not 
only a theoretical explanation but also a justification for legal diversity and, following 
from justification, the acknowledgment that different rules may be justifiable for 
similar problems.98 In the OTC derivatives markets, bilateral close-out netting is 
indeed a transnational rule which gained legal exemption from the ordinary rule of 
insolvency laws according to which unsecured creditors of a bankruptcy estate are to 
be treated in the same manner. It is an exemption rule, or a ‘safe-harbor’, for certain 
types of financial transactions according to which, in simplified terms, a contractual 
clause that allows a counterparty to terminate the transactions upon counterparty 
insolvency is enforceable. It is generally deemed as justified public policy choice, 
but it has its critics as summarized in subchapter 5.7. Market participants favour 
some jurisdictions over the other perhaps one of the reasons being that the legal 
orders of the former and their courts are more receptive to transnational law as 
discussed in Chapter 4.
2.9.2 THE PATH DEPENDENCE OF SYSTEMIC THINKING
It is clear that legal scholarship on transnational law is much about private 
normativity, repeated interactions, and spontaneously formed orders as discussed 
above and further especially in Chapter 3. Why claim something to the contrary? 
Transnational law can also be about ‘rethinking legal thinking’ and it is clear that 
this leads to slight inconsistencies at best, and to clear contradictions at worst, 
between academics who have rethought ideas from their own perspectives. These 
perspectives, in turn, reflect various legal traditions and theoretical models.99 Such 
reconceptualizations seem to be a newer phenomenon in legal scholarship. In the 
transnationalisation of finance, many of the events that took place in the 1960s 
97 ibid 486–88.
98 ibid 489–90. 
99 Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori, Suvi Sankari (eds), Transnational Law – Rethinking European Law and 
Legal Thinking (CUP 2014) 2. 
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were an anomaly to the legal scholars of that time. Private normativity and repeated 
transactions in business took place that transcended the boundaries of states and, 
in the process, essentially, as the evidence gathered for Chapter 3 suggests, no laws 
were generally breached. No solution was found from written ‘black-letter’ legislation 
and regulations to even conceptualize the phenomena with the vocabulary that 
existed at that time. Hence, these anomalies were referred to being ‘transnational’ in 
their ontology. In contrast, from a state-centred perspective, private law is ‘private’, 
meaning that it is a mere subcategory of public law that is ‘no less the arena of political 
power than the public law created in legislation and administration’.100 However, 
construing and viewing financial markets as some type of political abstraction that 
could be made to simply obey the commands of states through force and policital 
power is problematic for various reasons discussed throughout this research. From 
a methodological point of view, transnational law without private normativity is 
not transnational law but the type of positivist law that wholly excludes nonstatist 
sources of law. Fortunately, the private normativity aspect is acknowledged at least 
in some contemporary studies on transnational law as discussed in subchapter 
2.10.2 below.
As noted by Lars Viellechner, there is a strong belief in the unity of the written 
hard law, first grounded on religion, then on the state.101 State itself is a legal tradition, 
which is argued to be capable of becoming ‘more and more receptive to non-state 
order and non-state sources of law’.102 Reconceptualizing transnational law as to 
not to include private normativity runs too many risks. Transnationalisation is real 
but it can go unnoticed if the inherent private normativity aspects of transnational 
law are ignored. To summarise the problem:
Analytical legal theory that takes the experience of the law-state as the 
standard and measure of legality explains the existence and nature 
of non-state types of prima facie legality in the following way: intra-, 
trans-, supra-, and super-state social phenomena are legal phenomena 
only to the extent that (i) they share the characteristic features of state 
law or (ii) are in some way actually supported by or connected to state 
practice or recognition […] Little conceptual or normative room is left 
for novel, state-independent forms of legality to emerge.103 
100 Curtin, Senden (n 70) 164; Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory – A Translation of 
the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law (OUP 1996) 95–96.
101 Lars Viellechner, ‘Responsive Legal Pluralism: The emergence of transnational conflicts law’ (2015) 6 TLT 
312, 319.
102 Glenn (n 31) 704, 713.
103 Keith Culver, Michael Giudice, Legality’s Borders. An Essay in General Jurisprudence (OUP 2014) XXI; 
Oren Perez claims that ‘Traditional legal theory has failed to produce a theory that adequately captures the 
structure and dynamics of quasi-legal systems’, Oren Perez, ‘Fuzzy Law: A Theory of Quasi-Legal Systems’ 
(2015) 28 Can. J.L. & Juris. 343.
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If something cannot be even conceptualized, neither can the problems associated 
with that something. The other problem is that historically, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, transnational law was, and indeed still is, about novel, state-independent 
or perhaps more descriptively, autonomous, since market activity takes place in a 
society, forms of legality. The initial choice in systemic thinking concerning law 
is the exclusivity aspect of state-made law, meaning that state-made legislation is 
law, whereas other types of norms and the normative orders they form are not. To 
repeat, a functional rather than formal understanding of what is ‘law’ is necessary 
for understanding private normativity. Philipp R Wood has noted metaphorically 
how ‘[t]he law is the one universal secular religion which practically everybody 
believes in’ while at the same time acknowledging how flawed the law may more than 
occasionally be. Laws may be intrusive and excessive, they may not enjoy observance, 
they may be misused as well as abused, and they can be used to serve the state rather 
than the persons it governs. 104 The same might be said about transnational law, but 
as said, such problems cannot even be identified without proper conceptualizations.
Mikhail Xifaras notes that the discourse on ‘global law’ is open to non-state 
law. Xifaras describes: 
Some rightly talked about Non-State Law. It is rare, however, that we 
manage to identify legal phenomena that are clearly independent of 
national legal orders. Most common examples are forms and practices 
that do not have their origin in the State, in which the role of the State is 
transformed, but the State does not disappear.105
Indeed, the state does not disappear since they remain as the gatekeepers of contract 
enforceability which, in turn, depends on public policy. Neither can nation states 
be declared bankrupt and out of existence through this process unlike corporations 
as further discussed in subchapter 2.10.2. Put perhaps too abstractly, transnational 
law cannot declare independence from the societies in which it operates in.
One might consider that only such laws with sufficient input legitimacy, 
which refers to a structure for democratic participation in rule-making of a given 
community, qualifies as law. A collective of people should be able to cast their 
vote through this structure in order for private normativity to be considered ‘hard’ 
law that is made official through a democratically elected body, a parliament. Or 
absent input legitimacy, transnational law should have output legitimacy, i.e. 
‘government by the people’, where the legitimacy follows from the participation 
of a collective of people with a collective identity to a rule-making structure that 
104 Philip R Wood, The Fall of the Priests and the Rise of the Lawyers (Hart Publishing 2016) 3, 241–42.
105 Mikhail Xifaras, ‘The Global Turn in Legal Theory’ (2016) 29 Can. J.L. & Juris. 215, 220.
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the collective can influence.106 If this is the case and norms and rules require either 
input or output legitimacy, the problem of illegitimacy goes much further than the 
legitimacy of transnational law. Much of ‘hard’ law has never been subject to either 
direct democratic processes or to indirect rule making-structures. As noted by Jan 
Dalhuisen, much of what is referred to as commercial law or financial law, legal 
principles, and even the financial instruments predate the birth of modern nation 
states and law codifications. They have never been made subject to, or come into 
existence through, any democratic processes to begin with. In addition, many of 
the academic models used, especially in civil law countries, as the founding parts 
of designed state legal systems are themselves something that have never been 
subject to any democratic participatory processes. The 19th and 20th centuries are 
the centuries that saw the rise and spread of monopolistic legal codifications giving 
law its territorial character, theorized legal research as a distinct field of academic 
study focusing mostly on state legislation denying the autonomy of any other source 
of law. 107 By default, transnational contracts discussed in this research are, and as 
the evidence tells they are, designed to be legal, enforceable and compliant with 
all laws and regulations. 
At worst, private normativity which is the key in understanding transnational 
law goes unintentionally or, through wilful ignorance, bypassed altogether. Systemic 
thinking, as coined by Dalhuisen,108 focuses on legal rationality, systematization, 
coherence, and black-letter codifications and legislation that have the impossible task 
of telling the answer to any past, current, and future legal problem. Indeed, the idea 
that law and regulation is merely something that states can produce and ought to be 
capable of being read from codified black letter rules, laws, or regulations, remains 
paradigmatic. This is in many ways problematic which is here illustrated through an 
analogy. In the 20th century, printed phonebooks, updated yearly, told the numbers 
to landline telephones. Around the millenium, cellular phones, pre-paids, voice-
over-internet protocols, and other modern communication technologies emerged. 
These were the outcome of repeated interactions between private individuals. New 
concepts had to be invented for new phenomen that were close to being science fiction 
only a few years before their invention. For a systemic thinker, the technological 
development is not the outcome of technological innovations created by individuals 
seeking to create products and services for which there is a market demand. Quite 
106 MAP Bovens, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy and Accountability in EU Governance’ in Paul’t Hart, Deirdre 
Curtin, Mark Bovens (eds), The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit? (OUP 2010) 20–23.
107 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, The 
Transnationalisation of Commercial and Financial Law and of Commercial, Financial and Investment 
Dispute Resolution. The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources. Volume 1 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 7, noting that academic models are exercises on monopolistic and systemic consistency and 
conceptual unity never mind the commercial or financial realities of finance, 7–10. 
108 ibid 6–10.
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the contrary, these products are the outcome of suspicious, assumedly immoral, 
maybe even criminal, acts made in the shadowy waters of even more shady private, 
foreign, information and communications technology sector which clearly is there 
for the sole purpose of challenging the rational, systemized, coherent, written, 
black-letter, state-regulated phonebook! In the face of evidence, this makes little 
sense and the problem might not lie in the technological development but in the 
underlying theoretical premise studying this development. Systemic thinking 
might be trapped in evolutionary path dependence, which, to draw an analogy 
from biology, means that the evolution is directly constrained by history which 
determines the possibilities of today and tomorrow.109 Gerard Alexander has defined 
path dependence as follows:
A range of technological, economic, social, and political arrangements, 
once in place, appear to generate patterns of costs and benefits such 
that rational actors prefer to maintain the status quo even if an 
alternative might provide higher aggregate returns in the long run. 
Actors support the status quo not because change stands to generate 
some costs – which is true of almost all changes – but because change 
imposes significant net costs at least in the short term. The longer actors 
operate within such a status quo, the more any shift to an alternative is 
unattractive. Initial choices are thus ‘locked in’.110
There is plenty of scientific evidence beginning at least since the 1960s confirming 
that private normativity is real, and these normativities transcend state borders 
and categories of law. Being hostile towards the idea that transnational law is about 
acknowledging private normativity becomes a question of preserving power and 
control as well as retaining status quo. Legal research needs higher aggregate returns 
than systemic thinking is able to produce.
109 Oona A Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law Systems’ (2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 601, 613–17. 
110 Gerard Alexander, ‘Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation’ (2001) 13 (3) Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 249, 254; Kerber (n 50) 419–20: 
 [t]he future development of the law is dependent on the previous states of the law. This is a descriptive 
term and path dependence can lead to many outcomes, favourable and unfavourable.
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2.10 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.10.1 WHY A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT IS NEEDED?
Empirical research on transnational law suffers ‘from a sufficient intellectual 
framework, which should ideally precede any such research and direct it’.111 
This is why the theoretical framework and construction of a transnational legal 
order is needed. Transnational legal order is a theoretical construct that tells us 
that transnational law operates autonomously, markets consist of autonomous 
individuals, but not independently from states and their legislation and regulations. 
Even the existence of such a theoretical construct is contrary to the codification 
ethos of the nineteenth century prevalent especially in the Continental European 
thinking in which autonomous source of law, such as custom, do not exist without 
state recognition.112 Transnational method aids the understanding of non-statist 
sources of law. Maciej Borowicz notes that in this context, there exists a conceptual 
gap for exercizing private power in a transnational context. This gap is so wide that it 
limits even the identification of what is the question from a normative standpoint.113 
While finance might be hard to conceptualize in legal theory, finance is driven 
by pragmatic every-day negotiation and execution of contracts that seek to give 
a return on investment, to hedge risks, to speculate, to engage in arbitrage, 
or whatever the reason for any particular transaction may be. The substantive 
part of this research could have been written without a single reference to any 
legal theory or to transnational law as a concept but then, it would have lacked 
a theoretical structure. Much of the contemporary literature concerning private 
law or financial regulation seldom refers to any particular legal theory. 114 In 
financial regulation, the theoretical discussion concerns theories like liberal 
intergovernmentalism, public choice theory, and historical institutionalism,115 
but apparently not transnational law. 
The observable elements of transnational law, such as transnational contracts, 
remain in existence and unaffected regardless of the legal theoretical perspective 
or the lack thereof of the observer. To draw an analogy, the falling tree in the 
111 Dalhuisen (n 23) 135.
112 Dalhuisen (n 107) 82–83.
113 Maciej Borowicz, ‘Private Power and International Law: The International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association’ (2015) 8 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 46, discussing close-out netting and private regulatory 
mechanisms in the OTC derivatives industry as a form of transnational power. 
114 For example, none of the writers in Sarah Paterson, Rafal Zakrzewski (eds), McKnight, Paterson and 
Zakrzewski on the Law of International Finance (2nd edition, OUP 2017) discuss legal theory.
115 Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G Hill, John C Coffee, Jr, The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis (CUP 2013) 17–23.
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forest transmits physical particles propagated through a medium, even if there is 
no one to hear it, or regardless of what is the listener’s subjective interpretation of 
the origins and ontology of what is referred to as ‘sound’. As noted by Katharina 
Pistor, it is for the scientific observer to acknowledge these observable elements, 
set them into the legal theoretical model of their choosing best fitted to observe 
certain phenomena, or even construct a new one, and draw her conclusions.116 As 
Stepan Wood has noted, legal scholars do recognize such private interactions, but 
their accounts are flawed followed by the divergent theoretical, methodological, and 
normative perspectives.117 Common perspectives are needed, and acknowledging the 
inherent private normativity aspect of transnational law is one place to overcome 
these challenges.
2.10.2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
‘Transnational legal order’ and ‘transnational legal ordering’ (TLO) involves both 
public and private actors which can differ in their geographic, substantive, and 
organizational scope as discussed below. This definition is compatible with the idea 
of private normativity as a non-statist source of law and should capture the most 
crucial element of transnational law, private normativity, and transnationalisation 
processes. Already at this point it should be understood that in this research, legal 
order can also include those that do not arise from states but ‘from participatory 
structures or communities that spontaneously produce their own laws’.118
Under TLO, one way of defining ‘transnational law’ is to see it as a ‘a collection of 
formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively 
order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions’. Associated 
organizations and actors are to be construed and understood broadly.119 ‘Law’ is 
to be understood as establishing generalized normative expectations understood 
and used by actors within a particular context for purposes of constraining and 
facilitating particular behaviours.120 This definition, while welcomed, still focuses 
on formalized legal norms and practice of law across national jurisdictions. In 
the transnational market, there is more to it. Bilateral close-out netting became a 
generalized normative expectation in the OTC derivatives market. It also became 
used by market participants for the purpose of facilitating the procedure to be 
116 Katharina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) Journal of Comparative Economics 315, 317.
117 Wood and others (n 59) emphasizing, in contrast to this research, a prescriptive and normative undertone 
for transnational law, 339.
118 Dalhuisen (n 23) 132.
119 Halliday, Shaffer (n 18) 6.
120 ibid 11.
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followed upon counterparty default. It became formalized first in a transnational 
contract, the ISDA Master Agreement, and after that, in financial regulation as 
well as in EU Directives and, through transposition, in national legal orders. The 
facilitator behind this was an associated trade organization, ISDA. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the use of close-out netting provisions was generally not illegal. Their 
enforceability was uncertain in different jurisdictions when a counterparty to a 
transaction became insolvent. Regardless, the use of these provisions was already 
part of lex mercatoria of finance, as understood in this research, but there was no 
formalized legal norms in existence. The normative power that this type of private 
normativity yields should not go unacknowledged. 
TLO qualifies as a transnational legal order when it fills three attributes. 
Transnational law of OTC derivatives market fills these three attributes. First, the 
norms must be produced by, or in conjunction with, a legal organization or a network 
that transcends the nation-state. These legal organizations can include primary 
institutions of law, legislatures, executive departments, agencies, and courts, or 
‘quasi-legislature’ engaged in secondary lawmaking. Importantly, this attribute 
also identifies norms created by non-state actors, which in turn generally seek 
recognition from states to legitimize the norms and enhance their own authority. 
Through this process, norms of non-state actors are part of the formation and 
institutionalization of legal norms.121 In the OTC derivatives market, the norms 
are produced in interaction with, among others, national central banks, the Basel 
Committee, an international organization, and a private trade organization, ISDA, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 5. Second, the norms ‘directly or indirectly, formally or 
informally, engage legal institutions within multiple nation-states, whether in the 
adoption, recognition, or enforcement of the norms’. This attribute incorporates 
private lawmaking to the definition of TLO: ‘Private transnational institutions 
develop formalized norms that are to be used in contracts and, if necessary, 
ultimately recognized and enforced by national courts’.122 Third, ‘[t]he norms are 
produced in recognizable legal forms’, i.e. that the form must by formalized through 
the use of formal texts, whether these texts take the form of written rules, standards, 
model codes, or judicial judgments — without excluding formalization by private 
actors.123 Both apply to the OTC derivatives market where ISDA formalized the 
norms which ultimately became recognized and enforced by national courts, also 
demonstrated in Chapter 5.
While otherwise compatible with the idea of transnational law being about 
private normativity, the definition of a TLO has one deficiency in regard to the 
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order for corporate bankruptcy. It is true that that before international cooperation, 
the attitude inherent in national legal systems varied widely towards companies in 
financial distress.124 It has been argued that the history of the ‘transnational financial 
legal ordering’ began as late as 1974 when the Bank for International Settlements 
introduced the Basel Concordat, a form of financial regulation still used today.125 
The argument here is that transnationalisation processes leading to a financial legal 
order precede the establishment of formal rules by states.
Following a cursory review, it is true that many policy instruments that 
contributed to a transnational financial order were introduced in the 1990s. The point 
is that transnational legal order can operate without such policy instruments. Non-
binding and binding regulations, were introduced in the 1990s from UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)126 to EU Regulation on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1999),127 to name a few.128 It is worth highlighting the significance of 
bilateral close-out netting, in that its legal recognition was further promoted by 
UNCITRAL in the Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency (UNCITRAL 2009) 
and a Guide to the Enactment and Interpretation of the Model Law (UNCITRAL 
2014),129 and by the World Bank in the Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor/Debtor Regimes.130 
It is also true that the emergence of a TLO on the complex domain of cross-border 
insolvency would seem inconceivable without conscious design of TLO. First, there 
would be the absence of international bodies or networks that need to give the order 
its legal form, and second, following from this absence, there is presumably nothing 
that could order social relationships in a manner ‘that transcend the nation-state 
in one way or another’.131 In practice, however, it would seem that TLOs do exist 
and order can be created even in the absence of both of the aforementioned and 
assumed prerequisites for transnational legal ordering. One important bankruptcy 
case from the 1970s may illustrate this argument of how a TLO can manifest itself 
124 Susan Block-Lieb, Terence C Halliday, ‘Settling and Concordance – Two Cases in Global Commercial Law’ 
in Halliday, Shaffer (n 18) 77–78.
125 Eric Helleiner, ‘Regulating the Regulators – The Emergence and Limits of the Transnational Financial 
Legal Order’ in Halliday, Shaffer (n 18) 231, 236.
126 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html> accessed 1 June 2019.
127 Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 160, 30.6.2000, 
p. 1–18, repealed.
128 While they all recognize same public policy objectives, they differ in their scope. Rizwaan Jameel Mokaal, 
‘Liquidity, systemic risk, and the bankruptcy treatment of financial contracts’ (2015–2016) 10 Brook. J. 
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 15, 45-48.
129 Block-Lieb, Halliday in Halliday, Shaffer (n 18) n 188, 78.
130 The World Bank, ‘The Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’ (revised 2015) 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/919511468425523509/ICR-Principles-Insolvency-Creditor-Debtor-
Regimes-2016.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
131 Halliday, Shaffer (n 18) 20.
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without a designed framework save for the existence of central bank involvement 
in the background and the enforcement of a settlement agreement by a state court. 
It is also a reference case on how a random historical event can act as a catalyst for 
international cooperation that in turn became central to the development of the 
OTC derivatives market in the 1980s and the whole banking industry. Before this 
case analysis, the hierarchy of transnational legal order needs to be drawn.
2.10.3 THE HIERARCHY OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Steven L Schwartz and Lucy Chang note that humans, that are in many ways limited, 
have to rely on simplifications of reality and routines, and these simplifications can 
develop into a custom within a community. Although generally beneficial for society, 
these customs can become harmful when they do not approximate reality and 
amplified by the fact that humans do not wish to reassess customs they are used to.132 
There is no reason to believe that legal theorists are immune to this which means 
that also the following hierarchical portrayal of laws is bound to be incomplete in 
many ways. However, legal theoretical framework may provide the observer with 
a starting point for making empirical observations. As put by Katharina Pistor:
The theory of science teaches us that one can hardly identify relevant 
empirical observations without an underlying idea of an order in one’s 
mind, i.e. without a theory. This does not mean, however, that one is 
limited to the mental maps that are currently in use.133 
The mental map used in this research is currently in use and its central premises 
are as follows:
(i) Non-statist sources of law are real. Law is not something that is in the 
exclusive domain of states, which have the power to legislate but which is 
but one source of law;
(ii) Contracts create legal obligations between private natural and legal persons 
who are exercizing their innate and inalienable right to private property, 
exercise of and transferability of private property, and the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda;134 
132 Steven L Schwartz, Lucy Chang, ‘The Custom-to-Failure Cycle’ (2012) 62 Duke Law Journal 767.
133 Pistor (n 116) 317.
134 Fabien Gélinas, ‘Arbitration as transnational governance by contract’ (2016) TLT, noting how pacta sunt 
servanda, 6: 
 [c]uts across both space and time as a staple moral and legal principle is that consent somehow resonates 
universally as one of the most powerful sources of legitimacy available. The legitimating power of consent 
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(iii) Private norms can qualify as legal norms which are not necessarily and 
automatically subordinate to any particular state laws; and
(iv) which states may or may not recognise and enforce;
(v) Transnational law does not claim supremacy over national legal systems, 
national laws or regulations.
The following structure is not to be read as a claim for supremacy of transnational 
over national laws and regulations. In finance, market participants must resort 
to state law and state courts. They act autonomously but not independently. 
This is the case, for example, in insolvency situations the outcome of which is 
basically determined by national insolvency laws that reflect local public policy 
objectives. More generally, market participants have to resort to states for contract 
enforcement. The lex mercatoria of finance is subordinate to the legal orders of 
states. As summarized by Pistor, financial instruments are in all forms about 
contractual relations enforceable in a court of law.135 States continue to remain 
as the sovereign in their respective geographical territories and transnational law 
must respect these local laws.136 As common historical knowledge tells, states can 
suppress and prohibit any forms of ‘private’ through legislation and the power of 
the state. States can abolish all notions of the fundamental principles and even 
outlaw any forms of private interactions. Regardless of this power, as any black 
market for private products and service people – for reason or the other – choose 
to use under the rule of the most oppressive and totalitarian states imaginable, 
people still engage in repeated interactions (by trading with each other), private 
normativity still exists and private normative orders are still spontaneously created. 
In this sense, at least, the fundamental principles are truly inalienable and are not 
construed and determined by state law. 
The transnational legal order can be further construed as a structure consisting of: 
(i) fundamental principles manifested in public international law, from the 
protection of private ownership, transferability of property, and contract, 
to public policies such as the protection of environment, safety, and health; 
(ii) transnational customary laws that are mandatory in their nature not by 
law but which are still followed in business. They emerge and evolve in 
commercial practice, like eurobonds and close-out netting, which concern 
is linked to a broad-based recognition that human agency is essential to human dignity and that agency in 
prioritising otherwise incommensurable values is particularly important in securing the conditions for that 
dignity.
135 Pistor (n 116) 319. 
136 Dalhuisen (n 107) 328.
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‘all that is considered normal by participants on which they commonly rely 
in their business and markets’, and in their routines and perceptions; 
(iii) uniform substantive treaty law of mandatory nature as well as financial 
regulation operating under public international law; 
(iv) mandatory general principles such as the notions of good faith in contractual 
relationships; 
(v) standardized contractual terms of private trade organizations;
(vi) customs and practices of private trade organizations that can be found for 
example from their private rules and recommendations; 
(vii) international conventions, if deemed relevant; 
(viii) general principles of the particular legal structures or relationships common 
to leading legal systems, and ultimately the national law applicable defined 
through conflict of law rules; and, finally 
(ix) local national laws identified through the most appropriate conflict of laws 
rules.137
It is not a new finding that those who agree that transnational law is essentially about 
private normativity are undecided about its hierarchy and relative importance of its 
sources.138 The purpose of this hierarchy is to lay out a mental map to demonstrate 
that in many cases and situations there are no other laws available than fundamental 
principles of private property, transferability of the same, and binding contracts. 
Through repeated interactions, transnational customary law can emerge like it 
did in the eurobond market as further discussed in Chapter 3. Perhaps the most 
challenging task (a task that falls outside the scope of this research) is to find a place 
for transgovernmental regulators briefly discussed in Chapter 6 in the structure 
above. 
The rules expressed in the ISDA Master Agreement architecture also reflect 
the transnational customary nature and the market practices OTC derivatives 
market.139 Local bankruptcy laws might be becoming more facilitative in recognizing 
transnational practices also when it comes to the enforceability of bilateral close-out 
netting.140 Be that as it may, in the OTC derivatives market, much of the private 
normativity emerged from repeated interactions between market participants 
which manifested itself in the form of a standardized contractual terms. Before 
the 1980s, there was nothing to be put to category (v) above when it comes to OTC 
derivatives market. Later on, market participants engaged in repeated interactions 
137 Dalhuisen (n 107) 218–22.
138 Dalhuisen (n 23) 180–87; Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years’ (1988) 
Arb.Int’l 86, 109.
139 Dalhuisen (n 89) 368–371.
140 Dalhuisen (n 89) 315.
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with international regulators (operating under public international law) through 
which this transnational law of the OTC derivatives market, the contractual right 
to use bilateral close-out netting, became even codified in many jurisdictions. In 
the EU, this took place through national transposition of EU Directives as further 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Many aspects of finance take place without the sources of law referred to 
in categories (ii)–(ix). Take nation states, for example. Nation states have a 
multidimensional role in finance and in the very creation of transnational law. 
They are typically stakeholders in the financial institutions located in their respective 
jurisdictions. States also finance themselves in the international capital markets 
and have played an important role in the formation of the OTC derivatives market 
in general, from individual products to the regulatory recognition of private 
regulatory mechanisms, as also discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Nation states have 
played also an unintentional role as facilitators. State-made laws and regulations 
have given rise to many forms of legal innovations that are not caught by existing 
national regulatory barriers. Eurobonds were created for this purpose, as were swap 
structures. Furthermore, nation states can default on their debt, but unlike private 
market participants, they cannot be declared bankrupt. In the capital markets, 
sovereign issuers issue debt to finance their public projects, and they have much 
power over issues like taxation, expenditures, and control over the money supply. 
If a corporation defaults, it can disappear from existence, whereas a nation state 
cannot.141 Importantly, ‘[t]here is no international bankruptcy law for sovereign 
states and therefore the outcomes are determined by the bargaining position of the 
parties and free agreement’.142 In other words, besides the fundamental principles 
referred to in category (i) above, in some cases there is not much other law available 
than transnational law when a state defaults on its debt.
The Herstatt bankruptcy example discussed in subchapter 2.11 demonstrates 
that transnational financial institutions can operate and find legal solutions to highly 
complex and sensitive legal problems without the sources of law referred to in (ii)-
(ix). For any other absent sources of law, beyond fundamental principles, these 
financial institutions had to rely on the implicit fundamental principles, the creation 
of a private contract, and its enforceability in a national court. The legal risk arising 
from national laws created an incentive for these private financial institutions to 
find a transnational solution to a transnational legal problem. This is not an isolated 
event and example of actual and verifiable transnational normativity. The same 
applies to the emergence of the eurobond market, as well as to the invention of 
141 Panayiota Koulafetis, Modern Credit Risk Management. Theory and Practice (Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
2017) 97.
142 Philip R Wood, ‘How the Greek Debt Reorganisation of 2012 Changed the Rules of Sovereign Insolvency’ 
(2013) 14 Bus. L. Int’l 3, 13.
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bilateral close-out netting in the OTC derivatives markets, not to mention the Greek 
debt crisis involving credit default swaps and their interpretation in 2012. Market 
participants operated largely on the basis of fundamental principles since virtually 
no other law is available. Gradually, transnational law gained recognition from 
international organizations and some aspects of customary transnational law turned 
even into ‘hard law’ whereby national parliaments made transnational practices the 
official law of the land. To understand codified legislation and financial regulation, 
it is often necessary to know about their transnational origins. It is very challenging 
to put the interactions between private normativity and financial regulation into 
a legal theoretical framework given the esoteric nature of the latter. However, it is 
important, which is why it is attempted in the following subchapters. 
2.11 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE NORMATIVITY AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION
2.11.1 HERSTATT RISK REVISITED: TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY TRIGGERS 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION
Without the existence of any other law, the fundamental principles and the 
enforcement of a private contract by a state court were enough to solve probably 
the most complex legal question that arose in finance in the 1970s. On 26 June 
1974, one of the largest German banks, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A (Herstatt) 
was closed and placed into liquidation at 3:30 P.M., Cologne time, in the Federal 
Republic of Germany by the German Federal Supervisory Authority for Credit 
Matters (Das Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen). All payments by Herstatt 
stopped immediately upon being declared bankrupt.143 To briefly summarize the 
preceding events, Herstatt had entered into futures trades under which it suffered 
great losses following the currency fluctuations in the 1970s. Herstatt’s worsening 
economic condition was rumoured as early as 1971, and despite the cascading 
rumours and tangible evidence, the German regulators chose not to act, which 
is why the case is known also as an example of both regulatory, in oversight and 
supervisory responses, and self-regulatory, in internal risk management, failure. 
Other German financial institutions did not come to aid, let Herstatt fail, and finally 
it was declared insolvent.144 However, it is not the liquidation of Herstatt that brought 
143 Chris O’Malley, Bonds Without Borders: A History of the Eurobond Market (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 
2014) 55.
144 Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons taught by Herstatt and 
Company’ (1977) 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 2–3; the preceding events have been described in detail in 
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Trust is good, control is better’: The 1974 Herstatt Bank Crisis and its 
Implications for International Regulatory Reform’ (2015) 57 (2) Business History 311.
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the concept of ‘Herstatt risk’ to the vocabulary for decades to come but one of its 
consequences involving one bank account in the State of New York, US. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.’s (Chase) held a bank account of Herstatt in New 
York, but Herstatt did not conduct, and had not conducted, any business nor have 
any other presence in the US. At about 10:30 A.M. US time, the news of the Herstatt 
liquidation reached Chase in NY. Maybe in order to protect its own solvency and 
itself from potential claims in this unique situation, Chase suspended all outgoing 
US dollar payments from the Herstatt account, holding over $150 million, which 
effectively meant that Chase did let the incoming payments in foreign currencies 
to be credited to the Herstatt account, until the closing of the business day in New 
York, but did not pay the counter values in dollars to the would-be creditors of 
Herstatt. In practice, this meant that Chase received payment instructions from 
various market participants but did not act in accordance with them.145 In other 
words, those market participants requesting Chase to credit the Herstatt bank 
account had given a payment instruction to Chase to credit the Herstatt account 
before the other party, Herstatt, had fulfilled its obligation and which was now 
unable to do so following the liquidation decision. At worst, every unit of foreign 
currency debited to the Herstatt account could lead to losing the whole principal or 
at least mean significant delays in recovering the amount from the insolvency estate 
of Herstatt. The preliminary assumption was that the litigation over the Herstatt 
account assets could take years. 146 
By the end of the business day, the amount of payment orders and checks seeking 
to debit the Herstatt account rose to according to one preliminary estimate close to 
$620 million (which in the end came down to approximately $200 million). What 
followed was ‘one of the most extraordinary legal dramas in New York banking 
history’ as the cross-border elements of the situation were so complex and unique 
to which a solution could not be found from written legislation or legal principles.147 
First, there was the question of applicability of the United States Bankruptcy 
Act to the funds on the Herstatt account which could mean that there could be two 
administrators for the same assets. Second, there was the liquidation process of 
Herstatt in another country, which in practice necessitated immediate cooperation 
between the creditors and the liquidator while the legal situation necessitated that 
the liquidator would not enter the US as this could affect the legal status of the 
Herstatt account and the liquidator himself under US laws.148 Third, the assets 
of Herstatt were scattered in Germany and New York and there were virtually 
no rules, laws, nor directly applicable case law on how to manage even the first 
145 O’Malley (n 143) 55.
146 Joseph D Becker, ‘International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt’ (1976) 62 A.B.A. J. 1290, 1291, 1291–93.
147 ibid 1291.
148 Joseph D Becker, ‘Transnational Insolvency Transformed’ (1981) 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 706, 708.
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question as to how to deal with a situation where the payment order had been given 
to a bank situated in a different time zone from the insolvent entity, Herstatt. In 
contrast, there was a great legal uncertainty arising from the US Bankruptcy Code 
under which it could be argued that the mere presence of assets in the form of a 
bank account could constitute a separate bankruptcy estate. This, in turn, would 
have granted the US trustee powers over assets wherever located, including West 
Germany and consequently, all the assets of Herstatt.149 Consequently, there would 
be a trustee in the US and a liquidator in Germany risking a ‘turf war’ between 
the two. This legal risk was an incentive for the creditors to reach a settlement 
between themselves.150 Every issue at stake involved at least two national legal 
systems representing different legal traditions among creditors with high interests 
in the outcome. Despite the difficult conditions and the absence of formal legal 
rules or regulations, or as some argue because of the lack of the same,151 over 30 
creditors152 and the liquidator of Herstatt, and many other parties involved could 
find and agree on a settlement on February 1975 - less than a year from the date 
when Herstatt was placed into liquidation.153 The New York court dismissed an 
earlier petition for the bankruptcy of Herstatt and the remaining funds were soon 
transferred to the creditors in accordance with the settlement agreement.154 
Perhaps the origins and details of the concept of ‘Herstatt risk’ are no longer very 
well known, but it remains a widely known concept that refers to risks in settlement 
and clearing. The risk is about a situation where, in a reciprocal situation, one 
counterparty fulfills its contractual obligation and its counterparty fails to do the 
same.155 If Party A owes €100 to Party B, and Party B owes €102 to Party A, and 
Party A transfers €100 to Party B, the exposure of Party A is €202 towards Party 
B. Consequently, if Party B does not fulfill its end of the bargain towards Party A, 
Party A may have lost €202. The amount of time required to carry out a payment 
in a payment system or to transfer a security from one securities account to another 
are at the centre of this risk. As the example on the evolution of central securities 
depositories indicates, as discussed in subchapter 3.6, financial infrastructure grows 
149 Ingo AJ Klocker, ‘Foreign Debtors and Creditors under United States and West German Bankruptcy Laws: 
An Analysis and Comparison’ (1985) 20 Tex. Int’l L. J. 55, 59–60. 
150 Becker (n 146) 1293. 
151 Becker (n 148) 709.
152 ‘Among more than 30 banks, claimants to the account included Morgan Guarantee ($13m), a Swiss 
subsidiary of Seattle-First ($42.5m), Hesse-Newman of Germany ($39.7m), Citibank ($10m), Svenska 
Handelsbanken ($7m). About 3000 creditors made claims on Herstatt’. Mourlon-Druol (n 144) 327.
153 Becker (n 148) 710; as to the liability of the management of Herstatt for the bank failure, HR Dissman, 
‘The Obligations and Liabilities of Directors and Officers of Companies and Their Protection by Insurance 
– Germany’ (1981) 9 Int’l Bus. Law. 421. The management had entered into forward positions that 
caused losses and led to the bankruptcy of Herstatt. The German court dismissed the claim against the 
management as it was difficult to establish any personal liability, 422–23. 
154 Nadelmann (n 144) 10–11.
155 European Central Bank (n 84) 115–30.
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from market demand and states can facilitate the use of such innovations through 
legal recognition and enforceability. Financial technology has advanced greatly since 
the 1970s. The issue of how to manage the related legal risks in new technological 
environments has been a challenge ever since.156 
2.11.2 THE AFTERMATH OF HERSTATT
As described in subchapter 2.10.3, financial regulation comes in third place in 
the hierarchy of transnational legal order after the fundamental principles and 
transnational customary laws. Many of the interactions between transnational law 
and private normativity are about the interactions between ISDA and the Basel 
Committee. The Herstatt case acted as a catalyst for international co-operation. 
After Herstatt, central bankers saw a demand for international supervisory co-
operation and coordination between national regulators and a division of labour 
between home and host state regulators of transnational financial institutions.157 
Following the meeting of the Governors of the Group of Ten (G10158), the Basel 
Committee was established in 1974 under the Bank for International Settlements,159 
to meet such demands and to address such problems as those that were recognized 
in connection with the Herstatt liquidation.160 
The catalyst for the first Basel Accord (Basel I) was the 1982 international debt 
crisis which was followed by lengthy negotiations between the members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision;161 the initial purpose of which was to search 
156 Richard Dale, ‘Derivatives clearing houses: the regulatory challenge’ (1997) 12 J.I.B.L. 46, ‘[t]hese systems 
constitute an extraordinarily complex chain of financial flows and resulting credit interdependencies that 
I dare say nobody fully understands’ 48; Mark Hsiao, ‘Finality Orders in the Clearing System and OTC 
Derivatives Regulation in Hong Kong’ (2013) 43 Hong Kong L. J. 139, describing the payment-versus-
payment system as a private solution to the Herstatt risk in modern technological framework, 151–52; 
for the potential impact of new technologies on clearing and settlement, Alexis Collomb, Klara Sok, 
‘Blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): What Impact on the Financial Sector?’ (2016) 103 
Communications & Strategies 93.
157 Janet Austin, ‘The Power and Influence of IOSCO in Formulating and Enforcing Securities Regulations’ 
(2015) 15 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 1. 
158 Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and West Germany, <https://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm> accessed 1 June 
2019.
159 The BIS itself was established in 1930 to deal with reparation payments imposed on Germany by the 
Treaty of Versailles following the First World War. Being both a limited-liability company incorporated 
under Swiss law and an international organization based on international treaty as well as a cooperative 
body of national central banks allowing them to ‘keep politicians at arms length’, the BIS has a distinct 
nature among international organizations. Gianni Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for 
International Settlements (CUP 2007) 49–51; O’Malley (n 143) 55.
160 Concordat of the Basel Committee, known at that time as the Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices, ‘Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks’ foreign establishment’ (26th 
September 1975) BS/7544e <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf?noframes=1> accessed 1 June 2019.
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indicators for future banking crises as well as simply compiling a list of regulators 
in other countries. Reaching international standards was slow and gradual, but 
nevertheless it represented a multilateral approach to financial regulation. Basel I 
was introduced in 1988. The aim of Basel regulations have since been to harmonize 
international financial regulation through an emphasis on the assessment of credit 
risk, the risk that the other party to a transaction does not honor its obligations for 
reason or the other, standardized minimum capital requirements and risk-weighting 
of assets.162 Following the collapse of other financial institutions such as Banco 
Ambrosiano SpA in 1983 and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 
1992, the Basel Committee continued enhancing the cross-border co-operation and 
information sharing between national supervisory agencies.163 In time, Basel I found 
recognition in the EU through Directives and eventually, through transposition, 
also in the legal orders of its member states.164 
A random historical event, in this case the collapse of Herstatt, determined 
the choice of the initial regulatory path. It has even been claimed that the banking 
business came to be ‘largely about attempts to work around regulations and the 
resulting growth in nonbank alternatives in the far more complex financial system of 
today’. 165 These non-bank alternatives are generally referred to as shadow banking, 
which is examined in some detail in the next subchapter since they tell more about 
the interactions between private normativity, from individual consumers to private 
financial institutions, and financial regulation. The combination of government 
deposit insurance and the bailout function, or ‘lender of last resort’, a function 
of central banks to alleviate liquidity problems in financial turmoil, may have led 
to a situation where financial institutions had less reasons to internalize their 
costs for a potential failure. The revised Basel Accord (Basel II) was introduced in 
2004, which added new risk categories, including legal risk, to the requirements 
on supervised entities. Post-GFC analysis reveals that these regulatory measures 
were slow-moving and failed to provide a clear warning about the upcoming global 
financial crisis.166 Financial regulation of the OTC derivatives market returns in 
162 Marc Levinson, ‘Faulty Basel: Why More Diplomacy Won’t Keep the Financial System Safe’ (2010), 89 
Foreign Aff. 76, 77–80; Koulafetis (n 141) 2: 
 Credit risk can be defined as the risk of financial loss due to the borrower’s, bond issuer’s or 
counterparty’s (the “obligors”) failure to honour their financial obligations. The obligor’s failure to honour 
their obligations can arise due to inability or unwillingness. 
163 Anu Arora, ‘The global financial crisis: a new global regulatory order?’ (2010) 8 J.B.L. 670, 676–77. 
164 Federico Torzo, Peter Scherer, ‘The capital treatment of credit derivatives in Europe’ (1999) 14 J.I.B.L. 
144, 145–46.
165 Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick, ‘The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial 
Regulation and Lender of Last Resort’ (2013) 27 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 45, 56.
166 ibid 57; Dalhuisen (n 89) 718–720; Bezhad Gohari, Karen E Woody, ‘The New Global Financial Regulatory 
Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?’ (2014–2015) 40 J. 
Corp. L. 403, 426–28.
52
Transnational law of finance
Chapter 6. In this Chapter, however, it is already useful to highlight the interactions 
and interconnections between finance and financial regulation. 
2.12 STATES CREATED SHADOW BANKING
According to Adam J Levitin, shadow banking is not a product of organic evolution 
of the financial market but more of an outcome or a sideproduct of financial 
regulation.167 Essentially, shadow banks serve the same purpose as commercial 
banks. Like commercial banking, shadow banking has a function that can be 
characterized as lending, and likewise like commercial banking, shadow banking has 
a deposit function. Instead of deposits like in commercial banking, investors invest in 
the financial products offered by a shadow bank which they can withdraw similarly 
to how they can withdraw their deposits. Regulatory capital requirements set a 
low-risk weight for most of shadow banking products, from repurchase agreements 
to swaps and many others, which incentivizes their use and conveys a signal that 
these products are somehow safe, even when they necessarily are not. 168 Shadow 
banking is interlinked to the global financial crisis of 2008.169 
According to Roberta Romano, the global financial crisis can be attributed, 
not necessarily decisively, to a situation where many withdraw their investments 
simultaneously, a phenomen generally known as a bank-run, in the shadow 
banking sector. Similarly, to how everyday consumers can withdraw their deposits 
simultaneously and consequently cause problems for a bank, when many market 
participants do this, liquidity problems can arise in many interlinked markets 
especially when many own each other with short-term debt. In essence, one cannot 
fulfill their contractual obligations to pay someone else if a counterparty fails to 
pay the former, which can lead to a cascade of defaults. It is common to focus on 
the actions of private entities as the creators of shadow banking and regulatory 
arbitrage discussed in subchapter 3.5.3, bypassing of existing rules whereby 
a financial institution can reduce the amount it holds regulatory capital while 
maintaining the same level of exposures, as its motivation.170 The fact that shadow 
banking is a side product of financial regulation itself seems not to be an issue. The 
167 Adam J Levitin, ‘Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy’ (2016) 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357 357, 364.
168 ibid 379–407.
169 Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein, ‘The Growth of Finance’ (2013) 27(2) The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3, 6; Financial Stability Board, ‘Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues A Background Note of 
the Financial Stability Board’ <http://www.fsb.org/wp–content/uploads/r_110412a.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019; Shen Wei, ‘Demystifying Shadow Banking in a Bank-Centric Paradigm: A Comparative Approach’ 
(2017) 33 B.F.L.R. 1, discussing the ambiguity of the concept, 2–3.
170 Kristin N Johnson, ‘Macroprudential regulation: a sustainable approach to regulating financial markets’ 
(2013) U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 902–06, 914–18.
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discussion revolves around how to make more or shape existing financial regulation 
to reduce systemic risk, a problematic concept discussed in subchapter 6.4.171 
According to David Ramos Muñoz, shadow banking should not be viewed as 
a parallel financial system to regulated banking. Instead, shadow banking is the 
financial system we have, and the role that legal institutions play in its creation should 
be investigated more.172 In addition, rather than being somehow invisible or in the 
shadows to regulators, these nonbank financial shadow banking entities interact 
with regulated institutions and are visible to the same.173 The reason why many 
Basel-regulated financial institutions held non-performing assets was that Basel II 
incentivized them to do so by giving such assets a lower regulatory risk-weighting 
than the actual credit risk of the products. Financial regulation contributed to the 
creation of the GFC.174 Romano criticizes that post-GFC, the regulatory response 
has been to continue the failed strategy adding further to the complexity without 
offsetting benefits.175 According to Levon Garslian, ‘[o]ne thing is clear: the origin of 
the [GFC] lay not in the derivatives market, but in the economic imbalance created 
by the “defective” mortgages,’ and the excessive amount of opaquely rated credit 
default swaps sold on these assets.176 
From where do these defective mortgages and other assets originate? And 
how does consumer action interact indirectly with financial regulation and the 
OTC derivatives market? To put the questions into a historical context, during the 
last half of the 1970s, borrowing accelerated on all levels of western societies and 
changed the behaviour of corporates, governments, and individuals, which in turn 
created a demand for new types of business from groups of financial intermediaries 
to new types of securities. The growth of finance can be especially associated 
with two activities: asset management and household credit. Asset management 
brought benefits in that it opened new investment opportunities for customers 
171 As it does in, for example, Christina Parajon Skinner, ‘Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation’ (2016) 94 
N.C.L. Rev. 861, 868–873; Ross P Buckley, ‘Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global Finance’ (2016) 
36 Oxford J.Leg.St. 242; Anita I Anand, ‘Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?’ (2010) 60 
U. Toronto L.J. 941, 947; Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The global financial crisis, behavioural finance and financial 
regulation: in search of a new orthodoxy’ (2009) 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 23.
172 David Ramos Muñoz, ‘Shadow Banking: The Blind Spot in Banking and Capital Markets Reform’ (2016) 
13 Eur. Company & Fin. L. Rev., 157.
173 Anat R Admati, ‘The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking’ 
(2014) 43 The Journal of Legal Studies 35, 55.
174 Roberta Romano, ‘For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and 
Recalibrating the Basel Architecture’ (2014) 31 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 8–19. 
175 ibid 23; Chapter 6.
176 Levon Garslian, ‘Towards a universal model regulatory framework for derivatives: Post-crisis conclusions 
from the United States and the European Union’ (2015–2016) 37 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 941, for an overview 
of OTC derivatives regulation prior to 2008 in the US and the EU, 941, noting that both lacked ‘a 
comprehensive regulatory framework prior to the 2008 financial crisis,’ and noting that there is no 
consensus among experts as to the impact of OTC derivatives on the global economy in 2008, 969–71, 
976.
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and simultaneously facilitated access to diversified capital for corporations which, 
through increased supply of money, also likely lowered the cost of capital. On the 
other hand, the better access might lead to overinvestment to certain industries. 
As to household credit, wider access to capital could also mean overinvestment 
and excess consumption in relation to income.177 For consumers, the availability 
of household credit meant the possibility to extend the maturity of their mortgages 
and consumer spending loans, and the ability to divert available cash into further 
consumer spending. It was a public policy objective to make capital more readily 
available to consumers.178 Consumer credit cards were a driver for more convenient 
payment methods and of course generated business to the issuers, gave access 
to new financing methods, and, at least in some segments, led to higher risks of 
default and social ills.179 At the same time, bank de- and reregulation that followed 
from technological advancement decreased income inequality especially among 
the poor.180 The role public policies play in issues like homeownership have a 
clear systemic impact for the whole financial system which is why this aspect 
should not go unnoticed in scholarly research.181 As consumer credit and financial 
intermediation are connected also to the OTC derivatives industry, it is beneficial to 
identify some of their attributes in more detail to further highlight the interlinkages 
between seemingly unrelated markets. This all relates to a much larger topic of 
‘democratisation of credit’ and of the credit culture we live in.182 However, these are 
not central for the purposes of theoretically construcing the transnational law of 
the OTC derivatives market which is why the impact of culture promoting of living 
beyond one’s means is only mentioned here. Shadow banking is the creation of states. 
177 Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein, ‘The Growth of Finance’ (2013) 27(2) The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3, 5–6.
178 Stephen A Cowan, Susan E Foley, ‘New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance’ (1978) 13 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 1075; David M Darst, The Handbook of the Bond and Money Markets (McGraw-Hill, Inc 
1981) 16–17; Peter W Salsich, ‘Homeownership - Dream or Disaster?’ (2012) 21 Journal of Affordable 
Housing 17.
179 Sandra E Black, Donald P Morgan, ‘Risk and the Democratization of Credit Cards’ June 25, 1998 <https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9815.html> accessed 1 
June 2019. 
180 Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Alexey Levkov, ‘Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank 
Deregulation in the United States’ (2010) LXV 5, The Journal of Finance 1637. 
181 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform ‘The Role of Government 
Affordable Housing Policy in Creating the Global Financial Crisis of 2008’ describing the political 
objective that was backed by flawed and minimal evidence of increasing homeownership rate among low- 
and moderate-income families; the history of the public policy of affordable housing dates back to at least 
to the latter half of the 1970s, Dalhuisen (n 89) 547, n 178.
182 Dalhuisen (n 89) 547–554, 612–15.
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2.13 SHADOW BANKING AND CREDIT DERIVATIVES
Following the surge in consumer spending for goods and services that apparently 
fulfilled some subjective consumer need, one new and still a very common method 
of redistributing credit and other types of risk was, and still is, securitization. In 
short, credit risk means that a counterparty to a transaction does not meet its 
obligation when due and will not meet that obligation for full value, or even more 
simply put, the risk of loss if the counterparty does not pay when the counterparty 
is supposed to pay. Regardless of the type of transaction, it involves credit risk 
from deposits to loans and from bonds to derivatives.183 In the simplest terms, 
securitization refers to the assignment of an asset, for example a mortgage, to parties 
willing to bear the risk of credit risk. The securitizing financial entity, the originator, 
receives cash that the originator can use elsewhere, from the investors who buy the 
debt securities backed by a cash flow originating from mortgage installations. The 
cash flow, amortization of a mortgage, is tied to the debt securities, and the parties 
who have taken the risk of non-payment are the investors: if the debtor-consumers 
will not pay, the investors lose, and not the financial institution-originator who had 
originally granted the loans to the consumers now in default.184 
In its synthetic form, the originator does not assign the actual asset but 
transfers the underlying risk, thus in this case, the risk of the non-payment by 
the aforementioned consumer.185 Securitization requires much legal structuring.186 
Until 2007, academic literature may have ignored the in-depth analysis of credit 
derivatives used in securitizations.187 This structure involves the use of credit 
derivatives made under the ISDA MA architecture.188 Underpricing of risk in the 
183 Koulafetis (n 141) 3–11.
184 Mortgages are a popular debt type for securitization, but generally any type of asset can be securitized as 
long as the legal ownership of the asset can be assigned, the asset generates predictable cash flows and 
there is historical data available as to quantify the credit risk, non-payment risk, of the asset, Markus 
Krebzs, Securitization and Structured Finance Post Credit Crunch: A Best Practice Deal Lifecycle Guide 
(Wiley 2011) 75–76. 
185 For synthetic securitizations, Bob Penn, ‘Banking Regulation’ in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 114) 93–94; 
for securitizations, Geoff Fuller, ‘Loan Transfers, Securitisation, and Structured Finance’ ibid, 693–95; 
for a critical view, Oskari Juurikkala, The Law and Economics of Credit Default Swaps. Derivatives 
Regulation, Insurance Law, and Recent Financial Market Reforms (Faculty of Law, University of 
Helsinki 2015); Oskari Juurikkala, ‘Financial Engineering Meets Legal Alchemy: Decoding the Mystery of 
Credit Default Swaps’ (2013–2014) 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 425.
186 For an end-user perspective on how transactions were structured, Craig W Murray, ‘The Oil and Gas 
Lawyer’s Role in New Financing Techniques’ (1995) 42 Ann. Inst. On Min. L. 44.
187 Frank Partnoy, David A Skeel Jr, ‘The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives’ (2007) University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Faculty Scholarship Paper 1019, 1021 <http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
faculty_scholarship/119> accessed 1 June 2019; Steven Edwards, ‘The law of credit derivatives’ (2004) 
J.B.L. 617, noting also the negative regulatory attention this market attracted relatively early on. 
188 Krebzs (n 184) 125; Houman B Shadab, ‘Guilty by Association - Regulating Credit Default Swaps’ (2010) 
Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J 407, 422–24.
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mortgage market spread from securitizations, and, from there, to the credit default 
swap market.189 With an absence of standardized terms in the collateralized debt 
obligation market, market participants drafted and customized contractual terms, 
and innovated new financial structures to facilitate securitizations. Already before 
the global financial crisis of 2008, it was clear for some that the size of the credit 
risk would not be adequately captured by existing standardized contractual terms 
or that the arrangements could lead to transfer of risks other than credit risk, the 
risk that a CDS is supposed to transfer, in the market.190 
Some market participants knew and understood more about these interlinkages 
which paved the way for considerable informational asymmetries between dealers 
and end-users on the one hand and on the other also between public and private 
sectors more generally. Some knew more than the others.191 In the aftermath of 
the GFC and in the hundreds of litigations that ensued, numerous court scrutinies 
revealed that the terms and conditions of many of these structured transactions had 
been drafted poorly, and in an inconsistent or even in a contradictory manner.192 
While commoditization of risk through securitization generally allows better access 
to funding, financial engineering had become excessive in many respects before the 
2008 financial crisis.193
Aside from the economic benefits, what other drivers were there to engage in 
the securitization business? One answer is that regulators created an incentive to 
do so. According to James S Barth and others, the Basel Committee recommended 
the use of securitization and allowed securitized assets to have a lower capital 
requirement than loans. In hindsight, the incentive was distorted and created an 
incentive for structurally unregulated products. In earlier times banks knew the 
credit standing of their customers but this apparently became harder once there 
were no longer individual mortgages but bundles of co-mingled mortgages from 
which the actual credit risk was difficult to determine. A uniform set of regulations 
reflecting political compromises made the whole financial market subject to systemic 
risks.194 One reason is that the market transformed from personal (from creditor 
189 Shadab (n 188) 415–16.
190 Ian Sideris, Simon Puleston Jones, ‘How to Adapt ISDA Documents for CDOs’ (2005) 24 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 
78
191 Anita I Anand, ‘Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?’ (2010) 60 U. Toronto L.J. 941. 
192 Rachel Evans, ‘Inscrutable, Ambiguous and Inconsistent’ (2008) 27 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 28
193 Dalhuisen (n 89) 473–77; For a comprehensive overview and review, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
‘Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, The, ‘final report of the national commission on the causes of the 
financial and economic crisis in the United States’ (January 2011) Official Government Edition <https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
194 James R Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr, Ross Levine, Guardians of Finance – Making Regulators Work for 
Us (The MIT Press 2012) 51–54; Philip Rawlings, Andromach Georgosouli, Costanza Russo, ‘Regulation 
of Financial Services: Aims and Methods’ (2014) Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, 
University of London, 54–55, <http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/research/138683.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019. For a summary of common type of criticism, Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr, ‘Turning a blind eye: why 
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to known debtors), to impersonal (from creditor to a pool of unknown debtors).195 
In addition, since credit derivatives allowed lender banks to transfer the credit risk 
instantly away from themselves to other parties, lending standards deteriorated 
while the credit derivative sellers lacked the capability to properly monitor the 
ability of borrowers to repay their loans.196
At least one research team suggests that financially constrained borrowers and 
lenders may have an incentive to collude to overvalue the collateral of mortgages 
in order to receive and grant larger loans.197 Importantly, the information about the 
risks of the collateralized bonds were disclosed to the investors in advance, save for 
the size of the drop in home prices that very few anticipated, but the sheer amount 
of information required by prospectus regulations made it to some extent ‘akin to 
the difficulty that would be posed by searching the Internet without a search engine 
to systematically filter through and organize results’.198 
The Basel Committee, as an institutional choice, is cemented to the international 
financial regulatory framework in a manner that might have prevented and might 
continue to prevent the emergence of perhaps more efficient alternative forms 
of financial regulation.199 The power and weight of tradition of doing things is 
not limited to the Basel Committee but has been observed also in other areas.200 
According to Pierre-Hugues Verdier, financial regulation will continue to be shaped 
by three actors: the financial regulators, the financial industry, and great power 
governments, that each have their own reasons not to change the existing regulatory 
framework. 201 Similarly, Anat R Admati views the issue of ineffective regulation 
as a policy choice: 
[a] key reason for the repeated failure to implement effective regulation 
is the politics of banking. Banks are as fragile as they are because they 
want to be and because policy makers often see benefits to themselves 
Washington keeps giving in to Wall Street’ (2012–2013) 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1329–1340.
195 Adam J Levitin, ‘The Crisis without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 63 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 999, 1009–1010.
196 Moorad Choudhry, Structured Credit Products: Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitisation (2nd 
edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010) 2. For one summary of contributing causes to the GFC, ibid 9–15.
197 Sumit Agarwal, Itzhak Ben-David, Vincent Yao, ‘Collateral Valuation and Borrower Financial Constraints: 
Evidence from the Residential Real Estate Market’ (2012) NBER Working Paper Series 19606. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA <http://www.nber.org/papers/w19606.pdf> accessed 1 
June 2019.
198 Steven L Schwartz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009) Wash. U. L. Rev. 211, 222 
<http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/1> accessed 1 June 2019.
199 Lucia Quaglia, The European Union and Global Financial Regulation (OUP 2014) 35, 43, 55.
200 Rawlings and others (n 194) 14.
201 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation’ (2013) 88 Ind. L.J. 
1405, 1457–59.
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(or to other causes) from tolerating, and at times even encouraging, this 
fragility and have little to gain from challenging it.202
Whatever the legal theory one chooses to use, it should be able to somehow 
capture the private normativity aspects and interactions between finance, financial 
regulation, legislation, and even consumer behavior. The concept of transnational 
legal ordering could be the way forward and a case study on the evolution of the 
eurobond market discussed in the next Chapter could be illustrating in this regard.
202 Admati (n 173) 55.
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3. TRANSNATIONALISATION AND MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION 
3.1 MARKET LIBERALIZATION CAME AFTER THE EUROBOND 
MARKET 
The words ‘regulation’ and ‘deregulation’ are not absolute goods and 
evils, nor are they meaningful policy prescriptions1
Financial regulation can be understood to mean ‘any state influence on business 
conditions and behaviour patterns of financial institutes on the financial market’.2 
Following this working definition, state laws are a form of financial regulation since 
they demonstrably influence the business conditions and behaviour patterns of 
financial institutions or those working in them. In the words of Panayiota Koulafetis, 
‘[f]inancial intermediaries have always been regulated’, and due to state intervention, 
in the form of bailouts and nationalizations of financial institutions, their regulation 
has changed significantly.3 Financial liberalization is perhaps a vague but still 
a necessary umbrella term that helps to contextualize this research. Private 
normativity can flourish in illiberal market conditions. Financial liberalization and 
its systemic implications have been studied by many from different angles and 
there is evidence regarding its benefits and downsides in the short and long term in 
different countries.4 It is generally understood as a set of gradual and interlinked 
processes consisting of various economic reforms carried out in different states at 
different times. 
The following three-part categorization has been used by Graciela Laura 
Kaminsky and Sergio L Schmukler in their research on the evolution and impact 
of the same on nation states.5 First, there is the category of opening up of the capital 
1 Tom Davis, former U.S. congressman for the State of Virginia, III US House, Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators, Hearing before the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 23, 2008 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG–110hhrg55764/html/CHRG–110hhrg55764.htm> accessed 1 June 2019.
2 Alexander Wellerdt, Organisation of Banking Regulation (Springer International Publishing 2015) 27 
(emphasis added).
3 Panayiota Koulafetis, Modern Credit Risk Management. Theory and Practice (Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
2017) 1. 
4 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, ‘Liquidity, systemic risk, and the bankruptcy treatment of financial contracts’ 
(2015–2016) 10 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 15, 24–27.
5 Graciela Laura Kaminsky, Sergio L Schmukler, ‘Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization 
and Stock Market Cycles’ (2008) 12 Review of Finance, Oxford University Press for European Finance 
Association 253, noting, 280:
 [t]here is consensus that at the core of the link between crises and liberalization is the lack of good public 
and corporate governance and the existence of weak government policies and institutions.
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account liberalization. This is essentially the freedom for banks and corporations to 
borrow freely abroad without first addressing national regulatory requirements. In 
other words, what is typically deregulated are the exchange controls that outright 
prohibit or limit borrowing to and from either abroad.6 Capital controls include 
restrictions on capital inflows and outflows from one state to another. The ratio of 
the former for states is to reduce domestic dependence on foreign capital as well as to 
protect itself from the boom-bust cycle discussed in subchapter 6.2 by discouraging 
foreign investors from entering the market and overflowing the domestic market 
with foreign capital. In turn, restrictions on outflows of capital are to prevent foreign 
investors from exiting the domestic market. There are many ways to prevent these 
flows, but regulations often ‘[c]reate perverse incentives and other inefficiencies, 
and may worsen, instead of prevent, such [financial] crises’.7 
As evidence from the eurobond market suggests, exchange controls had limited 
impact in hindering lending to and from abroad. According to research by Dennis 
P Quinn and A Maria Toyoda, capital account openness was in a steady decline 
from 1958 until the late 1970s when measured by the existence and severity or 
magnitude of restrictions on capital outflows and inflows.8 Second, liberalization 
of the domestic financial sector may refer to deregulation of domestic controls on 
interest rates or controls on credit allocation. This could be summarized to refer 
to the level of state control on the formation of interest rates and the requirement 
for private institutions to subsidize or otherwise favour certain domestic industries 
over foreign industries. Third, deregulation of the stock market which refers to a 
regulatory environment where foreign investors are allowed to hold equity, shares, 
in domestic corporations.9 Typically, none of the three measures can be pinpointed 
to any specific date or occurrence, whether that be the signing of an international 
treaty or the enactment of state legislation with the policy objective of unhindered 
6 IMF Articles of Agreement, Article VIII, section 2(b):
 Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange 
control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be 
unenforceable in the territories of any member. 
 In the US, courts adopted a wider definition of what constitutes an ‘exchange contract’ whereas in 
continental Europe, courts adopted narrower definitions. This led to divergence and regulatory arbitrage 
already in the 1960s. Jody Daniel Newman, ‘Exchange Controls and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure 
as an Alternative Defense’ (1985–1986) 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1499, 1509–15.
7 Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, Jennifer 
Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (CUP 2013) 88–89.
8 Dennis P Quinn, A Maria Toyoda, ‘Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead to Growth’, The Review of 
Financial Studies (2008) 21 (3) 1403, 1410:
 [T]he 1960s through the early 1980s, in contrast, were characterized by a retreat from international 
financial openness. The closure from 1961 to the early 1980s was accompanied by decreases in the annual 
standard deviation of CAPITAL [an indicator used by Quinn and Toyoda]: during this period, it was 
financial closure, not openness, that spread worldwide. (emphasis added)
9 For the impact on business models generally, Peter Norman, Plumbers and Visionaries: Securities 
Settlement and Europe’s Financial Market (Wiley 2008).
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movement of capital or deregulation of existing regulation preventing the same.10 
Kaminsky and Schmukler note that the findings in this research area are often 
inconclusive and at least prima facie conflicting while they often share the same 
research point of departure, the capital markets.11 This dissertation also has capital 
markets, the eurobond market, as its point of departure followed by legal analysis 
of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. Linking capital markets with 
the OTC derivatives market from a legal perspective can potentially complement 
existing economic research by offering a legal description on how the financial sector 
changed, grew, and what social benefits and costs it may have brought with it.12 
The relevance of this pre-liberalization era for this research is that this 
development led in part to the emergence of the OTC derivatives markets. This 
market saw its modern emergence and exponential growth in the 1980s together 
with other financial innovations. The evidence is clear: inflows and outflows of capital 
were common and grew exponentially regardless of the outright prohibition and 
limitations on capital movements and even criminal sanctions on the same. Financial 
institutions and corporations still borrowed and lent abroad, raised capital from and 
invested in international bond markets and invested in foreign companies prior to 
these areas being liberalized or deregulated in the aforementioned meaning. Further, 
the evidence suggests that this was also the time of great financial innovation both 
in the financial product range offered, the emergence of financial infrastructure 
still used to date, and the rise of what is commonly referred to as transnational 
corporations. This is all the more interesting as Kaminsky and Schmukler refer to 
outright prohibition to borrow abroad as the most extreme form of restriction on 
capital movements which were common during the pre-liberalization era.13 
The general regulatory environment before that can be roughly summarized 
as follows. As to the capital account, banks and corporations were not allowed to 
borrow abroad, there were special exchange rates in force set by states, and there 
were restrictions on capital outflows in that any transfer of capital from one state to 
another were often prohibited. The domestic financial sector was subject to controls 
in lending and borrowing rates, certain areas were subsidized over others preventing 
the free allocation of capital, and deposits in foreign currencies were prohibited. In 
10 Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 265–66. For a literature overview in economics, Luuk Elkhuizen, Niels 
Hermes, Jan Jacobs, Aljar Meesters, ‘Financial development, financial liberalization and social 
capital’ (2018) 50 (119) Applied Economics, 1268, 1269–70, < https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/
files/54201649/Financial_development_financial_liberalization_and_social_capital.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019.
11 Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 254–55.
12 Robin Greenwood, David Scharfstein, ‘The Growth of Finance’ (2013) 27(2) The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3. Greenwood and Scharfstein calculate that in the US the value-added share of GDP of 
financial sector between the 1950s and the 1980s grew from approximately 2.8 per cent to 4.9 per cent. In 
their calculation, the definition of ‘finance sector’ includes insurance, securities, and credit intermediation 
subsectors, 3–4. 
13 Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 259.
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the stock market, foreign investors were not allowed to hold domestic equity, and 
even if they were, there were limitations as to how to repatriate capital, dividends, and 
interest.14 However, much was still unregulated. For example, it was not until the end 
of the 1970s when banks established in England became, following a series of bank 
failures, regulated by the Bank of England through the introduction of the Banking 
Act of 1979. The emphasis was on self-regulation further endorsed in the 1980s 
and 1990s by politicians and regulators alike.15 Nevertheless, from the late 1970s, 
deposit-taking banking became a licensed activity in the United Kingdom, subject 
to oversight by the Bank of England and its enforcement mechanisms, including 
fines, as well as mandatory crisis management.16 Within the European Community, 
banking was steadily becoming subject to pan-European financial regulation in 
the late 1970s and 1980s and this regulatory development can be characterized as 
being ‘revolutionary’ in its nature.17 Banking was hardly an unregulated activity.
A few remarks should be made before moving on to the transnationalisation 
processes that took place during the pre-liberalization era. Market liberalization 
did naturally have a significant impact on the earlier pre-liberalization business 
models. Following liberalization more characteristic of the 1980s, internationally 
active banks switched their former core business, deposit-taking, lending, and 
brokerage, to other emerging business areas such as the underwriting business in 
the capital markets and acting as a dealer between buyers and sellers. In other words, 
the business was to trade on their own account as a principal rather than on behalf 
of their clients as the agent.18 Often this meant that the business model switched 
from brokerage, thus acting as agents to facilitate trading between buyers and sellers, 
to acting as a principal with other market participants.19 At least in some aspects, 
deregulation in this process was gradual in that while the prohibitive regulations 
were in force, regulators allowed these activities by interpreting these regulations 
in a facilitating manner that in turn made it difficult to reregulate new types of 
business.20 Also in the OTC derivatives industry, this meant a division between 
14 This is a summary of the ‘no liberalization’ category used in Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 285–89.
15 Philip Rawlings, Andromachi Georgosouli Costanza Russ, ‘Regulation of Financial Services: Aims and 
Methods’ (2014) Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of London, 12–18, 
< https://www.qmul.ac.uk/ccls/media/ccls/docs/research/020-Report.pdf > accessed 1 June 2019.
16 Banking Act 1979, Chapter 37.
17 Matthias Haentjens, Pierre de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law (Routledge 2015) 
7–9.
18 Robert Weber, ‘New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the 
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy’ (2010) 63 Admin. L. Rev. 783, 805–11.
19 Market liberalization and deregulation is often tied to the reform referred to as the Big Bang in the 
UK which came into full effect in 1986. In many respects the Big Bang was a move towards formalized 
deregulation and reregulation of areas that were earlier self-regulated. Peter JR Bloxham, ‘The Financial 
Services Act’ (1986) 1 I.B.L.J. 73. 
20 Saule T Omarova, ‘The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking’ (2009) 
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Paper 1021 <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1021> accessed 1 
June 2019.
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two types of business: an intermediation service for clients and a dealing function 
on its own account. The difference, while very significant as to its repercussions in 
other areas of finance and its legal implications, was not even clear to the market 
participants themselves.21 
To summarize, since the future, adaptation and evolution of financial products 
is unknown, financial regulation is always behind in regulating new products which 
are by their nature not regulated when they are first introduced in the market. Flows 
of financial products became gradually deregulated while the market participants 
became reregulated by their functions.22 One does not need to go far to find and 
invest in unregulated financial products traded in the shadow banking sector. 
Financial innovations can be popular among investors, and despite their popularity, 
they can remain ‘in the regulatory backwater’. For example, the so-called exchange 
traded funds, or ETF’s, are currently the most actively traded financial products 
in the world and yet they still operate in a regulatory vacuum or in the cracks of 
existing regulations. 23 A cursory online search reveals that in order to trade ETF’s, 
it requires one to have a proof of identity, a bank account, access to a computer, 
a standard brokerage agreement, and a minimal amount of disposable funds, to 
build a portfolio on ETFs. ETF’s can be also built with derivative structures as 
synthetic ETF’s.24
3.2 ON GOVERNANCE THEORIES AND NARRATIVES
Already in the early 1980s, the general ethos was towards deregulation of those 
regulations seen as a hindrance to market innovation, and towards co-operation 
between public and private.25 Contemporaries of that time were by no means 
oblivious to the effects that public regulation can have on finance. While these 
theories are not central for the purposes of this research, they do provide insights 
as to how the concept deregulation is problematic. Deregulation as the primary 
driver for capital movements was seen early on as a somewhat misleading concept. 
In the words of EJ Kane, who approaches the issue issue from the perspective of 
21 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis’ (1988) 44 Bus. Law. 365, 373.
22 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
Volume 3 Financial Products, Financial Services and Financial Regulation (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 490–91.
23 Henry TC Hu, John D Morley, ‘A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-traded Funds’ (2018) 91 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 839.
24 For statistics of ETFs < https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/etf-etp/etf-etp.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2019. 
25 James H Fogelson, ‘The World of the ‘80s – 1980 Annual Meeting Program of the Section’ (1981) 37 Bus. 
Law. 203. 
64
Transnationalisation and market liberalization 
Hegelian dialectics,26 deregulation ‘diverts attention from regulations that are being 
tightened or left unaltered and from reallocations of regulatory authority’, how 
‘unchanged and tightened restrictions play at least as important role in shaping 
financial market structures as the particular regulations undergoing relaxation’, and, 
how ‘by realigning its organization structure, a financial firm can not only reorganise 
its regulatory environment, it can also create pressure on legislatures and regulators 
to rewrite the regulations under which it has to play’.27 Further, the link between 
regulation as the driver of innovation seeking to circumvent the same was already 
apparent during this era as ‘in a regulated firm, an innovation can be justified as 
well, or even instead [of accomplishing a task more efficiently], by its productivity 
in regulatory avoidance: its ability to release pent-up competitive pressure’.28 
According to Jonathan R Macey, who views regulation from the perspective 
of public choice theory, financial regulation is not shaped by political climate or 
public opinion. Financial regulation is much more about rather simple incentives 
and supply and demand for both regulation and deregulation. Public opinion is 
shaped by the political process, and this process, in turn, is driven by interest 
group dynamics. Interest groups might favour more regulations, re-regulations 
and deregulations depending on what relative advantage over their competitors 
there is on the table. The politician has both the incentive to pass such laws to 
gain political support and the incentive to claim that the regulations are in the 
public interest. Thus, it is the interest groups that shape the politician, who in turn 
convinves the public on the benefits of regulations, re-regulations or deregulations 
as the case may be. One benefit may be in making a regulation so ambiguous and 
complicated, that its ramifications are difficult to assess.29 To contextualize, this 
26 Edward J Kane, ‘Shadowy Banking: Theft By Safety Net’ (2014) 31 Yale J. on Reg. 773, 777; Heikki 
Marjosola, Regulatory Governance of EU Financial Markets and Institutions. Dealing with 
Incompleteness of Law and Constitution (Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki 2017) noting that 
while regulatory dialectic grasps the basic governance problem to some extent, ‘[i]t offers few tools to 
analyse the problem precisely, let alone ways to mitigate the cycle of unintended consequences by better 
governance models’ 39.
27 Edward J Kane, ‘Deregulation and Changes in the Financial Services Industry’ (1983) 39 The Journal of 
Finance, 759, 760, 768; Executive Director of Bank of England, David Walker, ‘Some Reflections on Big 
Bangs in Financial Systems’ (1987) 13 CBLJ 388:
 ‘[the very maintenance of the Glass Steagall restrictions appears to have been enormously influential in 
encouraging product innovation, the exploitation of legal loopholes and activity abroad, in just the same 
way as the former regulation Q ceiling on interest diverted “national” U.S. business to London and helped 
establish the Euro-dollar market there.’ 
 Regulation Q was a ceiling on interest rates that institutions could pay in the US to prevent a savings rate 
competition between commercial banks and other institutions entering the market, Stephen A Cowan, 
Susan E Foley, ‘New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance’ (1978) 13 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1075, 
1077. In addition to the Interest Equalization Tax discussed in this Chapter, Regulation Q may have been 
one significant factor in driving business offshore from the US, but due to space limitations, it is not 
investigated further.
28 Edward J Kane, ‘Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of 
Banking Regulation’ (1980) 36 The Journal of Finance 355, 358.
29 Jonathan R Macey, ‘The Myth of “Reregulation”: The Interest Group Dynamics of Regulatory Change in 
the Financial Services Industry’ (1988) 45 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 1275, 1277–82; Chapter 6.
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observation was made in the same decade when there was ‘undeniable movement 
towards greater international regulation of international business’ and calls for the 
business communities themselves to take part in the design of the rules applicable to 
transnational corporations as their exclusion from the processes might lead to costly 
opposition by the same.30 It is also acknowledged in this research that especially 
during the 1980s, ‘efficient capital market hypothesis’ was in vogue in economics and 
which was subsequently ‘hijacked’ by politicians in the 1980s for political purposes. 
31 These are not central issues for the purposes of this research already because 
much of the transnationalisation processes precede this era. 
This research could have been contextualized differently and filtered through 
a different kind of narrative that emphasises top-down policies for market 
liberalization by states. Instead of explaining transnational law through the evolution 
of transnational contracts, the starting point could have been state treaties under 
public interrnational law,32 switch from the Bretton Woods system to the fractional 
reserve banking system in 1971,33 or the introduction of international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund, or the establishment of Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the agreements for the 
liberalization of capital movements.34 Assumedly, they might have played a role 
in the transnationalisation of finance but the evidence put forward in this research 
suggests that much of the developments were uncoordinated and spontaneous 
driven by individual transactions carried out by a multitude of different creditors 
and debtors. However, transnationalisation processes might potentially be relabelled 
as an outcome of deliberate and externally controlled public policy driven by an 
underlying ideology and a political doctrine on markets and economy. This narrative 
is often coined under concepts like neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, or 
similar.35 
30 Jonathan I Charney, ‘Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law’ (1983) Duke 
L.J. 748, 787. 
31 Ronald J Gilson, Reinier Kraakman, ‘Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still A Matter 
of Information Costs’ (2014) 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 315–16 < http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/
virginialawreview.org/files/Gilson%26Kraakman_Book%20final.pdf > visited 1 June 2019; for an earlier 
analysis, Jeffrey N Gordon, Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research’ (1985) 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761. 
32 Gohar G Stepanyan, ‘Financial Liberalization and Foreign Institutional Investors: Literature review’ in 
Narjee Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cossett (eds), Global Capital Markets (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
2011) 19–23.
33 For an overview, Eric Helleiner, ‘Regulating the Regulators – The Emergence and Limits of the 
Transnational Financial Legal Order’ in Terence C Halliday, Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transnational Legal 
Orders (CUP 2015).
34 OECD (2018), OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, 4.
35 Ralf Michaels, ‘On liberalism and legal pluralism’ in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori, Suvi Sankari (eds), 
Transnational Law – Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (CUP 2014) 122. Michaels views 
lex mercatoria and Islamic law as ‘radical threats to the state’, 139, and the former as a manifestation 
of ‘neo-liberalism’ which Michaels does not seek to define further than as a type of a liberalism ‘that is 
not tied to the state but transcends it’, 137; David Singh Grewal, Jedediah Purdy, ‘Introduction: Law and 
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Fernanda D Nicola describes the rivalry being drawn between two groups in this 
area. Allegedly, there are ‘[n]eoliberal lawyers advocating for an efficient common 
market and greater regulatory competition and welfarist lawyers advocating for 
greater social justice and a European civil code for private law’. The reception of 
evidence is allegedly in both ‘camps’ calculating.36 Agustín José Menéndez notes that 
‘[w]hile it is hard to reconcile with neoliberal socio-economic theory, if such things 
exists, it provides a framework compatible with ordo-liberal, liberist, liberal, social-
democrat, or Marxist accounts of the [financial and political] crises [of the European 
Union]’. 37 If neoliberalism and its variants is factually true, as a policy based on an 
identifiable ideology, or similar, which can be reconstructed as a framework, then 
it may offer a purposeful starting point for wildly differing critical, normative and 
prescriptive worldviews. However, the concept is problematic. As is argued in this 
Chapter 3, much of the transnationalisation of capital markets and the evolution 
towards the emergence and dominance of private regulatory mechanisms used today 
emerged and gained popularity among market participants during an era when 
the public policies of states were generally geared towards curbing international 
financial flows. In addition, this market evolution took place apparently during 
an era when something referred to as neoliberal paradigm was not, according to 
Menendez, apparently even close to being mainstream.38
Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1; Antonio Segura-Serrano, ‘International economic 
law at a crossroads: global governance and normative coherence’ (2014) 27 L.J.I.L. 677, 688, 692; 
Michael A Wilkinson, ‘The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional Crisis 
of the European Union’ (2013) 14 German L.J. 527; Agustín José Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of 
the European Union’ (2013) 14 German L.J. 453; Julia Black, ‘Paradoxes and Failures: New Governance 
Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75 Mod. L. Rev. 1037, 1061; Dan Awrey, ‘Complexity, 
Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (2012) 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 235, referring 
to an ‘influence of market fundamentalist thinking on the established wisdom underpinning the Post-war 
push to liberalize international trade and capital flows’ n 7; Timothy A Canova, ‘Banking and Financial 
Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion’ (1999) 14(6) American University International 
Law Review 1572.
36 Fernanda F Nicola, ‘Transatlanticisms: constitutional asymmetry and selective reception of U.S. law and 
economics in the formation of European private law’ (2008) 16 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 87.
37 Menéndez (n 35) 465; Financial laissez faire is about the idea of free banking, i.e. the absence of 
government intervention into the financial sector including central banks, government-sponsored deposit 
insurances and government regulations on the financial system more generally. Kevin Dowd ‘Free 
Banking’ in Peter J Boettke and Christopher J Coyne, The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics 
(OUP 2015) 213; Kevin Dowd, ‘The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire’ (May, 1996) 106 (436) The Economic 
Journal, 679; Financial laissez faire in this meaning never existed during the timeframe of this reserch. 
For a historical case study, Tyler Beck Goodspeed, Legislating Instability: Adam Smith, Free Banking, 
and the Financial Crisis of 1772 (Harvard University Press 2016).
38 Menéndez (n 33) 476 ‘The neoliberal paradigm became part of the mainstream, emerging from the radical 
wilderness to which it was confined in the 1950’s and 1960’s.’ Similarly, Rajesh Venugopal, ‘Neoliberalism 
as concept’ (2015) 44 (2) Economy and Society 165, 168: 
 Before 1980, neoliberalism was an esoteric term, used scarcely, and then only by economists. Since 
then, it has become one of the most widely used terms across many social science disciplines, except in 
economics where it has disappeared.
67
Oliver Marc Hartwich notes that: 
If neoliberalism is hardly ever defined, if it can mean anything you wish 
to disagree with, then it is understandable that it results not from an 
attempt to gain theoretical knowledge but from the desire to defame 
your political opponents. In this way, the neoliberal label has become 
part of political rhetoric, albeit as an almost meaningless insult.39 
Echoing the argument of Hartwich, in his critique of the neoliberal narrative, Rajesh 
Venugopal acknowledges a fundamental problem in one of the central literature 
sources on the topic. It does not include a single source for what it considers a 
neoliberal theory.40 As further summarized by Venugopal, the problem is that the 
concept of neoliberalism, or its variant ‘ordoliberalism’, was from the beginning 
used by its proponents in ‘[e]ntirely contradictory and opposite ways’. The concept 
creates ‘analytical blind spots by conflating significantly different phenomena under 
a common term’. While not being necessarily useful for academic purposes, the use 
of ‘neoliberalism’ creates an unintended side-product that might be useful for an 
observer. It may tell an observer how ‘critical scholarship’ built on ‘[m]orally loaded, 
one-sided deployment of neoliberalism’ is constructed.41 For the purposes of this 
research, neither governance theories nor narratives are not that relevant as its 
primary purpose is to gather legal theoretical knowledge by applying transnational 
method to what is refers to as transnational law. What is needed to understand at 
this point is that transnationalisation does not require nor is dependenant on formal 
acts of deregulation by states nor political decisions of their electorates to liberalize 
capital movements as tempting it might be to think that it does. The evidence would 
more suggest that states sough to further ‘liberalize’ capital movements only once 
it was understood that investors had already liberated themselves. 
3.3 THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS: THE ONTOLOGY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
3.3.1 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Transnational method is first and foremost about acknowledging, identifying 
and studying private normativity and bottom-up law-making processes and 
their interactions with states. Transnational law is about conceptualizing a legal 
39 Oliver Marc Hartwich, ‘Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword’ (2009) CIS Occassional 
Paper 114, 2 <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/07/op114.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
40 Venugopal (n 38) 183. 
41 Venugopal (n 38) 183.
68
Transnationalisation and market liberalization 
phenomenon that does not fit well into existing categories of law. To illustrate 
this point, the concept of ‘transnational corporation’ is revisited. Transnational 
or multinational corporations have been researched at least since the 1950s. They 
were referred to being transnational in their ontology since they did not fit into 
existing categories of law. The terms are sometimes confusing and ‘always imprecise’ 
but transnational corporations have generally been understood in a more or less 
same manner as a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality with common 
ownership and a common management strategy.42 One of the modern notions 
of transnational law can be traced back to at least 1963, when Clive Schmitthoff 
envisioned a law of international trade, that would be autonomous by its nature and 
that would constitute a common platform for commercial lawyers regardless of their 
background, legal education, and the governance structure of their home states.43 
The observation of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations in 1985 
is as relevant as ever since in light of the evidence put forward in this subchapter, 
it is true:
[A] number of factors [...] conspire to make purely national control 
systems variously evadable, inefficient, incomplete, unenforceable, 
exploitable, or negotiable [...] with respect to transnational 
corporations.44 
Without seeking to mysticize transnational corporations, much about their ontology 
still remains unknown. Historically, transnational corporations were regulated 
from the outset in terms of export controls, securities regulation, antitrust law, and 
taxation but they could also operate in unregulated areas.45 As noted by Patrice-
Hubert Petit and David Chekroun, transnational company groups have a ‘strong 
national root due to the parent company’s geographical establishment’ while the 
majority of their turnover is ‘dispersed across the world’. More currently, these 
groups operate in an increasingly complex legal and regulatory environment. Yet 
it is still difficult to identify such ‘groups’ and their transnational elements from 
a state law perspective. For example, national legal orders tend to identify the 
single individual legal entities within a group but not the group as a whole. In 
such an environment, transnational groups tend to self-regulate their behaviour 
42 Raymond Vernon, ‘Economic Sovereignty at Bay’ (1968) Foreign Affairs 110, 114; Robert B von Mehren, 
Martin E Gold, ‘Multinational Corporations: Conflicts and Controls’ (1976) 11 Stan. J. Int’l Stud. 1.
43 Clive M Schmitthoff, ‘The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation’ in Chia-
Jui Cheng (ed), Clive M. Schmitthoff’s Select Essays on International Trade Law (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1988) 139.
44 UN Centre on Transnational Corporations: Environmental Aspects of the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations: A Survey (1985) para 51, quoted in Fleur Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational 
Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory’ (1994) 19 Melb. U. L. Rev. 893, 896. 
45 Mehren, Gold (n 42) 10.
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through their own governance structures.46 This is why the term ‘transnational’ as 
a conceptualization of private normativity is as relevant as ever.
The ‘exponential growth’ of transnational corporations was seen as a challenge for 
the legal profession and scholarship from the outset. 47 Generally, the intercorporate 
holdings of parent companies in foreign subsidiaries were often subject to local legal 
restrictions de jure but the impact of such restrictions were more that of a hindrance 
than an insurmountable obstacle for transnational corporations.48 Transnational 
corporations do typically have an identifiable jurisdiction where their headquarters 
are located: a local company register will tell an outside observer that much. Who 
actually owns transnational corporations? Transnational corporations can choose 
the venues where they raise their capital or in which exchanges their equity and 
other securities are traded and are in this respect autonomous from their stated 
home jurisdiction.49 
By using derivatives structures, the real share ownership in public companies 
can be hidden with relative ease. The development towards this possibility was 
noted as early as 1987 by the likes of Mark D Young and William L Stein, who 
noted how ‘[n]othing precludes the financial wizards from one day conjuring up 
stock-index swaps. If successful, the international and national equity securities 
markets would then be linked to self-regulated swap markets’.50 In principle, swaps 
can be used to replicate virtually any kind of financial transaction as demonstrated 
in detail in Chapter 5. According to one source, equity swaps that can be structured 
as stock-index swaps were introduced to the financial markets in 1989.51 Local 
withholding taxes imposed on dividends paid to foreign investors by local companies 
lose meaning. Foreign investors can reach the same economic position, without 
being subject to the withholding tax, by investing in stock-index swaps emulating 
the aforementioned local share-index in every economic detail.52 Combined with 
46 Patrice-Hubert Petit, David Chekroun, ‘Governance of transnational groups: what are the stakes? What 
are the challenges?’ (2016) 6 I.B.L.J. 617, 618, 625–26, 631–33; Peter Hansen, Victoria Aranda, ‘An 
Emerging International Framework for Transnational Corporations’ (1990) 14 Fordham International Law 
Journal 881, 882:
 [t]he nature of the transnational corporation as a group of enterprises with a unified structure and with 
common control and strategy has yet to find a legal regime that matches those characteristics. From the 
legal perspective, a transnational corporation is only recognized as a group of separate national companies 
established under the laws of different countries.
47 Detlev F Vagts, ‘The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law’ (1969–1970) 
83 Harv. L. Rev. 739. Vagts notes that ‘the multinational enterprise’ is ‘certainly post-World War II and 
largely post-1955’ creation, 746.
48 ibid 742–43.
49 AC Pritchard, ‘London as Delaware?’ (2009) 78 Univ of Cincinnati Law Review 473, 474. 
50 Mark D Young, William L Stein, ‘Swap Transactions under the Commodity Exchange Act: Is 
Congressional Action Needed’ (1988) 76 Geo. L. J. 1917, 1942.
51 Drew E Macintyre, ‘Financial innovation and regulatory trepidation: swaps and the OSC’ (1995) 25 CBLJ 
163, 165. 
52 David P Hariton, ‘Equity Derivatives, Inbound Capital and Outbound Withholding Tax’ (2007) 60 Tax 
Law. 313, 318.
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an option structure that allows the stock-index swap holder to acquire the actual 
shares, market participants are able to launch takeover campaigns on corporations 
in secret. 53 
Recent scholarship notes that derivatives can be used to subvert insider trading 
and anti-market manipulation laws. As Yesha Yadav summarizes the market, ‘[e]
ither this [credit derivative] thriving market is operating outside or at the margins 
of existing law-or the law itself has not adapted to the existence of these markets.54 
Credit derivative markets emerged in the mid-1990s in cooperation with a state 
financial institution, transnational financial institution, and a transnational 
corporation. In time, market participants developed their own private regulatory 
mechanisms based on the ISDA MA architecture for this market as further discussed 
in subchapter 5.10. Transnationally operating corporations can, as a technical 
matter, render local disclosure regulations meaningless with relative ease by using 
cash-settled options. The transnational setting leaves much room for financial 
innovation.55 Contemporary financial regulation in the EU require the holder of 
such hidden positions to notify these positions to regulators who disclose these 
positions to the public. In the EU, this requirement was introduced in the Second 
Transparency Directive in 201356 and the notification requirements were nationally 
transposed to the legal systems of the Member States in 2015. This took place over 
30 years after the rapid expansion in the OTC derivatives market. Recital 9 of the 
Second Transparency Directive notes the same thing addressed in this subchapter:
Financial innovation has led to the creation of new types of financial 
instruments that give investors economic exposure to companies 
[…] Those instruments could be used to secretly acquire stocks in 
companies, which could result in market abuse and give a false 
and misleading picture of economic ownership of publicly listed 
companies […] the definition of financial instruments […] should cover 
all instruments with similar economic effect to holding shares and 
entitlements to acquire shares.57
53 Elina Khasina, ‘Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership of Synthetic Positions in Takeover Campaign’ (2009) 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 904.
54 Yesha Yadav, ‘Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets’ (2014–2015) 103 Geo. L.J. 381, 386.
55 Armin J Kammel, ‘The dilemma of blind spots in capital markets – how to make efficient use of regulatory 
loopholes?’ (2009) 10 German L.J. 605
56 Article 13 of Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, OJ 
L 294, 6.11.2013, p. 13–27.
57 ibid Recital (9).
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Transnational corporations also benefit from wider array of choices and legal 
arbitrage in the transnational law market58 where ‘the specific cost-benefit position 
of TNCs [transnational corporations] translates into superior choice incentives’ in 
comparison to small or medium-size enterprises. The benefits range from scale 
economies of being able to use standardized contracts in different business areas 
perhaps globally to the ability to choose which bankruptcy regime applies to their 
operations.59 
Perhaps unexpectedly, in the OTC derivatives market, there has traditionally 
not been that much reason to engage in ‘forum shopping’, the one use of which 
is to strategically have a case heard in the most favourable court to the party or 
the parties, and not necessarily in the most appropriate court from a legal point 
of view. As the evidence put forward in Chapter 5 suggests, the vast majority of all 
OTC derivatives transactions executed under the ISDA MA architecture were from 
its beginning and for the time period relevant for this research, the 1980s to early 
2010, governed by default either English law or the laws of the state of New York and 
the jurisdiction English courts or the courts of the state of New York, respectively. 
The popularity of English law may have changed in the post-global financial crisis 
(GFC) world. For example, large market participants in the US started increasingly 
to negotiate for the inclusion of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to their derivative 
agreements with end-users out of the fear of class-action law suits which can be 
very costly and, in any case, public.60 In 2013, ISDA released the ISDA Arbitration 
Guide,61 and in 2018, the ISDA Choice of Court and Governing Law Guide at 
the request of its members. The 2013 Guide includes model arbitration clauses as 
well as model jurisdiction clauses that can be included to the standard ISDA MA 
architecture. 62 One reason is that market participants from emerging markets may 
find arbitration awards more easily enforceable than the rulings of New York and 
English courts.63 Historically, at least in the US, market participants have favored 
arbitration if market participants deem state intervention too intrusive or public 
courts unresponsive for commercial needs.64
58 Horst Eidenmüller, ‘The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational 
Corporations’ (2011) 18 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 707, 711, 730.
59 ibid 727–29. 
60 Zachary E Davison, ‘Minding the Gap: A Call for Standardizing Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses in OTC 
Derivative Transactions’ (2014–2015) 59 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 707.
61 ISDA, ‘2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide’ <https://www.isda.org/a/6JDDE/ISDA–arbitration–guide–
final–09–09–13.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
62 2018 ISDA Choice of Court and Governing Law Guide.
63 Peter Cresswell, Stuard Dutson, Connor Redmond, ‘Towards an expedited and cost-effective arbitration 
award in financial services disputes’ (2016) 82 Arbitration 306, 307.
64 Bruce L Benson, ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’ (1989) 55 Southern Economic Journal 
644, 656.
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Often the distancing and denationalizing of transactions from any particular 
legal system of a state has been the very objective of not only by the private parties 
engaging in what can be referred to as regulatory arbitrage (discussed in subchapter 
3.5.3) which is a public policy problem to some to be tackled by states and to others 
a part of the ontology and inherent and inseparable dynamics of transnational 
finance, but also public officials and regulators themselves. This development led 
legal researchers in the 1950s and 1960s to ask whether this development would 
bring to existence a non-national autonomous private entity (i) that does not have 
a de facto specific country of incorporation, (ii) that has a widely dispersed business 
activity and shareholding, and (iii) that has an internationalized management,65 
the members of which take its decisions in light of international economic factors 
affecting the non-national autonomous private entity rather than the national 
welfare as conceived by nation states.66 
Far from being unaware of the tension between public versus rising private 
power, there were early calls for international cooperation, the purpose of which 
was clear, ‘to enable world-minded corporations to serve the world’s interest as 
properly regulated citizens of the world’.67 The status of transnational corporations 
led to observations such as that ‘[t]he law, national and international, is completely 
out of date so far as transnational corporations are concerned’ and that economic 
facts over their ontology were being rushed at the cost of proper legal and political 
theory.68 Robert Gilpin summarized the situations as follows: 
[O]n the one hand, powerful economic and technical forces are creating 
a highly integrated transnational economy, blurring the traditional 
significance of national boundaries. On the other hand, the nation 
65 It might be useful to also turn to early findings made in management research in which the demand for 
‘international general managers’ was identified, Lawrence E Fouraker, John M Stopford, ‘Organizational 
Structure and the Multinational Strategy’ (1968) 13 Administrative Science Quarterly 47, 53–54.
66 Vagts (n 47) 789, noting also that certain off-shore jurisdictions enable the use of de jure place of 
incorporation and a de facto ‘declaration of independence from all significant relationships to a home 
country’ as well as that ‘[M]NE’s [multinational enterprise] at some point might decide that the legal and 
political burdens of their United States connection were no longer worthwhile’, 787. For tax structuring 
techniques employed by US firms already during the 1960s, Robert J McDonald, ‘Section 367–A Modern 
Day Janus’ (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1012. 
67 Anthony M Solomon, ‘Foreign Investment Controls: Policy and Response’ (1969) 34 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 118, noting ‘[s]ome 300 or 500 major international corporations will own seventy-five per cent of 
the fixed industrial assets outside the public sector in the non-communist world’, 125. The concentration 
of market activity to relatively few transnational financial institutions, the implicit antitrust concerns, 
and the increasingly complex regulatory framework was also acknowledged during that era, Benjamin J 
Klebaner, ‘Conglomerate Commercial Banking: Issues and Policies’ (1970) 44 St. John’s L. Rev. 499, 501–
9.
68 Arthur S Miller, ‘The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community’ (1960) 46 Va. L. 
Rev. 1539, 1571, n 7.
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state continues to command men’s loyalties and to be the basic unit of 
political decision.69
This has always been true in financial regulation: finance operates transnationally, 
and public regulations more locally, even where there is transgovernmental 
cooperation and there is loyalty to the nation state, even among financial regulators 
that in principle are there to combat risks that transcend national borders.70 Hence 
the concept of transnational law that conceptualizes the phenomena of private 
normativity that demonstrably transcend the borders of nation states and that 
includes elements that are hard to quantify or even to identify under traditional 
and established areas of law. In the 1990s, ‘transnational cooperation’ was to be 
understood as the cooperation between governmental agencies and transnational 
actors, that is, private market participants and their respective private trade 
organizations. OTC derivatives master agreements can be seen as the outcome 
of transnational cooperation.71 In 2015, scholars viewed ISDA as ‘the principal 
transnational trade association and standard-setter for the OTC derivatives 
markets’.72 
The risks and tensions that foreign direct investment of transnational 
corporations might pose to state sovereignty have been long acknowledged and 
analyzed.73 Policy makers sought to intentionally create modern lex mercatoria to 
facilitate and unify international trade laws. This work was carried out especially 
under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
and The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). 
These efforts took inspiration and drew parallels, perhaps hastily so, from historical 
lex mercatoria. From this perspective, national interference was seen as problematic 
for both international trade as well as the economic wellbeing of developing nations 
69 Robert Gilpin, ‘The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations’ (1971) 25 International Organization 
398; Chapter 7, n 137.
70 Chris Brummer, ‘Does today’s world need a global financial regulator?’ (2014–2015) 33 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 
18, 19, arguing that a political objective of establishing a global financial regulator is problematic given 
that nation states are unlikely to give up on their sovereignty. For an argument in favour of a global 
financial regulator, Tajinder Singh, ‘Does today’s world need a global financial regulator?’ (2014–2015) 33 
Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 18. According to Singh: 
 [m]ove to an enforceable system, whether treaty based or otherwise, will certainly not happen overnight. 
But now is the time to start thinking on this, and for wise persons to put their heads together; Chapter 6 
(n 135); Subchapters 6.4 and 6.7.5.
71 Thomas C Singher, ‘Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable 
Alternative to Congressional Action’ (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1397. 
72 John Biggins, Colin Scott, ‘Public-private relations in a transnational private regulatory regime: ISDA, the 
state and OTC derivatives market reform’ (2012) 13 EBOR 309 (2015) 378.
73 Vernon (n 42) 116–17; Raymond Vernon ‘Sovereignty at Bay Ten Years After’ (1981) 35 International 
Organisation, 517, noting how ‘the advocates and the opponents of multinational enterprises were already 
locked in furious combat’ by 1971. One might ask how much effect, if any, such discourse had on the 
transnationalisation of finance. 
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to which foreign direct investment was directed in exceeding numbers.74 For 
example, the home state of a transnational corporation might exercise its powers 
through the parent company, which in turn has a foreign subsidiary, making the 
transnational corporation potentially an effective vehicle to enforce policies over 
foreign states. In turn, from the investor perspective, the host state might exercise 
its direct powers on the foreign subsidiary75 or seek other retaliatory measures 
against such influences.76 From the host state perspective, the direct investments 
of transnational corporations could be viewed as an unwelcomed cultural expansion 
by foreign powers, especially those of the US.77 The ability of investors to avoid 
the applicability of the laws and regulations of the US was seen as a by-product of 
internationalization of transnational corporations.78 
3.3.2 LEGAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
As demonstrated in the preceding subchapter, transnational law is much about 
research on private normativity. The ontology of transnational corporations has been 
raised in earlier legal scholarship: it has been studied extensively under the rubric 
of transnational law and many legal scholars have characterized the ontology of 
the market in which transnational corporations operate as something that has ‘less 
and less significant identity with any single nation or government’.79 Transnational 
method helps to identify and name private normativity that transcends the 
boundaries of states and existing categorizations of law. 
Detlev Vagts already discussed the legal nature of transnational corporations 
in 1960s private corporations that transcended the boundaries of states on many 
levels and ‘which must content itself with string together corporations created by the 
74 Louise Hertwig Hayes, ‘A Modern lex mercatoria: political rhetoric or substantive progress?’ (1976–1977) 
3 Brook. J. Int’l L. 210.
75 For earlier discussion on investment treaty arbitration, J Gillis Wetter, ‘Salient Clauses in International 
Investment Contracts’ (1962) 17 Bus. Law. 967, noting also that concession agreements under which 
private corporations ‘obtained a more or less quasi-governmental status’ can be traced at least back to the 
18th century, 967–68.
76 Eckard Rehbinder, ‘The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European Legal Point of View’ (1969) 
34 Law & Contemp. Probs. 95, 97–98. Often such tensions involve energy sector, geopolitics, and 
technology transfers. For a cold-war era example, Patrizio Merciai, ‘The Euro-Siberian gas pipeline dispute 
– a compelling case for the adoption of jurisdictional codes of conduct’ (1984) 8 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 1, 
28:
 Present international law does not confer a single personality on the many legal persons, each 
incorporated under the laws of the different State, that together make up the single economic entity 
known as a multinational enterprise.
77 Solomon (n 67) 121–22.
78 Solomon (n 67) 118, 124.
79 Mehren, Gold (n 42) 1, 3. 
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laws of different states’ in comparison to intergovernmental organizations.80 During 
the same era, it was already clear that transnational corporations would be subject 
to conflicting national jurisdictions and that some of these corporations would 
be able to evade the jurisdiction of any state at least to some extent. Problematic 
phenomena from the state perspective were seen as ‘by-products of increasing 
internationalization of American business’.81 Further, many others have continued 
from these and similar findings by putting forward observations and questions 
about, for example, the nature of mercantile law as a body of customary law ‘which 
is the foundation on which national and international commercial legislation has 
been and continues to be built’.82 The critical role of a transnational corporation in 
wealth creation, and tax revenues needed to run a state, has been long acknowledged 
as has been the calls for their regulation. 
3.3.3 OBSERVATIONS FROM TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Transnational lex mercatoria has been a highly polarizing concept amongst 
academics and legal practitioners for a long time.83 Transnational lex mercatoria 
has been construed to operate as a part of customary economic rules, a subset of 
public international law.84 There is agreement among scholars that it is legitimate 
to refer to transnational commercial law that includes private normativity as one 
source of legal norms. Again, private normativity cannot displace national laws 
or public policies through contractual means. Nevertheless, transnational law is 
about legal norms that can derive from other sources than states. Such norms can 
be contract-based, and these transnational contracts form the transnational lex 
mercatoria of finance as is described in Chapter 5. As pointed out by Roy Goode on 
transnational law, the non-autonomity of international commercial practice, and the 
still ill-defined and not readily ascertainable concenpt of the new lex mercatoria, it is:
[A] set of legal norms not based on any one legal system but derived 
from variety of sources, some of which […] may not be legal instruments 
but may nevertheless be resorted to as evidence of a consensus on 
appropriate legal rule towards which arbitrators can be more responsive 
80 Vagts (n 47) 740.
81 Solomon (n 67) 124–25.
82 Harold J Berman, Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria)’ 
(1978) 19 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 221, 223.
83 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of Transnational 
Rules’ (1995) 10 ICSID Review, 208, 209.
84 For earlier discussion, Stephen Zamora, ‘Is There Customary International Economic Law?’ (1989) 32 
German Y.B. Int’l L. 9, 15, 23. 
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than national courts, and which can supplement but which cannot 
displace a national legal system determined under conflict of laws 
rules.85 
The existence of something referred to as a modern lex mercatoria has not gone 
unnoticed in the EU either.86 Empirical evidence suggests that the application of 
transnational law or modern lex mercatoria as an explicitly stated governing law of 
contracts is rare.87 Gilles Cuniberti acknowledges the limitations of conducting an 
empirical study regarding the use of transnational law or similar as the governing 
law of contracts. The empirical evidence available suggests that commercial parties 
rarely choose lex mercatoria, transnational law, or similar, as the governing law 
of their contracts.88 Such evidence has been often seen as a reason to bypass 
arguments in favour of the existence of transnational lex mercatoria or at the very 
least dispute its autonomous nature.89 Autonomous does not equate independence 
from surrounding societies in which autonomous action of private individuals takes 
place.90 One reason behind the seeming ‘gridlock’ in the autonomy of transnational 
law is that many understand what is meant by ‘autonomous’ differently and then 
use it in vastly different contexts. However, what can be agreed is that ‘[a]utonomy 
implies something that is outside the realm of the State’.91 In narrow sense, the 
autonomy can be understood to refer to freedom of contract and in a wider sense 
to the systemic autonomy of lex mercatoria itself. Some emphasize that norms arise 
spontaneously from business communities and some emphasize legal positivism 
and its exclusivity aspect and view the phenomena as ultimately a question of 
private international law. For some, the conceptualization of transnational law is 
85 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2nd edition, OUP 2015) 31. 
86 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization. COM (2002) 654 final, 22, ‘It is common 
practice in international trade for the parties to refer not to the law of one or other state but […] to the lex 
mercatoria’.
87 Christopher R Drahozal, ‘Contracting out of national law: an empirical look at the new law merchant’ 
(2004–2005) 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 523, concludes that the use of transnational law in international 
arbitration has at least served as a marketing tool for some arbitrators if nothing else, 549–51, and draws 
the conclusion partially from empirical evidence that demonstrates that corporate actors seldom use lex 
mercatoria and partially on the basis of a sociological argument put forth in Yves Dezalay, Bryant G Garth, 
Dealing in Virtue, International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal 
Order (University of Chicago Press, 1996) 88–91; similarly to Drahozal, Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Lex 
Mercatoria - Hoist with Its Own Petard’ (2004) 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 67, 82. 
88 Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria’ (2013) 52 (1) Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 369, also 
discussing how ISDA MA is not autonomous from national legal orders given the fact that it is governed 
by state laws and because of its inevitable connection to public policies of states, 376–77.
89 Terence C Halliday, Gregory Schaffer, ‘Introduction – Transnational legal orders’ in Halliday, Shaffer (n 
33) 3, n 8.
90 Bernardo M Cremades, Steven L Plehn, ‘The new lex mercatoria and the harmonization of the laws of 
international commercial transactions’ (1983–1984) 2 B.U. Int’l L. J. 317, 329–31.
91 Helen E Hartnell, ‘‘Living La Vida Lex Mercatoria’ (2007) 12 Unif. L. Rev. n.s. 733, 735.
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an ideological battleground at the expense of ‘scientific, inquiring spirit’.92 Perhaps 
with the exception of the last group, the differing views between legal positivism 
and transnational legal theory can find a common ground, and for those troubled 
by the idea of finance somehow escaping the state, it may be of comfort to hear 
that virtually every aspect of trade in over-the-counter derivatives and the terms 
and conditions contained in the master agreement architecture has become publicly 
regulated in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as discussed in Chapter 6.
To briefly summarize the findings of Emmanuel Gaillard, contemporary legal 
theoretical considerations on international arbitration tells that the legitimacy 
of international arbitration is recognized by nation states. National legal orders 
can accept the idea of an arbitral legal order founded on public international law. 
One can reach this conclusion from both natural law and positive law premises. 
‘Transnational’ does not mean ‘a-national’ or stateless law. However, drawing a 
theoretical construct is difficult as it becomes increasingly more complex the more 
one seeks to characterize these private transnational rules as an arbitral legal order. 
In other words, it is one thing to accept that transnational rules are applied in 
arbitral proceedings and another whether to accept an existence of a true arbitral 
legal order based on such transnational rules.93 
Transnational corporations themselves seem persistently to disagree with 
the suitability of lex mercatoria to govern their contractual relations. Its use as 
the explicit governing law of contracts is rare, but still a reality.94 Arbitral awards 
based on lex mercatoria are generally enforceable in national courts and its use 
may carry many benefits for the contracting parties.95 In a survey conducted in 
200896 found that ‘general principles of international commercial contracts’, ‘the 
lex mercatoria’ or the like are used as the governing law of contract ‘often’ by 6 
per cent and ‘occasionally’ by 13 per cent of the respondents, while 23 per cent 
responded ‘almost never’ and 58 per cent ‘never’.97 Importantly, this tells us little 
about the prevalence of transnational lex mercatoria. The governing law of contracts 
can be construed by using other phrases. Arbitral awards, for example, may refer 
to regimes, including equity, common law, or trade practices, custom, or usage of 
trade,98 and arbitral tribunals generally apply a particular component or ‘branch’ of 
92 ibid 736, 747, n 50. 
93 Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal theory of international arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 35–61.
94 Drahozal (n 87) n 39, 537–40, 543–44. 
95 Markus Petsche, ‘The Application of Transnational Law (Lex Mercatoria) by Domestic Courts’ (2014) 10 
JPIL, 489, 503–08.
96 The Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
‘Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law – A 
Business Survey’ <https://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_
civil_justice_survey_-_summary_of_results_final.pdf > accessed 1 June 2019.
97 ibid Question 23.
98 Leila Anglade, ‘The use of transnational rules of law in international arbitration’ (2003) 38 Irish Jurist 9.
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transnational law and determine the contents of transnational law on a case-by-case 
basis.99 Against this background, the aforementioned figure could be 100 per cent 
for ‘never’ and yet there would be perfectly room for transnational lex mercatoria 
under trade practices, custom, or usage of trade, and similar. As discussed, some of 
the transnational sources are not necessarily legal instruments provided by states, 
yet they can be said to be legal norms that can be drawn from a variety of sources, 
including those of private origin.100 Legal theoretical considerations aside, this is 
how transnational financial contracts and state laws can interact in court praxis as 
demonstrated in subchapter 5.2.5. 
Going back to arbitration, the ruling in International Court of Justice Barcelona 
Traction Belgium v. Spain101 might serve not only as an illustrating period piece 
on the evolution of transnational corporations but also as an observation on the 
spontaneous and evolutionary aspects of transnational law based on a contract:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the 
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the international 
activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which 
are often multinational, and considering the way in which the 
economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first sight 
appear surprising that the evolution of law has not gone further and 
that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the 
international plane. […] […] a body of rules could only have developed 
with the consent of those concerned. 102 
One traditional driver for the transnationalisation of arbitration was states 
themselves, or more accurately, the legal and political risk arising from states. These 
conflicts, in turn, tied transnational corporations to international law firms operating 
under and construing the arbitral awards under the auspices of public international 
law103 and specifically under the International Chamber of Commerce.104 Going 
back in history, the risk of nationalization of foreign assets materialized often 
especially in the petroleum industry in the Middle-East during the 1950s and 
1960s. These risks gave the parties concerned, transnational corporations and third-
99 Petsche (n 95) 500, 509. 
100 Goode and others (n 85).
101 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3.
102 ibid 89, discussed in Merciai (n 76) 28–31. 
103 Mehren, Gold (n 42) 8–10.
104 Thomas J Biersteker, ‘The Illusion of State Power: Transnational Corporations and the Neutralization of 
Host-Country Legislation’ (1980) 3 Journal of Peace Research 207, summarizing some of the techniques 
employed by transnational corporations as to ensure ‘a minimal loss of control over their operations’ 214, 
215–19. 
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world countries both represented often by Anglo-American law firms, an incentive 
to seek a neutral jurisdiction for the arbitration process which was often found 
among European countries.105 Allegedly, transnational corporations did not receive 
adequate compensation for the expropriation or other interference on their assets 
by states.106 It was already during these times, and partially through high-profile 
arbitral awards, when talks about the emerging ‘New International Legal Order’ 
entered the scholarly discussion and government policies. For example, claims were 
made that state sovereignty is relative rather than absolute when it comes to the 
natural resources located in their respective territories.107
Arbitral awards of those times have been referred to as the ‘founding acts’ of 
a transnational legal order, which in turn was created ‘merely by accident and 
without self-awareness’, echoing a degree of spontaneity as to its emergence, and 
how the legitimacy of the transnational legal order ‘rests on the way representation 
is structured’ on both sides of the conflict - often for the benefit of especially Anglo-
American intermediaries.108 As it was then, it is still common for contracting parties 
to ‘contract-out’ from countries with less developed legal infrastructure by using 
international arbitration instead of local courts and local laws.109 
The outflow of capital from oil-exporting states is also and at least indirectly 
connected to the issue of eurobonds and the rapid emergence of the eurodollar 
market,110 and directly connected to: the proliferation of bank lending in the 1970s 
when sovereigns became the borrowers and oil-exporting states their creditors 
via commercial banks;111 the so-called ‘petrodollars’ and the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries in general;112 the early notion of how ‘an integrated 
worldwide capital market exists today beyond the control of any one nation or 
monetary authority’ the regulation of which would to some extent require ‘some 
sacrifice of national sovereignty’;113 the impact of petrodollars on the demand for 
105 Dezalay, Garth (n 87) 63–69. 
106 Samuel KB Ansante, ‘International law and foreign investment: a reappraisal’ (1988) 37 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 
588, 604–09; Richard Hay, ‘Protecting assets from political risk’ (1997) 3 P.C.B. 1997, 152, 153.
107 K Venkata Raman, ‘Transnational corporations, international law, and the new international economic 
order’ (1978–1979) 6 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 17. 
108 Dezalay, Garth (n 87) 65–75.
109 Eidenmüller (n 58) 732.
110 Stuart R Singer, ‘Current Problems of Structuring Petrodollar Loans’ (1976) 27 Mercer L. Rev. 469; 
Corinne R Rutzke, ‘The Libyan Asset Freeze and Its Application to Foreign Government Deposits in 
Overseas Branches of United States Banks: Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co’ (1988) 3 
Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 241, 254.
111 Lee C Bucheit, ‘A Lawyer’s Perspective on the New International Financial Architecture’ (1999) 14(7) 
J.I.B.L. 225; RM Auerback, ‘Sovereign debt – default and restructuring of debts owed to private creditors’ 
(2003) 18(11) J.I.B.L.R. 440.
112 Walter J Levy, ‘The Years That the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects’ 
(1978) 57 Foreign Aff. 287.
113 Jahangir Amuzegar, ‘OPEC and the Dollar Dilemma’, (1978) 56 Foreign Aff. 740, 747–50, discussing 
how the eurodollars are outside the reach of the US and the futility of attempting to control this through 
currency and capital controls and the overall limited policy choices the US had at its disposal at that time.
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new financial regulation already in the 1970s,114 and for the development of the 
European integration and the problem of the member states of the EEC in dealing 
with difficulties in balance of payments.115 These developments are not central for 
the description of the transnationalisation processes of finance, explained through 
the evolution of transnational contracts, which is why they are only mentioned here.
3.4 THE EUROBOND MARKET REVISITED: THE EMERGENCE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The history of the eurobond market is also the history of the OTC derivatives market 
and without knowing the former, it may be difficult to form a transnational view of 
the latter. As described by Peter Gallant, ‘The Eurobond markets have no home’. The 
term ‘eurobond’ is jargon originating from the 1960s which refers to debt securities 
that are not domestic in their nature as they are not sold in the home currency of 
the borrower or the borrower’s home market. Nor are they foreign debt securities, as 
they are not intended to be sold to investors in the place where they are issued. The 
eurobond market grew rapidly in the 1980s and one of the main reasons for this was 
that eurobonds combined with swaps, a common type of OTC derivative discussed 
in Chapter 5, allowed market participants to avoid local exchange controls.116 The 
precise meaning of eurobond is somewhat context bound.117 Eurobonds were from 
the beginning used as a means of finance by private borrowers and public actors 
from governments to international financial organizations.118 The idea of syndicated 
underwriting bond arrangements dates back to at least the end of 19th century and 
as such, the eurobond market was not a new phenomenon; Neither are capital 
flows from one jurisdiction to another.119 
As an introduction, it is useful to briefly summarise the idea and process of 
a bond issue. Bond issues are a central type of transaction that can take place in 
international capital markets to raise funds from the market for both states and 
114 Mehren, Gold (n 42) 1, 5.
115 Peter Herzog, ‘The European Community and the Recycling of Petrodollars’ (1975) 3 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & 
Com. 425. 
116 Peter Gallant, The Eurobond Market (Woodhead-Faulkner 1988) 7–9, 144–45. Later on, eurobond issues 
were to be referred to as ‘international bonds’ or simply ‘bond issues’, to avoid confusion with the euro 
as a separate currency, Geoff Fuller, ‘Bond Issues’ in Sarah Paterson, Rafal Zakrzewski (eds), McKnight, 
Paterson and Zakrzewski on the Law of International Finance (2nd edition, OUP 2017) 536.
117 Dalhuisen (n 20) 662.
118 Georges R Delaume, ‘Choice of Law and Forum Clauses in Euro-Bonds’ (1972) 11 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
240, 244–45.
119 Stefano Battilossi, ‘Financial innovation and the golden ages of international banking: 1890–1931 and 
1958–81’ (2000) Financial History Review 141, 154. 
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corporations. Bond instruments represent a debt that the bondholder who is entitled, 
as against the issuer of the bond, to payment of the debt, as well as entitled to sell 
and buy them on the market. Before the bonds are sold to the larger public, the 
bonds will first be subscribed and bought by a small group of underwriter syndicate 
banks from the bond issuer for a fee. The syndicate then resells the bonds on the 
secondary market to a much larger group of potential investors where they can 
trade, depending on whether there are buyers and sellers.120 
One of the earliest syndicated eurobond issues already possessed many of the 
main features of any debt securities issue today. It is also an early example of 
the interaction between private parties and governments and financial and legal 
innovation driven by the urge to structure transactions in order to reduce tax burdens 
specifically and the impact of state regulation generally - in this example at the 
permission, indifference, or outright demand of state officials to do so. It should 
also be noted from the outset that other types of financing techniques were already 
booming during the same era due to the emergence of the eurobond market. Many 
of them were the result of the emergence of the eurobond market but for the present 
purposes they are not central.121 
The first syndicated and dollar-denominated eurobond issue is attributed to a 
state-owned corporation. The bond issue involved negotiation between an Italian 
state-owned company Istituto per la Riscostruzione Industriale’s (IRI) subsidiary, 
Autostrade as the borrower, S.G. Warburg & Co., an English merchant bank as the 
lead manager, and Deutsche Bank and Rotterdamsche Bank as the co-managers 
(together the Syndicate). First, as to its constituting elements, the eurobond was 
issued in a foreign currency to both the Italian borrower, who needed US dollars to 
finance its operations, and the place of issue, the United Kingdom.122 The eurobond 
was aimed by the Syndicate to a few selected investors on the market.123 The US 
dollar-denominated issue was listed both in recognized exchanges in London as well 
as in Luxembourg, where the listing requirements were considerable but yet still 
lighter than those of the London Stock Exchange.124 It was an offshore investment 
120 Fuller in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 116) 535–38.
121 It was already common to structure new credit to a legal form that would not show as debt on the balance 
sheet, thus the concept of ‘off-balance-sheet treatment’, of the debtor. The level of indebtedness of the 
debtor is typically controlled by creditors through financial covenants - a contractual private regulatory 
mechanism - on the capital structure of the borrower. Samuel C Butler, ‘Legal and Practical Aspects of 
Nonconventional Types of Financing That Have Developed and Are Now Developing’ (1968) Pub. Util. L. 
41. Such objectives also contributed to the increasing length of the terms and conditions. For example, the 
definition ‘indebtedness’ could exceed one printed page in length, 45.
122 Autostrade $15,000,000 5½ guaranteed bonds, maturing between 1972 and 1978, Gallant (n 113) 12–13; 
Chris O’Malley, Bonds Without Borders: A History of the Eurobond Market (John Wiley & Sons 2014) 
23–26.
123 This technique would now be known as ‘private placement’. Haentjens, Gioia-Carabellese (n 17) n 72.
124 O’Malley (n 122) 24–25. In practice, it involves the production of a sales document referred to as 
prospectus the content of which must meet specified content and disclosure standards. For prospectuses, 
Fuller in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 116) 535; Haentjens, Gioia-Carabellese (n 17) 30–39. Listing of 
Eurobonds to stock exchanges could have been a mere formality. Gallant (n 116) 141–42. 
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in that while otherwise tightly regulated environment, the eurobond issues were 
largely exempt from local UK regulations applicable to local entities. Structuring 
the IRI issue as an offshore investment was also a direct requirement set by the 
UK officials for foreign issuers and the Syndicate. The offshore status combined 
with the prior experience, expertise, and common language, financial institutions 
draw market participants to this market.125 
The Syndicate first underwrote, i.e. bought the bonds, and then sold the bonds 
to non-UK investors who could afford to invest and found the IRI eurobonds 
profitable. The main reason behind this structure was state laws, the effect of which 
the parties concerned sought to avoid. Investors residing in the UK were subject 
to local exchange controls and withholding of tax rules, whereas foreign investors 
were not. In contrast, directing the bond issue to UK residents would likely have 
made it subject to all UK rules and regulations, and quite likely to income tax that 
is withheld ‘at the source’ meaning that the investors would receive their funds net 
of taxes rather than gross. With decreased profit, it would have been challenging 
for the managers to sell the bonds to potential investors. The legal risk was that 
the local tax officials would deem the investors to be UK residents to which the tax 
applied. 126 At that time, England was protectionist over its domestic capital market 
against foreign borrowers but encouraged foreign investors to use London as a place 
to raise capital in other currencies.127 The bonds issued were in bearer form, which 
meant that the bondholders retained anonymity as the eurobonds were viewed as 
a negotiable instruments128 essentially meaning that they were transferable to a 
third party who, as its bearer, was entitled to the interest and repayment and had 
unencumbered ownership of the eurobond. This differed from, for example, shares 
and shareholders who would typically have to be registered to a public register. 
Eurobonds were also tax efficient in that foreign investors were exempted from 
the English income tax on the interest receipts of the eurobonds.129 As a negotiable 
instrument, the eurobond included a whole legal framework of its own. This status 
was limited as the contracting parties could not establish binding third-party effects 
of the eurobonds. The aspect of who has the ownership rights over a claim would 
still be determined on the basis of national laws.130
125 O’Malley (n 122) 18.
126 ibid 23–5, 41; Battilossi (n 119) 165–66. 
127 Norbert Horn, ‘A Uniform Approach to Eurobond Agreements’ (1977) 9 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 753, 742, n 
5, referring to Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6 c. 14.: Bank of England, E.C. 7 (July 17, 1968).
128 Negotiable instrument is an English law concept that was applied to bonds. Later on, the concept of 
transferring bonds as physical instruments and negotiable instruments largely disappeared following 
technological advancement and, as discussed in this chapter, transnationalisation of the market. Fuller in 
Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 116) 543, 10.3.3.
129 O’Malley (n 122) 23–25, 41; Battilossi (n 119) 165–66. 
130 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, The 
Transnationalisation of Commercial and Financial Law and of Commercial, Financial and Investment 
Dispute Resolution. The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources. Volume 1 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 373.
83
The news of the IRI issue spread throughout Europe fast. As discussed, US 
dollars were in high demand outside the US, whereas many US-based investors 
were keen on investing abroad. New eurobonds were issued first by governmental 
entities and international institutions, but also exceedingly by corporations.131 US-
based corporations were expanding heavily abroad, especially by investing directly 
into Europe with US dollars. They would also establish subsidiary presence and 
operate the business themselves rather than trade directly with foreign corporations. 
US corporations had concerns of a legal risk. The US government might tighten or 
introduce new export restrictions, place restrictions on foreign direct investment 
and introduce new tax regimes applicable to the same. The US government did 
indeed introduce several measures to prevent US dollar capital outflow to balance 
the deficit in its foreign payment accounts. Government officials considered this 
to be the least-cost route in comparison to other policy choices considered at that 
time as politically and economically unacceptable.132 
3.4.2 THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
To understand the history of financial regulation is, it is necessary to know about 
its modern origins.133 Capital controls were the central regulatory element of the 
post-World War II regulatory environment in the 1950s and 1960s. These control 
measures were means to stabilize fluctuations in domestic currencies and domestic 
markets of individual states. The post-war international financial order represented 
by the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement was to promote free trade of goods but not 
the free movement of capital. In contrast to the more laissez faire approach suggested 
by some private actors ,134 state officials favoured interventionist approaches where 
the former were to serve political and economic goals of states, the powers of 
which were to be preserved. The use of permanent exchange controls was to be 
the norm and capital movements were to be controlled by nation states. The use 
of regulatory measures, such as exchange controls, were even promoted by new 
public international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund,135 the 
policy of which was to explicitly allow its member states to impose restrictions and 
to use fiscal and monetary measures to combat the possible negative impact of 
131 Andre WG Newburg, ‘Financing in the Euromarket by U.S. Companies: A Survey of the Legal and 
Regulatory Framework’ (1977–1978) 33 Bus. Law. 2171, 2172.
132 Solomon (n 67) 118, 119.
133 For another summary, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘The Political Economy of International Financial 
Regulation’ (2013), 88 Ind. L.J. 1405, 1409–13.
134 Laissez faire and free banking are outside the scope of this research; (n 37).
135 Eric Helleiner, States and the reemergence of global finance: from Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Cornell 
University Press 1996) 25–29.
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capital flows.136 These restrictions remained in force until the 1990s.137 In that era, 
nation states could use far-reaching interventionist and selective strategies, virtually 
of their choosing, from the rate of interest to the distribution and size of credit 
flows, from one sector of the domestic economy to the other. The private sector, 
both banking and business, was heavily-regulated in terms of foreign business and 
their operational sphere was characterized by state protectionism, both in finance 
and in trade, meaning that the private sector remained in ‘a permanent state of 
liquidity rationing’.138 
The evidence suggests that prohibitive regulations did not satisfy nor apparently 
suppress the demand for capital. States, state-controlled entities, and private 
corporations were in dire need of foreign capital generally, and strong US dollars 
specifically, following the reconstruction boom after World War II. Simultaneously, 
for US asset managers that invested on behalf of investors, new business 
opportunities arose not only in trade but also in foreign direct investment in US 
dollars, of which they had plenty.139 Following the logic of supply and demand, this 
meant the increasing outflow of US dollars to the rest of the world, including Europe. 
This was a public policy problem for the US in that the outflow led to a deficit in its 
balance of payments.140 The size of the eurobond market during its formative years 
from 1963 to 1975 was hard to measure statistically, but what is known is that the 
136 For an overview, Timothy A Canova, ‘Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal 
Contagion’ (1999) 14(6) Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 1572, 1610–13; O’Malley (n 122) 12.
137 Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 260–62.
138 Lars Jonung, Jaakko Kiander, Pentti Vartia, ‘The great financial crisis in Finland and Sweden – The 
dynamics of boom, bust and recovery, 1985–2000’ (2008) 350 Economic Papers, European Commission, 
December 2008, 11 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication_summary13549_en.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2019; For an overview of the US regulations on imports and exports, and their impact 
on transnational corporations, Mehren, Gold (n 42) 10, 11–13; Douglas W Arner; Michael W Taylor, 
‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International 
Financial Regulation’ (2009) 32 U.N.S.W.L.J. 488, summarizing, 509–10: 
 At the end of the Second World War, reflecting the view that while global trade was desirable, global 
finance was not, the Bretton Woods structure did not provide a specific hard law, international institution-
based structure for finance because the design was based on the premise that finance would be domestic 
and subject therefore only to domestic regulation. (emphasis added)
139 Substantial parts of these assets held by US asset managers might have been actually those of communist 
states who earned US dollars for their raw material exports and used these assets to buy machinery and 
grain. Fearing that the US might freeze these assets in the US, these investors chose to invest and divest 
their assets into the eurobond and eurodollar market, George H Windecker Jr, ‘The Eurodollar Deposit 
Market: Strategies for Regulation’ (1993) 9 (1) Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 357, 361, n 18, n 19; Corinne R Rutzke, 
‘The Libyan Asset Freeze and Its Application to Foreign Government Deposits in Overseas Branches of 
United States Banks: Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co’ (1988) 3 Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 241, 252–
53.
140 Solomon (n 67) 118; Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969: P.L. 91–
128: 83 Stat. 261, 24, November 26, 1969, Hearing before the Committee on Finance, September 3, 1969, 
Washington, Covington & Burling. (Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969)).
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market grew rapidly141 and the investor base was global and included states with 
closed economies, such as the Soviet Union.142
Regardless of the regulatory environment, the 1960s saw the rapid introduction 
and deployment of financial and legal innovations that circumvented many of the 
restrictions placed on capital movements or simply existed outside any form of 
government regulation. Put into legal theoretical context, these market actors acted 
and relied on fundamental principles of private property, freedom of contract, and 
pacta sunt servanda. By the 1970s, cross-border capital movements had reached a 
level so high that it became known as the ‘golden era of banking’.143 This phenomenon 
has been covered from many angles during the last decades,144 but nowadays more 
often as a passing footnote. However, the emergence of the eurobond and the 
eurodollar market may hold important and timeless observations about the nature 
of, and the interactions between, finance and law. 
For the purposes of this research, the history of the largest bond market in the 
world, the eurobond market,145 may also shed light on why the OTC derivatives 
market came to grow rapidly in the 1980s, why ISDA emerged, why and how it 
grew to its prominent role, and why the ISDA MA architecture became the industry-
standard used by private institutions and sovereigns alike. Cross-currency swaps 
linked the world’s largest capital market, the eurobond market, together. From its 
early beginning in the 1960s, the eurobond market evolved and became interlinked 
closely with modern derivatives markets that started its emergence in the 1970s 
through the increasing demand for interest rate and currency swaps, a type of 
derivative structure. 146 Local exchange controls were not much of a hindrance for 
cross-border capital movements.147
141 Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140) 24; Claudio Segre, ‘The development of 
a European capital market. Report of a Group of Experts appointed by the EEC Commission’. November 
1966, EU Commission – Working Document, 360–1 <http://aei.pitt.edu/31823/> accessed 1 June 2019.
142 Singer (n 110) 473–74.
143 Battilossi (n 119) 141. It is worth noting that even in such a heavily regulated environment, regulations 
now considered to be at the core of financial regulation did not yet exist at that time. For example, the 
existence and enforcement of insider trading laws is by and large a much more recent phenomenon, 
Kaminsky, Schmukler (n 5) 289. 
144 Christopher J Mailander, ‘Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the International Marketplace: 
Lessons on Meeting Globalization’s Challenge Drawn from the International Bond Market’ 31 Geo. Wash. 
J. Int’l L. & Econ. 341 (1997); Virginia K Trioa, ‘An Overview of the Eurobond Market’ (1987) 12N.C. J. 
Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 331 <http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol12/iss3/2> accessed 1 June 2019.
145 For an overview of the market size, <https://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm> accessed 1 June 2019.
146 Syndicated bonds, swaps, offshore transactions, and regulation as the drivers for financial innovation 
precede this era, Battilossi (n 119) 158–59. Financial market data from the nineteenth century is ‘less than 
perfectly reliable and not easy to interpret’, Raouf Boucekkin, Fréderic Docquier, Fabien Ngendakuriyo, 
Henrik Schmigelow, ‘Contract Rules in Codes and Statutes: Easing Business Across the Cleavages of Legal 
Origins’ in Michèle Schmiegelow, Henrik Schmiegelow (eds), Institutional Competition between Common 
Law and Civil Law – Theory and Policy (Springer 2014) 61.
147 Richard Roberts, ‘Setting the City free: the impact of the U.K. abolition of exchange controls’ (2000) 2 
J.I.F.M. 2000, 132. Roberts also notes that it was not the abolition of exchange controls that led to the 
eminence of the City, but how the exchange controls had only reinforced its position as an international 
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Free movement of capital was one of the fundamental freedoms and public 
policy objectives of the European integration project from the beginning. In practice, 
however, these ideals started have practical meaning in the mid 1980s.148 A short 
selection of early case law of the European Court of Justice may illustrate the 
legal problems that hindered the free movement of capital. In Europe, the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (the EEC Treaty) entered into 
force on 1 January 1958. Pursuant to Article 67 (1) of the Treaty, the Member States: 
[S]hall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent 
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, 
progressively abolish as between themselves restrictions on the 
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States 
and also any discriminatory treatment based on the nationality or 
place of residence of the parties or on the place in which such capital is 
invested
The creation of the Common Market and even a common currency to stimulate 
labour mobility were still merely an academic discussion but nevertheless ‘on the 
table’.149 The process of official liberalization of capital movements was a slow and a 
gradual process. EEC member states sought to protect their national capital markets 
and their balance of payments positions. By the mid 1970s, the Commission of the 
European Communities had proposed a few drafts for minimum standards for stock 
exchange listings, prospectus requirements, and uniform regulations for open-end 
investment companies, but they had not been transposed into legislation. It was at 
the discretion of the EEC member states as to how regulate finance.150 
In the dusk of the European integration, the European Court of Justice had 
to balance its preliminary rulings between what was ‘necessary’ and the ‘proper 
functioning of the Common market’ under Article 67 (1) and did these Articles have 
direct effect, i.e. did they give directly applicable rights to corporations and thus 
could they be invoked directly or were such rights conditional upon on the adoption 
of directives.151 First, the exchange controls could manifest themselves in the form 
financial centre, 137; Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment 
(OUP 2009) 34–41, noting that the United Kingdom and Germany in the late 1970s had understood ‘that 
capital control measures were actually of very limited effectiviness under the economic conditions of the 
time’, and the abolition of exchange controls in these two countries had a significant impact on setting an 
liberalization agenda for capital movements across the European Economic Community.
148 Arner, Taylor (n 138) 505.
149 Robert A Mundell, ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’ (1961) 51 The American Economic Review 657, 
661.
150 Newburg (n 131) 2174–75; the first European Community banking directive was introduced in 1977, 
Haentjens, Gioia-Carabellese (n 17) 8.
151 From the outset, the unavailability of legal remedies under the EEC Treaty for private parties to contest 
87
of custody charges imposed on Italian residents investing in bonds issued by the 
European Coal and Steel Community on a foreign stock exchange. Deutsche Bank, 
acting as the custodian, had acted in compliance with the Italian legislation according 
to which that Italian residents may not, except with ministerial authorization, hold 
shares in companies having their registered office outside Italian territory or hold 
shares or bonds issued or payable abroad.152 In the second case, the question was 
whether the shares of an Irish company listed in Ireland and England were within 
the sphere of liberalized capital movements, or could the local exchange controls 
of Ireland render private contracts unenforceable for trades concluded in England. 
In other words, the legal question was whether an EC directive had direct effect 
on the free movement of capital or would the local exchange controls trump the 
directive?153 The third example case involved an Italian national residing in the 
Federal Republic of Germany who was charged by Italian authorities for violation of 
Italian exchange control rules. The Italian national sought to export Italian lire notes 
from Italy to Germany and the legal question was that the prosecuted was allowed 
to do so under European law.154 Regardless of the fragmented and unharmonized 
market, financial markets flourished first in the form of eurobonds followed by the 
eurocurrency market.
3.4.3 TAXATION AS THE DRIVER FOR LEGAL INNOVATION
Why did the Istituto per la Riscostruzione Industriale issue its bonds in London 
rather than New York, US, a traditionally popular financial hub for international 
bond issues? Perhaps the most significant driver for the emergence and popularity 
of the eurobond market was the introduction of the Interest Equalization Tax 
introduced by the US Government in 1963. The public policy goal was to prevent 
the outflow of US dollars abroad in order to rebalance the deficit in the US balance 
of payments.155 In its beginning, the Interest Equalization Tax made US private 
and legal persons liable for a 15 per cent tax for certain acquisitions of US dollar 
potentially illegal and protectionist state measures came under criticism, Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The 
Private Appeal against Illegal State Activities in the European Coal and Steel Community’ (1962) 11 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 325. 
152 Case 157/85 Brugnoni v Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia. For discussion, Andrew Evans, 
‘Exchange control and European Community Law’ (1987) 2 J.I.B.L. 1987, 63.
153 Case 143/86, John Richard Alan East and others (Margetts and Addenbrooke) v Thomas Cuddy and 
Winifred Cuddy, European Court reports 1988 Page 00625. For discussion, Andrew Evans, ‘Problems of 
free movement of capital’ (1988) 3 J.I.B.L. 183.
154 Case 203/80, Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati, European Court reports 1981 Page 02595. 
For discussion, Philippe Chappatte, ‘Free Movement of Capital in Europe’ (1982) 1 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 35.
155 For a more detailed analysis of the interest equalization tax with references to the regulatory framework 
that was in existence, as well as political background, Singer (n 110) 469; Legislative History of the 
Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140).
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denominated securities issued by non-US persons who had traditionally issued 
securities in New York.156 After the introduction of the tax, investors had to find a new 
venue to raise capital from the international capital markets. Despite warnings and 
efforts to liberalize the local market from local regulations, the interest equalization 
tax law was enacted. It is ‘still considered one of the most misinformed financial 
policies adopted by any administration, proposing a tax that achieved exactly the 
opposite of what it intended’.157 While it may have had some success in preventing 
the outflow of US dollars to certain unwanted regimes, this cannot be ascertained, 
it did not work as it was supposed to in curtailing the outflow of US dollars. To the 
contrary, the statistics and its analysis suggest that while new US dollar denominated 
bond issues in the United States ‘virtually disappeared’, they reappeared outside 
the US in ever exceeding volumes.158
Interest equalization tax drove business, both US and non-US investors from New 
York to London and other financial centres where eurobond issues similar to those 
of IRI saw a surge. This development was partially fueled by the newly-found efforts 
of some English state officials to attract business to their jurisdiction.159 However, 
far from being in favour of liberalization, the Bank of England that was protective 
over its own authority as was the City of London that opposed the abolishment 
of the exchange controls and the free movement of capital. Post WWII, The City 
was becoming ‘increasingly adrift from its traditional, pre-1914 internationalist 
roots’ characterized by ‘conservatism and preference for the status quo’ more than 
internationalism and free flow of capital. The eurodollar and euromarkets ‘flourished 
entirely autonomously of exchange controls’. 160 
A significant proportion of those new eurobond issues were made by US 
companies in US dollars used often to finance domestic (US) investments. This 
effectively meant that the use of eurobond market helped to relieve rather than 
worsen the US balance of payments problems. This is why the US Treasury 
encouraged US corporations to use this finance structure. Thus, incentives for 
financial and legal innovation had at least tacit, if not outright, direct government 
support while at the same time tax authorities worked under their own imperatives 
of trying to tax the very same transactions.161 The additional benefit of eurobonds 
was, for example, of not having to file a US registration statement mandatory for US 
156 Pub. L. No. 88–563, § 2(a) (1964). 
157 Ronen Palan, ‘International Finance Centers: The British-Empire, City-States and Commercially Oriented 
Politics’ (2010) 11 Theoretical Inq. L. 149, 163.
158 Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140) 23–25.
159 O’Malley (n 122) 25–32; Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140); Battilossi (n 
119) 165–66.
160 David Kynaston, ‘The long life and slow death of exchange controls’ (2000) 2 J.I.F.M. 37, 38.
161 Newburg (n 131) 2173; Craig M Boise, Andrew P Morris, ‘Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in 
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles’ (2009) 45 Tex. Int’l L. J. 377, 
381, 430–31; Singer (n 110) 485–87.
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bond issues. Eurobonds also relieved some entities from disclosure requirements 
under the US securities laws.162 The Interest Equalization Tax was extended multiple 
times and its effective rate was finally repealed in 1976.163 
Depending on the situation and likely of the financial resources at their disposal 
to buy the required legal advice, transnational corporations were in some cases able 
to repatriate eurodollars back to the US without being subject to dual taxation. As 
the US government also had an incentive to direct the flows of US dollars back to 
be invested into the US market - remembering that this was seen as a public policy 
problem in the beginning and the ratio for enacting the interest equalization tax - the 
interests of transnational corporations and the state were aligned. Withholding tax 
could be rendered inapplicable through financial and legal structuring, but this led 
to further legal risks.164 By establishing a subsidiary to an offshore jurisdiction with 
which the US tax treaties under which the US tax regime did not apply, the foreign 
subsidiary could transfer capital in US dollars to the US parent company legally.165 
This is naturally a simplified summary that only illustrates the fact that capital flows 
could be structured so as to avoid being caught by a tight regulatory framework. 
In reality, ‘it became necessary for corporations wishing to market convertible 
debentures [a type of eurodollar financing allowing the investor to convert bonds to 
equity] to enter an administrative labyrinth of exceedingly complex dimensions’.166 
Eurobonds were a driver for offshore tax business. Offshore centres were used 
at the approval of public authorities. Normally it was achieved by establishing 
subsidiaries to offshore jurisdictions with which the US had signed tax treaties.167 
In fact, such ‘treaty shopping’ by the US borrowers was encouraged by the US 
Treasury to bypass the US withholding tax as long as the offshore intermediary 
maintained some minimum amount of equity capital and was subject to taxation 
in the offshore centre. If a US corporation wished to borrow funds on international 
capital markets, a finance company would do it on its behalf by first issuing an 
eurobond, which would then transfer funds to the offshore intermediary, which in 
162 Steward R Jr Bross, ‘The United States Borrower in the Eurobond Market––A Lawyer’s Point of View’ 
(1969) 34 Law & Contemp. Probs. 172, 176–77.
163 William W Jr Lancaster, ‘The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A Look at AD HOC Rulemaking’ 
(1969) 55 Va. L. Rev. 83, n 10; Norbert Horn, A Uniform Approach to Eurobond Agreements, (1977) 9 
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 753.
164 Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140) 23, 32, which includes a reference to 
Canada, the government of which had agreed bilaterally on an exemption for some US regulations with 
the US, as one channel of repatriating ‘hot dollar’ flows back to the US from London branches of financial 
institutions. 
165 Butler (n 121) 42–43; Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140) 27–28, noting 
also that the repatriation of US dollars back to the US would not necessarily demonstrate the balance-of-
payment statistics as a capital inflow but as a financing item.
166 Eric R Fox, ‘Financing Foreign Operations Through Domestic Finance Subsidiaries’ (1969) 55 Va. L. Rev. 
1306, 1310.
167 ibid 1308–11, n 14.
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turn would borrow the funds to the US corporation, which in turn would ultimately 
benefit from the lower withholding tax rate upon repayment.168 
At the beginning of 1968, the United States took new measures to prevent 
capital outflows and to repatriate US dollars held abroad by US corporations back 
to the US. The measures included an executive order,169 new regulations, and a new 
regulatory agency, the Office of Foreign Direct Investment.170 While prohibitive 
in general, the ratio of some of these policies were to channel some of the capital 
outflows to certain parts of the world with a strong balance of payments and reserve 
positions. From the beginning, the new regulations gave rise to difficult questions as 
to what constitutes ‘transfer of capital’, legal uncertainty as to their applicability to 
different forms of new innovative structures, and to ‘artificial distortions of normal 
business practices’.171 Regardless of the legal uncertainty of what was legal and what 
was illegal, violations could carry criminal sanctions up to $10,000 fines for both 
natural and legal persons, and a maximum of 10 years imprisonment.172 In practice, 
the US Internal Revenue Services issued rulings approving the use of the finance 
subsidiary business under the US/Netherlands Antilles tax treaty deemed necessary 
to finance both US domestic and international corporate activities.173 Finally, once 
the US Treasury who had earlier condoned ‘treaty shopping’, sought to abrogate 
the US/Antilles tax treaty, the US Congress unilaterally repealed the withholding 
168 Hariton (n 52) 315, n 10.
169 Exec. Order No. 11387, Governing Certain Capital Transfers Abroad, Jan. 3, 1968, 33 Fed Reg. 47:
 1(a) except as expressly authorized by the Secretary of Commerce, from engaging in any transaction 
involving a direct or indirect transfer of capital to or within any foreign country or to any national thereof 
outside the United States. 
 1(b) ‘[t]hat any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who, alone or together with one or 
more affiliated persons, owns or acquires as much as a 10% interest in the voting securities, capital or 
earnings of one or more foreign business ventures shall cause to be repatriated to the United States such 
part as the Secretary of Commerce may specify. 
 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=106173> accessed 1 June 2019.
170 Butler (n 121) 42, noting that the creation of the Office of Foreign Direct Investment and its regulations 
‘may prove to be the biggest boom to lawyers since the 1950 amendment of § 7 of the Clayton Act’, a 
reference to US antitrust law the scope of which was widened through the enactment Celler-Kefauver 
Antimerger Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1225, The American Antitrust Institute, ‘Summary of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act’ (2013) National Press Club – Washington, D.C. <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/
default/files/Section%207.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. Based on this evidence, transnational self-regulation 
in professional services dates at least to the 1950s. For transnational self-regulation in professional 
services, Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Standardisation in services – European ambitions and sectoral realities’ 
(2016) 41 E.L. Rev. 513. 
171 Lancaster (n 163) 101–04. For example, US parent companies were under obligation to repatriate a 
certain amount of earnings per annum from their subsidiaries to the US which from a tax perspective 
would mean that the dividends would possibly be subject to dual taxation, both under the US income tax 
laws and a foreign tax law, 121–25. 
172 Charles I Kingson, ‘Investment in Western Europe under the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: 
Repatriation, Taxes and Borrowings’ (1969) 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26–7, n 104.
173 United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548, April 12, 1983, 44.
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tax on portfolio interest (but not for US equity dividends) as an harmful and anti-
competitive measure to US based corporations and governmental entities.174 
The US regulations further increased eurobond financing. Legal risks created 
incentives to structure transactions to a form that would render domestic US 
tax regulations inapplicable with at least tacit if not direct support from the US 
treasury.175 If some capital outflows could be curtailed, the regulations created 
incentives for financial and legal innovation in the form of new financial products 
and financing techniques.176 
It was especially transnational corporations based in the US that had made 
direct investments to European countries by establishing European branches. As 
these branches required capital, they would issue eurobonds to finance these foreign 
operations. The markets were still largely regulated nationally through exchange 
controls, and subject to many other regulations such as prohibition of advertizing 
of securities as well as regulatory limitations as to how brokers could make contract 
with potential investors, among others. However, as long as the transactions were 
made in a currency different to that of individual states, the respective national 
regulatory agencies had no incentive to prohibit their national corporations from 
raising capital from international capital markets and probably not even the authority 
to limit the eurobond and eurodollar markets in their respective jurisdictions since 
these transactions did not involve domestic currencies.177 
Eurobonds were effectively self-regulated on a transnational plane. As described 
by Robert L Knauss, while the emergence of the eurobond market was originally an 
unintended byproduct of a public policy response to the US balance of payments 
problem, eurobonds now had ‘a life of their own’. In general, ‘[w]hile attorneys sit 
and worry about legal restraints the financial community just does what is needed to 
develop an effective financing device to meet needs’.178 The demand for capital soon 
extended from the bond market exceedingly dominated by the eurobond market to 
other types of finance, such as loans or lines of credit. In addition, London interbank 
offered rate (LIBOR) was being exceedingly used as the standard reference interest 
rate in finance.179 While the interest equalization tax had already been repealed in 
the late 1970s, financial institutions and borrowers still had the incentive not to 
choose to issue eurobonds first within the US or to offer them to US citizens or 
174 Hariton (n 52) 315–16, n 12–14; AW Newburg, ‘United States Companies and International Financing’ 
(1986) 20 Int’l L. 763.
175 Lancaster (n 163) 87–90; Singer (n 110) 475.
176 Singer (n 110) 474–77.
177 Newburg (n 131) 2175.
178 Robert L Knauss, ‘International Security Markets’ (1969) 3 Vand. Int’l 35, 38–42, appendix ‘Statistics on 
European Securities Markets’.
179 Newburg (n 131) 2175–78.
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residents as this would have made them applicable to US securities laws generally 
and particularly the Securities Act of 1933.180 
3.4.4 PRIVATE NORMATIVITY IN ACTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
EUROCURRENCY MARKET 
Following the boom in the amount of eurobond issues, much of the currencies, 
especially the US dollar, were left circulating outside the place of their issue. This 
offshore currency market came to be known as the eurocurrency market, having its 
origins already in the late 1950s. The prefix ‘euro’ was a misnomer from the beginning 
as it had nothing to do with continent of Europe per se. In the eurocurrency market, 
commercial banks acted as intermediaries in currencies that circulate outside the 
issue country of the currency in question. In other words, eurocurrency trading 
is a form of offshore financing where both the borrower and the lenders are from 
countries other than that of the currency of the bond issue. The reason for structuring 
the eurobond issues under the laws of England was that the local officials allowed 
and exempted them from local English regulations. The Bank of England allowed 
this offshore market to develop in London by not intervening, and many of those 
eurodollars originated from US-based financial institutions fleeing another set of 
local US regulation.181
For example, the US dollars held by a financial institution located in England 
would be referred to as eurodollars. By depositing and relending currencies for their 
ultimate borrowers, commercial banks could facilitate business for themselves in 
foreign currencies. In contrast to dealing in foreign exchange, which was a business 
on its own, the eurocurrency transactions involved only one currency, for example, 
a loan in eurodollars, whereas the former always involved more than one currency 
as the purpose was to exchange one currency to another.182 Eurodollar lending also 
provided an impetus for contract standardization in finance, especially in the lending 
documentation.183 A decade later, standardized lending documentation would form 
the basis for OTC derivatives transactions that further evolved into the ISDA Master 
Agreement architecture through market demand as described in Chapter 5.
180 Horn (n 163) 755–76, noting also that it was already common during that time to apply for a subsequent 
listing on the New York Stock Exchange which renders the Securities Exchange Act applicable, 756, n 12. 
The legal uncertainty of the application of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 deemed ambiguous to extraterritorial transactions gave rise to many legal disputes already at that 
time, Mehren, Gold (n 42) 15–18. 
181 Palan (n 157) 161–63.
182 Edmund MA Kwaw, ‘Towards the creation of an international legal regime for the operation of 
Eurocurrency deposits’ (1994) 43 I.C.L.Q. 317, 318.
183 Philip R Wood, ‘Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s’ (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 8.
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Following eurobond issues from approximately 1965 onwards, transnational 
corporations now had large US dollar deposits at foreign banks or at branches of US 
banks. eurodollars, dollars circulating outside the US, that is, were used for various 
types of financing which also meant that a new type of banking services became 
in demand. This further reinforced the trend towards further transnationalisation 
of financial institutions that began to establish branches and subsidiaries in other 
jurisdictions to facilitate trading in different currencies.184 As was already noted 
by Andre WG Newburg, the term ‘Euro’ in this context was becoming an even 
more generic root word as the market was becoming increasingly global and 
attracted new market participants entered from across the world. However, despite 
its global nature, it was especially London that retained its predominant role in 
the euromarket. Eurodollars were first used in short-term interbank markets, 
but business soon expanded to lending by bank syndicates to now-multinational 
corporations and governmental borrowers.185 From the perspective of the US, 
the quick turn of events did not leave much room for public policy to reverse the 
developments. The eurodollar market grew at a rapid pace forming ‘a huge pool of 
convertible international liquidity, subject to (virtually) no central bank controls of 
any sort. Both central and commercial bankers alike, in quiet moments, are appalled 
by the dimensions of the monster they have created’.186 The eurodollar market was 
a financial innovation that eroded national sovereignty as it was not subject to the 
exclusive control of central bankers; from now on, ‘international currency traders 
would have to be factored into a nation’s monetary policy’.187 
By the end of the 1960s, syndicated eurodollar lending proliferated. In other 
words, groups of financial institutions began lending a larger sum of credit for 
one debtor than would be possible to lend by one financial institution. One of the 
reasons these loan agreements were governed by English law with submission to 
the jurisdiction of the English courts was that the new interbank-deposit funding 
market was located in London. This choice would - hopefully - reduce the legal 
risks that might arise from the jurisdiction of the third-country borrower. Market 
participants were already familiar with the common law and equity legal system. 
Following the entry into force of the European convention of 1968 on judgements 
in civil and commercial matters, the choice of law in international contracts was 
recognized by the adhering states. This essentially meant that rulings made by 
184 Battilossi (n 119) 169; Newburg (n 131) 2172. On the lucrative reinvestment of the eurodollars by 
transnational banks to developing countries between 1973–1980 and their ‘uneasy alliance’ with the 
International Monetary Fund, Richard Bernal, ‘Transnational Banks, the International Monetary Fund 
and External Debt of Developing Countries’ (1982) 31 (4) Social and Economic Studies 73.
185 Newburg (n 131) 2172–73.
186 Legislative History of the Interest Equalization Tax (1969) (n 140), quoting The Economist, 29–31. 23, 31.
187 Charles RP Pouncy, ‘Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives’ (1998) 51 S.M.U. L. 
Rev. 505, 525–26. 
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English courts in accordance with the laws of England would be enforceable in 
other states in which the European Convention was applicable.188 
The eurocurrency deposits rapidly increased in amount and size, while at the 
same time the legal status of the fundamental aspects of trading were unclear. For 
example, the concept of ‘payment’, the method of determining the proper law of a 
eurocurrency deposit contract, and the legal characterization of an international-
funds transfers were in this legal grey area. Regardless of this legal risk, there was 
very little litigation in the eurocurrency deposits. When disputes occurred, it often 
originated from state action, such as the imposition of exchange controls which then 
turned into a jurisdictional conflict between states189 or involved other state actions 
such as asset freezes.190 In essence, the eurobond market was both described and 
placed under the heading and concept of transnational law from early on. The very 
purpose of eurobonds was to operate in a ‘transnational financial dimension’ with 
a degree of self-sufficiency from national legal systems while acknowledging that 
the latter may restrict party autonomy and possibly ‘interfere with the contractual 
objectives of the parties’. Private international law could offer some answers to the 
question of which national laws could interfere with these rights but generally, the 
situation was unclear and in a constant state of flux depending on which governing 
contract law was chosen out of many.191 The legal risks of this environment created 
a demand for strict adherence and compliance to any possible applicable national 
laws through contract. 
188 Wood (n 183) 12–14.
189 Kwaw (n 182) 318, 334–35, 342–43. By the end of the 1970s, the eurocurrency market would become a 
political arena where the Federal Reserve was seeking control over the eurocurrency market via financial 
regulation through the Bank for International Settlements, financial institutions were lobbying for general 
deregulation of their activities and the central banks of England, Switzerland, and Germany were in favour 
of maintaining the euromarket as beneficial to their own interests, Helleiner (n 132) 135–39.
190 See the high-profile case involving the asset freeze of US dollars held on dollar-denominated account by 
foreign branches of US banks in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1986] L. No. 1567/L. 
No. 4048 (Q.B.) I, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600, 1603 (1987); Corinne R Rutzke, ‘The Libyan Asset Freeze 
and Its Application to Foreign Government Deposits in Overseas Branches of United States Banks: 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co’ (1988) 3 Am.U.Int’l L.Rev. 241; Daniel Urech, ‘Eurodollar 
deposits and freezing orders: the Libyan assets case revisited’ (1988) 3 J.I.B.L. 269
191 Delaume (n 118) 248–53. 
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3.5 OFFSHORE CENTRES AND TRANSNATIONALISATION OF 
FINANCE
3.5.1 SHORT HISTORICAL REVIEW OF OFFSHORE FINANCING
By the mid-1980s, ‘virtually every major U.S. corporation had at least one 
Antilles finance subsidiary’192 and weighting of the arrangement’s benefits for US 
corporations and the decrease in tax revenues,193 the US finally ended both the tax 
treaty in its entirety with the Antilles as well as repealed withholding tax on bond 
interest payments for foreign bondholders. From a tax revenue perspective, the 
Antilles structure allowed US corporations to deduct interest payments onshore 
while de facto financing the offshore company by repaying the debt at a higher 
interest rate than the offshore company had to pay to the eurobond investors. This 
structure, while legal and promoted originally by the US government itself, had 
become a strain for public officials, especially the Inland Revenue Service, as was 
the withholding tax in itself in that it did not generate much revenue but created 
an obstacle for US corporations and governmental entities for unhindered access 
to international capital markets.194 Already before the emergence of the eurobond 
market, there were many offshore jurisdictions that served the purpose of structuring 
financial transactions for transnationally operating financial institutions.195 
One way of structuring eurobond issues for US corporations was to establish 
offshore holding companies in offshore jurisdictions. These offshore jurisdictions 
both regulated and taxed the former, and they were often incorporated into 
jurisdictions like Luxembourg196, the Netherlands Antilles or domestically to 
Delaware, US. In the eurobond market, the Netherlands Antilles came to be the 
most popular offshore jurisdiction since its laws and regulations did not impose 
withholding or inheritance taxes on nonresidents, it benefited from an income tax 
treaty in force between the US and the Netherlands, and, like in the UK, its exchange 
controls did not apply to eurobonds as long as the debt securities of the offshore 
subsidiary were not sold to residents of the Netherlands Antilles. The US withholding 
192 Boise, Morriss (n 161) 379, n 4, 429; Tony Freyer, Andrew P Morriss, ‘Creating Cayman as an Offshore 
Financial Center: Structure & Strategy since 1960’ (2013) 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1297; for an overview, IMF Staff 
Assessments, ‘The International Monetary Fund Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs)’ <http://www.imf.org/
external/NP/ofca/OFCA.aspx> accessed 1 June 2019.
193 United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548, April 12, 1983, Statement of William 
J Anderson, Director General Government Division Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer 
and Monetary Affairs Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives on Federal Efforts 
to Define and Combat the Tax Haven Problem <https://www.gao.gov/products/121055> accessed 1 June 
2019. 
194 Boise, Morriss (n 161) 423–26; Hariton (n 52) 315–16, n 8, n 14.
195 For an overview of the transnationalisation of banks, financial innovation, and the capital outflows in 
1890–1931, Battilossi (n 119) 145–157. 
196 Kingson (n 172) n 191.
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of tax did not apply provided that as long as the interests paid by US companies to the 
Netherlands Antilles subsidiary were taxed at the Netherlands Antilles at prevailing 
rates and that the subsidiary was a capitalized and independent entity conducting 
substantive business activity.197 The choice over place of incorporation of a foreign 
finance subsidiary was driven also by other tax and regulatory considerations the 
level of corporate income taxes and stamp taxes among them.198 
3.5.2 THE GRISHAM EFFECT OF OFFSHORE CENTRES
Structuring a transaction as ‘offshore’ carries a sinister ring to it already because it 
involves technical vocabulary and may involve a jurisdiction located typically in a 
tropical surrounding. This image is referred to as the ‘Grisham Effect’ which refers 
to novelist John Grisham’s book ‘The Firm’ and its movie adaptation with perhaps 
both fascinating and notorious but misleading portrayal of offshore investments 
generally, and the Cayman Islands specifically, as a centre for illegal activities such 
as tax avoidance and money laundering.199 
The emergence of offshore jurisdictions is an illustration of how transnational 
law may operate. Like any type of business nowadays, offshore structuring often 
employs derivatives structures200 which makes it reasonable to examine the matter 
to some degree. As characterised by William Vlcek, the use of the term ‘onshore’ 
is absent without the use of ‘offshore’. Being onshore is often equated to being 
situated in the domain of a regulated sovereign state. Being offshore is equated 
with less regulation and less taxation by a somehow less sovereign state. The image 
might be that the offshore centres and their users are more or less ‘free riders on 
global public goods’. Many of the exotic islands equated with being ‘offshore’ not 
only in geographical terms but also from state regulation are common-law based 
and hold close connections either to England or the US. 201 Offshore refers here to 
transactions where the contracting parties structure a transaction in whole or in part 
under a law that would not otherwise be applicable to the contracting parties or the 
contract they make. With this definition, any jurisdiction can be an offshore center.
197 Similarly, a Delaware subsidiary would have to meet similar requirements to be eligible for tax benefits. 
Newburg (n 131) 2190–94.
198 Kingson (n 172) 46–47; Christopher R Brown, ‘Reagan Threatens the Eurobond Market’ (1982) 1 Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. 4
199 Boise, Morriss (n 161) n 329.
200 Del Wright Jr, ‘Financial alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil the IRS 
and How the IRS Helps Them’ (2013) 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 611.
201 William Vlcek, Offshore Finance and Small States: Sovereignty, Size and Money (Springerlink 2008) 18–
21. 
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Tradable goods and services, commodities, are determined by supply and 
demand and law provides a framework within which trading takes place. As profane 
it may sound, the level of profanity - but not its truthfulness - depends on how 
one conceptualizes law, law itself is also a tradeable commodity. States advertise 
and are ready to supply when there is a market demand for a particular type of 
law.202 On the demand side, market participants can choose which law shall apply 
to their transactions and if they are dissatisfied with the chosen laws or courts, 
they can switch to a more accommodating jurisdiction and often still have these 
foreign rulings enforced by their respective national courts.203 This system of choice-
of-law and choice-of-court is upheld, favoured, and accommodated by the states 
themselves.204 According to a survey conducted by the Oxford Institute of European 
and Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies in 2008,205 
market participants use this option. Over 90 per cent of the respondents viewed 
the possibility to choose the governing law of the contract as either important (42 
per cent) or very important (49 per cent).206 In addition, over 90 per cent of the 
respondents chose a foreign contract law either occasionally (41 per cent) or often 
(44 per cent).207 On the supply side, states as suppliers of law commodities have 
both direct, such as tax revenues, and indirect, such as the attractiveness of financial 
industry service providers, incentives to enter the market for legal rules.208 It is worth 
stressing that ‘[a]ny regulation that attracts or repels businesses also contributes 
or detracts from the state’s overall economic environment and thereby potentially 
affects the welfare of all participants in this environment’;209 hence, the emergence 
of a transnational law market.
202 Larry Ribstein, Erin O’Hara, The Law Market (OUP 2009) 66; Eidenmüller (n 58) 707, 709.
203 In the EU, Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: 
 ‘Article 1  
Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State, 
 Article 2 (1) 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or 
clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the 
parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract.’
 For overriding mandatory provisions, ibid, Article 9.
204 Eidenmüller (n 58) 709–12.
205 The Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio–Legal Studies 
‘Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law – A 
Business Survey’ <https://www.fondation–droitcontinental.org/fr/wp–content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_
civil_justice_survey_–_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; Ribstein, O’Hara (n 202) 
81–82.
206 ibid Question 15.
207 ibid Question 16.
208 Eidenmüller (n 58) 707, 712–13.
209 Ribstein, O’Hara (n 202) 74.
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3.5.3 ON ARBITRAGE GENERALLY
Craig M Boise and Andrew P Morriss Boise claim that the use of offshore 
jurisdictions is more of a feature than a problem of international finance: there 
will always be differences among legal regimes and arbitrage opportunities, which 
means that some party will benefit from any imbalance, were that benefit derived 
from time, information, or regulation.210 Like offshore finance, arbitrage can be 
seen as something sinister and ethically questionable, equated with outright theft.211 
Financial innovation carries a similar bad reputation and has become ‘almost 
a byword for egregious profiteering by wily bankers at the expense of innocent 
customers’.212 Financial arbitrage in economic terms, put simply, means profiting 
from a price difference, or benefiting in some other way, from differences in two 
markets. For example, buying a commodity in one market for one price, and selling 
the same commodity in another market at a higher price with a profit margin that 
exceeds the cost of selling it in another market, is financial arbitrage. Regulatory 
arbitrage is the act of benefitting from a difference between the economics of a 
transaction and the design of a regulation. Financial regulation can require that a 
bank must hold a certain amount of regulatory capital to shield it from economic 
risks, but this regulatory burden can be reduced typically by using derivative 
structures.213 More generally, regulatory arbitrage is about seeing opportunities in 
the regulatory framework to make a profit.214 For example, if two counterparties 
are subject to two different regulatory regimes under which risks are measured 
differently, the counterparties may be able to use this difference to their benefit.215 
In its negative meaning, regulatory arbitrage could mean that the lower cost of 
operating in one jurisdiction derives from the lower quality of regulation (lower 
environmental protection comes to mind) and a market participant using this 
210 Boise, Morriss, (n 161) 377; Markus Krebzs, Securitization and Structured Finance Post Credit Crunch: 
A Best Practice Deal Lifecycle Guide (Wiley 2011) xii, 13, noting that ‘Beware of unexplainable “arbitrage” 
in any shape or form […] it is for you to figure out whether there is real justification behind it or if it looks 
plain “dodgy”‘ 37; Kevin E Davis, Anna Gelpern, ‘Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: regulating the 
Intermediaries’ (2010) 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1209, ‘[c]ompetition is in part a function of the inherent 
mobility of capital; however, governments have historically sought to restrict their citizens’ capacity to 
invest abroad’, and also mentioning the famous ‘backfiring’ of the Interest Equalization Tax, n 111.
211 Edvard J Kane, ‘Shadowy Banking: Theft by Safety Net’ (2014) 31 Yale J. on Reg. 773. Kane seems to view 
financial innovation as something as outright socially harmful and unethical with no redeeming qualities.
212 Avinash Persaud, Reinventing Financial Regulation – A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk (Apress 
2015) 139.
213 Panayiota Koulafetis, Modern Credit Risk Management. Theory and Practice (Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
2017) 8–11; Jordan Barry, ‘On Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review, <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1859750> accessed 1 June 2019. 
214 Annelise Riles, ‘Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws approach’ (2014) 47 Cornell Int’l L.J., 
63, 71–72, also discussing how regulatory harmonization often means uniformity of rules. The benefits 
of uniformity are taken for granted but uniform financial regulation may bring additional risks into the 
financial system, 77–83; Chapter 6.
215 Krebzs (n 210) 37.
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opportunity engages in this behaviour without market ramifications. However, if 
the costs are lower in one jurisdiction due to the fact that these local regulations 
achieve their objective more efficiently than other regimes, regulatory arbitrage can 
be benefical.216 In finance, some financial institutions engage in regulatory arbitrage 
whereas most do not.217 Identifying the risks that regulatoru arbitrage can pose to the 
financial system is one thing, and efficiently regulating the same is a whole another 
matter.218 From a regulatory perspective, the problem is that regulating financial 
entities efficiently in one jurisdiction may matter little if these efficiently regulated 
financial entities are linked and exposed to poorly regulated and risky financial 
entities operating elsewhere.219 To add more complexity to the whole question of 
what does arbitrage mean and is it harmful and to whom, financial innovation and 
regulatory arbitrage is not only allowed but are often favoured or even outright 
required by regulators themselves.220 Eurobonds were from the beginning a means 
to raise capital from a transnationalised market at a cheaper rate than it would have 
been to raise it from a regime that imposes withholding taxes on the acquisition of 
bonds. It was financial arbitrage in the sense that the price of raising capital was 
smaller due to a regulatory difference between England and other jurisdictions. 
Further, it was regulatory arbitrage in the sense that under English law eurobond 
issues were exempted from some regulatory and tax requirements under English 
law as long as other strict regulatory requirements were met. 
Smaller offshore jurisdictions used for structuring of transactions are vulnerable 
to onshore pressure from states. However, new offshore hubs are likely to emerge 
or survive depending on the viability and suitability of their own legal systems for 
structuring a transaction as well as their political arrangements and connections to 
other states.221 ‘Structuring’ a transaction means, from a legal perspective, ensuring 
216 Ethiopis Tafara, Robert J Peterson, ‘A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New 
International Framework’ (2007) 48 Harv.L.Rev 31, 52.
217 Nicole M Boyson, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, René M Stulz, ‘Why Don’t All Banks Practice Regulatory 
Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust-Preferred Securities’ (2016) 29 (7) The Review of Financial 
Studies, 1821, arguing that misaligned managerial incentives are not first-order reasons for particular type 
of regulatory arbitrage.
218 Hossein Nabilou, Alessio M Pacces, ‘The hedge fund regulation dilemma: direct vs. indirect regulation’ 
(2015) 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 183; Andreas Engert, ‘Transnational hedge fund regulation’ (2010) 11 
E.B.O.R. 329, 332, 357–62, noting again the important observation worth repeating that in a transnational 
setting, ‘[t]he causes and effects of systemic events cut across the territorial boundaries of jurisdictions’, 
377.
219 Kathryn Collard, ‘Advantages of a co-regulatory OTC derivatives regime’ (2014–2015) 46 Geo. J. Int’l L. 
877, 887. 
220 See for example a financing instrument referred to as ‘contingent convertible bonds’ or in market jargon 
‘CoCos’. They are a form of bonds that private market participants have innovated to meet regulatory 
capital requirements under the CRD IV regime in the EU. There are reasons to believe that Cocos ‘will not 
save taxpayers from exposure in times of financial crisis and could actually contribute to making matters 
worse’, Persaud (n 212) 45–47; Tracy Chiyedza Maguze, ‘EU bank recapitalisation and the bail-in option: 
an analysis of the effects of mandatory bail-in on creditors’ property’ (2016) 5 UCLJLJ 207.
221 Boise, Morriss (n 161) 382–83, 429.
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that any given transaction follows all applicable or even possible applicable laws 
while allocating capital efficiently within these parameters. Structuring is made 
easier by relying on standardized contracts. As to the claim that these transactions 
go untaxed, the use of offshore structure means that some tax regime structures are 
inapplicable, while other tax regimes are applicable due to their reliance on bilateral 
tax treaties between states, for example.222 The difficulty lies in the differentiation, 
from a legal point of view, between a transaction intended to provide a tax benefit, 
which is legal, and creating a transaction for the perhaps sole purpose of creating 
a tax benefit, when it may or may not be illegal. In the US, the tax authorities 
have sought to address this problem through codifications and regulations, but the 
result has been that the benefits of using tax shelters simply outweight the cost of 
not using them, even when there is a risk of costly litigation.223 In addition, when 
the tax authorities claim victory over some tax shelters, they are overmatched as 
previous tax shelters become replaced with new ones.224
3.5.4 FINANCIAL OFFSHORE CENTRES WERE AND ARE REGULATED
Without a doubt and like all forms of finance, offshore centres can also be used as 
hubs for outright illegal activities and illegal tax evasion. It is general knowledge that 
much of the most traded goods globally are subject to state control or are outright 
illegal and so assumedly the financing of their tradings is as well. States can also 
drive unwanted offshore competition off the market - sometimes maybe to their 
own fiscal detriment.225 While there are public calls, regulations, and international 
treaties to combat illegal tax evasion, which is a central public policy concern,226 
their effectiveness in transnational finance and the transnational law market remains 
an open question. International and supranational treaties generally promote and 
obligate states to promote free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. 
These two public-policy objectives of creating an effective tax regime against tax 
shelters, while retaining the free movement of capital, could be seen to be pulling 
in opposite directions. Be that as it may, transnational corporations are routinely 
222 Bross (n 162) 179–181, 186–87. Eurobond convertibles could be structured as tax-free transactions and as 
an interest-deductible security for the acquiring company. Butler (n 121) 43. 
223 Wright (n 200) 659–64.
224 Wright (n 200) 653–54.
225 For the central elements of the onshore and offshore dynamics, Boise, Morriss (n 161) 377; Andrew P 
Morriss ‘Changing the Rules of the Game: Offshore Financial Centers, Regulatory Competition & Financial 
Crises’ (2009) 15 NEXUS 15, arguing that the GFC opened up a chance for powerful states to attack 
unwanted offshore competition, <https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/186> accessed 1 June 
2019.
226 Thorsten Beck, Chen Lin, Yue Ma, ‘Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and 
Financial Sector Outreach’ (2014) The Journal of Finance LXIX, 763.
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accused of illegal tax evasion. There is evidence that this is rare and allegeldly is 
limited to only some of the largest transnational groups that deploy a strategy of 
deliberate tax evasion.227
At least at one point in time, the more commonly used offshore jurisdictions 
have been supervised, regulated, and compliant with international regulatory 
standards.228 A study from 2012 by Michael Findley and others found that shell 
companies in tax havens were ‘significantly more likely to comply with the rules 
than providers in OECD countries like the United States and Britain’ and that 
‘providers in poorer, developing countries were also more compliant with global 
standards than those in rich, developed nations’.229 Equating the use of offshore 
regimes as automatically illegal or socially harmful, or even to be in some ‘gray 
area’ of finance, is problematic to say the least. Literature evidence demonstrates 
sovereign involvement in the very creation, regulation, and legitimatization of 
off-shore companies and offshore financing, as discussed in this Chapter. Yet, a 
narrative of tax haven jurisdictions attracting foreign capital with lax regulations 
for tax avoidance and/or off-balance-sheet accounting purposes and the problems 
they pose to effectiviness of financial regulation.230 The narrative is common.231 
In their stark criticism towards such narratives, Richard Gordon and Andrew P 
Morriss claim that there is a problem in legal scholarship:
‘[T]ax justice’ literature is driven by its incorrect assumptions about 
money, business, finance, and government. The assumptions are 
disguised by often overheated rhetoric and pseudoscientific, or 
completely unscientific calculations. […] what they are advocating is a 
fundamental reordering of global finance in ways that we contend would 
reduce social welfare.232
It may be that, while highly regulated, the US and England are relatively more 
optimally regulated than the regulatory frameworks of other developed nations. As 
227 Patrice-Hubert Petit, David Chekroun, ‘Governance of transnational groups: what are the stakes? What 
are the challenges?’ (2016) 6 I.B.L.J. 617, 621.
228 Boise, Morriss (n 161) 429. 
229 Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson, Jason Sharman, ‘Global Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers’ and 
Terrorist Financiers’ Access to Shell Companies’ (2012) Griffith University 
 <https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Global-Shell-Games-2012.pdf> accessed 1 
June 2019. The research notes how ‘[i]t is more than three times harder to obtain an untraceable shell 
company in tax havens than in developed countries […] It is easier to obtain an untraceable shell company 
from incorporation services […] in the United States than in any other country save Kenya’ 2, 21. 
230 Emily Lee, ‘The shadow banking system: why it will hamper the effectiveness of Basel III’ (2015) 30 
J.I.B.L.R. 373.
231 Richard Gordon, Andrew P Morriss, ‘Moving Money: International Financial Flows, Taxes, and Money 
Laundering’ (2014) 37 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1.
232 ibid 1. 
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noted by Philip Morriss, offshore (lax regulation) and onshore (strict regulation) are 
not the two ends of a uni-dimensional spectrum.233 For reason or the other, market 
participants favour these two jurisdictions as described in Chapter 4.
Calls for international and transgovernmental cooperation in this area are 
common and indeed much work has been done by organizations such as the OECD 
and the European Commission to implement a coordinated international standards 
and public exposure of tax secrecy, i.e. confidentiality, regimes. Ed Morgan goes 
on to conclude that transgovernmental cooperation can be seen as a façade for 
sovereign interests and, ‘[i]n the end, global tax rules are no more and no less than 
what states, in all of their differences and similarities, say they are.234 Considering that 
the evidence suggests that the most economically powerful state, the US, allowed, 
justified, and promoted the use of off-shore regimes, even physically ‘onshore’ in its 
respective geographical territories, to redirect US dollars back to the US, the filling of 
perceived regulatory vacuums efficiently with international co-operation seems like 
chasing a mirage. When it comes to doing politics on the issue of tax havens, this 
might not matter for those who benefit in one way or the other from the narrative. 
3.5.5 FINANCIAL OFFSHORE CENTRE AS A RACE TO THE BOTTOM?
Is regulatory arbitrage then a ‘race to the bottom’? Do transnational corporations 
flock to the most deregulated and lightly taxed jurisdictions? One case example 
suggests that the answer is a decisive ‘no’ to both questions. Delaware, US, a 
historically popular place to incorporate a US company for structuring offshore 
transactions,235 as the place of domicile, a Delaware state agency claims ‘The State 
of Delaware is a leading domicile for US and international corporations’. More than 
1,000,000 business entities have made Delaware their legal home. More than 66% 
of the Fortune 500 [a list compiled and published by Fortune magazine listing the 
500 largest US corporations by their total revenue -author’s note] have chosen 
Delaware as their legal home’.236 Delaware actively competes for business and when 
given the choice, market participants often choose Delaware law as the governing 
law of their contracts and outside the place of incorporation, corporations have 
little connection to Delaware otherwise.237 
233 Morriss (n 222) 15, 22.
234 Ed Morgan, ‘International tax law as a ponzi scheme’ (2011) 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 69, 115; for 
criticism towards the lax regulatory attitude towards British offshore centres, Philip Morriss, ‘Financial 
Regulation, Taxation and Economic Management in British Offshore Finance Centres: Critical Reflections 
on the Foot Review’ (2010) J.C.L.S. 391.
235 Kingson (n 172) 1, for initial public offerings, 33–40, for interest equalization tax structuring, 40–47.
236 <https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/> accessed 1 June 2019.
237 Ribstein, O’Hara (n 202) 81–82.
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AC Pritchard notes that Delaware does not compete on prices nor even 
taxation but more with the combination of the liability protections for directors, 
the predictability and stability of Delaware law especially in regard to its corporate 
governance rules, the quality of the judges of the judiciary upholding the liability 
protection in its case law, among others.238 Based on his empirical study, Jared A 
Elliass suggests that bankrupt debtors choose Delaware as the bankruptcy venue 
because of the predictability of the Delaware laws. Claims that there are hidden 
and ethically questionable motives behind this argument, the self-interest of legal 
experts, among others, found no support from the research.239 Being more optimally 
regulated is enough in competition over economic activity that generate revenues 
for the states to run in the first place. The transnational law market is real and 
one driver out of many for the supply and demand in this market are local tax 
regulations, but as the case of eurobonds demonstrates, it can be a decisive factor 
for driving markets from one jurisdiction to another.
Whereas taxation on physical consumer goods or an income tax on individual 
natural persons is relatively easy to comprehend and be turned into a public policy 
and then through representative democratic decision into legislation, the same does 
not necessarily apply to intangible assets such as financial instruments. To conclude 
this subchapter, a case study worth revisiting briefly reveals how Sweden sought 
to tax financial transactions by issuing a levy on equity transactions executed by 
brokers established or domiciled in Sweden. The tax law was proposed in 1983,240 
the tax was increased from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent, and its scope was widened in 
1986. The tax law was finally repealed in its entirety in 1991.241 To summarize, the 
outcome of the tax was that foreign investors were discouraged from using Swedish 
brokers to execute their transaction involving securities of Swedish corporations 
traded in a Swedish market place. 242 Following the entry into force of the tax law, 
238 Pritchard (n 49) 78 Univ of Cincinnati Law Review 473, 476–83; Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausner, 
‘Standardisation and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or the Economics of Boilerplate)’ (1997) 83 
Va. L. Rev. 713, noting the high quality of legal advice also as a factor, 723.
239 Jared A Elliass, ‘What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data’ (2018) 47 (1) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 119.
240 Regeringens proposition, 1983/84 [Government Proposal – authors note]: 48. The explanatory part of 
the Government Proposal reveals (9–10) that the primary justification and public policy objective for the 
transaction tax was that because the rate of Swedish wages remained stagnant, the persons engaging in 
the lucrative equities trade should collectively be taxed through the proposed levy. 
241 Regeringens proposition 1991/92:34 om upphävande av lagen (1983:1053) om skatt på omsättning av visa 
värdepapper. [Government proposal for the repealment of the Financial Transaction Tax – authors note]. 
The government proposal notes how the trade in the Swedish equity markets had diminished considerably 
and liquidity (an essential component of markets to operate) had decreased especially for large and 
medium-sized Swedish companies. 
242 John Y Campbell, Kenneth A Frooth (1993), ‘International Experiences with Securities Transaction Taxes’ 
in Jeffrey A Frankel (ed) The Internationalization of Equity Markets (University of Chicago Press 1994) 
277, 280–85 <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6276.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; Johan Almenberg, 
Magnus Wiberg, ‘Skatt på finansialle transaktioner’, Penning- och valutapolitik 2012,1, Riksbanken, 85, 
88–91, noting also that the complexity of financial products and the market makes it exceedingly difficult 
to reach tax neutrality across different asset classes. 
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it became harder for Swedish corporations to finance their activities with equity 
issuances as the tax made them less appealing to foreign investors who could invest 
in other non-taxed securities around the world.243 Regarding Swedish investors, all 
that was required to avoid the transactions being treated as taxable on the basis 
of residence was to open a non-resident account in London and trade through a 
foreign broker in Swedish securities.244 Alternatively, the same economic outcome 
could be achieved by structuring and trading in derivatives that did not fall under 
the stated category of taxable transaction under Swedish law.245 The finding is that 
that perhaps well-intentioned but less well designed local tax regimes do create 
unintended consequences in the transnational law market. The absence of proof 
for offsetting public welfare benefits of regulatory intervention seems not to hinder 
its enactment.
3.6 TRANSNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW OF INTERMEDIATED 
SECURITIES SYSTEMS
Intermediated securities systems, where securities such as eurobonds are held, 
contributed ‘to a spectacular upsurge in financial collateral transactions’ in 
collateralized derivatives, among others, and gave rise to regional law reforms both 
at the regional and international levels.246 As financial collateral is also an important 
part of the ISDA MA architecture and these intermediated systems are an example 
of bottom-up law making, private normativity, the facilitative role that states may 
have in this process, and the evolution of transnational customary law of finance, it 
is useful to revisit in some detail the private origins and normativity of these private 
regulatory mechanisms that emerged already in the 1960s. Soon thereafter, this 
area evolved into transnational lex mercatoria of book-entry systems that rendered 
domestic laws on contract and proprietary laws more or less irrelevant and conflict 
of law rules redundant once the autonomous transnational development in this 
area had taken place.247 
In principle, states can enact new law products to facilitate market interactions. 
As the eurobond example demonstrated, the product may be that a state decides 
not to act and not to apply certain laws for certain products, and if so required, 
243 Campbell, Frooth (n 242) 280–85; Almenberg, Wiberg (n 242) 88–91. 
244 Persaud (n 212) 193–95, noting also that under current laws, this should not be possible due to a 
regulatory requirement to declare the beneficial ownership of securities held on a foreign account.
245 Campbell, Frooth (n 242) 280–85; Almenberg, Wiberg (n 242) 88–91. 
246 Goode and others (n 85) para 15.44.
247 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
Volume 3 Financial Products, Financial Services and Financial Regulation (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 56–60, 441–43.
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make exemptions for certain product categories. Provided there is indeed a demand 
for a new law product, it will establish itself on the market. Other countries have 
a tendency of imitating each other in this regard. 248 Eurobonds display uniform 
international legal characteristics important for their interpretation by courts and 
arbitrators. The eurobond market satisfied the market demand for a new type of a 
financial product that was legally structured in a particular way as to ensure that 
it was compliant with national laws and regulations. It was for the issuers and the 
arrangers to decide where the issue would take place, which courts would hold, which 
would be the governing law of the issue, and how the financial institution acting as 
a bond agent on behalf of the bondholders would carry out its responsibilities. The 
transnationalisation process of eurobonds was not the result of political discourse, 
because there was no need for one, while being a perfectly legal method of raising 
capital from investors around the world.
The eurobond market was also the driver for new technological innovations 
for new types of financial infrastructure already in the late 1960s. Physical bearer 
instruments such as eurobonds were in many ways risky. Eurobonds could be stolen 
or be destroyed. Importantly there was a risk of fraud and forgery of the same. To 
obtain payment of principal or interest, the bondholder had to physically deliver 
the bond or interest coupon to a certain place of payment.249 There was a market 
demand for legal certainty over a record of ownership and subsequent transfer of 
title. To address the problem, market participants innovated and finally founded 
a new method of holding, trading, and dealing of investments. A solution could be 
found from central security depositories, a centralised and computerised system, 
to overcome logistical and legal problems of cross-border transfer of physical bond 
certificates and coupons. The technological solution for such problems was the 
immobilization of physical certificates, to facilitate settlement without physical 
delivery, and the creation of new legal concepts, fungibility of security interests 
being a central one.250 
To repeat, there was a market demand for more convenient, efficient, and safer 
trading that needed legal recognition and facilitative state legislation. Physical 
bearer instruments, such as bonds, were replaced with a new legal innovation, 
intangible and immobilized security interests. The only physical instrument left 
248 Eidenmüller (n 58) 707, 732, also mentioning the emergence and prevalence of the limited liability 
company, a private construct, in the United States as another example; Anthony Ogus, ‘Competition 
between national legal systems: a contribution of economic analysis to comparative law’ (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 
405.
249 Fuller in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 116) 547.
250 Giovanni Group: Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union. Brussels, 
November 2001, 9, n 11, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/first_giovannini_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2019; Marida Bertocchi, Euro Bonds: Markets, Infrastructure and Trends (World 
Scientific Series in Finance 2014) 60–61. Immobilization of security certificates was not a new invention 
as it dates back to late 19th century Germany, ibid.
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was an immobilized ‘global bond’ that represented a whole issue of securities. In 
time, even the global bonds would be left in history when the issues turned from 
immobilized to dematerialized, meaning that the securities existed only as book 
entries on compturers.251 Instead of transferring a physical bearer instrument from 
one party to another, the transfer would be achieved by debiting and crediting of 
book-entry accounts operated by the CSD in the computer systems of which a 
security instrument was held. 252 
From a more detailed legal perspective, the immobilization means essentially 
that physical certificates would typically be replaced by a single ‘global receipt’ 
that would be held by a specific custodian who holds and administers securities 
and other financial instruments for third parties. The bond agent would act as an 
intermediary between the bond issuer and the respective bondholders. Instead of 
holding a specific physical security with a specified series number, a security holder 
would now have a proprietary claim, simply put a co-ownership right, to a pool of 
assets with other holders of equivalent securities which the global receipt represents. 
These pools would then be separated to book-entry accounts in which individual 
bondholders would ‘keep’ their respective securities.253 These accounts were to be 
operated by specialized custodian institutions. Private companies, the founders of 
which were financial institutions such as Euroclear Bank and Cedelbank based in 
Belgium and Luxembourg, became an elemental part of trading by the end of the 
1960s. The increasing amount of bond issues led to the formation of a private trade 
organization, the Association of International Bond Dealers, that was to self-regulate 
the market with its own rules and standardize ‘trading habits’.254 The business of 
financial infrastructure was from the beginning characterized by a high-degree of 
specialization focused on new technologies in an identifiable community that was 
by its nature distant from politics and even other business areas.255 By the mid-
1990s, the two competing corporations had expanded their business in clearing 
and settlement. Eurobond settlement formed only a small fraction of their overall 
services offering, and the rapid increase in cross-border trading in securities made 
the legal recognition of these private mechanisms a public policy issue given that 
problems in this area transcended the borders of national jurisdictions.256 Euroclear 
and Clearstream are major actors in post-trading business and their private rules 
251 Fuller in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 116) 547.
252 Joanna Benjamin, ‘Determining the situs of interests in immobilised securities’ (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 923, 
923–24.
253 ibid.
254 Gallant (n 113) 17–18; O’Malley (n 122) 40–42. For a detailed account, Norman (n 9).
255 Norman (n 9) 5. 
256 Richard Dale, ‘Clearing and settlement risks in global securities markets: the case of Euroclear’ (1998) 
J.B.L. 434, 435, 441.
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have been both recognized and the use of which encouraged by the European 
Commission.257
Going back to the 1960s, it was not a coincidence that the central securities 
depositories were established in Luxembourg and Belgium. Given that the UK 
officials sought to retain the status of England as an offshore hub, it was for the 
market participants to find another jurisdiction as to ensure the inapplicability of 
the laws of the UK to their eurobond issues. The officials of both Luxembourg and 
Belgium recognized a common core of purposes in enacting targeted legislation 
that would facilitate trading: to provide technical services for the issuers, to serve 
a communication function between the parties concerned (the issuer, the bond 
agent, and the bond holders) and to centralize authority on behalf of creditor 
pools that, given that securities are traded all the time, were scattered in different 
jurisdictions, and changed constantly.258 The equity based concept of trust was 
especially facilitative in this regard, the existence of which required no enactment 
of any specific law in order to be able to provide legal certainty. In comparison 
Luxembourg and Belgium, as civil law countries, had to enact separate legislation 
that created ‘trust-based representation devices’ that emulated equity-based trust 
structures. Such legislation was to the author’s understanding lex specialis intended 
for transnational use, meaning it was not to be used for domestic and municipal 
transactions. Following the enactment of Arrêté grand-ducal of 22 December 1972,259 
the laws of Luxembourg recognized a convention fiduciaire (trust agreement) and 
représentantion fiduciaire (trustee). From a legal perspective, the central question 
was what law would apply to the book entry accounts held at CSDs, the legal status 
of which also had to be ascertained.260 Often the ‘global bond’ was deposited to a 
custodian also located in London.261 
The determination of the proper law applicable to the security rights (and later 
on, their use as a collateral) would point the question of proper law towards private 
international law. Under these rules, the applicable law would be determined by a 
lex situs rule, a general rule of English private international law. Under lex situs, 
the applicable law would be defined by the location of the asset. One problem out 
of many in the practical application of lex situs was that book-entry securities are by 
their nature intangible and thus have no physical location. It was also problematic 
257 Rosalind Bufton, Eduardo Martínez Rivero, ‘Clearstream: General Court confirms Commission Decision’ 
(2010) 1 (10) EC CPN. 
258 Frederic C Rich, ‘International Debt Obligations of Enterprises in Civil Law Countries: The Problem of 
Bondholder Representation’ (1980–1981) 21 Va. J. Int’l L. 269, 278.
259 Arrêté grand-ducal du 22 Decembre 1972, concernant la representation fiduciaire, Memorial (Off. Gaz.) 
Dec. 29, 1972.
260 Rich (n 258) ‘International Debt Obligations of Enterprises in Civil Law Countries: The Problem of 
Bondholder Representation’ (1980–1981) 21 Va. J. Int’l L. 269, noting the benefits of the common law 
trust structure in this regard.
261 Benjamin (n 252) 923, 924.
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that while the concept of lex situs was recognized in civil law countries, such as Italy 
and France, the interpretation of lex situs differed across jurisdictions making it 
very difficult to know which law would be applicable.262 As summarized by Georges 
R Delaume, discussing the issue as to how to overcome the inconsistency between 
the transnational character of eurobonds and their localization to a specific legal 
system if the existing private international law rules are applied, ‘[t]here is absolutely 
no clue as to the reasons determining the choice of one rather than another legal 
system as the proper law of the loan’.263 
To date, it remains unclear where financial instruments sit from a legal 
perspective, but they very much exist and operate under transnational customary 
law. The Hague Convention on Certain Rights with respect to Securities held with 
Intermediaries (The Hague Convention), was a process driven by private actors 
that took less than two years to complete. According to The Hague Convention, 
the primary rule is that the location of the account is determined by the governing 
law of the relevant account agreement, i.e. the contracting parties may in principle 
choose the governing law. Nonetheless, under the Financial Collateral Directive 
(FCD),264 the location is the place of the securities account (lex conto sitae).265 As 
noted by Michael Huertas and Aikaterini Theodosopoulou, under current EU law, 
the location of a relevant account could be determined to be situated at least in 
five different places. Planned harmonization attempts at the EU level are not only 
unlikely to clarify the issue, but to the contrary, might negatively affect existing 
market practices.266
Bond transfers grew in volume and so did the custody chains from one custodian 
to its sub-custodians that in turn could be located in different jurisdictions. What 
would be the applicable law to a eurobond held by a sub-custodian which was to 
face insolvency? Would the bondholder be recognized as the owner of the bond 
under the insolvency laws of the jurisdiction applicable to the bankruptcy estate 
of a sub-custodian?267 The reality was, and still is, that national laws would cause 
262 Paul Avanzato, Wilde Sapte, ‘How to Use the Collateral Carousel’ (1998) 17 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 29, 31; 
Benjamin (n 252) 925.
263 Delaume (n 118) 246.
264 2002/47 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43.
265 Sandeep Gopalan, ‘A demandeur-centric approach to regime design in transnational commercial law’ 
(2007–08) 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 327, 340–44, n 72, n 73, 379; Article 4 of the Hague Convention <https://
assets.hcch.net/docs/3afb8418-7eb7-4a0c-af85-c4f35995bb8a.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; the principle 
of lex conto sitae was adopted in earlier EU directives, which is why it was also chosen as the basis of 
the FCD, Klaus Lober, Ewa Klima, ‘The implementation of Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral 
arrangements’ (2006) 21 J.I.B.L.R. 203, 210–11.
266 Michael Huertas, Aikaterini Theodosopoulou, ‘Collateral and the Capital Markets Union: what the EC 
Green Paper tells us and what needs doing’ (2015) 30 J.I.B.L.R. 415, 421–22.
267 European Central Bank, ‘The Payment System: payments, securities and derivatives, and the role of the 
Eurosystem’ (2010), the definition of ‘custody risk’, 119:
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fragmentation to the custody chain as the laws of other nations could become 
applicable to book-entry accounts located outside the CSDs jurisdiction, which all 
would have their say on the question of situs. In addition to tangible/intangible 
distinction, property laws often distinguish also between movable and immovable 
things. The nature of book-entry securities as intangible and movable called for 
the creation of new form of situs or legal location so that applicable law could be 
identified to book-entry securities.268 As mentioned, unlike English law, civil law 
systems did not recognize trust structures and fungibility concepts, which is why 
there was a market demand for new legislation. Following the market demand 
for legal certainty, both Luxembourg and Belgium introduced new legislation to 
accommodate eurobond trading which differentiated them from other civil law 
countries. Both states enabled the utilization of a structure similar to equity based 
trust, identified the concept of fungibility, and allowed account holders to hold a 
proprietary claim for securities held by custodians recorded on their book-entry 
accounts.269 For example, under the Luxembourg law, the lex situs of securities was 
the law where the book entry on the CSD is held.270 While this development was 
welcomed, the situation was far from ideal in other respects, starting already from 
the question that the location of the book-entry account was unclear. In addition, 
each jurisdiction that was somehow affected by the issue could challenge the 
interpretation about the location of the assets and its legal enforceability.271
In contrast to this transnationalisation of law, the integration of the European 
Common Market was still in its infancy and would lag far behind. From the 
perspective of financial infrastructure providers: 
[I]ntegration came late to the party, long after technological advance, 
financial innovation and market liberalization had wrought changes in 
structures that served national markets in Europe.272
 The risk of a loss being incurred on securities in custody as a result of a custodian’s insolvency, negligence, 
misuse of assets, fraud, poor administration or inadequate record-keeping.
 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsystem201009en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
268 Nina Hval, ‘Credit Risk Reduction in the International Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: 
Collateralizing the Net Exposure with Support Agreements’ (1997) 31 Int’l L. 801, 802, 814–15.
269 Peter S Smedresman, Michael A Kenney, ‘Solving the Puzzle of Cross-border Securities Pledges’ (1996) 15 
Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 15, 17–18.
270 Hval (n 268) 815, n. 55.
271 However, market participants might still have decided to use trust-based devices in Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the legislation of which allowed for the trustee to act swiftly on behalf of the holders of 
eurobonds (and other securities) in its own name should there be a reason to protect the interests of the 
bondholders. In other jurisdictions, this might not have been possible. See the source referred to in Rich 
(n 258), n 89.
272 Norman (n 9) 5. 
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Integration through financial regulation not only ‘came late to the party’ but actually 
renationalized a transnational market. It can be said that the market participants 
trading eurobonds created efficient trading in inefficiently separated markets which 
were costly and risky as the regulatory, legal, and fiscal environment followed the 
lines of nations while the eurobond market was transnational in its nature and 
bottom-up law-making flourished. The functionalities of CSDs, clearing, settlement, 
depository services, are market services characterised by rules of contracts and 
technology of a regulatory, legal, and fiscal nature.273 It was only in the 1980s when 
securities were offered harmonization processes at the EU level.274
There was a market demand for better law that would reduce legal risks and 
would facilitate more efficient trading in eurobonds. The evolution was driven by 
the possibility to choose the governing law of the eurobonds, and the private/public 
governance regime (the laws of Belgium and the Netherlands) led to a cumulative 
process of improvements in governance structures.275 In the EU, the public policy 
makers and regulators noted how the market demand for efficiency had indeed 
created efficient trading infrastructure ‘in the presence of inefficiently separated 
markets’ that followed the lines of national legal orders. One particular financial 
product, the eurobond, had been the central driver in this development.276 However, 
it may well be asked why these markets became subject to renationalization not 
to state level but to the supranational local level of the European Union. The 
eurobond market was already functioning on a transnational basis but nevertheless 
became subject to local EU financial regulation borne out of perhaps questionable 
motives. The regulatory framework did not take the efficient eurobond market as 
its foundation but began to localize a transnational phenomenon through local 
regulation.277 While this issue cannot be further examined in this research, the 
conclusion is that the eurobond market laid down foundations for transnational 
contracts and private regulatory mechanisms that operated autonomously on a 
transnational plane but not independently of their legal and regulatory frameworks 
of states. This is private normativity in action, which gave rise to further contractual 
standardization discussed in the following Chapter.
273 Giovanni Group (n 250) Annex II, 64.
274 Haentjens, Gioia-Carabellese (n 17) 25–27.
275 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Institutional change in globalization: transnational commercial law from an 
evolutionary economics perspective’ (2008) 9 German L.J. 411, 426–31, discussing the regulatory 
competition and its drivers between legal systems.
276 See the first report of the Giovanni Group, a component of the EU’s policy objective known as the Lisbon 
Strategy, Giovanni Group: Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union, 
Brussels, November 2001, the objective of which was to ‘assess the current arrangements for cross-border 
clearing and settlement and to identify the main sources of inefficiency relative to the corresponding 
arrangements for domestic transactions’, i, 20, https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/first_giovannini_
report_en.pdf, accessed 1 June 2019.
277 Dalhuisen (n 247) 663, 696; Chapter 5, n 132.
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4. TRANSNATIONALISATION OF THE OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET 
4.1 THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR SHARED CONTRACTUAL 
LANGUAGE 
The law and practice of finance is largely based on contract. Both in the eurobond 
market and in the lending market, ‘global contractual standardisation’ and ‘consensus 
as to appropriate market practice’ was achieved already by the early 1980s. States are 
but one type of market participant in finance that adhere to these market practices.1 
Transnational contracts serve as an evidence of and an artefact of private normativity 
and bottom-up law making. Originally the outcome of spontaneous action of 
day-to-day transactions, i.e. repeated interactions between market participants, 
transnational contracts can become standardized in a coordinated effort and design 
by private trade organizations and their members, both public and private. The more 
the users, the more beneficial transnational contracts can become to the members 
of a business community.2 First drafted into existence by small specialized trade 
organizations to meet the market demand for simplified negotiation processes,3 
both sophisticated and less sophisticated market participants use, in vast majority of 
transactions, standard-form contracts in many segments of the financial markets.4 
Concurrently, private trade organizations who draft transnational contracts have 
grown from small clubs of a few members, to communities of hundreds of members 
of arguably the most influential financial and other private entities in the world, as 
well as sovereigns to their supporting service organizations.5 It is evident that any 
1 Joanna Benjamin, David Rouch, ‘The international financial markets as a source of global law: the 
privatisation of rule-making?’ (2008) 2 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 78.
2 Bryan H Druzin, ’Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal 
Order is Emerging’ (2014) 47 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1049; The benefits and detriments of standardized 
business contracts was also acknowledged by the state officials behind the Iron Curtain, Josef Rohlik, 
‘Trading with socialist partners’ (1974) 4 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 362, 380–83; George J Roman, ‘Socialist 
conflict of laws rules and practice in east-west trade contracts’ (1975) 7 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1113, 
discussing ‘self-regulatory contracts’ and ‘contracts without law’; in terms of arbitration, since communist 
countries had ‘accepted the customary law of international trade, most commissions will refer directly to 
that law to interpret international trade terms and determine liability under the contract’, Sanford B King-
Smith, ‘Communist Foreign-Trade Arbitration’ (1969) 10 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 34, 96.
3 Sean M Flanagan, ‘The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association’ (2001) 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 211. 
4 Mark R Patterson, ‘Standardisation of standard-form contracts: competition and contract implications’ 
(2010–2011) 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 327.
5 Flanagan (n 3) 238–41. For the current members list of ISDA <http://www2.isda.org/membership/
members–list/> accessed 1 June 2019.
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amendments to the existing transnational contracts can be disseminated almost 
instantly to the members of their respective business communities.
Especially the larger financial transactions are typically arranged under 
transnational contracts created by private trade organizations which collaborate 
with industry practitioners, regulators, and leading law firms across jurisdictions.6 
Transnational contracts are not static but adaptive to change. The market for 
transnational contracts has also matured in that the basic structures, documents, and 
processes have been settled upon and tested by market participants and by national 
courts.7 For a lawyer specializing in repurchase or repo transactions, the often-
used contract is the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) created and 
updated by the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) headquartered in 
Zurich and established in 2005 following the merger of the International Securities 
Market Association (ISMA) and the International Primary Market Association 
(IPMA).8 In securities lending, the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement 
published by International Securities Lending Association established in 1989 is the 
standard contract.9 For lawyers who specialize in syndicated loan arrangements,10 
the standardized agreement used in the transaction is in many cases a product of 
The Loan Market Association (LMA) established in 1996 and headquartered in 
London.11 There are also multi-product standard agreements that cover repurchase 
agreements, securities lending, and derivatives alike, such as those published by the 
European Banking Federation established in 1960.12 For derivatives lawyers, the 
most likely option is the ISDA Master Agreement (ISDA MA).13 For a long time, 
these different transnational contracts have been interlinked because seemingly 
different market segments operate in parallel. Take for example traditional bank 
lending and OTC derivatives which are seemingly different areas of finance. In 
reality, and from early on, transnational financial institutions started to use OTC 
6 Agasha Mugasha, ‘Global Financial Transactions and Jurisdictional Fragmentation: Inconsistent Decisions 
by Leading Trans-Atlantic Courts’ (2010–2011) 29 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 553, 560.
7 Agasha Mugasha, ‘International Financial Law: Is the Law Really “International” and Is It “Law” Anyway?’ 
(2011) 26 B.F.L.R. 381, 447–49.
8 <https://www.icmagroup.org/About-ICMA/history/> accessed 1 June 2019.
9 <https://www.isla.co.uk/> accessed 1 June 2019.
10 A syndicated loan, also known as a syndicated bank facility, is a loan offered by a group of lenders – 
referred to as a syndicate – that work together to provide funds for a single borrower to disperse credit 
risk. International syndicated loans can be traced to the end of the 18th Century, Goodwin v. Robarts 
(1875), L.R. 10 Exch. 337 (Eng. Ex. Ch.); affirmed (1876), (1875–76) L.R. 1 App. Cas. 476 (U.K. H.L.) in 
which the court analyzed the customary practices relating to international bonds.
11 <http://www.lma.eu.com/> accessed 1 June 2019.
12 <https://www.ebf.eu/home/european-master-agreement-ema/> accessed 1 June 2019. 
13 For an overview of ISDA, LMA and ICMA, their objectives and the standardized contracts they offer, 
Stanyo Neukov Dinov, ‘The Role and Function of Private Trade Associations as a Private Regulator in 
Making Markets More Efficient and Stable: The ISDA, The ICMA and The LMA in Comparative Review’ 
(2017) 16(4) British Journal of Economics, Management & Trade 2.
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derivatives products also in connection with lending with their existing corporate 
customers as evidenced by standardized loan documentation.14 
For the sake of simplification in this Chapter, ISDA Master Agreement (ISDA 
MA) refers both to the 2002 version and the 1992 version, which are built on the same 
architecture and fundamentals, and form the core of all derivatives transactions 
executed under it.15 ISDA MA is a product of a private trade organization known 
as The International Swaps and Derivatives, Inc. established in the mid-1980s. The 
creation of ISDA MA, and the whole OTC derivatives market, was the outcome of 
spontaneous actions by market participants to respond to the peculiarities of OTC 
derivatives trading in its modern dawn in the 1970s and 1980s. Each drafting and 
transaction were intentional and deliberate acts, co-ordinated by many, but the 
resulting products evolved at a rapid pace. The OTC derivatives market emerged 
spontaneously as further discussed in Chapter 5.
Regardless of the type of an occurrence that has repercussions on the market, 
it is reflected in a transnational contract. From the definition of standardized 
definition as to what constitutes a ‘business day’,16 to forces of nature that affect 
such definition in an unexpected manner17 and from government decisions18 to 
the introduction of a new currency19 and all the way to the effective collapse of a 
whole banking system,20 or terrorist attacks,21 every issue is dealt with contractually. 
Market participants can exercise their right to amend standardized terms and 
conditions as to their choosing but such deviation should be drafted carefully so as 
to avoid legal uncertainty from arising from ambiguous drafting.22 The commercial 
14 Christian A Johnson, ‘At the Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?’ 
(1998–1999) 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 1998–1999, 1. In his study, Johnson reviewed the loan documentation of 
129 loan transactions of which ninety-two contained references to associated derivative transactions, 26–
27.
15 Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Market in the Remaking: Over-the-Counter Derivatives in a New Age’ (2017) 
11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 309, 343–44.
16 Claude Brown, ‘Defining the Business Day’ (1995) 14 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 42
17 ISDA, ‘Hurricane Sandy Guidance’ (October 29, 2012), Second Update (October 30, 2012) < https://www.
isda.org/a/uViDE/hurricane-sandy-guidance-oct-29-2012.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
18 ISDA white paper, ‘Brexit – CCP Location and Legal Uncertainty’ August 2017; Edoardo Muratori, 
‘Governing law and jurisdiction clauses of the ISDA Master Agreement: legal basis and impact of Brexit’ 
(2017) 38 Comp. Law. 95.
19 Geoffrey Yeowart, ‘Preparing for the Euro’ (1998) 17 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 19; Simon Deane, ‘The Euro: 
implications for Hong Kong’ (1998) J.I.B.L. 13 383, 385–86.
20 Udaibir S Das, Michael G Papaioannou, Christoph Trebesch, ‘Effects of Russia’s 1998 Debt Crisis 
on the Domestic Banking Sector’ IMF Working Paper, 2012, WP/12/203, describing the Russian 
government’s moratorium on certain foreign payments by Russian residents, and its repercussions on the 
standardization of CDS contracts; Rym Ayadi, Patrick Behr, ‘The future for credit derivatives markets: The 
eminence of regulation’ 27–29, 11 April 2015, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242492908_
The_future_for_credit_derivatives_markets_The_eminence_of_regulation> accessed 1 June 2019.
21 For example, following the 9/11 terrorist attack, the New York stock markets were closed for four business 
days which was taken into consideration in the following version of the ISDA MA architecture. Paul C 
Harding, Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements, (3rd edition, Pearson Education Ltd 2010) 227.
22 Ebo Coleman, ‘Cross-Default Confusion’ (1997) 16 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 49
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decisions are expressed in the legal documentation, and their creation involves a 
multitude of different experts in addition to lawyers. Financial modelling requires 
appropriately drafted legal documentation capable of addressing risks and capturing 
the commercial intention of a transaction.23 
Cross-default clauses, a typical provision of any financial contract, serves as 
an example of what is meant by interconnections in the financial markets. Cross-
default clauses ‘basically state that ‘If you default on any agreement with any other 
party, you also default on this agreement and must immediately settle up’.24 If a 
counterparty defaults under any other agreement it has entered into with a third 
party, such default would be ‘imported’ to, i.e. also constitute a default under the 
other agreement(s) of the defaulting corporation. Simply put, a default under a loan 
agreement is a default under a derivatives agreement and vice versa. It depends on 
the wording of the cross-default clause when the non-defaulting market participant 
can exercise this right.25 If market participants invoke these clauses simultaneously 
across markets, there is a great change that the transnational market dries up of 
liquidity. This may potentially lead to cascading events of default transnationally 
and in systemic proportions. 26
A long case-law history directly concerning the ISDA MA architecture exists 
in English court praxis as reflected in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v 
National Power Corporation & Anor.27 Far from being some type of closed and 
secret community in regards to the ISDA MA architecture, ISDA has published 
publicly available user’s guides early on,28 on the ISDA MA architecture, which have 
also been relied upon by English courts as evidence as to the intent behind and the 
ratio of individual contractual terms of the ISDA MA architecture.29 Naturally, courts 
of different jurisdictions can interpret transnational contracts and their provisions 
in different ways. These rulings affect the choices and contractual arragenements 
transnational financial institutions do in the transnational law market. When it 
comes to ISDA MA, market participants may wish to choose their counterparties 
depending on which insolvency laws, either those of English law or the US law 
given that large dealers are in these jurisdictions, would be applicable in the event 
23 Panayiota Koulafetis, Modern Credit Risk Management. Theory and Practice (Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
2017) 165.
24 Philip H Harris, ‘Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market Crises: A Lawyer’s 
Perspective’ (1999) 4 Fordham Fin. Sec. Tax L. F. 25, 26.
25 Coleman (n 22).
26 Harriss (n 24) 26–31; Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edition, OUP 2015) para 15.72.
27 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v National Power Corporation & Anor [2018] EWHC 487 
(Comm).
28 Daniel Cunningham, ‘Swaps: Codes, Problems and Regulation’ (1986) 5 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 26, 26, 31.
29 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v National Power Corporation & Anor [2018] EWHC 487 (Comm) 
39, 77. 
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of counterparty default. National insolvency laws and the public policy choices 
they represent outweigh contractual provisions. For the same reason, transnational 
financial institutions may switch their location from London to New York or vice 
versa, or, alternatively, amend the existing ISDA MA provisions to ensure that the 
contract reflects and is in compliance with the local insolvency legislation applicable 
to a counterparty.30
The same set of facts may bring different outcomes depending on the jurisdiction. 
The contractual intent may become recharacterized to something else by courts 
in the application of local laws.31 To ensure legal certainty, market participants 
often choose particular laws as the governing law of their contracts and certain 
courts. While this can reduce legal risks, seemingly unrelated state laws can still 
have an impact on transactions if they are interpreted in a way that conflicts with 
transnational practice as further discussed in subchapter 5.8.4.
Financial transactions are accompanied by legal opinions. To identify and control 
legal risks, market participants request legal opinions from each jurisdiction deemed 
relevant for a transaction. With legal opinions, market participants can control, at 
least to some degree, the risk arising from the contracting parties as well as issues 
arising from state legislation, property laws, bankruptcy regimes, and collateral 
issues - generally those issues that contracting parties cannot override through 
contract. A legal opinion is a legal document typically drafted by a qualified lawyer in 
relation to the laws of the jurisdiction that is the subject of the opinion. It addresses 
various legal issues that relate to a transaction. The legal opinion may indicate how 
the laws are likely to be applied and interpreted in connection with a transaction 
by courts and regulators.32 This is not a new phenomenon. As put forward already 
by Oliver Wendell Holmes, people pay lawyers to argue for them before judges or 
30 James Grand, Perry Sayles, ‘Bankruptcy Code Trumps ISDA’ (2009) 28 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 34.
31 ibid.
32 Sarah Paterson, ‘Legal Opinions’ in Sarah Paterson, Rafal Zakrzewski (eds), McKnight, Paterson and 
Zakrzewski on the Law of International Finance (2nd edition, OUP 2017) 414–51. Requesting Legal 
opinions have been market practice at least from the early 1980s, Royal Bank of Canada, Group legal 
department, ‘Legal Opinions from Borrowers’ (1983) 2 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 3: 
 [I]t is of fundamental importance to banks to know that the representations and warranties with regard to 
factual and legal matters are true as stated in the credit agreement; 
 In time, legal opinions became longer and filled with qualifications ‘with the result that a recipient 
must have thought that everything was wrong with the document and nothing right’, Philip R Wood, 
‘Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s’ (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 16; Stanley Keller, 
‘Legal Opinion Practice at a Crossroads’ (2014) 69 Bus. Law. 917, noting that while the qualifications 
are customary practice, lawyers still include long qualifications for the fear of liability for the absence of 
the same. Legal opinions are uncertain if, and like most of the time, they have not been ‘tested’ in courts 
meaning that a court has not given its interpretation on the material correcteness of what has been stated 
in the legal opinion; Markus Krebzs, Securitization and Structured Finance Post Credit Crunch: A Best 
Practice Deal Lifecycle Guide (Wiley 2011) 126–27.
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to be advised in such a way as to keep them out of court. Lawyers are taught to 
predict the incidence of the public force that the courts yield.33 
The legal opinion standardized by ISDA came to be generally known as 
netting legal opinions and collateral opinions. In essence, market participants 
are required, through a regulatory requirement discussed further in Chapter 5, 
to find out that would the non-defaulting party to the ISDA MA be allowed to 
terminate the transactions upon counterparty default also when that counterparty 
is declared bankrupt or is otherwise made subject to some collective liquidation 
or reorganization procedure. National insolvency laws generally can ‘trump’ 
contractual arrangements and in the OTC derivatives market, the ability to use 
bilateral close-out netting upon counterparty default is of paramount importance 
for market participants. Already in 1997, ISDA had arranged for netting opinions 
from 23 jurisdictions for the 1987 and 1992 versions of the ISDA MA.34 According to 
Alastair Hudson, ‘derivatives law’ is not necessarily even an independent discipline 
itself if viewed from a national standpoint.35 Furthermore, while not referring to a 
transnational element of derivatives in this connection, he notes:
[T]wo things define derivatives law practice as a particular discipline 
in practice more than anything else: first, the standard market 
documentation which constitutes a form of closed knowledge about 
the techniques of that marketplace; and, secondly, the particular 
commercial practices and mathematical techniques which have given 
rise to the derivatives instruments themselves.36 
Transnational method can help to identify how the commercial practices that turn 
into transnational contracts come into existence and how they interact with state-
made laws and regulations.
4.2 STATE LAW TRUMPS TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Cases and court rulings concerning transnational contracts are followed very 
closely by the industry practitioners. Trading can be affected by many unforeseen 
events. For this reason, transnational contracts include terms and conditions that 
could be characterized as private regulatory mechanisms that were discussed in 
subchapter 2.7. The objective of contractual solutions is for market participants 
33 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1997) 110 Harv.L.Rev 991.
34 Bob Wessels, ‘Close-out netting in the Netherlands’ (1997) 12(5) J.I.B.L. 187, 193–94.
35 Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 0–29. 
36 ibid para 0–32 (emphasis added). 
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to ‘allow fact finding to take place and market solutions to be found’ instead of 
potentially unnecessary terminations of transactions. In practice, the contract could 
stipulate that the other party has an opportunity to ‘cure’ the situation within a 
few business days before the other party can exercise its termination rights.37 For 
example, the defaulting party can remedy the situation and be able to discharge its 
obligations by transferring the affected transactions to another of its offices located 
in an unaffected jurisdiction.38 
While all this may sound relatively simple, a practical example on the issue of 
recharacterization risk is useful in identifying the legal issues at stake in cross-
border finance. Consider a cross-border loan where the parties to the transaction 
have chosen English law as the applicable law and English courts as the applicable 
jurisdiction. The borrower is incorporated in England, viewing the transaction from 
the perspective of English law, the creditor is domiciled in France, and finally, the 
guarantor of the debtor is located in Germany. At least three state legal orders 
are connected to the transaction which all view with different concepts and even 
with differening mindsets. The transaction, a loan, is thus subject to three legal 
conceptualizations. This means that it is possible that the same set of facts may 
bring different results depending on how local courts apply their respective local 
laws to the transaction. Perhaps the debtor is unable to meet its obligations which 
is an eventuality that the parties have addressed in the loan documentation. In 
contractual language, non-performance is the most obvious ‘event of default’, a term 
that allows the non-defaulting party to take actions against the defaulting party. 
Should the transaction end up in a dispute, a local court would first look at private 
international law to determine whether it has the competence to act and, if yes, 
which law is applicable to the contract. This is within the powers of the contracting 
parties. However, while private international law could direct the dispute to be 
settled by English courts in accordance with the laws of England, mandatory rules 
of local laws reflecting public policy choices remain relevant in many respects.39 
Consider that the debtor is declared bankrupt. The insolvency laws of England 
applicable to the debtor could suggest that the payment instalments the debtor 
has made to the creditor constitute preferential treatment of one creditor over the 
others, and, for this reason, the creditor needs to return the payments it has received 
back to the bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy laws very typically include provisions 
on so-called ‘suspect periods’, or moratoriums, which is a certain time before the 
declaration of insolvency under which payments made from the bankruptcy estate 
37 For example, in force majeure events introduced in the ISDA 2002 MA architecture, this so-called waiting 
period is eight ‘Local Business Days’, Harding (n 21) 231.
38 Harding (n 21) 255.
39 Simplified example used here is taken from a more nuanced and thoroughly analyzed example in Paul 
Sebastianutti, ‘What is This Thing Called International Financial Law – Part 2’ (2009) 3 Law & Fin. Mkt. 
Rev. 155, 158
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can be viewed to be made with the intention of transferring assets away from a 
corporation for the benefit of some creditor(s) at the expense of other creditor(s). 
While it may be that the creditor did not know about the impending bankruptcy of 
the debtor, a court could still recharacterize the contractual intent of the parties as 
being preferential. Questions such as these became elemental in the OTC derivatives 
industry where the market participants saw that the right to terminate all OTC 
derivatives transactions upon counterparty default due to insolvency as a public 
policy issue discussed further in chapter 5.
In contrast to commercial transactions in which arbitration is more common, 
market participants in finance have favoured ordinary courts as the forum for 
settling disputes. Importantly, litigation is still a rare occurrence. Restructuring 
of a transaction, by for example extending repayment schedules to avoid default 
and refinancing of existing obligations, contractually is much more common than 
litigation.40 Private market participants are not in the market to litigate, but they 
‘are aware of and act in accordance with background private law as well as merchant 
norms.’41 
4.3 NEW YORK LAW AND ENGLISH LAW 
4.3.1 DRIVERS BEHIND POPULARITY 
The financial industry relies on state courts and state laws in disputes concerning 
their transnational activities. According to a 2013 International Arbitration Survey 
conducted by PwC, a private consultancy firm, and Queen Mary, University of 
London, the financial industry favours court litigation over arbitration with 82 per 
cent of respondents favouring the former as the most preferred choice of dispute 
resolution mechanism.42 Market participants favour English-American common 
law. According to the survey conducted by the Oxford Institute of European and 
Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,43 the preferred 
choice of governing contract law was English law 21 per cent as the first answer 
40 P Durand-Barthez, ‘The “governing law” clause: legal and economic consequences of the choice of law in 
international contracts’ (2012) 5 I.B.L.J. 505, 514.
41 Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society’ (2005) 46 
Harv.Int’l L.J. 471, 475–77.
42 PwC and Queen Mary University of London, ‘Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry 
Practices’ (2013) 7 < https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute-resolution/assets/pwc-
international-arbitration-study.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
43 The Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio–Legal Studies 
‘Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law – A 
Business Survey’ (2008) (The Oxford Survey) <https://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019.
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and 23 per cent of total answers.44 An overwhelming majority of the respondents 
(59 per cent) thought that that English law was the most used governing law by 
anyone conducting cross-border transactions followed next by Switzerland (13 per 
cent) and the US (11 per cent).45 
For the respondents, the five most important factors for determination of the 
governing law of the contract are, from the most important to the least important: 
first, the contract law applicable to the contract; second, the fairness of the court 
outcomes; third, the absence of corruption; fourth, the predictability of outcomes; 
and fifth, the quality of judges and courts.46 It is not a new finding that in a 
transnational setting, English language is the common language of international 
business and finance, and that the contracts in this field are written in the Anglo-
Saxon style.47 In doing so, transnational lawyers and law firms have been creating 
‘new privatized means and new modes of trans-state dispute processing’.48 
However, these transnational actors ‘are captured within essentially archaic 
systems of organization and legitimation’ of the state and thus do not operate truly 
transnationally.49
ISDA MA is by default subject either to English law or the laws of the state of New 
York and the jurisdiction of English courts or the courts of the state of New York, 
respectively.50 The interactions between derivatives trading and national laws led 
to debate and analysis relating to how to address legal risks in the future creating ‘a 
healthy reflexive relationship between the courts and legal practice’. This interaction 
occurs particularly in London and New York where the litigation most often takes 
place.51 Courts pave the way for the future conduct of business by setting binding 
precedents in the construction of the terms in finance documents.52 The reasons for 
the popularity of English law as the law governing the ISDA Master Agreements and 
governing also many other kinds of transnational contracts are claimed to be both 
historical and contemporary. English law is often seen as particularly attractive as the 
governing law of financial transactions because in general terms it offers certainty, 
44 ibid Questions 17.1 and 17.2. 
45 ibid Question 18. For the institutional reasons and the non-legal factors contributing to the popularity 
of some jurisdictions over the other, Raouf Boucekkin, Fréderic Docquier, Fabien Ngendakuriyo, Henrik 
Schmigelow, ‘Contract Rules in Codes and Statutes: Easing Business Across the Cleavages of Legal Origins’ 
in Michèle Schmiegelow, Henrik Schmiegelow (eds), Institutional Competition between Common Law 
and Civil Law – Theory and Policy (Springer 2014) 59–77.
46 (n 42) Question 19.
47 John Flood, ‘Megalawyering in the global order: the cultural, social and economic transformation of global 
legal practice’ (1996) 3 Int’l J. Legal Prof. 169, 190.
48 ibid 201.
49 ibid 201.
50 Hudson (n 35) paras 2–205–206, 10–02–06.
51 Mugasha (n 6) 577–78.
52 Simon Morgan, Jonathan Kelly, ‘Banks Seek New Strategy for Financial Disputes’ (1999) 18 Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. 13.
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stability, predictability, and commercial pragmatism because of the economic power 
of the UK, and because of the accrued financial expertise of the English courts.53 
From a commercial and financial perspective, the main driver for this choice can be 
found from equity that apparently allows for a more dynamic and responsive law 
for commercial and financial transactions in comparison to civil law countries in 
terms of, for example, fiduciary duties and the concept of contract.54 It is true that 
civil law countries have imitated trust structures in their own legal orders, as was 
discussed in chapter Chapter 3.6. English courts usually adopt a literal approach in 
the interpretation of the wording of standard form contracts as the courts generally 
view that professional market participants are in charge of the risk allocation of 
their transactions and are advized by competent and experienced legal counsels.55 
According to Cally Jordan, echoing perhaps the idea of transnational law: 
[d]ifferent legal traditions demonstrate different levels of openness 
and receptivity to international norms which do not derive from state 
authority and are not subject to national judicial enforcement.56 
The conventional argument is that the English legal system was recognized by the 
market participants as the most efficient, in terms of time, value and legal certainty 
and the rulings of the English courts are able to identify and apply transnational law, 
from customs to standard form contracts, in a receptive manner. To this end, it is 
possible that for a particular set of transactions, English courts have been receptive 
for a long time, which is perhaps illustrated by an early court case from 1759 in 
which it was stated that ‘mercantile law is not the law of a particular country but 
the law of all nations.’57 
In the OTC derivatives market, market participants often rely on and favour the 
expertise of courts and the legal certainty provided by their legal systems. This is 
also true in complex cases where courts apparently provide more legal certainty in 
comparison to other forms of dispute resolution.58 The popularity of English law 
cannot explain why English courts would somehow directly apply and enforce market 
53 Muratori (n 18) also arguing that even Brexit is unlikely to have a significant impact on the popularity of 
English law, 95; Frank J Fabozzi, Handbook of Finance, Vol 1 Financial Markets and Instruments (Wiley 
Finance 2008) 282, summarizing the benefits consisting of low level of regulatory interference, well-
established infrastructure, experienced human resources, and the use of English as the main language. 
54 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, The 
Transnationalisation of Commercial and Financial Law and of Commercial, Financial and Investment 
Dispute Resolution. The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources. Volume 1 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 
2016) 189.
55 Mugasha (n 7) 560.
56 Cally Jordan, ‘How international finance really works’ (2013) 7 LFMR, 256, 260.
57 Luke v Lyde (1759) 97 Eng Rep 614, 618 (KB); 2 Burr 882, 887 (Lord Mansfield).
58 Frank Partnoy, ‘ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation’ (2002) 
Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 213, 214.
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practices. To the contrary, they have a tendency of evaluating the relative bargaining 
power of the parties concerned over the contents of standardized contracts as well 
as the level of sophistication of the same.59 The evidence would thus suggest that 
choosing English law to govern most contracts of international transactions can 
derive from historical reasons. The assumed ability of English courts to be able to 
consider market considerations better than their foreign counterparts, the accrued 
familiarity with a certain legal system and the English language, and even as a 
reinforcing ‘snowball’ effect where one argument favours the next argument, or in 
other words ‘the very fact that English law is so widely accepted is in itself a factor 
of legal certainty’.60 The dominance of English law continued as the governing law 
of eurobonds given at least the concentration of expertise accrued over time and 
the speediness of enforcement.61
Already in the early 1990s, Ravi Tennekoon summarized the three elements 
that market participants seek to control in international finance:
1. The validity, enforceability, and interpretation of all legal documents 
evidencing and constituting the transactions;
2. The legal rights and obligations of the various parties to an international 
financing transaction are identified; and
3. The extent to which other systems of law will affect the transaction.62
Effective enforcement is equal to the existence of a designated court of law or 
other dispute settlement body that: (i) can properly investigate the validity of the 
creditor’s claim and a payment liability ordered on the debtor; and (ii) enforce the 
collection of debts, compulsorily or voluntarily. For an international transaction, 
it also requires that the judicial system identifies and acknowledges the other legal 
systems that affect the transaction besides the stated governing law of the contract 
as well as case-law of the English courts. From the ISDA MA perspective, this is 
especially relevant in regards to insolvency situations where the laws of the place 
of incorporation of the insolvent counterparty prevail over the governing law of 
the agreement.63 
The findings made under legal origins theory, which focuses part of its analysis 
on the fundamental differences of common law and civil law countries, in turn has 
focused on explaining from an economic perspective:
59 ibid 213, 220. 
60 Durand-Barthez (n 40) 514.
61 Tony Rhodes (ed), Syndicated Lending – Practice and Documentation (Euromoney Publications PLC, 
Playhouse Yard 1996) 311–12.
62 Ravi Tennekoon, The Law & Regulation of International Finance (Butterworths 1991) 16.
63 Harding (n 21) 220–21. 
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[w]hy capital flowed so much more massively to New York and 
London than to Paris and Frankfurt. In what impressed many 
thoughtful economists as an interesting departure from the efficient 
market hypothesis, it focused on behavioral patterns and legal rules 
encouraging the provision of capital to financial markets.64
Three widely-cited articles by Rafael La Porta and others are briefly summarized 
here.65 First, as demonstrated by La Porta and others, the character of legal rules 
and the quality of law enforcement, together with the legal environment of any 
given jurisdiction matters if the per capita GDP is used as an indicator of financial 
development. Second, the size and extent of a country’s capital market and the 
willingness of investors to exchange funds for the securities of local companies’ 
correlates with this indicator. The English-American common law jurisdictions 
fare better than the ‘Napoleonic’ French and the Roman-Germanic group when 
measured in terms of investor-friendliness and access to equity finance for local 
companies.66 Lastly, the evidence suggests that for market participants, public 
authorities serve the purpose of facilitating the environment for private contracting. 
From the market perspective, the role of securities regulation may be limited to 
ensure transparency through disclosure requirements and in offering a platform, 
judiciary, for efficient private judicial remedies.67 
The findings of La Porta and others have been widely cited and also cricitized 
regarding their methodology.68 However, the findings of Katharine Pistor echo 
the findings of La Porta and others. In the context of the OECD countries, those 
countries referred to as ‘liberal market economies’, in which ‘firms coordinate their 
activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements’ and where 
‘the equilibrium outcomes of firm behaviour are usually given by demand and 
supply conditions’ are common law countries. In contrast, ‘centrally coordinated’ 
economies, i.e. ‘economies in which firms depend more heavily on non-market 
relationships to coordinate their endeavours with other actors to construct their 
64 Henrik Schmiegelow, ‘A Counterintuitive Efficiency Divide between Common Law and Civil Law: Rules 
and Structures of Civil Procedure in Eight Developed or Newly Industrialized Countries’ in Schmiegelow, 
Schmiegelow (n 45) 119.
65 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Schleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins’ (2008) 46 (2) Journal of Economic Literature, 62; Rafael Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
deSilanes, Andrei Schleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1; Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Schleifer, Robert W Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of External 
Finance’ (1997) 52 (3) Journal of Finance 1131. 
66 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, Rober W Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of 
External Finance’ (1997) 52 (3) Journal of Finance 1131.
67 ibid (n 65, 2006) 19, 27.
68 Schmigelow in Schmigelow, Schmigelow (n 45) 124–28, noting, among other reasons, the general 
difficulty of assessing statistically a large group of countries, as well as ‘generalizing association of civil law 
with government control of the business environment and inferior economic performance’ 127.
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core competencies’ are in turn civil law countries.69 In the European context, one 
reason for the popularity of English law as the governing law of contracts is the 
distinctive feature of the flexible property laws that it offers. According to Elena 
Christine Zaccaria, English property law has the ‘ability to adapt and address market 
needs by frequently stretching and repositioning the boundaries of well-established 
principles rather than creating exceptions or novel concepts of law’.70 
At least one study found that few English court cases involved ISDA MA prior to 
2009. After the Global Financial Crisis, disputes increased considerably, suggesting 
that English courts were well positioned to affect transnational law, or ‘to generate 
binding “fixes” for sophisticated contractual remedies, trigger public and productive 
debate about terms of standard form contracts, bind users and members, and 
develop ‘market-minded’ jurisprudence’.71 As explained by Agasha Mugasha, 
the interaction between courts and trade organizations is that normally English 
courts and New York courts follow the industry practices in their interpretation and 
application of the law, and in the case of divergence between commercial perceptions 
of market participants and the courts, either the trade organization amends the 
standard documentation or legislative action is taken. As standardized financial 
contracts are so widely used, a court ruling may have global repercussions.72 
In forum shopping, i.e. the strategic objective of seeking to have a case heard in 
the most favourable but not necessarily the most appropriate court, the question 
over which court to shop for may lean towards a choice between New York and 
English law.73 Regarding the role of legislation, the most decisive indicator of the 
attitude of a legal system towards finance may also be found in its bankruptcy 
laws. As resources are scarce and not every creditor can get paid in full in the 
event of a debtor bankruptcy, the bankruptcy laws tell us who are favoured over 
the others and on what grounds, and whether the bankruptcy regime is geared 
towards being creditor or debtor friendly. In the latter, the regime aims to rehabilitate 
rather than liquidate insolvent entities. Creditors favour jurisdictions where their 
69 Katharina Pistor, ‘Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies’ in Klaus J Hopt, 
ddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda, Harald Baum (eds), Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, 
States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (OUP 2006) 249, 251, bringing forth suspicion 
towards the idea that legal rules are somehow converging across jurisdictions. Individualism or 
collectivism are deeply embedded in legal systems, 279. 
70 Elena Christine Zaccaria, ‘An inquiry into the meaning of possession and control over financial assets and 
the effects on third parties’ (2017) J.C.L.S. 1, 3.
71 Joan Braithwaite, ‘Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: Evidence from the Derivatives Market’ 
(2012) 75 MLR 779, 803–04. For the discussion relating to the exclusivity of ISDA jurisdictional clauses, 
Christian Oetiker, Jana Essebier, ‘Jurisdictional Clauses: Exclusive or Not? The Example of the English 
Courts’ Jurisdiction under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement’ (2015) 9 No. 2 Disp. Resol. Int’l 149.
72 Mugasha (n 6) 560, discussing the interaction between courts and the ISDA MA, 561–74; Edward Murray, 
‘Firth Rixson: ‘Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement’ (2012) 25 Insolv. Int. 1, discussing the 
procedure of how the ISDA MA is amended once a court ruling concerning the same has the force of law.
73 Melanie Ryan, Andrew Yong, ‘Springwell – are the English courts the venue of last resort for complex 
investor claims?’ (2009) 24 J.I.B.L.R. 54.
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rights are respected with the absence of minimum dividend requirements, where 
collateral arrangements are enforceable, and more generally, where property rights 
are respected and legal institutions are supportive of the rule of law.74 Wood has 
summarized the core policies that should be observed if one is to enhance private 
commercial activity in any given jurisdiction: bankruptcy laws should be reasonably 
predictable, that are as simple as possible, are free of volatile governmental intrusion, 
that aim to reduce transaction costs, and respect towards contract and property 
rights nationally and internationally.75 
The evidence suggests that not even a court ruling that rendered a whole range of 
OTC derivatives unenforceable would deter market participants to other competing 
financial hubs from London.
4.3.2 HAMMERSMITH AND FULHAM REVISITED
The new opportunities in the expanding OTC derivatives markets of the 1980s 
also attracted end-users unfamiliar to new products that led them to suffer great 
economic losses. This unfamiliarity and losses combined with legal uncertainties 
relating to the new products was also a driver for innovation from a new perspective 
in that it created incentives for lawyers, acting on behalf on the end-users as their 
clients, to find ways of seeking plausible ways of disputing the enforceability of the 
unfavourable trades and to recover damages from the dealers in courts.76 Similar 
type of risks relating to unenforceability were already referred to as legal risks 
which could arise from lack of legal capacity or authority of the counterparty or, 
as discussed earlier, from bankruptcy or insolvency. It is not uncommon for courts 
to challenge and even deem unenforceable some type of obligations characteristic 
to OTC derivatives trading that can be hard to demonstrate. However, in the 
derivatives market the old risks manifested themselves in new forms especially as 
issues concerning the legal capacity and authority of the end-user, both corporate 
74 Joel F Houston, Chen Lin, Yue Ma, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows’ (2012) Vol. 
LXVIII, The Journal of Finance, 5 1851, 1860, 1867, 1885–86, and in turn, generally the restrictiveness of 
financial regulation is positively associated with aggregated capital outflows, 1886.
75 Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) 4–6; often this 
has not been the case, which is why standardized financial contracts, such as the ISDA MA, also need to 
be amended accordingly, Dermot Turing, ’Insolvency in Asian markets: lessons for the survivors’ (1999) 1 
J.I.F.M. 23. Generally, Ross Cranston, ‘Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law’ (2006–2007) 42 Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 597.
76 Denis M Forster, ‘New Legal Weapons on the Derivative Battlefield’ (1995) 14 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 36, 
listing techniques as to how to render unfavourable transactions void and on how to recover damages 
as relating to missing capacity and authority (such as ultra vires and lack of individual authority to 
execute the trade(s)) and contract formation (such as requirement for contract to be in written form, 
absence of requisite contractual intent, inadmissibility of recordings of trade calls) and duress (such as 
misrepresentations by the dealer that subjected the end-user to economic duress) 37–38.
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and non-corporate entities and their signatories, to enter into legally binding 
derivatives contracts. 
The case Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC was a major ruling that added 
to the confusion of the enforceability of derivatives contracts due to acting beyond 
powers, i.e. ultra vires. The Council of the London Borough of Hammersmith and 
Fulham (Hammersmith), a very active end-user of swaps in the late 1980s, was 
found to have lacked the legal capacity and authority under the Local Government 
Acts of 1963 and 1972 to enter into these transactions and that all the swaps entered 
into by the same were speculative rather than to identify and manage financial 
risks of traditional lending. 77 Hammersmith had entered into a wide range of 
speculative trades with large exposures, according to some estimates over 100 times 
its annual turnover and had involved a wide array of different derivatives between 
1987 and 1989. Already before running into financial trouble, it was an employee 
of a transnational financial institution who contacted state officials to warn about 
the status of Hammersmith. It was a deliberate legal strategy to seek a court order 
to declare the OTC derivatives transactions, that had turned highly unprofitable 
for Hammersmith, ultra vires.78
Once the case had gone through the Divisional Court and was appealed in the 
Court of Appeal, which had decided that swaps served a facilitative rather than a 
speculative function were legitimate, the U.K. House of Lords saw the situation 
differently and overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal.79 The House of 
Lords asked whether the Council had had the legal capacity to enter into the swap 
transactions to begin with, which meant that the purpose of the swaps was not the 
legal question to be addressed. On these grounds, the swap transactions entered 
into by the Council, who apparently had failed to assess the suitability and the 
associated risks of derivatives and incurred heavy losses under the transactions, 
were found ultra vires due to lack of legal capacity of Hammersmith and Fulham, 
which would have required an express power in the relevant legislation.80 This meant 
that not only these particular trades entered into by Hammersmith and Fulham, 
but also several thousand derivatives transactions entered into by around 130 local 
77 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1. 
78 Chris O’Malley, Bonds Without Borders: A History of the Eurobond Market (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 
2014) 128.
79 ibid.
80 Martin Loughling, Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-local Government Relations 
(Clarendon Press 1996) 349–50. While also welcomed, the ruling of the House of Lords attracted 
criticism. Building his argument on an official investigation report, Loughlin concludes, 361–62: 
 [T]he Hammersmith experience provides some salutary lessons in the dangers of adopting an enterprise 
orientation [in a public authority] without proper safeguards or adequate scrutiny of its implications for 
the entire activities of the organization;
 Brandon Becker, Francois-Ihor Mazur, ‘Risk Management of Financial Derivative Products: Who’s 
Responsible for What’ (1995) 21 J. Corp. L. 177, 206–7, n 200, discussing a similar US court decision, 
207–09. 
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authorities and over 80 banks, turned ultra vires and invalid.81 82 While the master 
agreement structure and legal opinions may have addressed issues pertaining to 
the legal capacity of the entity and the legal authority of the signatories, it became 
evident that it was not enough to protect the sell-side from claims based on an 
argument of the lack of legal capacity and authority and that further legal clarity as 
to the enforceability of derivatives transactions in this respect was in high demand.83 
The Hammersmith case did open up a string of other court litigations with similar 
ultra vires arguments that have been made until recent years, some successfully 
but more often unsuccessfully.84 
4.4 THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF  
OTC DERIVATIVES IN THE 1980S
4.4.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
There was virtually no law governing explicitly OTC derivatives trading in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This is why market participants had to often rely on basic principles of 
contract, or in the parlance of this research, fundamental principles of a transnational 
legal order discussed in subchapters 2.10.2 and 2.10.3. when constructing the legal 
structure of new types of transactions.85 As there was no standard documentation 
in the market, financial institution drafted individually the terms and conditions of 
their derivative transactions on the basis of their existing lending documentation.86 
Nor was there regulatory control on swaps or clear recognition of the new products 
81 Loughling (n 80) 355, describing also how market participants as well as local authorities who 
had successfully hedged against interest rate movements made an unsuccessful attempt for the 
implementation of retroactive legislation, with the support by the Bank of England, that would have 
rendered the transactions entered into between financial institutions and local authorities legal and 
enforceable. 
82 Adam R Waldman, ‘OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the 
Abyss’ (1994) 43 Am. U.L. Rev. 1023, 1042–43. The same risk is persistent also in the current regulatory 
framework, Jo Braithwaite, David Murphy, ‘Central Counterparties (CCPs) and the law of default 
management’ (2017) 17(2), J.C.L.S. 291, 295–96, n 21.
83 David M Lynn, ‘Enforceability of Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives’ (1994) 50 Bus. Law. 291, 308–
09. Lynn also notes that legal opinions require further standardization as many of the legal opinions do 
not clearly state that the end-user has the capacity to enter into derivatives contracts, n 115. For similar 
US case law concerning capacity and authority issues, ibid 314–25. For the investor’s responsibility in 
ensuring its capacity and authority, John McGrath, ‘Derivatives under Global Scrutiny’ (1994) 13 Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. 20.
84 For a list and analysis of this case law, Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘Liability of swaps dealers against users’ (2006) 
17 I.C.C.L.R. 63; Braithwaite, Murphy (n 82) n 21. For an analysis from a ‘forum shopping’ perspective, 
Ryan, Yong (n 73) 54.
85 Drew E Macintyre, ‘Financial innovation and regulatory trepidation: swaps and the OSC’ (1995) 25 CBLJ 
163; Ronald L Cheng, ‘Legal Doctrines Restricting the Secondary Market in Interest Rate Swaps’ (1988) 26 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 313, 314.
86 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis’ (1988) 44 Bus. Law. 365, 385.
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under tax laws.87 In the US, derivatives could fall under existing financial regulations 
but the applicability of the existing regime was unclear as no case law or regulatory 
guidelines existed as to their applicability to new products previously unknown from 
a regulatory perspective. The legal uncertainty often led to disputes and litigation.88 
In addition, even if the legal form and economic substance of a given derivative 
could be identified, it was often unclear which regulatory agency had control over 
which type of financial instruments.89 The regulatory agencies themselves had been 
in dispute between themselves over jurisdictional lines already earlier90 and now also 
in the new situation. At worst, official statements given by the regulators added to the 
confusion rather than reduced it. Importantly, many market participants chose to 
market and sell new products without waiting for a regulatory clearance, that might 
or might not be needed, but which was in any case unavailable from regulators. For 
some, it was already clear in 1986 that regulatory authorities will find themselves in 
a position where the market action would be difficult to reverse, because the markets 
simply will be too large and too well organized to permit regulatory intervention in 
the absence of a major confrontation between the industry and the regulators.91 
During the same era, ‘[a]s an exchange of cashflows, the swap structure could be 
used to replicate virtually any other kind of transaction’.92 Traditionally, futures, 
a type of highly standardized derivative, were traded on regulated exchanges but 
the market had shifted to trading products bilaterally, or over-the-counter, which 
negatively affected the competitiveness of exchanges.93 By the mid-1980s, new 
OTC derivatives products were being offered and traded ‘by every major financial 
institution and multinational corporation in the world’ at a speed that ‘plainly has 
87 Armell Cates, ‘Swap Financing’ (1986) 20 Int’l L. 837, 843; James A Watkins, ‘Legal Issues in Currency 
Swaps’ (1982) 1 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 26, 31.
88 Stuart Somer, ‘A Survey of Legal and Regulatory Issues Relevant to Interest Rate Swaps’ (1992) 4 DePaul 
Bus. L.J. 385, 390, 395.
89 Daniel P Cunningham, Craig T Abruzzo, ‘Regulating Derivative Securities and Transactions in the 
US’ (1995) 14 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 16, 17, discussing the uncertainty relating to the agency powers of The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an US regulatory agency, that regulated at that time futures 
contracts and commodity options, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, that regulates the issuing 
and trading of securities; Chapter 5.
90 The earlier regulatory dispute in the early 1980s between the CFTC and SEC concerned the margining 
requirements both in the futures industry as well as in the OTC industry, Jerry W Markham, ‘Federal 
Regulaton of Margin the Commodity Futures Industry – History and Theory’ (1991) 64 Temple Law 
Review 59, 97–99.
91 David J Gilberg, ‘Regulation of New Financial Instruments under the Federal Securities and Commodities 
Laws’ (1986) 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1599, 1607–08, 1686–87.
92 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Derivatives law as a niche area is dead’ (1997) 12 J.I.B.L. 351, 354–55; Bruce S 
Darringer, ‘Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analysis of Swap Risks and a Critical Assessment of the Basel 
Accord’s Treatment of Swaps’ (1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 259, noting that ‘almost any kind of swap 
can be created […] Within these broad [swap] categories, infinite variations can be created’ 269–70 
(emphasis added).
93 Macintyre (n 85) 163; Bank for International Settlements ‘62nd Annual Report’ Basel, 1992, 15th June, 182 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1992_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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outstripped the ability of accountants, lawyers, and regulators to keep pace with their 
development and to determine their status under prevailing law and practices’.94
4.4.2 FUTURES? FORWARDS? – LET THE REGULATORS DECIDE
Forwards are traded, and cleared bilaterally, whereas futures are traded on exchanges 
and cleared by central counterparties. Whereas bilateral OTC derivatives trading 
allows for greater customatization of transactions contractually, central counterparty 
clearing facilitates several benefits in comparison to OTC derivatives trading.95 
In economic substance, these two products can be indistinguishable. Their actual 
difference has been debated at least since the 1980s, which renders the definitions 
context-bound. Financial regulation in the US states that ‘futures contracts’ are 
traded on exchanges and thus within the jurisdiction of Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), a US regulatory agency, whereas those which are not traded on 
exchanges but traded bilaterally, are not. The legal uncertainty as to what is a future 
and what is a forward has caused a significant amount of litigation.96 In 1974, the 
futures industry became heavily regulated97 and reregulated further in 1982 when 
the CFTC was granted with new enforcement powers, in a legislative process that 
was ‘difficult, time consuming, and expensive’.98 Futures refer here to products that 
are standardized to a degree where the counterparties negotiate only the future rate 
and the price of the transaction. All other terms and conditions are pre-set by an 
exchange in its rules leaving no room for counterparties to amend them. Futures 
in essence leave nothing more than the price of the product to be negotiated.99 If 
the transaction involves further contractual customization that deviates from the 
pre-set terms and conditions set by an exchange, the product is a forward.100 
In the US, the distinction between futures and forwards gave rise to legal risk. 
Trading in the former was a regulated activity whereas the regulatory status of 
94 Gilberg (n 91) 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1599, 1600; for end-user perspective, Craig W Murray, ‘The Oil and Gas 
Lawyer’s Role in New Financing Techniques’ (1995) 42 Ann. Inst. On Min. L. 44.
95 Jon Gregory, Central Counterparties – Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC 
Derivatives (Wiley Finance 2014) 37.
96 Francesca Taylor, Mastering Derivatives Markets: A Step-by-Step Guide to the Products, Applications 
and Risks (4th edition, The Mastering Series, FT Press 2011) 24–25.
97 Stephen Greenberg, ‘On Being Regulated: Remarks by a Futures Commission Merchant’ (1977) 6 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 143. 
98 Don L Horwitz, Jerry W Markham, ‘Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commssion: Scene II’ 
(1983) 39 Bus. Law. 67, 82–84.
99 For an example of a multilateral clearing model which employs the ISDA MA architecture, Byungkwon 
Lim, Aaron J Levy, ‘Contractual Framework for Cleared Derivatives: The Master Netting Agreement 
between a Clearing Customer Bank and a Central Counterparty’ (2014) 10 Pratt’s J. Bankr. L. 509, 512–14. 
100 Roberta Romano, ‘A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation’ (1996) 55 Md. L. 
Rev. 10–11.
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forwards was unclear.101 More precisely, it was unclear which government agency 
had the authority to regulate and supervise forwards. This risk arose from the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).102 Pursuant to the CEA, futures trading should 
be carried out in recognized exchanges meaning that trading in derivatives outside 
exchanges could be perceived as an illegal activity.103 Historically tightly regulated 
by the CFTC,104 which was facing competition from the OTC derivatives market, 
the futures industry was pressing regulatory agencies, namely the CFTC, to claim 
authority and to put forwards under the scope of futures regulation, but to no avail. 
To add to the confusion and legal uncertainty, any dispute over the same ending up in 
court could turn any existing interpretation to its backside. In addition to regulatory 
uncertainty, there was a significant risk of recharacterization were a court to reach 
another conclusion as to the economic and legal nature of forwards or futures.105 
Complex definition disputes ensued over what is a ‘commodity’, ‘future’, and 
‘future delivery’ under the CEA.106 In turn, government regulation on swaps was 
‘neither comprehensive or coordinated’.107 The arguments from the swap market 
participants was that regulation would stifle innovation and drive business overseas, 
and the counterarguments were that left unregulated, there was not only a great 
risk of running into major defaults, but even cases of outright fraud.108 In the late 
1980s, the CFTC issued a no-action notice that would create a ‘safe harbor’ for 
some particular swap types but would otherwise leave the market wondering over 
the legal status and the enforceability of swaps.109 Already at that time, the policy 
makers knew of the concentration and interconnectedness of markets and that a 
crash in one market may lead to crashes in other markets globally.110 Following 
101 Kimberly D Krawiec, ‘More Than Just New Financial Bingo: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding 
Derivatives’ (1997) 23 J. Corp. L. 1, 35–36. Some financial institutions had already adopted a view that 
forward trading was a part of their current activities and a permitted form of business. Jerry W Markham, 
David J Gilberg, ’Federal Regulation of Bank Activities in the Commodities Market’ (1984) 39 Bus. Law. 
1719, 1769–70. 
102 Commodity Exchange Act § 4(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
103 Marc A Horwitz, ‘Swaps Ahoy – Should Regulators Voyage into Unknown Water’ (1994) 1, Ind. J. Global 
Legal Stud. 515, 522–24.
104 Robert A Hudson, ‘Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market’ (1978) 58 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 8–12. 
105 Horwitz (n 103) 545–49.
106 Mark D Young, William L Stein, ‘Swap Transactions under the Commodity Exchange Act: Is 




110 Following the market crash in 1987, the US government set up a task force to investigate what had caused 
the market crash, The Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, Department of the 
Treasury, (Jan. 8, 1988) 9–13 <https://archive.org/details/reportofpresiden01unit> accessed 1 June 2019; 
apparently, the whole crash was to a large extent caused by a problem in the IT trading infrastructure, llan 
W Kleidon, Robert E Whaley, ‘One Market? Stocks, Futures, and Options During October 1987’ (1992) 
47(3) The Journal of Finance 851.
130
Transnationalisation of the OTC derivatives market 
the enactment of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992,111 the CFTC was given 
authority to exempt OTC products from the CEA. The CFTC did exercise this right 
and thus reduced the legal risk of OTC derivatives trading being seen as an illegal 
activity off-exchange futures trading under the CEA.112 The CFTC was authorized to 
largely exempt all swaps transactions from public regulation and state law save for 
cases such as anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions on the condition that the 
exemptions were in the public interest. In its 1993 statement, the CFTC concluded 
that swap agreements are widely used by both the private and the public sector 
and that they are important tools for both hedging, risk management, and for the 
purposes of reaching ‘other financial objectives’. Enhancing legal certainty over 
enforceability of the OTC derivative products was seen as a public policy objective. 
The risk that these transactions would be unenforceable was to be reduced and 
financial innovation was to be promoted by not interfering.113
4.5 INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC MECHANICS OF 
DERIVATIVES
4.5.1 DERIVATIVES CAN BE CONFUSING, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE TO BE
The perceived complexity of derivatives can be seen as an overdone argument ‘driven 
more by fear than fact’ as ‘all complex derivative instruments are built from a 
combination of simple, seemingly safe, financial instruments’.114 Transactions can 
be structured by using simple building blocks no longer than one page in their 
economic terms. From a legal perspective over-the-counter derivatives are not only 
bilateral contracts that contain rights and obligations but a technology in their own 
right to which ‘all of the laws, court decisions, and practices with respect to contracts 
in general should be presumed to apply […] unless there is an identifiable reason 
not to do so […]’.115 Derivatives are bilateral contracts regardless of how they are 
traded or cleared.116 
Derivatives consist of futures, forwards, options, and swaps - swaps are typically 
structured as a set of forwards - and their combinations to which almost only the 
creativity of their buyers and sellers set the limits. Market participants engage in 
111 H.R.707.
112 John Andrew Lindholm, ‘Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation––Minimizing Swap Credit Risk 
Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992’ (1994) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 73, 90–93. 
113 Swap Exemption 58 Fed Reg. 5587, 5590 (Jan 22, 1993). 
114 Avinash Persaud, Reinventing Financial Regulation – A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk (Apress 
2015) 144.
115 Schuyler K Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (2nd edition, LexisNexis 2010) para 1.1.
116 Feder (n 15) 321–22; UNCITRAL, The Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions, 
27, 2013, ‘[t]he Principles also cover ‘central clearing’ mechanisms which are ultimately also built on 
bilateral relationships’ (emphasis added).
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different strategies that employ a variety of market jargon products such as caps, 
floors, collars, swaptions, callable swaps, and overnight swaps, to name only a few, 
but they are built on the aforementioned basic structures.117 ‘OTC derivative’ is an 
umbrella term that conveys no precise meaning other than it is a transaction that 
involves two counterparties who enter into and clear the transaction bilaterally. 
The OTC market of derivatives is ‘everywhere and nowhere’ as it affects every 
other financial market but has no fixed location and is not easily identifiable in 
comparison to other financial instruments. This is one reason why this market is 
perceived to be such a distant phenomenon.118 Financial regulation remains local, 
whereas transnational banking is global. It may be impossible for local regulators 
to monitor the global activities of such financial institutions with any precision. 119 
In most, if not every, book and article on the subject, the author represents his 
own understanding of derivatives contracts as something that can be specifically 
identified, labelled, and analyzed. This research is no exception in this regard, but 
each example is written in the form of terms and conditions. This makes it easier 
to understand what structuring and contractual standardization actually mean.120 
One observation is that a ‘derivative’ is hard to define. Schuyler Henderson, 
while acknowledging the difficulty in defining the concept in a definite way, has 
summarized derivatives from a legal viewpoint as contracts for the ‘[e]xchange of 
cash or delivery flows between two parties, each of which flows is, in the eyes of 
the respective parties, equal to the other at the start of the agreement: a financial 
arrangement involving mutuality and valued by reference to current market rates, 
prices, or levels’.121 Alastair Hudson, who notes the same difficulty, begins with the 
notion that ‘derivative product is a financial product the value of which is derived 
from another financial product’.122 The Bank for International Settlements defines 
derivatives as ‘a financial contract whose value depends on the value of one or more 
underlying reference assets, rates, or indices, on a measure of economic value or 
on factual events’.123 These or their close variations are the most common types of 
definitions but there are also others.124 For the financial theorist, the categorization 
117 Taylor (n 96) 127; David Loader, Clearing and Settlement of Derivatives (Butterworth–Heinemann 2005) 
103–04.
118 Henderson (n 115) paras 1.1, 2.1.
119 Christian Hofmann, ‘Global systemically important banks (GSIBs): operating globally, regulated 
nationally?’ (2017) 2 J.B.L. 155, 157–58.
120 For a comprehensive overview, Romano (n 100); for practical examples, Flanagan (n 3) 215–20.
121 Henderson (n 115) para 1.1. 
122 Hudson (n 35) para 1–06. Hudson refers to Henderson’s earlier definition, ibid 25, n 6. 
123 BIS, ‘Glossary’ 17 October 2016 < <https://www.bis.org/dcms/glossary/glossary.
pdf?scope=CPMI&base=term> accessed 1 June 2019. 
124 For other definitions and critical analysis, Timothy E Lynch, ‘Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century 
Understanding’ (2011) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 1; for a public policy proposal building 
on findings made in mandatory product approval outside finance, Saule T Omarova, ‘License to deal: 
mandatory approval of complex financial products’ (2012–2013) 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 63; for a critical 
analysis of the derivatives industry, Hudson (n 35). 
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of different products may not always matter, but for a lawyer it does as the analysis 
of the legal obligation to perform differs between different types of products.
The following examples are so called ‘vanilla’ trades. In jargon, ‘vanilla products’ 
are those that are the easiest to trade and once the basic structure of such a product 
is customized, it becomes an ‘exotic’. There is always demand for ‘vanilla’. To use 
the vanilla analogy, if you change the type of onions used or cook them differently 
to a classic hamburger from a fast-food chain restaurant, it is no longer a trademark 
hamburger, but a hamburger that resembles the original hamburger: now there are 
assumedly less buyers in comparison to the standardized version. Or maybe not, 
and the new product ends up being in high demand among customers - no one 
can predict how a certain product will fare in a given market. The more tailored the 
product in terms of its substance, the more complex an exotic derivative product it 
becomes. Exotic products, in turn, have less buyers and sellers which means that 
their liquidity can be low.125 
4.5.2 FUTURES AND FORWARDS IN CONTRACTUAL TERMS
Futures and forwards are promises to supply an asset, for example, a particular 
commodity or a security at a set price on a set date. Both parties are under 
legal obligation to perform their obligations regardless of, for example, the price 
fluctuations of the particular asset during the life of the contract. Both counterparties 
take a risk and although there will be a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ under the particular 
transaction, both have been able to knowingly protect themselves from a certain 
risk. This is one type of hedging which generally refers to strategic risk management 
against market movements.126 Forwards and futures are often used in foreign 
exchange (FX) trading which allows contracting parties to ‘lock in’, i.e. agree on 
a future exchange rate for two currencies in advance. On the specific future date, 
the delivery can be either ‘physical settlement’, i.e. that on the agreed later date the 
contracting parties actually exchange the amount currencies at the foreign exchange 
rate agreed by the parties or more often by ‘cash settlement’, whereby only the 
difference between the agreed foreign exchange rate and the official exchange rate 
is paid by one party to the other for the amount agreed to by the parties. 127 
Simplicity means easy standardization and a high level of standardization makes 
products more liquid as there are many buyers and sellers for such products. These 
125 Penny Davenport, ‘Benchmarking in the OTC Derivatives Markets’ in Taylor (n 96) 151–52.
126 Edward Murray, ‘Derivative Transactions’ in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 32) 606–07.
127 Juan Ramirez, Accounting for Derivatives – Advanced Hedging under IFRS 9 (2nd edition, Wiley Finance 
Series 2015) 97–99. 
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combined, standardized products can be traded in exchanges ‘on-the-counter’.128 
In economic terms, the terms of a future or a forward contract could be and often 
are so simple to include:
• the counterparties;
• the trade date; 
• maturity, i.e. the date on which the transaction is settled; 
• the buy amount (Currency/Commodity X); 
• the sell amount (Currency/Commodity Y); 
• the forward/future rate (ie the exchange rate on the settlement date); and 
• the settlement method (physical or, as in the vast majority of FX trades, 
cash).129 
4.5.3 OPTION IS A LEGAL RIGHT TO ACT OR NOT TO ACT
Unlike forwards and futures, options do not oblige, hence the word ‘option’ to act 
or not to act, the option buyer to buy or sell the commodity, security or other asset 
(the right to buy is a call option and the right to sell is a put option) on a set date 
at a set price. For this, the option buyer pays a premium for the option seller. In 
jargon, the seller of the option is known as the ‘writer’ who is obliged to either sell 
or buy upon a notice of the option buyer.130 Should the market movements become 
favourable to the buyer, it can use the option and if not, the buyer can simply 
choose not to use it. The risk inherent in options is that, unlike in forwards, where 
the future settlement amount is known (one agrees to buy and one agrees to sell a 
currency or a commodity at a set price at a set time) at the time of the execution of 
the transaction, the risk of the option seller can at least in theory be unlimited.131 For 
example, an option seller could be legally obliged to deliver a particular commodity 
at the agreed price (known commonly as the ‘strike price’, i.e. ‘the fixed price, per 
share or unit, at which an option conveys the righ to call (purchase) or put (sell) 
the underlying shares or units132 to the option buyer regardless of the prevailing 
market price. The market price could be something much higher than the seller of 
the option had assumed. 
A simple derivative contract could be as simple as follows:
128 Gregory (n 95) 16–17. In their modern form, futures trading began in 1972 as an added feature to spot 
foreign exchange contracts. Taylor (n 96) 205–07.
129 Ramirez (n 127) 97–8.
130 Hudson (n 35) paras 1–92–95; Loader (n 117) 201.
131 Taylor (n 96) 169; for a detailed account on the whole trading process, Loader (n 117) 83–96.
132 Loader (n 117) 199.
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• Call option: the right and not the obligation to buy (‘call’);
• Exercise: conversion of the option into the underlying transaction or 
commodity, for example 100 shares of company X;
• Strike price: the price at which the option buyer can exercise the option;
• Expiry date of the option, i.e. the timeframe when the option buyer can 
exercise the option (for European style option, certain exact date and for 
US style any time during the life of the option);
• Rollover date, i.e. the date(s) when the buyer can exercise the option; and
• Premium
Behind these capitalized letters, there are standardized definitions drafted either by 
trade organizations like ISDA or the market participants themselves in their own 
templates. In short, the option buyer pays a premium for the seller and the option 
gives the buyer alternatives as to when, whether, how much, and at what price 
would the option be used133 Like futures, options can be contractually standardized 
to the degree that they are eligible for exchange trading. In turn, customization of 
the terms and conditions can render the product more exotic and thus less liquid 
and less suitable for exchange trading.134 
4.5.4 CURRENCY SWAPS ERODED LOCAL EXCHANGE CONTROLS
Early swaps made in the late 1970s ‘made national borders largely irrelevant to the 
flow of capital among industrialized countries.’135 Swaps are typically categorized 
into interest rate, basis, currency, and currency basis, as well as equity and credit 
default types. Interest rate swaps form the bulk of all the OTC derivatives. In market 
parlance, futures and forwards are used to hedge short-term exposures (0–3 years) 
and swaps for longer exposures (from 3 years to decades). The longer the maturity, 
the higher the risk(s).136 In the US, ‘swap’ is a general term that covers a multitude 
of different derivatives products137 whereas in the EU, derivatives are ‘financial 
instruments’, ‘swaps’ are a subcategory of financial instruments, and while it is not 
133 Loader (n 117) 162–63.
134 Loader (n 117) 56–57.
135 Henderson (n 115) para 5.1
136 Taylor (n 96) 74–76.
137 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(47)(A)(i) (2012):
 A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “swap” means any agreement, contract, 
or transaction— that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind that is for the purchase 
or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodities, securities, 
instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or 
property of any kind […].
135
defined, it is still listed as a distinct category.138 The basic idea of a swap can be 
explained in simple terms. Most often, swaps are legal obligations used to exchange 
some cash flow in one way or the other from one party to other(s) for a certain 
time period.139 The purpose of the exchange depends on what the parties wish to 
achieve, meaning at least in theory that it is the imagination of the same that sets 
the limits for their structuring.140 For example, one can combine a swap, which is 
typically a set of forwards, with an option structure. The result is a swaption. For 
example, a swaption could be an option to enter into a swap.141
The following example is based on a real swap arrangement. It might not be 
an overstatement to say that following this swap transaction, national barriers on 
capital movements more or less lost their meaning if not instantly then in any 
case within a few years. The first modern currency swap was apparently executed 
in 1981, when Salomon Brothers, a transnational financial institution, acted as a 
broker in a $210 million currency swap between IBM, a transnational corporation, 
and the World Bank, a public international organization, whereby IBM swapped 
its (devalued) Swiss francs and deutschemarks to (overvalued) US dollars held by 
the World Bank. For IBM, the devalued currencies were a problem, but not the 
overvalued US dollars as it had a lot of cash, and for the World Bank the swap 
allowed it to provide cheaper funding to developing countries as it would have been 
possible with the more expensive US dollars.142 Later on currency swaps came to 
be one of the main drivers for the increasing growth of the eurobond market where 
the bond issuances were used to facilitate pre-agreed swap arrangements.143 A more 
generic example may be drawn from this real transaction.
Party A, a transnational corporation, has access to currency 1 at a competitive 
price but not to currency 2 which is, for one reason or another, unavailable or is 
relatively costly to obtain for Party A. Party A needs currency 2 but not currency 1. 
Similarly, Party B has better access to currency 2 but not to currency 1. Party A and 
B both raise the loans (or bonds, as the case may be) in their respective cheaper 
138 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU OJ L 173, 
12.6.2014, p. 349–496 (MiFID II) Annex 1, Section C, (4), Financial instruments: 
 Options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to securities, 
currencies, interest rates or yields, emission allowances or other derivatives instruments, financial indices 
or financial measures which may be settled physically or in cash […].
139 Hudson (n 33) para 1–96.
140 Darringer (n 92) 269–70.
141 Loader (n 117) 98–102.
142 Russel J Funk, Daniel Hirschman, ‘Derivatives and Deregulation: Financial Innovation and the Demise of 
Glass-Steagall’ (2014) 59 Administrative Science Quarterly 669, 671; for the market growth of the interest 
and currency swap market between 1986–1991, BIS, Recent Developments in International Interbank 
Relations, Basel, October 1992, Appendix A, Table 6, 49–50 <https://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc02.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
143 Frank J Fabozzi, Handbook of Finance, Vol 1 Financial Markets and Instruments (Wiley Finance 2008) 
283.
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currencies from their domestic banks. Both Party A and Party B now have loans in 
a currency that they do not want. For this reason, Party A and Party B enter into 
a currency swap transaction between each other. Put simply, under the currency 
swap, both Party A and Party B continue to repay their respective loans to their 
respective banks but they exchange liabilities between each other. Effectively, the 
economic position is that Party B pays interest and principal payments of Party A 
and vice versa. Both parties are in a position as if they would have had access to the 
cheaper currency from the outset without ever having a ‘real’ access to it. Naturally, 
it takes a lot of calculational structuration and contractual tailoring for the swap 
to be economically mutually beneficial to both parties. Again, and like in interest 
rate swaps, it is the perceived comparative advantage the counterparties might be 
able to use to their mutual benefit through currency swaps. Should the swap be 
structured correctly, both Party A and Party B should be in a better position due 
to the currency swap. In contrast, options and futures in principle have a ‘winner’ 
and a ‘loser’ depending on the market movements.144 
The economic and legal terms of a currency swap could be as follows:
• Maturity 5 years
• Parties  Party A and Party B 
• GBP nominal  GBP 70 million
• EUR nominal  EUR 100 million
• Initial exchange  On start date, Party A receives the EUR  
 nominal and pays the GBP nominal 
• Party A pays  Euribor 12-month annually, actual/360 basis, 
 on the EUR nominal
• Party A receives  GBP 5% annually
• Final exchange  On maturity date, Party A receives the GBP 
 nominal and pays the EUR nominal to Party B 
In its simplest, and most common, form a cross currency swap involves the following 
cash flows: 
• An initial exchange of principal amounts;
• A string of interim interest payments. Periodically, one party pays a fixed (or 
floating) interest on one of the principal amounts while the other party pays 
144 The comparative advantage theory is controversial and, in relation to currency swaps, has been subject 
to academic debate since at least 1992, Robert H Litzenberger ‘Swaps: Plain and Fanciful’ (1992) 47 The 
Journal of Finance 831; John Andrew Lindholm, ‘Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation–
Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992’ (1994) Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 73, 81–84.
137
a fixed (or floating) interest on the other principal amounts. The payments 
may be netted 
• A final re-exchange of principal amounts.145 
The difference between interest rate swap and currency swap is that the latter 
involves more than one currency and usually includes the exchange of principals. 
The interest rate element in currency swaps can be fixed to fixed, fixed to floating, 
or floating to floating rate.146 While derivatives can be made complex, drafting an 
agreement that would render local exchange controls, prohibiting borrowing from 
abroad, meaningless, is half a page long.
4.6 INSIDE A TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
There is a somewhat identifiable generic division of labour between the experts 
involved in financial transactions entered into by a financial institution. It is not 
a new argument that internal management matters and incentives in financial 
institutions may create risks on a systemic scale: 
[T]here may be incentives for at least some bank employees to engage 
in a variety of ploys that would lead to banker information failures. A 
person engaged in derivatives operations may emphasize rewards and 
downplay risks.147 
First, there are the researcher analysts who analyze specific markets, individual 
entities or asset classes to produce information which can be used by the clients of 
a financial institutions usually for a fee.148 Second, the financial instruments and 
products need to be priced and this is often the area of quantitative analysts and 
145 The example is a simplified version of the example used in Ramirez (n 127) 102–03.
146 Taylor (n 96) 197.
147 Henry T Hu, ‘Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism’ (1993) 102 (6) Yale Law Journal, 1457, 1492–94, noting also the public safety 
net of financial institutions, bail-outs, and that prohibition on OTC derivatives should be weighted against 
their benefits and how a prohibition should be: 
 ‘justified only by compelling empirical evidence demonstrating that the social costs outweighed the social 
benefits. No such empirical evidence exists. Given the nascent understanding of the economics of the 
instruments, this empirical issue will not soon be resolved’ 1495–96; 
 for a contemporary analysis of misconduct in financial institutions, Andrea Minto, ‘Misconduct in 
Banks: Approaching the Issue from a Systemic Perspective’ (2016) 31 J.I.B.L.R. 94, noting in regard 
to compensation schemes that ‘[m]anagers with unfettered powers (i.e. no regulatory constraints on 
behaviour) will tend to favour high-risk strategies, which have high variances and low or negative expected 
returns’.; Chapter 3 (n 217).
148 Terri Duhon, How the Trading Floor Really Works (Bloomberg Press 2012) 213–229.
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deal structurers who create, calculate, and deploy different pricing models and 
risk management tools depending on the context.149 The complexity of the models 
and technological advances are seen as one driver for general complexity in the 
financial system.150 Third, the financial product can be sold by the sales expert 
to an individual client. At this stage, the division of labour can further be divided 
between the somewhat fractioned relationship and even cultural clash between sales 
persons, who manage client relationships and attend to the needs of individual 
client, and traders, who execute the transaction at a price which is also profitable 
for the bank as the seller of the financial product to the client, and, depending on 
the compensation scheme, maybe for the trader as well. In simple terms, the trader 
makes the market of the client (market maker) and the client either sells or buys 
on the bid or the offer of the trader (market taker).151 
The experts of middle and back office ensure that the transaction is correctly 
carried out and booked in to the system of the financial institution. Fourth, 
compliance officers are responsible that their respective institutions comply with 
the internal and external regulations, laws, codes of conduct and standards, and 
perform risk assessment of the organization. This risk assessment often follows the 
risk analysis of public regulators meaning that the private analysis carried out by 
compliance officers also concentrates on the risks regarding financial stability and 
systemic risk implications.152 Fifth, risk managers seek to ensure that there are 
processes in place for new financial product approvals and limits on various types 
of risk whether that is risk limits on individual traders, for example on the total 
notional amount the trader may have in its trading book, or the type of counterparties 
the trader may trade with.153 
Lastly, there is the legal team or teams responsible that the contractual 
arrangements are in place and individual terms and conditions are negotiated with 
each counterparty and that the transactions comply with both external and internal 
compliance requirements. There is a further division of labour and specialization 
involved in handling these two aspects and in some types of transactions expertise 
149 ibid 252, 266.
150 Dan Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (2012) 2 Harv. 
Bus. L. Rev. 235, 246–50.
151 Duhon (n 148) 84, 192; Traders learn their skillset in one financial institution, and if they want to learn 
more, they typically switch to the ‘buy-side’ bringing with them the culture they became accustomed to 
and the personal connections they made at their earlier employer, Ilya Beylin, ‘A reassessment of the 
clearing mandate: how the clearing mandate affects swap trading behavior and the consequences for 
systemic risk’ (2015–2016) 68 Rutgers U.L. Rev. 1143 1178, 1185.
152 This is an example of regulatory convergence between public and private, Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Risk 
Management and Compliance in Banks’ in Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union 
(OUP 2015) 210–16. 
153 Duhon (n 148) 298–308, noting also that risk management cannot and should not be considered to be a 
function of a particular group, but a responsibility of every expert involved in the transaction(s), 298–99. 
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is required in both.154 As noted by Hu, lawyers ‘involved in financial innovations 
[…] must be sensitive to less obviously relevant bodies of law which can materially 
affect the economics of new financial products’155 and Edwards: 
[A]s derivatives do not conveniently fit within a particular area of 
law, derivatives lawyers are required to apply contract, company, 
commercial, property, insurance, and corporate insolvency law to the 
business of derivatives whilst being concurrently aware of accounting, 
tax, credit, and regulatory implications.156 
4.7 SELF-REGULATION THROUGH CONTRACT
4.7.1 FINANCIAL ENGINEERING BEFORE SWAPS: BACK-TO-BACK LOANS
Hedging is essentially a method which is designed to mitigate different types of risks 
in a financial transaction.157 In one simple example, if one has ever been worried that 
the interest rate might go up on a mortgage, buying an interest rate cap (that limits 
the interest rate to a preagreed level regardless of the actual interest rate level) from 
a financial institution is one way to hedge against the risk of rising interest rates. 
To contextualize early de- and reregulatory policies, one significant change during 
the 1970s and 1980s was the deregulation of the restrictions on the ownership in 
stock-brokerage firms and of the restrictions which services providers can offer 
lead to foreign ownership and the emergence of new types of financial services.158 
For example, the re-regulatory approach in the UK to market regulation focused 
on functions rather than form of business or the ownership structure. For market 
participants, this approach did offer freedoms of not being bound by national 
legislation, at least not to the same extent as elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, 
and an opportunity for market participants to ‘affiliate themselves to one or several 
transnational professional bodies, according to the business carried on’.159 
154 The required expertise follows the introduction of the new public financial regulation that began emerging 
in the 1990s, Ross Cranston, ‘Banking and Investment Services: Implications of the New Financial 
Landscape’ in Guido Ferrarini, European Securities Markets – The Investment Services Directive and 
Beyond (Kluwer Law International 1998) 45–46. 
155 Henry TC Hu, ‘Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory 
Paradigm’ (1989) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 341, n 22 (emphasis added).
156 Steven Edwards, ‘Legal principles of derivatives’ (2002) Journal of Business Law 1.
157 Loader (n 117) 185.
158 Peter JR Bloxham, ‘The Financial Services Act’ (1986) 1 I.B.L.J. 73, 74.
159 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Implementation of the ISD and CAD in national legal systems’, 9, in Guido 
Ferrarini (ed), European Securities Markets – The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (Kluwer 
Law International 1998).
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As described by Watkins, the abolition of local exchange controls on international 
capital flows was a significant change in 1978, after which obstacles for import and 
export of cash and securities were removed. This meant that obligatory permissions 
from state treasuries and the requirement to make foreign currency investments at 
a higher exchange rate and to return a certain amount of the foreign currency upon 
the realization of their foreign investment were no longer relevant.160 It was already a 
common practice to bypass the restrictions through financial and legal innovations, 
however, such as back-to-back loans, with the explicit or implicit permission or 
unawareness of regulators. 
There was also the issue of reregulation of virtually all known financial entities 
that were made subject to new regulatory requirements by their functions following 
some deregulations in other areas.161 Different types of exchanges vary greatly in their 
governance structures, which reflects their rulebooks, an evidence of spontaneous 
norm creation and normativity in itself, on how trade is conducted. Often the rules 
of an exchange are a combination and interplay of government regulation and self-
regulation. As late as the 1980s most exchanges were privately regulated and owned 
by their constituencies, whereas today they are subject to public regulation and are 
often publicly traded corporations instead owned by their founders.162 
Going back from exchanges and regulatory changes to the simple act of 
borrowing abroad, exchange controls prohibiting this activity in the UK were a 
driver for financial innovation in the lending market.163 Already before 1979 when 
the exchange controls were still in force, structuring allowed market participants to 
avoid their applicability to their transactions. In the lending market, back-to-back 
loan arrangements opened up not only access to foreign lending markets, but also 
at a cheaper rate, simultaneously allowing for price arbitrage and the hedging of 
rate fluctuations.164 Swap structures were an evolutionary step forward from back-
to-back loans in that they allowed market participants to lower their credit risk as 
the former reduced the amount of funds the market participants had to transfer 
between each other.165 The ability to shield from the latter was in high-demand given 
that especially the latter-half of the 1970s was a time of great price volatility across 
different markets and financial instruments from which market participants sought 
160 Watkins (n 87) 26.
161 For a general UK perspective on why some areas were deregulated and reregulated, David Walker, ‘Some 
Reflections on Big Bangs in Financial Systems’ (1987) 13 CBLJ 388.
162 Thierry Foucault, Ailsa Röell, Marco Pagano, Market Liquidity: Theory, Evidence, and Policy (OUP 2013) 
32–34.
163 Watkins (n 87) 26–27. 
164 Watkins (n 87) 26.
165 Patricia Brown, ‘Tax Consequences of Interest Rate Swaps: Characterization by Function, Not Prejudice’ 
(1988) 6 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law. 122, 133–35.
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to shield themselves.166 The change from fixed to floating exchange rates meant 
that market participants became vulnerable to outside shocks against which they 
had to protect themselves through fixed/float diversification.167 It was not the state 
that brought this common legal structure to its end, but an English court decision 
that gave rise to legal uncertainty that in turn forced market participants to seek 
alternative methods to back-to-back loans. Following the British Eagle decision,168 
the legal structure of back-to-back loans was becoming exceedingly complex and 
risky from a legal standpoint regarding their enforceability.169 
By the end of the 1970s, swap structure took over the back-to-back loans. 
Swaps were structured into a form that did not constitute borrowings from a legal 
perspective and thus were not subject to exchange controls. For financial purposes, 
they were borrowings.170 Back-to-back contracts gave rise to legal uncertainty as 
it was unclear whether a non-defaulting debtor could terminate its obligation to 
repay even if the counterparty in the arrangement was in default.171 In principle, 
the non-defaulting party could set-off its claims against the defaulting counterparty. 
However, following the British Eagle, the legal structure of back-to-back loans was 
becoming exceedingly complex and risky.172 
In comparison, swaps were easier than back-to-back loans to terminate upon 
counterparty default. The latter constituted outstanding debt in comparison to 
swaps that the non-defaulting could terminate as unknown future obligations. 
The non-defaulting party of a swap was contractually entitled to accelerate, i.e. 
make payments due immediately, following a default notice to the defaulting party. 
The enforceability of such contractual term under back-to-back loan contracts had 
become legally uncertain.173 Back-to-back loans had already opened up access to 
foreign capital markets and even at a cheaper rate than would otherwise been 
possible, allowed for hedging of interest rate fluctuations, and could be even used 
to avoid exchange controls from being applicable, at least to some extent.174
166 Stefan Gerlach, Srichander Ramaswamy, Michela Scatigna, ‘150 years of financial market volatility’ BIS 
Quarterly Review, September 2006, 80–1 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1632414> accessed 1 June 2019.
167 Gautam Goswami, Milind M Shrikhande, ‘Interest Rate Swaps and Economic Exposure’ (1998) 9 Global 
Finance Journal 51.
168 British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd. v. Campagnie Nationale Air France, 1975 1W.L.R. 758.
169 Watkins (n 87) 26.
170 Cates (n 87) 837–38.
171 Watkins (n 87) 30.
172 Watkins (n 87) 26.
173 Watkins (n 87) 30, also noting how ‘[s]ome draftsmen have attempted to steer a course around this 
problem by expressly making the obligation to repay back-to-back loan a conditional obligation’. 
174 Watkins (n 87) 26.
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4.7.2 PRIVATE NORMATIVITY AT PLAY: CONTRACT STANDARDIZATION
Contract standardization makes trading across markets easier, it lowers transaction 
costs, and standardized contracts, or customary standard terms, are overall more 
convenient to use standardized contracts, in transactions than to draft them 
individually.175 Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner describes the learning benefits 
of standardized contracts in more detail. It is more efficient as there are probably 
less errors in contracts examined by many professionals than in individually drafted 
contracts. The other side of the argument is that once standardized to a high 
degree, no learning occurs if no one bothers to read the standardized contracts any 
longer for the same reason. 176 An associated problem is the compartmentalization 
of knowledge, which is especially relevant for modular agreements such as the 
ISDA MA, thus very few may have a view of the whole contractual arrangement; 
mistakes in drafting may become multiplied across transactions under the same 
contractual architecture.177 If a standardized term has been evaluated by a court, 
it can further add to legal certainty if, for example, the court ruling sets a judicial 
precedent regarding how certain standardized terms or even individual words are to 
be construed.178 Network benefits also apply, meaning that the more a standardized 
contract has users, the more beneficial its use becomes, as well as switching costs, 
meaning the more familiar the users are for a specific type of a standardized contract, 
the likelier it is that such users wont switch to a competitor’s standardized contract, 
even if the latter is technically superior. 179 
Contract standardization does not protect from all types of risks. As said, standard 
documents do not offer solutions if the market participants fail to follow its terms and 
conditions. Second, the standardized documentation, while reducing transaction 
costs, can evolve from a relatively simple architecture into an increasingly complex 
architecture that gives rise to legal disputes in itself. Third, the unfamiliarity of 
courts with the documentation and the market in general can give rise to legal 
risk. Courts may find standardized market contracts to be illegal or unenforceable, 
or otherwise draw conclusions from the perspective of the market that may be 
questionable. Depending on the case, a court ruling in one country may have negative 
175 Anna Gelpern, ‘The Importance of Being Standard’ (January 2017) European Central Bank 2016 Annual 
Legal Department Conference Proceedings 23, 25–8,
 <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1971 or https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963333> accessed  
1 June 2019.
176 Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausner, ‘Standardisation and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or the 
Economics of Boilerplate)’ (1997) 83 Va. L. Rev. 713, 720–21.
177 Anna Gelpern, ‘Commentary: Public Promises and Organizational Agendas’ (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 
57, 71 <http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/51-1/51arizlrev57.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
178 Kahan, Klausner (n 176) 722–23.
179 ibid 725–28.
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repercussions on the whole market that the market participants will then seek to 
address by amending the standard contract as may be required.180
Through standardization, transaction lawyers have developed a common 
language. Importantly, the language used by those engaging in finance is not limited 
to certain area of finance but is usable across multiple types of financing. The usual 
structure of a transaction has involved and continues to involve the same questions: 
Are the pledges that secure the loan enforceable should the borrower be unable to 
repay the loan?181 If the debtor has several creditors, what is the priority of multiple 
claims, i.e. who gets the interest payments first and in what order? Which party gets 
paid first if the debtor becomes bankrupt?182 How will a local court interpret a certain 
standardized clause considering its national legal system?183 These questions touch 
upon local property laws, contractual techniques, and bankruptcy laws, or more 
generally, to bodies of laws that may materially affect the economics of a transaction. 
The issue of asset separation, client assets separated from own assets, i.e. the issue 
of commingling where the holder loses proprietary interest, what could constitute 
preferential or even fraudulent transfers, tax issues, and finally enforcement rights, 
i.e. the right of a contracting party to enforce its rights in a court, both domestic or 
foreign, are also central for virtually any type of financing. The relevant legal issues 
are very much the same across jurisdictions.184
There is nothing inherently new in that lawyers draft the contractual architecture 
and individual terms and conditions, that may be required for a certain transaction, 
and that the same set of standardized terms and conditions is then used as the 
base for transactions by others.185 Standardized contractual terms and conditions 
evolve in that they reflect accumulated experience. Standardization has long been 
considered a form of ‘private self-government’ and the content of standardized 
contracts as something that courts should pay special attention to.186 Development 
180 Schuyler Henderson, ‘Credit derivatives and operational risk, or why a credit default swap is not like a 
bond’ (2007) 1 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 31, 32–33, 35.
181 Joshua Margolis, Chul Hyun Kim, ‘Court Ruling Leaves Uncertainty over Secured Lending’ (2003) 22 Int’l 
Fin. L. Rev. 25, discussing a ruling of the Korean Supreme Court ‘that casts doubt over the enforceability 
of pledges as security in the context of corporate reorganizations’.
182 Steven L Schwartz, ‘The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance’ (1998) 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 
235, 236, 239–43. 
183 Helmut Merkel, ‘Implications of the negative pledge clause in international finance’ (1987) I.B.L.J. 669.
184 Schwartz (n 182) 244–46. Schwartz concludes his simple main point ‘[r]etain local counsel with top 
expertise, know how to ask the relevant questions, and be sure counsel fully understands both the 
questions and their underlying rationale’, 254; for an example of relevant legal questions in securitization, 
Krebzs (n 31) 59–61.
185 For innovation and standardization in the lending markets as a response to fluctuations in rates in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Duane D Wall, Sean J Geary, ‘Interest Rate Options, Funding Practices and Yield 
Protection’ (1982) 1 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 20. 
186 Karl N Llewellyn, ‘Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals’ (1960) 256, 362:
 The content of the standardized terms accumulates experience, it avoids or reduces legal risks and also 
confers all kinds of operating leeways and advantages, all without need of either consulting counsel from 
instance to instance or of bargaining with the other parties;
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and enforcement of private standards and rules generally, and the standardization 
of contractual terms, have also formed a part of central clearing from its modern 
beginnings. For example, as early as the 19th century, market participants could 
hedge risks of price changes through typifying the commodities that could serve as 
the underlying of futures contracts and the standardization of the delivery terms, 
including offsetting claims. Contractual standardization was a method to enhance 
liquidity through making different types of contracts fungible, i.e. as something 
more easily comparable and thus more tradeable.187
For example, in the lending markets that had proliferated at the end of the 
1960s following the emergence of the eurodollar market, the syndication process 
was quite similar as it is today: each member of the syndicate makes a separate loan 
to the borrower, one of the syndicate banks is chosen as the agent through which 
payments and communications will be channelled, the syndicate delegates some 
of their powers to majority control, and the payments of the debtor are shared on 
a pro-rata basis. The overall contractual architecture and its foundations have not 
changed and the refinements to or the introduction of new terms and conditions 
often reflect unexpected events of the past. In short, the terms and conditions 
included conditions precedents, i.e. the conditions that had to be met before the 
banks were obliged to lend, terms allowing the borrower to prepay the loan but 
only in accordance with some conditions, the interest rate of the loan was a certain 
margin over LIBOR, and the interest periods could be chosen by the borrower. 
In addition, they included common clauses for taxes, increased costs, illegality, 
standard representations and warranties, events of default and acceleration, and so 
on, which are all part of standardized syndicated credit documentation.188 There was 
much standardized contractual language from which to build upon new contractual 
architecture, but OTC derivatives were in many ways very different from lending.
 Georges GR Delaume, Law and practice of transnational contracts (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1988) 100:
 Operating in substantially the same environment, new organizations tend to naturally benefit from the 
experience acquired by older organizations and exchanges of information, including contracts with their 
respective borrowers, among them is frequent […] definite patterns of lending have emerged and find their 
expression in the carefully drafted and detailed agreements prepared by these institutions.
187 Randall S Kroszner, ‘Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives 
Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, Part 2: The Role of Central Banks in Money 
and Payments Systems’ (1999) 31 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 596, 600; Default management 
is a complex part of an already complex industry and in many respects, financial regulation in itself can 
contribute to legal risks, Braithwaite, Murphy (n 82) 291.
188 Wood (n 32).
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4.7.3 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND THE EVOLUTION OF SWAPS 
Swaps were starting to take shape as essentially a long-term, non-transferable credit 
risk. In the mid-1980s, market participants soon discovered that freely transferable 
swap transactions would run into practical, legal, and regulatory challenges. The 
non-transferability of swaps was borne out of practical need as well as legal and 
regulatory considerations. These challenges directed market participants to structure 
swaps as non-transferable which in time became contractually standardized. First, 
free transferability could mean that a swap transaction could be recharacterized as 
a security by regulators which would mean the applicability of existing financial 
regulation concerning securities also to swaps transactions.189 Swap contracts are 
transferable at the permission of the counterparty as are other types of contracts. 
However, the transfer could lead to undesired outcomes also under tax regulations. 
The transfer could have meant an instant tax liability for the party ‘in-the money’ 
under the swap transferred. It could be argued that the tax consequence would 
essentially go against the ratio of the swap as a means of dispersing risk for a 
period of time. 190 
The alternative to transfer was to assign the swap to a third party but this would 
also require the consent of the counterparty which might be unwilling to do so. 
Further, under the laws of many jurisdictions, a party cannot unilaterally transfer 
its obligations without novating it to a third-party which would again need the 
consent from the original counterparty. Even with consent, the transferer would 
retain a contingent liability towards the original counterparty if the transferee would 
not perform its obligations. The solution was to not transfer but to figure out a 
practical solution. The solution was to leave the original swap in place and enter 
into a ‘mirror’ swap, a reverse swap of the original swap. This would give the party 
the benefit of the original swap. In turn, however, the mirror transaction would 
mean that a new transaction would have to be negotiated, and there would be 
two sets of cash flows requiring monitoring as well as doubled credit risk since 
there was now two counterparties instead of one.191 However, when weighting the 
above considerations against the increase in counterparties, the latter alternative 
became the market standard way of doing business in the OTC derivatives markets.192 
While the adoption of the ISDA MA architecture made trading with swaps easier, 
standardization came with a recharacterization risk. Whilst enjoying an exemption 
from an exchange trading requirement to which futures trading was subject to 
189 Henderson (n 115) para 17.28.
190 Cates (n 87) 842–43, n 5; Henderson (n 115) 908–09.
191 Cates (n 87) 843; Mark D Young, William L Stein, ‘Swap Transactions under the Commodity Exchange 
Act: Is Congressional Action Needed’ (1988) 76 Geo. L. J. 1917, 1934-35.
192 Under the standardized ISDA MA architecture, the assumption is that the parties may not transfer the 
agreement or any interest or obligation in or under the same. Henderson (n 115) 17.28.
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under the Commodity Exchange Act, swaps, consisting of forward-rate transactions 
could become recharacterized as futures.193 Regardless of this risk, the incentives 
to engage in this business started to accumulate. The larger the swap market, the 
more there was liquidity, and the more liquid a product became, the more there was 
incentive to standardize such products. Market participants argued that swaps were 
not futures, but there were many counterarguments for claiming otherwise. There 
was an identifiable risk that if regulated, swap markets could move elsewhere.194 
Mirror swap Party B has sold an interest rate cap to Party A. Under the 
terms and conditions of the interest rate cap, Party B has a legal obligation 
to pay to Party A if the interest rate reaches 5 per cent. For whatever reason, 
Party B no longer wishes to hold such market position. Accordingly, Party 
B could ask for a permission from Party A to assign the legal obligation to 
a third-party Party C. Should Party C not perform its obligations towards 
Party A, Party B still has a contingent, a secondary liability that is, to 
perform even if the legal obligation had been transferred. This secondary 
liability is a legal risk that could not be easily controlled by Party B. 
Alternatively, Party B can enter into a mirror interest rate cap with Party C 
the terms and conditions of which would be as follows: 
Buyer  Party A (protection buyer) 
Seller  Party C (protection seller) 
Maturity  10 years (15 January 2027) 
Notional  EUR 500,000 
Cap rate  5% 
Underlying Euribor 12-month 
Rollover date 2 days before the interest payment date 
Premium  EUR 1000 paid up-front
While Party A now holds two contracts instead of one, the position of Party 
A is now zero meaning that should the interest rate reach 5 per cent, Party 
A does not in principle lose anything as it is out-of-the-money under one 
contract and in-the-money under the other with identical terms. Naturally, 
however, having two counterparties equals two counterparty risks. While 
derivatives can mitigate risks, they transform or convert risk rather than 
makes it disappear. In this example, the transformation concerns the 
transformation of a market risk to a credit risk.195 
193 Subchapter 4.4.2.
194 Young, Stein (n 191) 1833–38, 1946–47.
195 Henderson (n 86) 398–400. 
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For transaction lawyers, the new way of doing business meant that they needed 
to have knowledge on traditional equity issuances, debt finance, and financial 
regulation, as well as the capability to draft the terms and conditions of new products. 
For investors, it meant a fundamental change in how trades were executed as 
derivatives trading necessitated immediate price quotes from the market, i.e. from 
those willing to swap the credit risk, how swaps needed to be valued on a daily mark-
to-market basis internally, because of the market volatility which might necessitate 
entering into a new swap with another counterparty, and how the investments were 
managed now more as a portfolio, as swaps opened the market in wholly new ways, 
rather than as individual investments.196 Such changes in business conduct and new 
types of business, in turn, needed to find articulation in new types of derivatives 
contracts as well as in existing loan documentation as many types of debt financing 
also started to include a separate but interlinked derivative transaction with its own 
contractual architecture.
4.7.4 THE EROSION OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL RESTRICTIONS
One important thing to note repeating is that formally repealing or otherwise 
disapplying an existing regulation is not necessarily the starting point for a new 
type of financial activity to emerge. Markets can form spontaneously even in a tightly 
regulated environment as described in Chapter 3. Findings made in economics 
may further illustrate this point. Market activity combined with financial and 
technological innovation can outgrow its regulatory framework to a point that 
renders the latter as simply obsolete dead letters where it makes little sense to keep 
the regulation in force but much sense simply to deregulate. Technological progress 
can lead to deregulation and simultaneously erode the benefits of regulatory barriers 
that inhibit competition and favour some market participants.197 Bank deregulation 
followed by technological advancement can decrease income inequality, especially 
among the poor.198 A prime example of the interaction between finance and law 
can be found in the repealing of the ‘Glass Steagall restrictions’, that refer to a set 
of US regulatory prohibitions enacted originally in the early 1930s. 
In the wake of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall led to the separation of 
commercial banking and riskier securities business in the US. The Glass-Steagall 
was formally repealed in 1999 once it was already evident that ‘[c]hanges in the 
196 Henderson (n 92) 351, 353. 
197 Randall S Kroszner, Philip E Strahan, ‘What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the 
Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions’ (1999) The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
198 Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Alexey Levkov, ‘Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank 
Deregulation in the United States’ (2010) LXV 5, The Journal of Finance 1637. 
148
Transnationalisation of the OTC derivatives market 
actual business activities of financial firms substantially altered the effects of the law 
and catalyzed the process of deregulation’. The use of OTC derivatives, especially 
swaps, was elemental in this evolutionary process.199 The Glass-Steagall had a 
‘loophole’ which commercial banks could use to engage in de facto investment 
banking business.200 Official removal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions was more of 
a formality. In the US, deregulation of intrastate branching and interstate banking, 
as well as multibank holding companies started in the 1970s and was generally 
more characteristic of the mid-1980s.201 The evolutionary processes are in constant 
motion and transnationalisation of law began much earlier than any formal act of 
deregulation by states.202 
By the late 1970s, and early 1980s, it had become very common for sovereign 
and corporate issuers to use swaps to benefit from comparative advantages different 
market participants had in different markets. They were long term because often 
their underlying asset, loans and bonds, had typically a long maturity spanning from 
a few years to decades. Often the economic rationale of the eurobond issue was not 
to raise capital for themselves, but to use the proceeds of the issue to access other 
financial markets to which they lacked direct access, or they had access but with 
relatively unattractive terms.203 This was achieved by using swaps which effectively 
meant the creation of an interlinkage between swaps (bilateral OTC transactions), 
securities (especially eurobonds), and bank lending. 
Swaps changed the whole landscape of banking in the 1980s in that, depending on 
the transaction, they could be structured as something resembling loans, securities, 
or futures, without necessarily being legally characterized as none of them. Retail (or 
commercial) banks had two functions, deposit taking and lending. Investment banks 
engaged in investment advice, intermediation, and trading for their own account 
with their own assets. They were regulated as separate types of business under the 
199 Funk, Hirschman (n 142) 673; The Glass-Steagal Act was a popular name for certain parts of the US 
Banking Act of 1933 which was originally demanded by an interest group to shield them from competition 
and to enjoy ‘super-competitive returns’. Once new competitors entered the financial market uninhibited 
by the Glass-Steagal Act it favoured commercial and investment banks to lobby for its deregulation, 
Jonathan R Macey, ‘The Myth of “Reregulation”: The Interest Group Dynamics of Regulatory Change in 
the Financial Services Industry’ (1988) 45 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 1275 <https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.
edu/wlulr/vol45/iss4/4> accessed 1 June 2019. 
200 Craig W Murray, ‘The Oil and Gas Lawyer’s Role in New Financing Techniques’ (1995) 42 Ann. Inst. On 
Min. L. 44, 46-47.
201 Kroszner, Strahan (n 197) 1441.
202 In contrast, this evolutionary view does not necessarily resonate with the macroprudential view that 
apparently emphasizes formal acts deregulation, while acknowledging the nonexistence of regulation in 
some cases, as a driver for financial innovation that allegedly led to the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Xavier Freixas, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró, Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation 
(MIT Press 2015) 94–98.
203 Josephine Carr, ‘Eurobonds Know No Bounds’ (1987) 6 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 7, noting 
 ‘[o]f the US$178bn worth of bonds issued last year almost two-thirds were swap driven compared to one 
third in 1985 the profit lying in the swap as pricing becomes tighter on the bond’.
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Glass-Steagall Act, and from the 1980s, they were competing in new OTC derivatives 
markets that did not fall into existing regulatory categories.204 Regulators who wished 
to regulate the new products had to either seek to apply existing regulations to the 
new business or seek new authority from legislature. In both cases, the regulators 
would be met with opposition from industry lobbyists as well as other regulators who 
would have chosen not to regulate.205 Financial innovation and ambiguous products 
eroded the existing similarly ambiguous regulations and regulatory categories. The 
categorization between retail and investment banking remains a central topic in 
financial regulation.206 
Havd things changed since the 1980s? Post-GFC in the US, a rule commonly 
referred to as the Volcker rule,207 also known as ‘Glass-Steagal lite’, entered into 
force. Among other objectives, the Volcker rule seeks to limit contagion from the 
shadow banking sector to commercial banks, limit trading for their own account by 
commercial banks (proprietary trading), and prevent the possibility of public funds 
being allocated to the shadow banking sector indirectly through and by commercial 
banks.208 The Volcker rule is said to contain regulatory ‘loopholes’ and that it will 
give rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities as well as produce unintended 
and unknown consequences.209 According to Adam J Levitin, with explicit and 
implicit government guarantee on the financial industry and financial regulation 
that stimulates product innovation and regulatory arbitrage, it is also the source of 
financial instability. The present state of banking is a combination of historical path 
dependence of fractional-reserve banking, and both the financial service industry’s 
and the financial regulators’ incentive to retain the status quo because it serves 
their respective interests.210
During the transformative decade of the 1980s, financial institutions switched 
from brokerage, with the idea of bringing together buyers and sellers for a fee, to 
dealing in their own account. This allowed them to charge fees on each of their own 
counterparties as well as to enter into transactions, or to take market positions, of 
their own. OTC derivatives products were not on-balance-sheet but were rather 
off-balance-sheet items. These products would not appear on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions. This effectively meant that regulatory capital requirements did 
204 Funk, Hirschman (n 142) 690–96. By the end of 1992, the OTC derivative market was largely 
concentrated to roughly 15 banks, of which seven were commercial banks, five investment banks, and 
three insurance companies, ibid, Table 2, 687.
205 Funk, Hirschman (n 142) 669, 690.
206 Alastair Hudson, ‘Banking regulation and the ring-fence’ (2013) 107 C.O.B. 1.
207 Section 619 of the Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
208 Hossein Nabilou, ‘Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a 
Panacea or Yet Another Maginot Line?’ (2017) 32 B.F.L.R. 297, 301
209 ibid 335–40.
210 Adam J Levitin, ‘Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy’ (2016) 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357; 
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not originally apply to OTC derivatives. This, in turn, allowed financial institutions 
to expand their business beyond traditional lending of deposit-taking and incurring 
long-term loans. The rapid expansion in the market could be found from dealing, 
where the financial institution acted as a principal and traded in its own account, 
rather than acting as an intermediary for others as a broker for its clients for a 
commission.211 Financial regulators were aware of such development and deemed 
it to be an acceptable banking activity subject to the general requirement of not 
being made for purely speculative purposes, and that market participants identified 
and managed the associated risks prudently.212 From the early-1980s, regulators 
and especially the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel committee 
became increasingly interested in the off-balance-sheet exposures of financial 
institutions and conducted many extensive studies on recent financial innovations 
in the international interbank market, including those made in the OTC derivatives 
market.213 Under the first E.C. Solvency Ratio Directive, that derives its contents from 
the work carried out by the Basel Committee, assets and off-balance-sheet items 
were already subject to weighting of risk according to their degree of credit risk, i.e. 
the risk of non-payment. The off-balance sheet items were to be first ‘transformed’ 
into calculable assets through a specific conversion factor. The Capital Adequacy 
Directive introduced the concept of ‘trading books’ according to which financial 
institutions were required to hold funds against losses from adverse fluctuations 
in the markets.214 Commercial banks started to use these products with their 
existing corporate customers, as evidenced by standardized loan documentation 
that reflected this development.215 In practice, this meant that the provisions of the 
lending agreement included specifically drafted provisions in regard to the derivative 
transactions entered into under a different agreement and created further demand 
for contractual standardization.216 
211 Cates (n 87) 838.
212 Henderson (n 85) 365, 393. 
213 Cates (n 87) 843–44; George A Walker, ‘Financial derivatives - global regulatory developments’ (1996) 
J.B.L. 66, 90: 
 It is clear from the above that a considerable amount of very significant and valuable work has been 
carried out in the area of derivatives especially with regard to the proper identification and assessment of 
all of the specific financial risks involved [in the OTC derivatives] industry.
214 Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio 89/647/EEC for Credit Institutions OJ L386 
(Solvency Ratio Directive); Council Directive 93/6/EEC of March 15, 1993, [1993] O.J. L141 (Capital 
Adequacy Directive); Federico Torzo, Peter Scherer, ‘The capital treatment of credit derivatives in Europe’ 
(1999) 14 J.I.B.L. 144, 145–46.
215 Christian A Johnson, ‘At the Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?’ 
(1998–1999) 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 1998–1999, 1. 
216 ibid 44–47.
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4.7.5 THE DEMAND FOR CONTRACTUAL STANDARDIZATION 
Following the emergence of the OTC derivatives market, new contractual concepts 
such as ‘notional amount’, ‘netting’, and new methods for how to calculate damages 
upon termination of such novel products were foreign to debt financing but essential 
for understanding derivatives trading.217 Importantly, technological advancement 
and the use of OTC derivatives blurred the line between traditional debt and equity 
markets in its complexity and flexibility. For example, by way of structuring bespoke 
equity derivatives, foreign market participants could acquire positions equivalent 
to US equities, traditionally still a highly regulated area subject to withholding 
tax regarding outbound dividend payments, without ever acquiring any of the US 
equities themselves. It was for the public officials to decide how to characterize 
various equity derivative transactions and how to tax them but without a coherent 
analytical model as how to do this, ‘[t]he outcome in any particular [court] case is 
a matter of sheer speculation’.218 
There was a clear contrast in the fast pace of derivatives trading, arising from 
their nature, and traditional forms of finance such as bank lending.219 In the former, 
trades needed to be executed orally, typically over the telephone, referred to as 
trade calls. From the documentation perspective, trades were supplemented with 
brief telex confirmations that included the economic terms of the transactions. In 
the traditional area, the negotiation and execution of the written agreement and 
required supplements could take place even months after the oral agreement.220 The 
swap agreements also reflected existing lending documentation but as the payment 
mechanics, rate setting provisions and the calculation of liquidated damages, for 
example, were different from bank lending, the end result was often a complex 
agreement that took a long time to negotiate.221 There is indeed a disconnect between 
217 For a side-by-side analysis and interlinkages of loan documentation architecture and ISDA MA 
architecture, ibid 33–44.
218 David P Hariton, ‘Equity Derivatives, Inbound Capital and Outbound Withholding Tax’ (2007) 60 Tax 
Law. 313, 317–18. The article focuses on the situation in 2007 and the assumption here is that the 
situation was no clearer than it had been in the 1980s and 1990s. ISDA MA 1992 addressed this issue 
by standardizing a provision for ‘Tax Event’ which allows the party affected by a tax to simply terminate 
the transaction affected by the tax. The affected party can be either the party who would otherwise have 
to ‘gross up’ its payment to negate the effect of the tax or the party who is to receive less because of the 
withholding tax. Harding (n 21) 76–77, 232–33. 
219 See for example Lynn (n 83) 301, noting that even when the counterparties, who already standardized 
master agreement architecture at their disposal, often signed the master agreement after entering into the 
derivative transaction. 
220 Typically, the fulfilment of what is referred to as ‘conditions precedent’ that the borrower must satisfy 
before the borrower is entitled to draw funds under the loan arrangement and a legal opinion from the 
borrower’s legal advisor confirming that, among other issues, the signatories of the borrower have the 
legal capacity to sign the loan documentation. For conditions precedent generally, Zakrzewski, ‘Loan 
Facilities’ in Paterson, Zakrzewski (n 32) 110, 134–9. 
221 Cunningham (n 28) 27. 
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a theory which assumes that all transactions are in written form while it has been 
a long-time market practice that they may not become documented at all.222
When the trading volumes grew, the exchange of written contracts became 
more of a formality as the contractual foundation of a transaction.223 This led to 
several problems. First, some jurisdictions might not recognize oral agreement as 
enforceable as enforceability would require the transaction to be in written and 
signed form. Second, the time gap between the oral agreement and the closing 
of the transactions in written form gave rise to operational risk, in this case the 
risk that the terms and conditions of a transaction did not match between the 
two.224 Even without delays, the parties might not even be aware of the possible 
contractual misunderstandings as they did not have the agreement in writing and 
even when they finally did, the contracts were drafted on the basis of their own 
standard agreements where the definitions might have been the same wording 
but not in how they were interpreted giving rise to what came to be referred to as 
operational or documentation risk.225 The answer to overcoming such problems 
could be found from a master agreement structure that would set the basic terms 
and conditions applicable to all later derivatives transactions entered into between 
the counterparties. Under the master agreement structure, the counterparties would 
only need to exchange a short document setting out the economic terms of the 
individual transactions and this, given it included only the economic terms and 
was thus short, could be exchanged on the same day as the oral agreement.226 The 
problem was that no such master agreement structure existed 
Philip R Wood has studied how illegality clauses were already in use in the 1970s 
and they can be traced back to the US and the 1930s when so-called ‘Trading with the 
Enemy’ legislation was in force. An embargo, for example, set under the legislation 
could lead to a situation where a creditor financial institution was prohibited from 
acting with a borrower in one jurisdiction while being contractually obliged to lend 
to the same under the governing law of the contract. In such a situation, a financial 
institution could cancel its commitment to the debtor. 227 It was also observed at an 
early stage that derivatives could be or become unlawful. The main legal risk was 
that it could constitute illegal gambling or wagering both in the US, the UK, as well 
as elsewhere, as derivatives transactions could be characterized or recharacterized to 
222 Hudson (n 35) para 2–27.
223 Cates (n 87) 838.
224 Operational risk is a context-dependant concept, the purpose of which is to allow for the recognition of 
different types of risk, Loader (n 117) 157–65.
225 Cunningham (n 28) 27; Diane Genova, Don Thompson ‘A Guide to Standard Swap Documentation’ (1988) 
3 Com. Lending Rev. 44; Guylaine Charles, ‘The ISDA Master Agreement – Part I: Architecture, Risks and 
Compliance’ (2012) January-February, Pract. Compliance & Risk Mgmt. for the Sec. Indus, 25, 26–27.
226 Cunningham (n 228) 35.
227 Philip R Wood, ‘Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s’ (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 20.
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include a speculative element without commercial basis. The application of such laws 
to derivatives would effectively mean that such contracts could be rendered void and 
unenforceable.228 To add further uncertainty, there was no case law available that 
would address such issues.229 Swaps had to be drafted to have a commercial basis 
to avoid it being construed as illegal wagering or gambling. By claiming that a swap 
transaction reflected actual risks and contractual obligations of the counterparties, 
it was hoped that a court would not deem such action to constitute gamgling or 
wagering.230 In the UK, the Financial Services Act in 1986 exempted OTC derivatives 
from constituting illegal gaming or wagering.231
As in every financial arrangement, there was the question of if and how would 
local tax laws affect transactions. Again, this issue had been addressed and even 
contractually standardized already in the sovereign syndicated lending market in the 
1970s that, in turn, had proliferated from the eurocurrency market in the 1960s.232 
The market practice was already that if either of the parties was under local tax laws 
obligated to withhold tax, the affected party should nevertheless pay the other party 
in full and thus ‘gross up’ the amount of the tax payment on the principal. Local tax 
laws hit local companies in two ways, first in the form of tax, and second, through 
contractual gross-up obligation.233 Tax gross-up provisions are market standard in 
virtually any type of modern standardized transnational contract, and, in the ISDA 
MA architecture, the affected party is protected with the option to terminate those 
transactions affected by the tax.234 
228 William P Rogers, Jerry W Markham, ‘The Application of West German Statutes to United States 
Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Policies’ (1987) 19 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 273 
229 Somer (n 88) 404–05.
230 Cates (n 87) 837, n 5. The same care in drafting would also relate to avoiding the derivatives being 
construed as insurances, a regulated product, 845; Ronald L Cheng, ‘Legal Doctrines Restricting the 
Secondary Market in Interest Rate Swaps’ (1988) 26 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 313, 325–28. While life 
insurance companies were prohibited from entering into derivatives transactions, the regulations in this 
respect were laxed in the early 1980s, at least in the US, which allowed insurers to invest a portion of their 
assets to options and futures for hedging purposes. E Grala Bronislaw, John W Osborn, ‘Hedging with 
Options and Commodity Futures under the Revised New York State Insurance Law’ (1984) 16 Conn. L. 
Rev. 477.
231 Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, pt.1, ch. V, § 63 (1): 
 (1) No contract to which this section applies shall be Void or unenforceable by reason of—
 (a)section 18 of the [1845 c. 109.] Gaming Act 1845, section 1 of the [1892 c. 9.] Gaming Act 1892 or any 
corresponding provisions in force in Northern Ireland; or
 (b)any rule of the law of Scotland whereby a contract by way of gaming or wagering is not legally 
enforceable.
 The exemption was maintained in later Acts, Ross P Buckley, ‘Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global 
Finance’ (2016) 36 Oxford J.Leg.St. 242, 246–48. 
232 Subchapter 3.4.4.
233 Wood (n 32) 19; Andre WG Newburg, ‘Financing in the Euromarket by U.S. Companies: A Survey of the 
Legal and Regulatory Framework’ (1977–1978) 33 Bus. Law. 2171, 2177–78.
234 For an example of tax structuring under the LMA standard lending documentation, Adam Blakemore, 
Oliver Iliffe, ‘Sub-participations, taxation and the mitigation of lender credit risk’ (June 2011) 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law
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More specifically to derivatives market, there was the question of how payments 
made and received during the duration of the swap agreement would be seen from 
a taxation perspective and would they give rise to a chargeable gain or allowable 
loss.235 In addition, and remembering that this was before the liberalization era, many 
jurisdictions had local withholding tax arrangements in force, as part of exchange 
controls or otherwise, which raised the question of which party and on what basis 
should they be liable for the taxes if they would become applicable to the derivatives 
transactions. Under English law, it was for the party making a payment under a 
derivatives contract that was required to deduct tax before making a payment to the 
other party meaning that the transferee would receive the payment deducted with 
the withholding tax amount.236 However, under certain conditions banks incorporated 
in the UK and UK branches of foreign banks were exempted from this requirement 
provided that the financial entity in question was acting as a principal on its own 
behalf and not as an arranger for others.237 
Third, there was the issue concerning which valuation methods should be used 
in various transactions outside default situations and what should be the reference 
interest rate for the same. This aspect would come very much to the forefront of 
close-out netting calculations. Already in the early 1980s, English or New York laws 
were deemed the most suitable as the governing law of swap contracts.238 In regard 
to other relevant terms and conditions, the issue of how to calculate the payable 
amount and compensation prior to the scheduled maturity of the transaction was 
deemed uncertain and therefore in need of further contractual standardization to 
reflect ‘reasonable market calculations’.239 
Overall, there is clear evidence of how contractual standardization was already 
at this time driven by market demand for recognition of various risks and relative 
contractual simplicity, meaning that the issues were complex, but this complexity 
could be reduced through contractual standardization. The ISDA Master Agreement 
architecture discussed in detail in the following Chapter was at least partially built on 
existing processes and solutions found already in the market by market participants 
that had engaged in repeated interactions and thus had created spontaneously a 
transnational normative order for their dealings.
235 Watkins (n 87) 2, 31. Under English law, the status of OTC derivatives contracts was clarified under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act. Simon J Leifer, ‘Legal issues relating to the ISDA Master Agreement 
from the European and US Perspectives’ in Harding (n 21) 385–86.
236 Indemnity clauses are a typical way of dealing with this legal risk, which essentially means that the party 
which is subject to the withholding tax nevertheless has to gross up the payment for the other party. 
Harding (n 21) 45. The European Central Bank views domestic withholding tax regulations serving to 
disadvantage foreign intermediaries as a ‘[b]arrier to an efficient EU clearing and settlement environment’ 
European Central Bank, ‘The Payment System: payments, securities and derivatives, and the role of the 
Eurosystem’ (2010) 208.
237 Cates (n 87) 840, n 5.
238 James A Watkins, ‘Legal Issues and Documentation’ in Boris Antl, Swap Financing Techniques 
(Euromoney Publications Ltd 1983) 99–114.
239 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Credit Risk and Swap Exposure’ in Antl (n 238) 115–123. 
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5. TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACT: THE ISDA 
MASTER AGREEMENT 
5.1 BILATERAL CLOSE-OUT NETTING FROM PUBLIC POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE
Before going into the evolution of the ISDA Master Agreement, it is necessary to 
review why the OTC derivatives market matters from a public policy perspective. 
Transnational contracts are used by policy makers to decrease risks in the financial 
markets. This is meant to be achieved through allowing for close-out netting and 
margining the use of which the ISDA MA architecture facilitates. The size of the OTC 
derivative market is often overstated if the nominal value is used as a benchmark. 
This might lead the reader astray.1 In a notional amount, the size of the OTC 
derivatives market has varied from $350 trillion to $700 trillion during 2008–16.2 
In comparison, market capitalization of listed companies globally was roughly $76 
trillion at the end of 2016.3 The nominal amount refers to gross nominal value of 
all payments arising from OTC derivative transactions. It does not directly indicate 
the amount of potential losses and actual credit exposures in this market but serves 
more as a rough proxy of the potential total price risk transferred in this market.4 
Instead, a more realistic figure of the OTC derivatives market can be calculated 
through gross market value which is defined as the value of all outstanding contracts 
before netting.5 The term ‘gross’ refers to the calculation of all positive and negative-
value contracts separately without offsetting them for individual counterparties. 
At the end of 2016, the gross market value of the OTC derivatives positions was 
calculated at $15 trillion. Lastly, and importantly for this research, the gross credit 
1 The narrative of ‘hundreds of trillions of OTC markets’ is persistent in academia. Jan D Luettringhaus, 
‘Regulating Over-the-Counter Derivatives in the European Union – Transatlantic (Dis)Harmony after 
EMIR and Dodd-Frank: The Impact on (Re)Insurance Companies and Occupational Pension Funds’ 
(2012) 18 Colum.J.Eur.L. 19, 20; Richard Haynes, John Roberts, Rajiv Sharma, Bruce Tuckman, 
‘Introducing ENNs: A Measure of the Size of Interest Rate Swap Markets’ (2018) US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Research Paper, <www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/
file/oce_enns0118.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2019. 
2 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Statistical release OTC derivatives statistics at end-December 2016’ 
(May 2017) Monetary and Economic Department (BIS Statistics 2017) Annex A <https://www.bis.org/
publ/otc_hy1705.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
3 Stocks traded, total value (current US$), World Federation of Exchanges database <https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD>
4 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
OTC Derivatives Market Activity Reporting guidelines for amounts outstanding at end–June 
2016 for non-regular reporting institutions’ (BIS Survey 2016) 4 <https://www.bis.org/statistics/
triennialrep/2016survey_guidelinesoutstanding.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
5 ibid 5, 16.
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exposures, which adjust gross market values for legally enforceable bilateral netting 
agreements, reflecting the market value or replacement cost for each transaction 
was $3.3 trillion at the end of 2016. 6 
5.2 THE TRANSNATIONAL ORIGINS OF BILATERAL CLOSE-OUT 
NETTING
5.2.1 PRIVATE NORMATIVITY IN THE MAKING: THE BIRTH OF ISDA
The birth of ISDA, originally known by the name Swap Dealers Association, Inc., 
may well have taken place in 1984 in a meeting of 18 financial institutions. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to reduce the high transactions costs of 
negotiating and drafting the terms and conditions for each swap.7 This meeting was 
the starting point for the transnationalisation of the OTC derivatives market. After 
consuming negotiations concentrating on battle of forms, everyone wanted to use 
their own familiar terms and conditions as the basis for further standardization. The 
first draft consisted only of the standard definitions known as the Code of Standard 
Wording, Assumptions and Provisions for Swaps, which came in two editions, the 
first in 1985 and the second in 1986 (together the Code). The Code was a non-
binding industry code of practice,8 and was neither a contract nor a regulation.
The purpose of the Code was to standardize the two sets of valuations. First, 
how to valuate floating rate options and the cash flows for a US dollar denominated 
interest rate swap, and second, how to valuate a swap when it was terminated before 
its intended maturity. In addition, it included standardized wording for certain 
events of default as well as standard representations and warranties.9 The valuation 
methods chosen for the Code were also those that the market participants had 
found easy to understand and straightforward in their application. In addition, it 
included choice of law and governing law provisions. From the outset, the users 
of the Code were free to deviate from the standardized wording and also amend 
6 BIS (n 2) 2. 
7 This was also the year when the International Primary Market Association (IPMA, currently the 
International Securities Market Association (ISMA) was established to improve legal documentation, 
‘to create a closer liaison with government bodies and other organizations that affect the development 
of the new issues business’ and to coordinate the development of trading practices of its members on 
a non-binding basis. Peter Gallant, The Eurobond Market (Woodhead-Faulkner 1988) 163–64; Daniel 
Cunningham, ‘Swaps: Codes, Problems and Regulation’ (1986) 5 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 26, 27. 
8 Cunningham (n 7) 27. For a side by side comparison of the 1985 and 1986 editions of the Code, ibid, 30–
32; Jeffrey F Golden, ‘Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation’ (1994) 13 Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. 18. 
9 Philip P Wood, ‘Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s’ (2010) 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 20. 
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it, as some individual financial institutions did, to cover other types of swaps than 
US dollar interest rate swaps.10 
Although the Code was widely adopted in the market, negotiating transactions 
was still slow.11 Many terms and conditions were scattered in several different 
agreements that market participants continued to use.12 Although not a contract, 
financial institutions could incorporate the Code into their own agreements.13 The 
Code was ‘more like a dictionary or menu of relevant provisions’ from which the 
parties could use in its entirety or incorporate parts or amend it to suit particular 
needs of a given transaction.14 The Code also addressed the legal risk of cherry 
picking and automatic stay arising from the US Bankruptcy Code which were 
a particular concern for those trading in OTC derivatives.15 Reducing these risks 
through would soon become central public policy objective.
As said, those who wished to use the Code needed to enter into an additional 
supplement agreement in order for a swap transaction to constitute a legally 
binding agreement. A Code would not suffice. The terms and conditions of these 
supplement agreements, in turn, were not standardized meaning that there was 
still much perhaps unnecessary negotiation left for market participants to do, even 
if the Code offered uniform formulations for some but not all terms and conditions. 
Fortunately for market participants, there was already an existing market solution to 
this problem. One other similar code already in use, the British Bankers’ Association’s 
standard terms (BBAIRS Terms), consisted of a master agreement structure. This 
meant that all the general terms and conditions applicable to all transactions were 
standardized, which would be applicable to all individual transactions executed 
under the BBRAIRS terms. Under the BBAIRS Terms, parties to a transaction 
needed to exchange only one additional confirmation page that specified the exact 
economic terms of an individual transaction, to create a binding agreement.16 
10 Cunningham (n 7) 26.
11 Cunningham (n 7), noting that in non-ISDA standardized agreement ‘[m]uch time was spent on the 
negotiation of payment mechanics, rate setting provisions and liquidated damages’ 27.
12 Diane Genova, Don Thompson, ‘A Guide to Standard Swap Documentation’ (1988) 3 Com. Lending Rev. 
44, 45; Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis’ (1988) 44 Bus. Law. 365, 
385–86; Paul C Harding, Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements, (3rd edition, Pearson Education Ltd 
2010) 18.
13 Sean S Flanagan, ‘The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association’ (2001) 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 211, 234–38; Edmund MA Kwaw, The Law and 
Practice of Offshore Banking and Finance (Quorum 1996) 185; Cunningham (n 7) 26–28. 
14 Golden (n 8) 18–19; Stuart Somer, ‘A Survey of Legal and Regulatory Issues Relevant to Interest 
Rate Swaps’ (1992) 4 DePaul Bus. L.J. 385, 406–07; The Bank for International Settlements, ‘Recent 
innovations in international banking’ (April 1986) acknowledging the contractual standardization carried 
out by ISDA, 59–60, as well as the important role of investment banks as standardizers of contracts 
and market practices, 45, ending in an observation that ‘[i]n general, however, the progress toward 
standardisation of OTC options across banks or among national markets has been slow’ 76, <https://
www.bis.org/publ/ecsc01a.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
15 Cunningham (n 7) 32–34. 
16 Cunningham (n 7) 28–29. The article also contains a side-by-side comparison of approaches and 
assumptions of the Code and the BBAIRS Terms, 29.
158
Transnational Contract: the ISDA Master Agreement 
However, BBAIRS Terms were meant for short-term interbank transaction in 
the London market for which reason they could serve only as the starting point 
for further standardization for the OTC derivatives market. Market participants 
adopted the basic idea of the BBAIRS Terms of having a master agreement under 
which transactions could be made on pre-defined and standardized terms and 
conditions.17 Following this development, market participants learned to ‘speak 
a common language’. The concepts and vocabulary were understood increasingly 
in a consistent coherent way, albeit disputes over the contents and meaning of the 
terms and conditions were still common between market participants. Regardless 
of this, as early as 1986, it was evident that ‘future cooperation may well lead to 
a standard form agreement that works under both English and New York law’.18
Contractual standardization was a method to drive down negotiation costs as well 
as to identify legal risks of OTC derivatives trading. Turning financial transaction 
into contractual terms is slow and costly. This might have held truth especially in 
the emerging OTC derivative market that was fast-paced, novel, and took place in 
a complex legal and regulatory environment full of legal risks. The growth of this 
market was spontaneous in that nobody could predict how popular each type of 
derivative product would become. The market generated supply and demand for 
further standardization. Scalable terms and conditions facilitated trading in new 
types of transactions.19 Contractual may also have had also the unintended effect 
of discouraging market participants from requiring such terms and conditions 
from their counterparties in derivatives transactions that they would normally 
require in their lending operations. These shortcomings in proper documentation 
varied from identifying the legal status of the counterparty and ensuring that the 
counterparties had the corporate powers to enter into OTC derivative transactions 
to proper monitoring of the credit risk of their counterparties during the life of a 
transaction.20 
17 Henderson (n 12) 386.
18 Cunningham (n 7) 26, 28; Josephine Carr, ‘Eurobonds Know No Bounds’ (1987) 6 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 7; 
Golden (n 8).
19 Genova, Thompson (n 12) 44; Theodore Kim, ‘A hundred ways to slice up credit’ (1998) 347 Euromoney, 
London 97, noting the industry demand not only for contractual standardization, but also for market 
information and for the development of common benchmarks for the pricing of risk. According to an 
industry estimate, the total notional amount of outstanding interest rate and currency swaps increased 
many fold during 1987–1991. For example, during that period, the notional amount of interest rate swaps 
grew from 388 to 1.622 billion US dollars and for currency swaps from 86 to 328 billion US Dollars, 
The Group of Thirty, Washington, DC, Working Group on Global Derivatives, ‘Derivatives: Practices and 
Principles – Global Derivatives Study Group, July 1993, 51–56 (Global Derivatives Study Group) <https://
group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Derivatives-PracticesandPrinciples.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019. According to another estimate drawn from an industry study, the respective figures rose from 1.622 
to 8.698 billion U.S. dollars and from 328 to 455 billion U.S. dollars during 1991–1995, Gautam Goswami, 
Milind M Shrikhande, ‘Interest Rate Swaps and Economic Exposure’ (1998) 9 Global Finance Journal 51, 
54.
20 Henderson (n 12) 387–88, also noting that those financial institutions offering other services to their 
clients would have an incentive to monitor their counterparties whereas in trading functions ‘[a] dealer 
which views its swap activities primarily as a trading function may take a more liberal approach to 
documentation, relying on the public rating of its counterparties’ 388. 
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The 1985 version of the Code was updated in 1986 to better reflect new market 
practices that had come into existence and evolved within one year. The new version 
differentiated market mechanism in a more nuanced way and introduced new 
definitions. In addition, market participants had found some of the key provisions of 
the 1985 Code complex and difficult to understand. These provisions were central as 
they determined how the value of a swap should be calculated when it is terminated 
before its maturity. Market participants had found one standardization, the so-called 
Agreement Value provisions, easier to understand than the alternative. The 1986 
version included a redrafted Formula and explanatory sentences to guide readers 
on its interpretation.21 
5.2.2 FROM A NON-BINDING CODE TO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT
New negotiations ensued. Unlike the first negotiations which were between dealer 
financial institutions, the following negotiations had to take into consideration and 
be counterbalanced with the views of those who bought OTC derivatives for their 
own use, the end-users, transnational corporations. The legal nature of the Code 
evolved from being a non-binding collection of standardized contractual terms and 
conditions towards being a standardized ISDA Master Agreement in 1987 (ISDA 
MA 1987). ISDA introduced two new forms, one for the US market and one for 
the ‘London market’, i.e. for the rest of the world. An ‘Interest Rate and Currency 
Exchange Agreement’ was designed to be used only in the US dollar interest rate 
swap market and was thus to be governed by New York law and under the jurisdiction 
of the New York courts. The ‘Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement’ 
(multi-currency form) was to be used in the latter and be governed by English law 
and under the jurisdiction of the English courts (together the Forms). The multi-
currency form was soon accompanied by the ‘1987 Interest Rate and Currency 
Exchange Definitions’ (the Definitions) to further facilitate swap trading now in 
15 different currencies.22 The market had grown significantly over the course of 
just a few years and new derivative products were ‘used in conjunction with, or 
as integral part of, virtually every other type of financial transaction’. Derivatives 
were becoming the main transaction instead of bank lending and capital market 
21 Cunningham (n 7) 26, 31. The explanatory sentences would in a few years evolve into separate guide 
books published by ISDA used also in this research as sources.
22 Genova, Thompson (n 12) 45, noting that ‘[t] oday, virtually all major market participants have adopted 
the International Swap Dealers Association, Inc. (ISDA) codes and forms for documenting interest rate 
and currency swaps’; Bank for International Settlements, ‘62nd Annual Report’ (15th June 1992), noting 
the rapid expansion of the swap market and the concentration of the market towards inter-ISDA member 
transactions, 180 <https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1992_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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transactions. Bonds were issued, and loans were made for facilitating trading in 
derivatives.23
ISDA MA 1987 introduced standard wording for various situations that could 
affect the economics of a transaction and give rise to legal issues. These situations 
ranged from mergers, payment provisions, netting mechanism for payments, 
contractual clauses on agreement assignment to third parties, new default provisions, 
and three alternative indemnification clauses, among others.24 As a sign of heavy 
sell-side, in other words, the dealer side, involvement in the drafting process, ISDA 
MA 1987 also introduced a close-out calculation method referred to as ‘one-way 
payment’. It basically means that only the defaulting party should pay for damages 
to the non-defaulting party upon default. The basic assumption among dealers 
was that the defaulting-party would be their client/counterparty for which reason 
there was essentially no need to consider an inconceivable situation where a dealer 
institution would default and be liable to pay for damages. The assumption serves 
also as a period piece of how banking was seen at that time. Without going into 
detail over one-way, limited two-way, or two-way payments, it suffices to note that 
two-way payment would become the market standard by the early 1990s.25 
The next version of the 1987 Definitions was published in 1991. This version 
expanded the scope of the Definitions from standardized interest and currency swaps 
to, among others, commodity and equity indices. As a reflection of the evolution 
taking place in the market, the 1991 Definitions introduced an open-ended definition 
which allowed market participants to state that Swap Transactions (as defined in 
the 1991 Definitions) are those transactions that the parties to an agreement want to 
define a transaction as such. It also introduced new optional terms, basically menus 
of terms and conditions, for certain definitions as in some market areas certain 
definitions were understood differently than in others.26 It was for ISDA to keep 
up with the constantly evolving market preferences in contractual standardization 
and for the market participants to analyze how well the standardized terms and 
conditions fit into their own transactions and amend it accordingly, if deemed 
necessary. 27 From early on, market participants could justifiably say that the ISDA 
23 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Derivatives law as a niche area is dead’ (1997) 12 J.I.B.L. 351, 353; Richard 
Benzie, ‘The Development of the International Bond Market’ (1992) BIS Economic Papers No. 32, noting 
that ‘[a] substantial but unknown proportion of international bond issues are associated with a swap 
transaction’ 70, <https://www.bis.org/publ/econ32.pdf>; Chapter 4 (n 203).
24 Isabel Pappe, ‘The ins and outs of swap transactions’ (1989) 15 CBLJ 158.
25 Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 121–22, 253–54; 
Pappe (n 24) n 780.
26 Christopher Bell, ‘1991 ISDA Definitions: Evolving with the Market’ (1991) 10 Int’l Fin. L. Rev, 26, 28, 
for a timeline of the evolution from 1985 to 1990, 28; Pappe (n 24) n 780. The 2006 ISDA Definitions 
covered different types of ‘plain vanilla’ products that is 158 pages long whereas Definition booklets are 
generally 40–70 pages long. The Definition booklets are ‘not very easy to read and include frequent cross-
references but on the whole they work well provided they are used critically’, Harding (n 12) 21–22.
27 Mark P Zimmet, ‘ISDA Master Agreement: can a creditor swipe your swap?’ (1998) 17 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 13. 
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MA provisions were the market standard, which in turn could be used as an argument 
in court proceedings should disputes arise. Especially a standardized methodology 
over the determination of damages upon termination, which is a nuanced and a 
market-specific question borne out of market practice, could prove to be beneficial 
in convincing courts that such issues should be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the ISDA MA. In other words: 
Among the most significant and beneficial effects of the standardization 
process may be the development of an industry wide practice through 
the ISDA agreements and the influence of this practice on judges called 
upon to determine damages.28 
The ISDA MA reflected prevailing market practices, or the lex mercatoria of the 
OTC derivatives market from its early beginnings. 
5.2.3 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT 1992
While new products could be categorized generally as ‘derivatives’, they could vary 
considerably as to their economic terms and how and for what they were used in 
the markets. These new product categories could, however, be attached to the ISDA 
MA architecture by including a simple reference to the new Definitions booklets 
stating that this Definitions shall form part of the Schedule or Confirmation of the 
ISDA Master Agreement. 
TABLE 1 Simplified Architecture of the ISDA Master Agreement 1992
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The counterparties could thus enter into different types of transactions across product 
categories under the single agreement structure. The contractual standardization 
evolved to the next stage through the introduction of ISDA Master Agreement 1992 
that came out in two versions (both versions referred together as ISDA MA 1992). 
The Local Currency-Single Jurisdiction version was to be used for transactions where 
both parties are in the same jurisdiction and enter into transactions in the currency 
of that country. The Multicurrency-Cross Border version was published in January 
1993 after lengthy negotiations between market participants that might have taken 
as long as two years.29 ISDA MA 1992 introduced significant alterations to the 1987 
version to balance the terms and conditions from non-defaulting party friendly, 
reflecting the earlier heavy involvement of dealer banks in the standardization 
process, to more neutral towards end-users. Importantly, following the demand 
for further standardization, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. 
as it was now known reflecting the expansion of the OTC derivatives market beyond 
swap structures, soon introduced new definition booklets that the contracting parties 
could opt to use under the Master Agreement in different market areas.30 ISDA 
also published a separate User’s Guide to the 1992 ISDA Master Agreements in 
January 1993 that was, albeit highly technical and nuanced, the main interpretative 
document for the 1992 ISDA MA.31 
The basic three-part architecture of the ISDA MA, Master Agreement Form-
Schedule-Confirmation has remained the same to this day at least in bilaterally 
cleared OTC derivative transactions. First, ISDA MA 1992 introduced the 
standardised template that includes the terms and conditions applicable to all 
derivative transactions executed under the ISDA MA 1992 architecture by its 
signatories. It was accompanied by two other documents, the Schedule and the 
Confirmation. Attention was paid to those terms that ensured that the counterparties 
had the corporate authority to trade in derivatives. In addition, the ISDA MA 1992 
included provisions for payment netting, novation netting, and close-out netting 
and basic types of events of default or termination events (such as non-payment 
or illegality) that give the non-defaulting party the right, but not the obligation, to 
terminate all or some of the transactions following a termination event.32 
Second, ISDA MA 1992 included a Schedule in which the counterparties could 
structure individual transactions applicable to certain transactions executed under 
29 Harding (n 12) 24.
30 Flanagan (n 13) 229; Golden (n 8) 19.
31 Harding (n 12) 31. 
32 Under the ISDA MA architecture, the other party, or in some cases both parties, can terminate some or all 
transactions through event of default and termination provisions. In simple terms, events of default are 
situations where one of the parties have failed to fulfill their obligations as to their own fault (for example, 
non-payment) which can lead to close-out termination of all transactions whereas termination events 
concern situations that are neither of the parties fault such as changes in tax laws affecting one of the 
parties. Harding (n 12) 87–110 (for ISDA 1992 MA), 225, 249, 249–82 (for ISDA 2002 MA).
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the MA structure. ISDA MA architecture leaves it up to the parties to opt in or out on 
Schedule level of the most usual terms and conditions from which the counterparties 
can choose from or draft, or ‘tailor’, additional types on a case-by-case basis. The 
terms and conditions agreed in the Schedule prevail over those contained in the 
ISDA MA, meaning that if there is a discrepancy between the ISDA MA and the 
Schedule, the wording of the latter is applied. 
Third, under ISDA MA 1992, each transaction executed orally was to be 
accompanied by a written Confirmation with a statement that the transaction is 
governed by the ISDA MA entered into between the counterparties.33 Following the 
logic of a master agreement structure, the Confirmation prevails over the Schedule 
and the Form. The Confirmation was designed with the intent that only the key 
economic terms and contractual obligations would be included to it. While the 
Confirmation itself could be only a single page long, each individual term on it 
would have to be carefully drafted to properly reflect the architecture of the ISDA 
MA from definitions including business days, day count fractions, reference rates, 
and payment instructions.34 The cross-border element of derivatives transactions 
was becoming more evident. The Confirmation could either serve as an evidence 
of a binding oral agreement entered into earlier between the traders, or for those 
jurisdictions requiring the transaction to be in written form, as the document 
that rendered the transaction into an actual enforceable agreement.35 Following 
technological development, paper Confirmations would gradually be replaced to 
some extent by electronic Confirmations, especially among dealers who have the 
technical capability to do so, the aim of which is to allow easier and quicker trade 
execution.36 
5.2.4 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT 2002 
The next version of the ISDA master agreement was published in 2003. It became 
known as the ISDA Master Agreement 2002 (ISDA MA 2002). Unlike ISDA MA 
1992, it was published only in a multicurrency cross-border format. The review, 
negotiation and drafting of ISDA MA 2002 took 12 months to complete. Based on 
a review carried out by ISDA, this process was also influenced by a policy group 
consisting of 12 transnational financial institutions. This policy group had already 
in 1999 noted the risks associated with inconsistencies across different standard 
33 Genova, Thompson (n 12) 46–49. 
34 David M Lynn, ‘Enforceability of Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives’ (1994) 50 Bus. Law. 291 291, n 
93.
35 Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Market in the Remaking: Over-the-Counter Derivatives in a New Age’ (2017) 
11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 309, 350.
36 ibid 354.
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form documents used in the OTC derivatives market.37 These risks concerned 
termination, valuation, and close-out issues and problems associated with both 
loss and market quotation provisions of the ISDA MA1992. Among others, the 
review led to the standardization of new termination events, such as force majeure, 
impossibility of performance, and sovereign event, which is a risk that an act of 
state somehow restricts a counterparty from fulfilling its contractual obligations.38 
The review also identified potential problems in the cross-product applicability 
of close-out netting provisions and called for a review of the existing ISDA collateral 
documentation. Originally, the plan was to expand the ISDA MA 1992 with a total 
of 14 new Annexes. However, contrary to the idea of contract standardization, the 
project was leading to increasing complexity rather than reduction of the same. 39 For 
this reason, it became evident that a new version of the ISDA MA would be beneficial 
and could prove to be popular among market participants considering the changes 
in legislation, new case law, market practices, and technological development.40 
ISDA MA 2002 followed the ISDA MA 1992 version closely.41 Up to 1025 individual 
differences were evident in the newer version, however, from minor clarifications 
to core issues like the close-out method. 
5.2.5 CLOSE-OUT METHOD: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FINANCIAL REGULATION, 
LEX MERCATORIA, AND THE ENGLISH COURTS
It was a widely held opinion among G-10 supervisory authorities that ‘[t]he correct 
method of assessing the credit risk on these [swap] items is to calculate the current 
replacement cost by marking to market, a technique that determines, among other 
issues, the exposure of a counterparty towards its counterparty on a certain date, 
and to add a factor to represent potential exposure during the remaining life of the 
contract’.42 This view would later be reflected in the ISDA MA 1992 close-out netting 
method. Under the ISDA MA 1992, the replacement cost was to be calculated on 
a mark-to-market basis by obtaining market quotations from three or more swap 
37 Harding (n 12) 167–68, noting also that a significant impetus for this report were the market events that 
occurred in 1997/1998 especially in the Asian and Russian markets. 
38 It is market practice to wait out events that may affect trading. Terminating transactions immediately, 
even if the agreement would allow a party to master agreement to do so, would generally be contrary to 
market practice. Therefore, termination provisions generally guide market participants to wait for a few 
business days to assess the actual implications of an event that affects trading. John Berry, ‘ISDA Sets 
New Standard for Derivatives’ (2003) 22 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 19, 20–21; Chapter 4, n 21. 
39 Harding (n 12) 168, 506–07, 539–40.
40 Berry (n 38) 19.
41 Hudson (n 25) para 2–96. 
42 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards’ July 1988, Basel, 13–14, 25, <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019 
(emphasis added).
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dealers in the market according to which the non-defaulting party determines the 
final close-out amount.43 The adoption and approval of close-out netting by the 
Basel Committee allowed market participants to substantially reduce the capital 
requirements for their OTC derivatives trading. ISDA continued to facilitate and 
lobby for the recognition of close-out netting.44 
Contractual standardization facilitated, if not created, market practices that 
allowed for the reduction of legal risks. Importantly, ISDA standardized two 
alternative close-out methodologies for the termination of all transactions upon 
counterparty default. In the ISDA 1992 MA, these provisions came to be known 
as market quotation and loss which both have the same objective of producing a 
close-out payment obligation, i.e. a net amount payable by one party to the other, 
but with different methodology that would each bring a different result. 
To summarise in a manner that cuts away the important nuances but serves 
here as an illustration, market quotation means that the non-defaulting party selects 
and requests a quotation, a price, for the terminated transactions from four dealer 
institutions ‘of the highest credit standing’ and based on these quotations, the non-
defaulting party defines a replacement cost for the terminated transactions. The 
replacement cost needs to be ‘reasonable’. The benefit of this approach is that the 
calculation of the settlement amount is transparent, as the amount is the arithmetic 
mean of those quotations.45 The problem of this method, however, becomes 
apparent when market conditions are volatile at the time of the quotation request. 
Termination upon event of default is an extreme measure and rare occurrence that 
market participants generally seek to avoid. The bankruptcy of a financial institution 
always has systemic repercussions meaning that the market becomes illiquid and 
when that occurs, the quotes received can be widely divergent. In addition, as the 
dealer market is concentrated around relatively few financial institutions, market 
quotation gave rise to privacy issues as the request for a quote could mean the 
disclosure of sensitive pricing information to a competitor.46 The weaknesses of 
the market quotation became apparent also in a market turmoil at the end of the 
1990s. At that time, many counterparties defaulted on their obligations and equally 
many non-defaulting market participants requested quotations at the same time 
43 Robert H Litzenberger ‘Swaps: Plain and Fanciful’ (1992) 47 The Journal of Finance 831, 838, Appendix 
A. 
44 Tony Shea, ‘The Basel Committee Consultative Papers on netting’ (1993) 8 J.I.B.L. 314, 316.
45 Guylaine Charles, ‘The ISDA Master Agreement – Part II: Negotiated Provisions’ May–June 2012, Pract. 
Compliance & Risk Mgmt. for the Sec. Indus., 33, 33–34; Harding (n 12) 136–37. 
46 Harding (n 12) 88. For a report concerning the unauthorized and concealed futures and options trading 
that led to the bankruptcy of Barings plc, The Board of Banking Supervision and the Bank of England, 
‘Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings’ 
(18 July 1995) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-into-the-collapse-of-barings-bank> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
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in a volatile and illiquid market. These experiences were one driver for market 
participants to seek new ways of calculating the close-out amount.47
The loss method was introduced as a fall-back measure to market quotation to 
be used in situations where the non-defaulting party had a reason to believe that 
the latter would not produce a reasonable result. Under the loss method, the non-
defaulting party determines, acting reasonably and in good faith, its total losses 
in connection with the master agreement and terminated transactions instead of 
determining it through quotations from dealers the intention of which is to produce 
a replacement cost for the terminated transactions.48 Both market quotation and loss 
were created by market participants. While they might have been market practice 
of the OTC derivatives market, this did not mean that courts would deem them as 
such or render themselves as the rubber-stampers of lex mercatoria. The courts 
made their own independent evaluation of these terms and conditions to which 
the market participants were bound to conform. For example, in the English court 
praxis, the ratio of market quotation and loss was seen broadly as the same contrary 
to the views of at least some market participants. In short, for English courts, the 
acquisition of replacement transactions would become the benchmark for valuation 
regardless of the method chosen by the market participants in their respective ISDA 
Master Agreements.49 
This interaction between the modern lex mercatoria and state courts is quite 
visible to date. The loss method has been criticized over its subjectivity and opacity 
generally, as it leaves a wide discretion to the non-defaulting party to define its losses, 
but on the other hand, at least in specific cases it still serves a purpose. The loss 
method may be the most suitable in illiquid and bespoke derivatives transactions 
as was more recently established by the High Court in Fondazione Enasarco v 
Lehman Brothers Finance. 50 Fondazione involved an Italian pension fund that 
had ISDA MA 1992 in place with Lehman Bros Finance SA. Following the collapse 
of the latter in 2008, the pension fund had, as the non-defaulting party, calculated 
its loss by making a new similar transaction with another financial institution 
without obtaining quotations from dealers as stipulated under the market quotation 
method. The High Court rejected the claim of the Lehman bankruptcy estate which 
had argued that the replacement transaction was different from the terminated 
transaction. The Italian pension fund had acted ‘reasonably’ in accordance with the 
provisions of the ISDA MA. Especially for more complex products, it may be difficult 
to obtain any quotes that would produce a reasonable result from other dealers. 
47 Charles (n 45) 33–34; Berry (n 38) 19.
48 Harding (n 12) 88–89.
49 Hudson (n 25) paras 3–100–117; Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd v Robinson [2000] C.L.C. 1328; Australia; 
New Zealand Banking Group v Société Générale [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 682 CA.
50 Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch). 
167
The High Court reaffirmed the established principles set in English jurisprudence 
that when the loss method is applied, the close-out amount must be determined 
reasonably, i.e. ‘the non-defaulting party must not arrive at a determination which 
no reasonable non-defaulting party could come to’,51 and this is what the Italian 
pension fund had done when it had made a new transaction from another dealer 
and used the price of this transaction in the close-out calculation.
Termination of all outstanding contracts upon insolvency was the solution that 
market participants deemed most appropriate and effective. Through negotiations 
between dealers and end-users, it was ISDA that introduced two methods and a 
process as to how to arrive to a single net amount. The methods were by no means 
flawless in that it would prevent legal disputes over the process from occurring. 
In fact, the interpretation of the ISDA 1992 MA close-out methods has been and 
continues to be subject to constant litigation because the ISDA MA 1992 is still 
widely used in the market.52 
In addition to market quotation and loss methods used in the ISDA MA 1992, 
there was a market demand for a new standardized method for calculation of 
settlement amount upon termination. In the ISDA MA 2002, the close-out amount 
definition and method replaced the market quotation and loss used in ISDA 
MA 1992.53 As an example of the interaction between lex mercatoria of the OTC 
derivatives market and court praxis, it was the language used by an English court in 
the Peregrine case54 that the drafters of the ISDA MA 2002 used in the formulation 
of the provision concerning the calculation of the replacement cost of terminated 
transactions. Following the language of the Peregrine, the replacement value was 
now to be performed in good faith ‘using commercially reasonable procedures’ in 
order to produce a commercially reasonable result under the close-out amount.55 
Like in the market quotation method, close-out amount also involves the 
calculation of how much it would cost for the non-defaulting party to replace or 
provide the economic equivalent of the terms of the terminated transactions. One 
important difference between the two, however, was that the close-out amount 
provision was more nuanced than the market quotation method in the recognition 
of how the payments and deliveries under each transaction should be valuated. 
The close-out amount included a non-exhaustive list of what information the non-
defaulting party may take into consideration when determining a close-out amount. 
As the list was non-exhaustive, it offered the non-defaulting party a wider discretion 
regarding the valuation of the terminated transactions as long as it was acting in 
51 Daniel Harris, ‘Valuation of closed-out swaps: a dirty business’ (2015) 6 J.B.L. 437. 
52 For case-law, ibid n 799. 
53 Harding (n 12) 167–68, 200. 
54 Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd v Robinson [2000] C.L.C. 1328.
55 Hudson (n 25) para 3–101, para 3–118.
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good faith, used commercial reasonable procedures, and the result was commercially 
reasonable.56 By this time, ISDA MA architecture had become highly nuanced and 
its use required significant expertise from its users. The architecture was becoming 
increasingly more complex despite the standardization of the terms and conditions, 
or perhaps because of it.57 Dealers were in the position to require end-users to use 
the ISDA MA if they wished to enter into derivatives transactions with them.58 
At least in some aspects, the private regulatory mechanisms under the ISDA MA 
architecture can contribute to moral hazard by allowing the non-defaulting party 
to have much control over a risk, the realization of which is borne by the defaulting 
counterparty.59
5.2.6 OTHER MASTER AGREEMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES TRADING
The demand for contractual standardization was by no means limited only to the 
US and the UK as there was also demand for local-language, local-law master 
derivatives agreements for domestic transactions elsewhere.60 A similar effort 
to that of ISDA was made in France in the 1980s and 1990s when two working 
groups, the Association des Trésoriers de Banque and the Association Française des 
Banques (AFB), commenced standardization projects similar to those of ISDA and 
BBAIRS. In 1987, the AFB published its ‘Conditions Générales pour les Opérations 
d’Exchange de Devises et/ou de Conditions d’Intérêts’ (Conditions Générales), a 
set of general principles for trading in swaps. The purpose of Conditions Générales 
could be described ‘as a soft normalization of vocabulary and practice of swap 
agreements’ and their recognition under law as usage. 61 
56 Berry (n 38) 20; Hudson (n 25) paras 3–128–129. 
57 Rodrigo Zepeda, ‘The ISDA Master Agreement 2012: a missed opportunity?’ (2013) 28 J.I.B.L.R. 308, 
318–20, noting that market participants as well as experienced courts ‘often floundered with the correct 
interpretation of Master Agreement provisions’ 318. 
58 For example, a lender bank could require the borrower to use the ISDA MA when the loan facility has 
a separate but an interlinked derivative component, Christian A Johnson, ‘At the Intersection of Bank 
Finance and Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?’ (1998–1999), 1, 40.
59 Carl Baker, ‘Rethinking the ISDA flawed asset’ (2012) 27(6) J.I.B.L.R. 250. 
60 Schuyler K Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (2nd edition, LexisNexis 2010) para 16.8. 
61 Pierre-Yves Chabert, ‘Trials and tribulations: the legal characterization of swap transactions’ (1989) 1 
I.B.L.J. 19, 36–39, also discussing the contractual aspects, regulatory treatment and taxation of swaps 
under French law and noting, 20: 
 [s]waps have been created by practitioners and bankers, as opposed to most of the other financial 
instruments in France which have been created by the Parliament or the Treasury within a pre-
determined legal framework. It is therefore necessary to define posteriori the legal characteristics of the 
contract (emphasis added); 
 Martin Gdanski, ‘French interest rate and currency swaps’ (1988) 7 In’tl Fin. L. Rev. 23, describing the 
Conditions Générales as a master agreement structure where the Conditions Générales are incorporated 
into individual transactions.
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The drafters of ‘Conditions Générales’ had taken inspiration from the Code 
and BBAIRS and it also included direct cross-references to the same. Importantly, 
also in France, contractual standardization was a step towards its customary usage 
globally. The use of multilateral clearing was also envisioned at that time. From 
the French perspective, contractual standardization was a tool to create and uphold 
private trade practices, not to replace legislators and public officials.62 Fédération 
Bancaire Française published yet another model agreement for domestic derivatives 
transactions. Another standardized model contract is the Euromaster, first issued by 
the European Banking Federation in 1999 with the option of using any European 
law as the governing law. In comparison, neither of them reached any such level 
of international recognition as the ISDA MA.63 Likewise in Germany, the Federal 
Association of German Banks introduced its own master agreement governed by 
German law in 1990, which was updated in 1993. This master agreement was also 
built on the same idea of a single agreement structure like the ISDA MA. The 
similarities in its architecture with the ISDA MA, reduction of legal risks relating to 
cherry picking and automatic stay, and automatic early termination upon insolvency, 
served the same purpose of enhancing legal certainty under the laws of Germany.64 
Essentially, the legal questions and legal risks of OTC derivatives trading revolved 
around similar, if not identical issues, not only in many states like the US, England, 
France, and Germany, but also in public institutions.
A master agreement structure formed the contractual bedrock of the eurozone 
project following the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998. 
The drafters of other master agreements, such as the AFB, had followed ISDA MA 
architecture closely, which was already by far the most used master agreement in the 
cross-border OTC derivatives market. Once the competence to define and implement 
monetary policy had been moved from Member States participating in the euro 
currency project to the ECB, the Governing Council of the ECB decided that ECB 
should make use of the existing master agreements to govern the foreign currency 
reserve assets of the ECB. Depending on the counterparty and its location or place 
of incorporation, the ECB was to use the AFB for counterparties located in France; 
a master agreement known as ‘Rahmenvertrag für echte Finanztermingeschäfte’ for 
counterparties located in Germany; ISDA MA 1992 (Multicurrency – cross-border, 
English law version) for counterparties located outside France and Germany and 
62 Chabert (n 61) 1 I.B.L.J. 19, 36; Gdanski (n 61) 23.
63 P Durand-Barthez, ‘The “governing law” clause: legal and economic consequences of the choice of law in 
international contracts’ (2012) 5 I.B.L.J. 505. 
64 Rainer Magold, Gillian Hogarth, ‘The 1993 German master agreement for financial futures transactions’ 
(1994) 9(2) J.I.B.L 64; Simon J Leifer, ‘Legal issues relating to the ISDA Master Agreement from the 
European and US Perspectives’ in Harding (n 21) 402.
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not incorporated in the United States; and ISDA MA (New York law version) for 
those counterparties incorporated in the US.65 
The standard-form master agreements required some modifications to make 
them suitable for the ECB regarding its legal status as a central bank.66 For example, 
certain provisions relating to bankruptcy were amended as the ECB could not be 
declared bankrupt.67 The cross-default clauses were also amended and widened in 
their scope.68 From a contractual standardization perspective, the most ambitious 
goal of the ECB was to create a ‘master-master’ netting agreement that would 
differ from the existing master agreements in two ways. First, this master netting 
agreement would serve as a master agreement of a master agreement that would 
allow cross-product netting between OTC derivatives and other financial instruments. 
For example, this would allow the ECB to terminate different master agreements 
for OTC derivatives products, governed by a derivatives master agreement such as 
ISDA MA, and repurchase transactions, governed by repurchase agreement such 
as the GMRA, upon counterparty default. Second, the aim of the ‘master-master’ 
structure was designed to be valid under different jurisdictions.69 
5.3 TRANSNATIONAL EVOLUTION OF BILATERAL  
CLOSE-OUT NETTING
Market participants had to invent close-out netting in order not to be ‘stuck’ with 
transactions if a counterparty would go insolvent. To repeat, the legal risk laid in 
automatic stay and cherry-picking that could arise from national insolvency laws. To 
examine the evolution of close-out netting, it is necessary to differentiate between 
different types of netting, the most common of which are payment netting (also 
referred to as settlement netting), novation netting, and close-out netting. Netting 
can occur between two counterparties (bilateral netting70) or between more than two 
65 Article 3, subsection 4, and Annex 3, Guideline of the European Central Bank of 3 February 2000 on the 
management of the foreign reserve assets of the European Central Bank by the national central banks 
and the legal documentation for operation involving the foreign reserve assets of the European Central 
Bank (ECB/2000/1), repealed; Guideline of the European Central Bank of 16 November 2001 amending 
Guideline ECB/2000/1 on the management of the foreign reserve assets of the European Central Bank by 
the national central banks and the legal documentation for operations involving the foreign reserve assets 
of the European Central Bank (ECB/2001/12) [2001] O.J. L310/31, repealed. 
66 Chryssa Papathanassiou, ‘The legal documentation for the reserve asset management of the European 
Central Bank: the schedules to the GMRA and to the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, and the Master 
Netting Agreement’ (2002) 4 J.I.F.M. 85.
67 Annex 1 subsection 5, ECB/2000/1 (n 65).
68 Annex 2a, subsection 4, ECB/2000/1 (n 65).
69 Papathanassiou (n 66) 85, 90–91; Simon J Leifer, ‘Legal issues relating to the ISDA Master Agreement 
from the European and US Perspectives’ in Harding (n 12) 410–11.
70 The European Central Bank defines bilateral netting as ‘an arrangement whereby two 
parties net their bilateral Obligations’, ‘Glossary of terms related to payment, clearing and 
settlement systems’ December 2009, 2 < https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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parties (multilateral netting71). It refers generally to a process by which parties can 
reduce their credit exposure and credit risk towards one other by paying net amounts 
instead of gross amounts. This is generally deemed cheaper and less risky than gross 
transfers which is why the legal recognition of netting arrangements is favoured as 
a public policy.72 Payment netting, novation netting, and close-out netting each 
serve a different purpose and in the context of early OTC derivatives trading, it 
became apparent that payment netting and novation netting were problematic if the 
other counterparty faced insolvency.73 One of the most important, if not the most 
important, of the legal risks identified by market participants was the ability to net 
their payments against an insolvency estate, or similar mandatory and collective 
liquidation of an insolvent counterparty.74 
Payment netting was already recognized as a common law doctrine, and likely in 
every legal system, of set-off. Simply put, payment netting means that counterparties 
who have payment obligations against each other, accrued claims on debts, due 
on the same date and in the same currency off-set their respective gross amounts 
and the other party who owes more pays a net amount to the other. It is a method 
of reducing the operational burden of sending many settlement messages instead 
of one. It also reduces credit risk, and settlement risk, as there are fewer transfers 
than there would be in a gross settlement, and it allows for the calculation of 
margin.75 However, it was unclear whether the non-defaulting party could benefit 
from payment netting also in insolvency of its counterparty. For example, payment 
netting that would become applicable upon counterparty insolvency, i.e. it would 
constitute an ipso facto clause, could be viewed by the bankruptcy administrator as 
preferential treatment of one unsecured creditor at the expense of other unsecured 
creditors.76 
The complexity surrounding common law anti-deprivation rule and pari passu 
rule was one central source of legal risk. Market participants wished to include 
ipso facto clauses to their derivatives contracts that would allow the non-defaulting 
party to terminate the OTC transactions upon the insolvency of the counterparty. 
The risk of tying payment netting also to insolvency situations was that ipso facto 
clauses can be unenforceable under national insolvency laws that often contain 
71 ibid 18, ‘multilateral netting: an arrangement among three or more parties for the netting of obligations 
and the settling of multilateral net settlement positions’.
72 Hudson (n 59) para 13–31. 
73 For insolvency set-off in different jurisdictions and summary of insolvency set-off and netting availability 
worldwide, Philip R Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) 
402–14, noting that the ‘[l]aw of set-off is of paramount importance in international financial affairs 
almost as important as the law of security interests’ 408.
74 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Credit Risk and Swap Exposure’ in Boris Antl, Swap Financing Techniques 
(Euromoney Publications Ltd 1983).
75 Tony Shea, ‘The Usefulness of netting agreements’ (1991) 6 J.I.B.L. 132. 
76 Henderson (n 60) para 11.3. 
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anti-deprivation rules. Anti-deprivation essentially means that an unsecured 
creditor may not withdraw or remove, through contractually or otherwise, assets 
from an insolvency estate to the detriment of other unsecured creditors who have 
the equal right to payment, ‘pari passu’, to the same assets in proportion to their 
claim and creditor rank, ‘pro rata’.77 This is still a common approach. According 
to the Unidroit Principles, a soft-law instrument, an ipso facto clause should not 
conflict with equal treatment of creditors and it should not be used to avoid the 
effects of local insolvency laws.78
Novation netting means essentially that on the payment date, both payment 
obligations are discharged and replaced by a new single legal obligation on one party 
to pay the net balance to the other. Unlike in payment netting, novation netting 
of reciprocal obligations creates a legal obligation to perform a single payment to 
a counterparty. The Basel Committee made an early attempt to define netting by 
novation: 
[B]ilateral contract between two counterparties under which any 
obligation to each other to deliver a given currency on a given date is 
automatically amalgamated with all other obligations for the same 
currency and value date, legally substituting one single net amount for 
the previous gross obligations.79 
While this definition serves the purpose of creating a single net amount, it was not 
adequate for bilateral OTC derivatives trading. First, novation netting would still 
require payments to be made on the same date and in the same currency, as in 
payment netting. This would go against the idea of cross-currency swaps, however, 
a common type of derivative structure in which the reciprocal payment obligations 
are not in the same currency.80 In addition, novation under English law and New 
York law is a three-party transaction, not bilateral. In novation, a third-party takes 
the place of the replacing party, becomes directly liable towards the remaining party 
and obtains all rights of the replaced party.81 
77 Although seemingly simple concepts, the anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu rule and their 
interpretation has been one of the central questions in insolvency situations since the 18th century to 
recent years. P Niven, ‘The Anti-Deprivation Rule and the Pari Passu Rule in Insolvency’ (2017) 25 Insolv 
LJ 5, 6. 
78 Principle 7(1)(c), Principle 7(1)(d) <https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/netting/netting–
principles2013-e.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2019.
79 For an early regulatory assessment, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’ July 1988, Basel, 26, n 6, <https://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs04a.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
80 Shea (n 75) 314.
81 Henderson (n 60) para 11.3.
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Novation netting would work in a multilateral trading, like in exchanges that 
clear trades centrally, where there are three-parties. In multilateral trading, novation 
would protect against the legal risk that insolvency laws would allow the liquidator 
of the insolvent counterparty to terminate those contracts favourable to the non-
insolvent (‘in-the-money’ contracts) party and continue those contracts favourable 
to the insolvency estate (ie those under which the bankrupt party was ‘in-the-
money’). From a contractual point of view, the risk was that instead of treating the 
terminated transactions as a single payment obligation achieved through novation, 
each individual transaction would constitute an individual agreement that the 
bankruptcy administrator might ‘cherry-pick’.82 
Consider that the parties had entered into a fixed-to-float interest rate 
swap under which Party A pays to Party B a fixed 5 per cent and Party 
B a floating rate to Party A. From the perspective of Party A and Party 
B, there is one transaction under a single agreement structure, but 
upon bankruptcy, from the perspective of national insolvency law, the 
transaction could be recharacterized as two separate agreements. If 
Party B is bankrupt, the liquidator could require Party A to pay the 5 
per cent fixed amount to the bankruptcy estate of Party B whereas the 
liquidator could limit the payable floating rate amount (or even outright 
terminate) of Party B to pay the floating rate to Party A given that the 
liquidator is not supposed to make payments out of the bankruptcy 
estate as this reduce the amount available to other unsecured 
creditors.83
These inadequacies in novation netting would give rise to and the demand for 
mechanics of close-out netting, a legally enforceable ipso facto clause for bilateral 
OTC derivatives transactions. Unlike payment and novation netting, close-out netting 
concerns obligations relating to future events rather than past obligations. Payment 
netting might allow netting for specific currencies on a specific date for existing 
delivery obligations, but OTC derivatives transactions consist of future delivery 
obligations. Essentially, the idea was to innovate a mechanism that would allow the 
82 Cunningham (n 7) 32. Kerr, 21. In the landmark English bankruptcy case on payment netting and 
novation netting British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd. v. Campagnie Nationale Air France, 1975 
1W.L.R. 758, the House of Lords ruled that certain contractual netting arrangements leave certain 
transactions identifiable and therefore severable, and deemed that the pari passu had been violated and 
that this principle could not be ‘contracted out’ of’ with ipso facto clauses. Following this ruling, market 
participants further developed the idea of close-out netting to reduce this legal risk. Edward Murray, 
‘Derivative Transactions’ in Sarah Paterson, Rafal Zakrzewski (eds), McKnight, Paterson and Zakrzewski 
on the Law of International Finance (2nd edition, OUP 2017) 684–87.
83 Example taken from Mark J Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 539, 570–71. 
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creation of one single net amount, the calculation of which would extend to cover 
all types of derivatives transactions entered into by the counterparties regardless 
of their form, maturity, and currency, and the future obligations thereunder.84 
In close-out netting, the termination of all outstanding obligations upon 
insolvency would be achieved contractually by acceleration, i.e. by rendering all 
the transactions immediately payable, calculating the termination amount, and 
contractual termination of all derivatives contracts between the counterparties. 
Ideally, if a counterparty is placed into insolvency, the non-insolvent party could 
use close-out to avoid the risk of cherry picking or automatic stay and replace these 
terminated transactions with new transactions. Premature termination of a swap 
gave rise to complex payment and valuation calculations from early on.85 Further, 
in addition to the risk of cherry picking, national bankruptcy laws generally contain 
provisions for automatic stay upon the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. 
Automatic stay is effectively an injunction on the creditors of a bankruptcy estate not 
to exercise any of its contractual rights and remedies, including ipso facto clauses86 
To identify and possibly reduce such legal risks, the most rational measure for market 
participants was to obtain a legal opinion from a local legal expert and ask whether 
the local insolvency laws recognized close-out netting and the legal recognition of 
possible collateral the market participants might have put in place.87 
Tthe ISDA MA sets the terms and conditions that regulate the procedure for 
bilateral close-out netting and the predetermined events that allow for the non-
defaulting counterparty to exercise this right. These events are referred to as Event 
of Default upon which the other party may initiate the close-out netting procedure. 
In simplified terms, the latter consists of: (i) acceleration of payment and delivery 
obligations from the contractually agreed maturity of all of the transactions entered 
into under the ISDA MA; (ii) the valuation of each transaction (and their potential 
conversion to monetary equivalents to certain currency) by the non-defaulting party; 
and (iii) the aggregation to result in an overall net amount, i.e. determination of a 
single payment obligation through novation.88 The amount of the remaining single 
payment obligation may be payable by either the non-defaulting or the defaulting 
party, depending on which party is ‘in-the-money’ or ‘out-of-the-money’. Close-out 
netting does not only affect the position of the bilateral counterparties, but also 
84 Shea (n 75) 314; Francesco C Nassetti, ‘Basic elements in the maze of netting’ (1995) J.I.B.L. 10(4) 145; 
For an analysis of the legal risk arising from the interpretation of ‘executory contracts’ and for related 
case law, Edward J Nalbantian, Peter S Smedresman, Tessa Hoser, ‘Netting and Derivatives – A Practical 
Guide’ (1993) 12 Int’l Fin. L. Rev, 38, 40; Henderson (n 12) 378–80.
85 James A Watkins, ‘Legal Issues in Currency Swaps’ (1982) 1 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 26, 30. 
86 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Credit Risk and Swap Exposure’ in [Antl (n 74) 117. 
87 Nina Hval, ‘Credit Risk Reduction in the International Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: 
Collateralizing the Net Exposure with Support Agreements’ (1997) 31 Int’l L. 801, 819–20. 
88 Marcel Peeters, ‘On Close-out Netting’ 3.10 in Thomas Keijser (ed), Transnational Securities Law (OUP 
2014); UNCITRAL, The Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions (2013) 32–33. 
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other creditors of the defaulting counterparty. A simplified example of close-out 
netting and its effect on other creditors can be drawn from an article by Mark J Roe: 
If the counterparty owes the bankrupt $100 million on one contract 
and is owed $100 million on another, the typical result, without netting, 
is that it must write a check to the bankrupt for $100 million, but it 
receives only a fractional return from the insolvent bankrupt. If the 
return to the bankrupt’s creditors is only ten cents on the dollar, a no-
netting scenario yields the counterparty a $90 million loss. Netting gets 
it that extra $90 million.89 
5.4 THE LEGAL RISK OF NATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAWS
Legal uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of a close-out netting provision 
would depend on whether the national insolvency laws are liquidation-oriented, 
generally favouring the termination of obligations and the distribution of an insolvent 
party’s assets, or reorganization-oriented which seeks to make insolvent party again 
a viable business through reorganization.90 The recognition of close-out netting 
as a contractual right under English law derives from Rule 4.90 of the Insolvency 
Rules 1986, which stated: 
(1) This Rule applies where, before the company goes into liquidation 
there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings 
between the company and any creditor of the company proving or 
claiming to prove for a debt in the liquidation. 
(2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other 
in respect of the mutual dealings, and the sums due from one party 
shall be set off against the sums due from the other. […] (emphasis 
added)
In other words, although not without legal risks as to the valuation of the terminated 
transactions, Rule 4.90 recognized the idea of a single payment amount in insolvency 
situations and thus English law was receptive towards the use of ipso facto clauses.91 
89 Mark J Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’ (2011) 63 
Stanford Law Review 539, 570.
90 See the example in subchapter 4.2.
91 Shea (n 75) 133–34.
176
Transnational Contract: the ISDA Master Agreement 
In contrast, in many civil law countries and also in the US, the recognition of 
contractual close-out netting arrangements upon insolvency required separate 
legislative acts.92 Their respective bankruptcy laws may reflect a tendency towards 
reorganization rather than liquidation, which in turn reflects to the unenforceability 
of ipso facto clauses upon counterparty bankruptcy. If such a right to terminate upon 
counterparty insolvency applies, the non-defaulting counterparty cannot perform 
close-out netting, or this right can at least be put on hold, stayed, by the bankruptcy 
administrator.93
In the US, this recognition required amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and 
especially to its Chapter 11, the aim of which is to allow for the rehabilitation of a 
company through reorganization, not its liquidation. The Bankruptcy Code includes 
an automatic stay provision which prevents the non-defaulting party from exercizing 
its contractual right to set-off.94 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code95 in turn 
could render ipso facto clauses unenforceable as well as potentially to allow the 
bankruptcy trustee to ‘cherry pick’ between contracts if the bankruptcy trustee 
would first be able to characterize the derivative contracts as ‘executory contracts’. 
The legal character of an executory contract means that both parties have reciprocal 
obligations which both parties can either accept or reject. OTC derivatives generally 
include such reciprocal obligations since depending on market movements, each 
party to a transaction can be ‘in-the-money’ or ‘out-of-money’. If the OTC derivative 
transaction would be executory regarding its legal form, this could be problematic 
from the non-defaulting party’s perspective since it could leave the non-defaulting 
party with the obligation to perform its obligations to a bankruptcy estate on those 
transactions beneficial for the latter and unbeneficial for itself. On the other side of 
the argument, the collective interest of all the creditors should be maintained without 
exempting one type of unsecured creditor from the full application of insolvency 
laws, including mandatory stay and the right to maintain those contracts in force 
that are beneficial for this collective.96 
92 For a civil law analysis of a legal risk in the form of cherry picking, Bob Wessels, ‘Close-out netting in the 
Netherlands’ (1997) 12(5) J.I.B.L. 187, 189–91, noting that under certain circumstances, while the Dutch 
bankruptcy act generally could recognize close-out netting, some transfers might be recharacterized as 
fraudulent preference and thus be rendered unenforceable under Dutch law.
93 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
Volume 3 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 2016) 309–312.
94 11 U.S. Code § 362 - Automatic stay,
 (a) […] a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title […] operates as a stay, applicable to all 
entities, of— 
 (7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this 
title against any claim against the debtor. 
95 1 U.S. Code § 365 - Executory contracts and unexpired leases […] [t]he trustee, subject to the court’s 
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract […].
96 Christoph Henkel, ‘Harmonizing European Union Bank Resolution: Central Clearing of OTC Derivative 
Contracts Maintaining the Status Quo of Safe Harbors’ (2013) 22 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 81, 89–
95.
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According to many legal risk analyses, the recharacterization of OTC derivative 
transactions was a possible or even a likely scenario in light of not only the 
Bankruptcy Code but also the then existing US case law.97 A ‘safe-harbor’ regime 
for bilateral OTC derivatives transactions, i.e. exemptions to the automatic stay and 
legal enforceability of close-out netting provisions, was enacted in 1990.98 ISDA 
‘actively participated in the enactment of the 1990 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code’.99 The appropriateness and even the legitimacy of these safe-harbours remain 
contested. The arguments against close-out netting are dicussed in subchapter 5.7.
5.5 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
The introduction of new products as well as the development of early master 
agreement structures did not go unnoticed by the Federal Reserve System and the 
Bank of England. In 1987, they announced a joint proposal for the calculation of 
risk weighting of certain specific types of swaps, as well as for an unspecified set of 
swaps.100 It was the potential non-enforceability of ipso facto clauses that gave rise 
to legal uncertainty, especially under the Bankruptcy Code of the US. In addition, 
capital adequacy regulations, under which financial institutions are required to 
hold a certain set amount of own funds to meet their obligations to their creditors, 
did not recognise close-out netting as a credit risk reduction mechanism. For this 
reason, the risk weighting of swaps was high. This required financial institutions to 
97 Adam R Waldman, ‘OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss’ 
(1994) 43 Am. U.L. Rev. 1023, 1062–68, noting that automatic stay and the definition of ‘executory 
contracts’ gave rise to legal uncertainty; Nalbantian and others (n 84) 40; Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Swap 
Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis’ (1988) 44 Bus. Law. 365, 378–80, summarising that if a 
contract is deemed to be an ‘executory contract’, it can be subject to cherry-picking by the bankruptcy 
administration or debtor in possession; Cunningham (n 7) 28. 
98 Public law 101-311–June 25, 1990 104 Stat. 267, § 1, Sec. 103, limitation on avoiding powers. 
 (g) […] the trustee may not avoid a transfer under a swap agreement, made by or to a swap participant, in 
connection with a swap agreement and that is made before the commencement of the case […];
 § 560. Contractual right to terminate a swap agreement 
 The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant to cause the termination of a swap agreement 
because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title or to offset or net out any 
termination values or payment amounts arising under or in connection with any swap agreement shall 
not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a 
court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title. […]; Lynn (n 34) 291, 332–33, 334–35; 
Nalbantian and others (n 84) 40.
99 Memorandum of Law of International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. Securities Industry 
Association, and the Bond Market Association, March 17, 2004, 4, as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Dismissal of Adversary Proceedings, in re Enron Corp. (Plaintiff) v. Lehman Brothers Finance S.A., et al., 
(Defendants), Case No. 01–16034 (AJG), Adv. No. 03–93383 (Amicus Curiae) <https://www.isda.org/a/
ftiDE/exhibit-amicus-brief.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
100 Federal Register / Vol. 52, No. 56 / 3–24, 1987, 9304.
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hold regulatory equity capital calculated on a gross basis for swaps, which reflect 
the actual net risk of these products.101 
Regulators did recognise novation netting, however, given that novation netting 
was about calculating past rather than future obligations, it was of limited use to 
market participants in the OTC derivatives market. In this market, the calculation 
was about future obligations and their valuation.102 Absent regulatory recognition 
of close-out netting, swaps would cost more than they would otherwise cost, and 
the banks would pass these additional costs on to clients.103 
Public officials saw the recognition of close-out netting also as a competitiveness 
issue in the domestic banking industry in the US and England generally, and 
especially for larger financial institutions already engaging in large-scale derivatives 
trading. One solution was to make the ‘large, sophisticated banking organizations’ 
subject to more intrusive regulations, since they had the financial means and 
capability to comply with more complex regulatory requirements.104 The Federal 
Reserve System and the Bank of England concluded that the industry efforts to 
create a single agreement structure under which multiple types of derivatives with 
the same counterparty could be consolidated, would be a welcome development. 
However, the financial industry had to meet two requirements to obtain regulatory 
recognition.105 
The US regulatory authorities and the Bank of England recognize that such 
arrangements [single master agreement and aggregation of transactions] 
may in certain circumstances reduce credit risk and wish to encourage their 
further development and implementation. If market participants were 
to develop such standardized master agreements with general, market-
wide application, and if there were unambiguous legal opinions that such 
agreements reduce credit risk and would be recognized by the relevant 
judicial authorities, the proposal might be modified to treat multiple 
contracts with a single counterparty that were created within the terms of 
such a master agreement as a single net contract.106
101 William D Kerr, ‘UK/US Proposal on Swap Capital Requirements’ (1987) 6 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 19, 20–21.
102 Dermot Turing, ‘Set-off and netting: developments in 1993 affecting banks’ (1994) 9(4) J.I.B.L 138, 139.
103 Kerr (n 101) 22–23. The calculation of the capital cost would to a large degree depend on financial 
benchmarking and the so-called mark-to-market valuation that determines, among other issues, the 
exposure of a counterparty towards its counterparty on a certain date.
104 Federal Register (1987) 9307–08 discussing de minimis rules for certain market participants. 
105 ibid. By 1989, ISDA ‘now composed of more than 100 major financial institutions’, Henderson (n 12) 373.
106 Federal Register (1987) 9312 (c).
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From the industry perspective, the first requirement was not seen as problematic 
given that at least ISDA had recently standardized and published a contract 
type that should meet this requirement.107 As to the second requirement of 
obtaining unambiguous legal opinions, the situation was more challenging since 
the enforceability of the netting provisions of the master agreement would often 
depend on the bankruptcy laws applicable to the counterparty and the laws of 
many jurisdictions. From the perspective of market participants, especially the 1978 
US Bankruptcy Code was unclear in this respect. Given that the OTC derivatives 
market was growing rapidly, the recognition of contractual netting clauses was 
also becoming a public policy concern.108 The prevention of cherry picking, and the 
enforceability of ipso facto clauses and other legal risks turned from a legal risk 
into a public policy issue from a regulatory perspective. Both transnational financial 
institutions and regulators now shared a common objective.
In order for market participants be able to report their derivatives transactions 
on a net rather than gross basis to regulators, set-off arrangements had to be 
contractually in place, and the enforceability of these contractual arrangements 
had to be ascertained with third party legal opinions used then as evidence for 
regulators as to their enforceability.109 The risk that a liquidator could overturn a 
close-out clause was assumedly quite evident. Regardless of the legal risk, market 
participants included close-out netting clauses to their contracts. The effectiveness 
of close-out clauses had not been ‘tested’, i.e. no such bankruptcy case had occurred 
where the liquidator would have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code in a manner that 
would allow it to cherry pick transactions. In addition, no court had given its legal 
interpretation of such a decision by 1989. The legal opinions in this regard were 
unreliable. However, the Basel Committee did not: 
[w]ish to discourage market participants from employing clauses which 
might well afford protection in certain circumstances in some national 
jurisdictions and [the Basel Committee] would be prepared to reverse its 
conclusion [on the legal uncertainty] if subsequent decisions in the courts 
support the integrity of close-out netting agreements.110 
107 Kerr (n 101) 21. 
108 Kerr (n 101) 21. 
109 Turing (n 102) 139, noting that following a notice by the Bank of England in December 1993, market 
participants were required to obtain third party legal opinions as to the enforceability of netting 
arrangements, and also describing the legal risks arising from English law regarding the enforceability of 
close-out netting. 
110 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards’ July 1988, 27 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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The legal uncertainty arising already from the US let alone the insolvency laws of 
other nations regarding close-out netting was also reflected in the legal opinions 
to which practitioners had to leave many qualifications. For simple transactions 
involving counterparties in a single jurisdiction and who were using a master 
agreement to document their transactions could obtain legal opinions with less 
qualifications. In contrast, cross-border transactions with bespoke products would 
mean increased legal risk arising from national laws which in turn would mean that 
legal opinions were more ambiguous and thus harder for regulators to accept.111 
ISDA standardized a customized legal opinion that could be requested from and 
provided by local councils in relation to the enforceability of contractual bilateral 
netting under different national laws. However, given the legal uncertainty arising 
from national legal systems, both legislation and case law, BIS did not consider these 
opinions to satisfy the requirement set out earlier.112 Perhaps having reached the same 
conclusion as BIS, ISDA had promoted and lobbied simultaneously amendments to 
the US Bankruptcy Code, the purpose of which was to ensure the legal recognition 
of close-out netting clauses without the risk of automatic stay or cherry-picking, 
save for cases of fraud.113 The lobbying efforts of ISDA extended also to authorities 
outside the US with the intent of getting the netting arrangements recognized in 
foreign bankruptcy laws. The US Congress did include these amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1990 that were a continuation to earlier amendments made 
in 1982 and 1984.114 However, the amendments to legislation did not prevent legal 
uncertainties arising from case law. US courts might reach different conclusions 
about the content of the amended laws. 115 
It was noted early on that market participants could, with relative ease, benefit 
from the inadequacies of tax regimes unable to identify the nature of interest rate 
swaps which could be tailored to an economic and legal form that rendered tax laws 
inapplicable to such products.116 Once the OTC derivatives markets grew, so did 
the regulatory attention by international regulators such as the Basel Committee117 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, the G7 summit, 
111 Nalbantian and others (n 84) 40–41, also predicting that the recognition of close-out netting might be 
achievable, at least for the simpler type of derivatives under the national laws of the G-12. 
112 Henderson (n 12) 396–97. 
113 Henderson (n 12) 365, 397.
114 Anatoli Kuprianov, ‘Over-the-Counter Interest Rate Derivatives’ (1993) 79(3) Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond Economic Quarterly 65, 88–89. For a detailed list of these and other US legislative 
amendments made, Amicus Curiae (n 99). 
115 Johnson (n 58) 65–76. 
116 Eugene Y Ferrer, ‘Tax Treatment of Interest Rate Swaps at Disposal: Should Swap Participants Have Their 
Cake and Eat it Too?’ (1992) 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 283. 
117 Bank for International Settlements ‘62nd Annual Report’ Basel, 15th June, 1992, 182–4, <https://www.
bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1992_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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and the Group of Thirty, only to name few.118 Existing financial regulation was also 
deemed, in many respects, inadequate from the outset in responding to the market 
development. For example, the capital adequacy rules introduced under the 1988 
Basel Accord were welcomed by market participants. The 1988 Basel Accord (Basel 
I) required no market participants to hold more capital as was seen necessary to 
cover the credit risk of simpler ‘vanilla’ products. This, however, was not the case 
in more complex or exotic derivatives that did not even exist, or became popular 
after the entry into force of Basel I. Furthermore, the process of changing the Basel 
I rules was deemed slow and overtly legalistic as the process involved at least twelve 
governments. The classification-based rules of Basel I were seen to reflect a ‘simpler, 
more static financial era’ and not the reality of the era of increasingly institutionalized 
and complex financial innovation.119 
Against the background of financial innovation and at least to some degree capital 
adequacy rules unfit to give answers as to the capital treatment of new derivatives 
products, it might not come as a surprise that capital adequacy arbitrage became a 
part of the business. The legal form outweighed the actual economic substance of 
products both under Basel I and the EC capital adequacy rules120 that were largely 
based on the former.121 Calls for more regulation in the derivatives market were 
common, but these concerns were criticized for being imprecise, and that they 
allegedly lacked a systematic and candid approach to the issue.122
As outlined by Henry TC Hu in 1989, the creation of a master agreement 
architecture would be beneficial, as such contract architecture could cover all 
transactions, often standardized, entered into by two market participants. This 
would save time and effort and the parties of the agreement could focus their 
negotiation efforts to those terms and conditions relevant for individual transactions. 
Separate, short confirmation that would include only the basic economic and legal 
terms of a given transaction could suffice in this regard.123 Hu also noted that the 
emergence of new type of financial products may be difficult to regulate if the 
underlying processes leading to their creation are unknown, as well as how legalistic 
approach with classification-based rules to financial products will aggravate this 
118 RH Weber, ‘New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the 
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy’ (2010) 63 Admin. L. Rev. 783.
119 Henry TC Hu, ‘Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory 
Paradigm’ (1989) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 393–94, 415, 435. 
120 Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio 89/647/EEC for Credit Institutions, OJ L386, 
Council Directive 93/6/EEC of March 15, 1993, [1993] O.J. L141/1.
121 Paul Goris, ‘Creative accounting and capital adequacy: the swap-loan dilemma’ (1994) 9 J.I.B.L., 150, 152, 
acknowledging the risk that, if regulated more heavily than elsewhere, market participants might relocate 
their swap transactions to other jurisdictions with a less stringent capital adequacy regime, 152–57. 
122 Drew E Macintyre, ‘Financial innovation and regulatory trepidation: swaps and the OSC’ (1995) 25 CBLJ 
163; Cunningham (n 7) 33.
123 Hu (n 119) 430–31.
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problem, and that some market participants can use this situation to their benefit 
whereas some cannot.124 In short, the issue was that the Basel Accord would lead 
to regulatory mispricing as new derivative products had to be fitted into existing 
regulatory categories that did not reflect the actual risk these products posed 125 
5.6 FROM REGULATORY RECOGNITION TO REGULATORY 
REQUIREMENT
5.6.1 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ISDA AND THE BASEL COMMITTEE
In the late 1980s, ISDAs role also extended from contractual drafting for new products 
to interactions with international organizations, namely the Basel Committee.126 
These efforts were directed especially towards the regulatory recognition of close-
out netting.127 In the EU, this came as part of the agenda in a larger regulatory 
process known as the Lamfalussy process discussed below in more detail. In 1989, 
BIS published a detailed study known as the Angell Report prepared by a group of 
experts from the central banks of the G-10 countries.128 The purpose of the study 
was to identify the possible benefits of netting arrangements, both in bilateral and 
multilateral clearing. As a word of caution, and as noted by Christian Chamorro-
Courtland, many scholars use the terms ‘clearing’ and ‘settlement’ in an inconsistent 
manner which leads to confusion and legal uncertainty.129
124 Hu (n 119) 392–94.
125 Hu notes that the challenges already identified in his 1989 article remain persistent in current financial 
regulation. Henry TC Hu, ‘Systemic Risk and Financial Innovation – Toward a “Unified” Approach’ in 
Joseph G Haubrich, Andrew W Lo (ed), Quantifying systemic risk (University of Chicago Press 2013) 
15. The regulatory ‘cubbyhole’ technique was used already in 1988 in ‘the international response to the 
systemic risks posed by the derivatives revolution’, 13. The technique involves the updating of existing 
classifications of products. A related issue is the ‘regulatory paradigm’ that includes the problem of 
‘extraordinary informational asymmetry between regulators and derivatives dealers’ meaning that the 
latter generally know more than the former of what is taking place in the market, 15.
126 Capital requirements were unbalanced as they applied to commercial banks but not to market participants 
operating outside central bank supervision echoing the early rise of shadow banking (discussed in 
subchapters 2.11.3. and 2.11.4), Gallant (n 7) 151–52; Cunningham (n 7) 33; BIS, Recent Developments 
in International Interbank Relations, Basel, October 1992, 23–25 <https://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc02.
pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; Basel Committee, Consultative proposal by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Supervisory Recognition of Netting for Capital Adequacy Purposes, April 1993 <https://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs11c.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
127 George Crawford, Bidyut Sen, Derivatives for Decision Makers: Strategic Management Issues, 129 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.1996), noting also how the ‘[u]niversal recognition of netting agreements would do 
much to reduce systemic risk in the international financial community’; Christopher L Culp, ‘Functional 
and Institutional Interaction, Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Economics of Derivatives Regulation’ 458, 
476–78, in Robert J Schwartz, Clifford W Smith (eds), Derivatives Handbook: Risk Management and 
Control (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997) noting ISDAs ‘tremendous efforts to secure the netting provisions’ 
in the relevant US legislation.
128 BIS, ‘Report on Netting Schemes’ February 1989 <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d02.pdf> accessed 1 
June 2019.
129 Christian Chamorro-Courtland, ‘Central counterparties (CCP) and the new transnational lex mercatoria’ 
(2011) 10 Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 57, 62.
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While acknowledging the benefits, the Angell Report also identified risks in that 
in some cases-netting arrangements could obscure the actual allocation of risks 
especially in cross-border settings.130 In its analysis, the Angell Report assumed that 
netting agreements are legally valid and enforceable, and concluded that if they are 
not, the ‘credit and liquidity risks can be much larger than otherwise believed’.131 
Further, the Angell Report noted that local national laws are the source of legal risk 
for contractual set-off arrangements.132 In 1990, BIS published its report, known as 
the Lamfalussy Report,133 which introduced six standards for netting schemes and 
principles for cooperative central-bank oversight of multilateral netting in clearing 
facilities. According to the Lamfalussy Report, which confirmed the view expressed 
in the Angell report, netting schemes are useful in reducing credit and liquidity 
exposures in the market, but only if they are legally enforceable, or ‘have sound legal 
basis’,134 and noted ‘the development of truly trans-national interbank settlement 
arrangements’ which technological advancement had made possible.135
Furthermore, the Lamfalussy Report recognized the necessity of a ‘properly-
prepared written netting agreement’ in securing the benefits of netting.136 In the same 
connection, the Lamfalussy Report concluded that such legal preparation will need 
to be thoroughly delivered by the market participants and netting scheme providers, 
but admits that such requirements might not be possible in all instances.137 In light 
of these findings, the Lamfalussy Report concluded that given the difficult choice-
of-law and conflict-of-law questions, netting benefits can only be achieved through 
harmonization of national laws.138 
130 BIS (n 128) 2.3–2.4, n 880.
131 BIS (n 128) 2.6, 2.7, noting also the advancement in information technology and its positive impact in 
reducing credit risk or liquidity risk, 4.5.
132 BIS (n 128) 5.9.
133 BIS, ‘Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten 
Countries’ Basel, November 1990, <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d04.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
The Lamfalussy Report was part of a larger public policy initiative known as a Lamfalussy Process that 
was to support the regulatory initiative of the EU, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), that served 
as the start for many directives and regulations aimed at creating a single market in financial services 
in Europe by 2005. Matthias Haentjens, Pierre de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial 
Law (Routledge 2015) 10–15; Nathalie Aubry, Michael McKee, ‘MiFID: where did it come from, where 
is it taking us?’ (2007) 22 J.I.B.L.R. 177; the outcome of FSAP was that ‘Significant elements of the vast 
regulatory machinery of the Financial Services Action Plan are in practice already being avoided’ 
(emphasis added); Joanna Benjamin, David Rouch, ‘The international financial markets as a source of 
global law: the privatisation of rule-making?’ (2008) 2 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 78, 79. 
134 The Lamfalussy Report (n 133) 2.23.
135 The Lamfalussy Report (n 133) 2.9.
136 The Lamfalussy Report (n 133) 2.24.
137 The Lamfalussy Report (n 133) 2.26.
138 The Lamfalussy Report (n 133) 2.27.
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5.6.2 INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON CLOSE-OUT NETTING
The financial industry sponsored and published public-policy recommendations and 
market research regarding derivatives trading. Maybe the most well-known of these 
were the reports published by an industry group known as the Group of Thirty, a 
group consisting of major dealer banks, consultancies, and law firms. The first report 
particularly relevant for the purposes of this research is titled ‘Derivatives: Practice 
and Principles’139 (the First Report), which included a set of 20 recommendations for 
the development of the derivatives industry. Of these recommendations, the First 
Report published in 1993 ‘recommends four ways that supervisors and regulators, for 
their part, can help the financial infrastructure keep up with derivatives activity’.140 
The recommendations addressed problems associated with the non-recognition of 
bilateral and multilateral netting, especially in the calculation of the capital adequacy 
of banks. The First Report noted that ‘[s]ignificant efforts have been made to develop 
standard master agreements that effect netting across the full range of derivatives 
products’ reflecting the requirement set earlier by regulators.141 
Following this development, the First Report concluded that regulators, 
national financial supervisors represented on the Basel Committee, ‘should 
recognize and implement bilateral close-out netting for capital purposes’.142 The 
First Report also addressed the issue of legal risk arising from national legislation 
in terms of enforceability of netting in bankruptcies, the overall enforceability of 
derivatives agreements, and the corporate capacity issues of different entities. 
The recommendation for regulators was to identify and prevent a situation where 
national legal systems, allegedly unable to meet the market demand for a certain type 
of legislation, would be a source of legal risks for derivatives trading and for financial 
development in general.143 Recommendation 22 urged legislators, regulators, and 
supervisors, including central banks, to ‘work in concert with dealers and end-
users to identify and remove any remaining legal and regulatory uncertainties with 
respect to’ ultra vires risk, enforceability of contracts, bilateral close-out netting, 
and collateral arrangements in bankruptcy.144 
The second report titled ‘Derivatives: Practices and Principles - Follow-up Surveys 
of Industry Practice’145 (the Second Report) was published by the Group of Thirty 
139 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19). 
140 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19) 3.
141 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19) 20.
142 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19) 20.
143 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19) 21, also referring to the English court case Hazell v Hammersmith 
and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1, 49, further analysed in this research in chapter 4.3.2.
144 Global Derivatives Study Group (n 19) 21.
145 Global Derivatives Study Group, ‘Derivatives: Practices and Principles – Follow-up Surveys of Industry 
Practice’ December 1994 (Global Derivatives Study Group 1994) < http://group30.org/images/uploads/
publications/G30_Derivatives–Surveys.pdf > accessed 1 June 2019.
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in 1994. The surveys were sent to roughly 900 firms, of which about two thirds 
were end-users and one third dealers, in the parlance of this research transnational 
financial institutions and transnational corporations, respectively.146 The Second 
Report consisted of policy recommendations for both dealer financial institutions 
as well as for end-users followed by a questionnaire relating to the same. Without 
other evidence, the Second Report casts light on the prevalence and adoption of 
master agreement structure in the OTC derivatives industry. Recommendation 13 
(Master Agreements) addressed to dealers suggested the adoption of one master 
agreement per counterparty for multiple types of derivative products which 
would allow payment netting and close-out netting.147 Of all categories of dealer 
respondents, in aggregate across all size categories, over 95 per cent responded that 
the recommendation applies to their respective business operations148 and the dealer 
market had witnessed a clear increase in the gross replacement cost documented 
under a master agreement structure over a period of 12 months.149 Interest rate and 
currency derivatives were commonly used under one master agreement, whereas 
FX forwards and options were not.150 
New product types could be attached to the existing master-agreement 
architecture through the introduction of standardized product definition booklets. 
Market participants were able to incorporate the new definitions to their existing 
master agreements by making a simple reference to an existing master agreement 
in a separately published Definitions booklet. This technique, in turn, allowed 
market participants to introduce new product categories while enjoying the 
benefits of a master agreement structure especially in relation to close-out netting 
and regulatory recognition in terms of capital adequacy requirements. Regarding 
the questions addressed towards end-users, the Second Report put forward the 
same recommendation 13 (Master Agreements) for the wide adoption of one 
master agreement with each counterparty for multiple types of derivative products 
which would allow bilateral payment netting and close-out netting.151 Of all the 
end-user categories, in aggregate, approximately 86 per cent responded that 
the recommendation applies to their respective business operations.152 The OTC 
markets became organized and managed by transnational financial institutions and 
transnational corporations. Using one particular market as an example of a wider 
146 It is worth noting that the response rate was perhaps somewhat low: 125 dealers and 149 end-users 
responded.
147 Global Derivatives Study Group 1994 (n 145) 66
148 Global Derivatives Study Group 1994 (n 145) 66, Question 13.1.
149 Global Derivatives Study Group 1944 (n 145) Question 13.6.
150 Global Derivatives Study Group 1994 (n 145) 66, Question 13.4.
151 Global Derivatives Study Group 1994 (n 145) 214.
152 Global Derivatives Study Group 1994 (n 145) 214, Question 13.1.
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phenomenon, ‘the major dealers establish the rules of the CDS market and for all 
practical purposes regulate it’.153 
Later on, close-out netting and legal enforceability of financial collateral 
arrangements became recognized also in international treaties, recommendations, 
and principles. Chapter V of the 2009 Geneva Securities Convention on substantive 
law explicitly recognizes close-out netting (Article 31), title transfer collateral 
agreements (Article 32) and the legal enforceability of these rights and arrangements 
(Article 33).154 The 2004 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the 
Guide) recognizes the importance of close-out netting in mitigating systemic risk and 
provides an example scenario in which the lack of close-out netting could result in 
a cascade of defaults and potential financial distress on a systemic scale. The Guide 
notes that there are nations with bankruptcy laws that do not recognize or limit 
close-out netting, how national bankruptcy laws can be strategically misused, and 
includes a policy recommendation not only as to its explicit recognition but also 
broad drafting of insolvency law provisions that would allow for the contractual 
automatic termination and close-out upon the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings.155 
5.6.3 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES ON CLOSE-OUT NETTING
In 2013, UNIDROIT, a public international organization that ISDA sought to lobby 
‘in order to fortify the favourable private and insolvency law treatment of close-
out netting’,156 went further in its efforts to promote the recognition of close-out 
netting through the introduction of The Principles on the Operation of Close-Out 
Netting Provisions.157 These Principles provided explanations and commentaries 
for each of the eight principles aimed at national legislators and policy-makers 
not as a binding legal instrument but as a recommendation. Interestingly, the 
Principles states that close-out netting is ‘not particularly well-defined’ and uses a 
functional understanding of the term, under which the result of a single payment 
153 Schuyler K Henderson, ‘Credit derivatives and operational risk, or why a credit default swap is not like a 
bond’ (2007) 1 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 31. 
154 Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities < https://www.unidroit.org/
instruments/capital-markets/geneva-convention> accessed 1 June 2019; the purpose of this agreement 
generally referred to as the Geneva Convention is to facilitate international trade through compatibility 
and convergence of different rules on intermediated securities, Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan 
McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edition, OUP 2015) paras 
15.18–15.43. 
155 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, United Nations, Recommendation 100, New York, 2005, 
156–58 < https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019.
156 Roy Goode and others (n 154) para 15.75
157 UNCITRAL (n 155).
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obligation is key, rather than attaching the definition to any existing legislative or 
regulatory instrument. In other words, the functional approach allows for different 
definitions and even methods under different jurisdictions and contracts as long 
as it achieves a certain result, a single payment obligation. The Principles also 
note that the understanding of the concept differs significantly as to its scope and 
legal effects in different jurisdictions. Among other risks, close-out netting could 
potentially be recharacterized as a common type of set-off under national laws.158 
Principle 7 is the most central for close-out netting, recommending that 
national laws should not allow for mandatory stay, cherry-picking, or consider it 
as preferential treatment of creditors, and promoting the recognition of contractual 
close-out provisions.159 Many scholars and policy makers about the benefits of close-
out netting but there are also considerable arguments against it which are discussed 
in Chapter 5.7. Even with the prevailing legal uncertainty in some jurisdictions,160 
close-out netting has by and large become enforceable in all EU Member States. 
Close-out netting and its recognition by policymakers in different jurisdictions 
was, and is seen as, an elemental part in reducing credit risk and systemic risk 
in financial markets. At least for such reasons, the industry representatives stress 
that any public deviation from, or intervention to, close-out netting should be used 
sparingly and crafted carefully.161 The Financial Stability Board, a transgovernmental 
organization, has introduced its own set of principles on close-out netting addressed 
specifically towards financial institution resolution. The UNIDROIT Principles are 
designed to apply to insolvencies in general and, while they are similar, there are 
other differences between them as well.162
5.6.4 CLOSE-OUT NETTING POST GFC: THE RESOLUTION STAY
One of the new regulatory powers introduced after the GFC is the right given to 
resolution authorities to impose a temporary stay on bilateral close-out netting 
when they take resolution measures against a large financial institution in financial 
trouble. Essentially, in the post GFC regulatory environment, it is financial regulation 
158 UNCITRAL (n 155) 2, 6, 19, Principle 2 Preamble. The functional approach acknowledges that close-out 
provision can be a part of a standard master documentation, of a tailor-made framework agreement, or an 
entirely separate and self-standing agreement, 21. 
159 UNCITRAL (n 155) 7; Stephanie Loizou, ‘Close-out netting and an introduction to the UNIDROIT 
principles on its enforceability’ (2012) 27 J.I.B.L.R. 429, 432.
160 For the remaining legal uncertainties, Matthias Haentjens, Perre De Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking 
and Financial Law (Routledge 2015) 203–04, n 33.
161 For an industry view, David Mengle, ‘The Importance of Close-out Netting’ ISDA Research Notes, number 
1, 2010, <https://www.isda.org/a/USiDE/netting-isdaresearchnotes-1-2010.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
162 Edward J Janger, ‘Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution’ (2015–2016) 10 
Brook. J. Cor. Fin. & Com. L. 1, 8.
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that sets the criteria for the terms and conditions that a master agreement must 
contain. While it is not possible to analyze resolution powers in any detail, given the 
volume of regulations alone, the existence of this power is an important example 
of the interaction between transnational law and transgovernmental regulation 
as evidenced by the innovations made to the ISDA Master Agreement structure. 
Resolution stay powers originate from the Financial Stability Board (a 
transgovernmental organization discussed in Chapter 6) that introduced Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Key Attributes) 
in 2014. 163 Regarding the treatment of netting in insolvency, the Key Attributes 
in turn follow the views adopted in the US. 164 The purpose of resolution stay is to 
prevent the termination of financial contracts for a short period of time if regulators 
place a larger financial institution into resolution or take other interventionary 
measures. For example, if a large financial institution is placed into resolution, and 
its counterparties terminate their respective financial contracts under their market 
standard financial contracts, there is a risk of both contagion, one too-big-to-fail 
might drag down its direct counterparties to default, and after close-out, there 
might be little left of the financial institution and thus little reason for resolution 
measures. 165 
The Key Attributes aim for continuity of the business of failing financial 
institutions rather than their dissolution. The resolution stay is limited in that that 
it is aimed only to prevent the use of contractual termination rights for a short 
period of time without interfering with the underlying obligations. Payment and 
delivery obligations remain in force during the resolution stay between the financial 
institution that is subject to the resolution measures and its counterparties. If an 
actual default occurs, resolution stay does not qualify as such, and the counterparties 
are allowed to terminate their respective contracts.166 In other words, contractual 
close-out netting rights are preserved under the Key Attributes, but their use is 
stayed for a short period under which resolution authorities are to figure out a 
solution to the problem of the failing financial institution. If the solution works, the 
only deviation for market participants is that their contractual rights to terminate 
and close-out were stayed for a short period time.167 
163 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’, 
I-Annex 5: Temporary stay on early termination rights 15 October 2014 <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_141015.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
164 Janger (n 162) 7. 
165 ibid 4–5. 
166 FSB (n 163) 51–53.
167 Janger (n 162) 7. 
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In the EU, the Key Attributes were introduced in the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD).168 Under Article 32(1) of BRRD, resolution authorities 
can take a resolution action if three conditions are met. In summary, these conditions 
are that: 1) an authority has determined that an institution is failing or is likely to 
fail; 2) private sector measures or other public measures than resolutions would 
not be enough to correct the problem; and 3) the resolution measure is in the 
public interest.169 There has been great discrepancy in the implementation of the 
Key Attributes across jurisdictions. The use of resolution stays raises questions on 
extraterritorial enforceability of such resolution measures meaning that a resolution 
decision made in one jurisdiction might not be recgonized in others.170 
Followed by discussions between regulators and ISDA, ISDA introduced a 
market solution in the form of a protocol under its ISDA MA architecture, the 
2014 ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol. Protocols are an importan feature of the 
ISDA MA architecture and a form of private regulatory mechanism. Through 
protocols, ISDA MA architecture can be voluntarily amended across multiple 
counterparties. Protocols are essentially a multilateral contractual amendment 
mechanism to which ISDA MA users may adhere to within a set period of time. 
If they adhere to a protocol, market participants are then to bilaterally amend 
their existing contract documentation as to comply with the obligations set in the 
Protocol.171 The adherents to the protocol agreed to amend their existing ISDA 
Master Agreements to contractually recognize the cross-border application of 
resolution stays.172 While technically voluntary, it is possible that adherence to the 
2014 ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol was due to a ‘trickle-down’ of pressure first 
from FSB to local regulators, and from there, from local regulators to the financial 
instutions under their supervision.173 
168 Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59/EU, Establishing a Framework for the Recovery of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 190, Article 71(1):
 Power to temporarily suspend termination rights
 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to suspend the termination 
rights of any party to a contract with an institution under resolution from the publication of the notice 
pursuant to Article 83(4) until midnight in the Member State of the resolution authority of the institution 
under resolution at the end of the business day following that publication, provided that the payment and 
delivery obligations and the provision of collateral continue to be performed.
169 BRRD (n 168) Article 32.
170 Traci Biedermann, ‘Cross-border resolution recognition: EU legislation staying default rights as a model 
for the United States’ (2016) 23 Colum. J. Eur. L. 177, 181.
171 Moorad Choudhry, Structured Credit Products: Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitisation  
(2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010) 133–34.
172 ibid 182; Janger (n 162) 10; the 2014 ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol was replaced by ISDA 2015 Universal 
Resolution Stay Protocol in 2015 <https://www.isda.org/protocol/isda-2015-universal-resolution-stay-
protocol/> accessed 1 June 2019.
173 Biedermann (n 170).
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5.7 BILATERAL CLOSE-OUT NETTING AND PATH DEPENDENCE
The legitimacy and appropriateness of the insovelncy safe-harbours discussed 
above remains contested by many.174 Bilateral close-out netting is criticized as it 
can excessively externalize risk to third parties and the financial system as a whole: 
As between it and the debtor, this [close-out netting] result is fair. But 
as between the counterparty and the debtor’s other creditors it may not 
be. […] The local attractiveness of derivatives netting among financially 
central firms is partly due to this risk transfer away from the firm and its 
creditors, to the United States. 175
Essentially, the argument is that close-out netting is actually a source of systemic 
risk instead of a method that reduces it. Close-out netting is claimed to: lack 
transparency as third parties cannot know about the contractual arrangements 
of others; lack consistency as it leaves too wide a margin of discretion for non-
defaulting parties regarding whether to terminate the contractual arrangements or 
not; and erode equality as it allegedly favours larger counterparties over their smaller 
counterparts.176 Close-out netting has also been said to result in unnecessary risks in 
the financial system, in that it allows for greater leverage, increases market volatility, 
serves as a redistribution mechanism of risk, leads to weak lending standards, and 
propagates systemic shocks.177 Market volatility is something that close-out netting 
does not necessarily protect against as there is a risk that in market turbulence it is 
the inability to meet margin calls in a market situation where the cost of collateral 
is higher due to increased demand that can lead to bankruptcies.178 Darrell Duffie 
and David A Skeel Jr have summarized the costs, as well as the benefits not covered 
here, of safe harbours to include lower incentives for counterparties to monitor 
their counterparties, incentive to benefit from too-big-to-fail status, substitution of 
174 Peeters (n 88) paras. 3.45–3.50; Peter Marchetti, ‘Amending the flaws in the safe harbors of the 
bankruptcy code: guarding against systemic risk in the financial markets and adding stability to the 
system’ (2014–2015) 31 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 305, 334–38. For analysis of the applicability of safe 
harbour regimes after the GFC under the US and English laws, ibid 340–73. 
175 Mark J Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’ (2011) 63 
Stanford Law Review 539, 570.
176 Vincent R Johnson, ‘International Financial Law: The Case Against Close-out Netting’ (2015) 33 B.U.Int’l 
L.J., 101, 116–125 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891907> accessed 1 June 2019; Peeters (n 88) paras 3.45–
3.50.
177 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, ‘Liquidity, systemic risk, and the bankruptcy treatment of financial contracts’ 
(2015–2016) 10 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 15, 59–62.
178 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul E Atkinson, ‘Deleveraging, Traditional versus Capital Markets Banking and 
the Urgent need to Separate and Recapitalise G-SIFI Banks’, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 
Volume 2012, Issue 1 <https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/Deleveraging,%20Traditional%20
versus%20Capital%20Markets%20Banking.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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one type of financing with other forms of financing, the risk of collateral fire sales, 
and an incentive for distressed companies to not file for bankruptcy in a timely 
manner.179 Trading under a master agreement also creates significant incentives 
for end-users to trade with the same dealer. This ‘lock-in effect’ means that the 
more there are transactions with a single dealer, the larger the benefits of netting, 
setoff, and margin. Conversely, transacting with one dealer instead of many runs 
the risk of concentration.180
Steven L Schwartz and Ori Sharon suggest that the amendment made to the 
US Bankruptcy Code in 1978 was, at least partially, the starting point of path 
dependence.181 To summarize the argument, one original argument backed with little 
evidence from a derivatives industry lobbyist resulted in narrow exemptions, which 
in time led to further industry-lobbied legislative amendments for the recognition 
of ipso facto clauses and close-out netting in the US Bankruptcy Code. Without 
proper justification and scrutiny, further amendments were made to legislation 
backed by industry lobbying. Each incremental step lacked proper and rigorous 
analysis of the consequences of each amendment to, for example, the rights of other 
creditors and systemic risk, while the original narrow exemption gradually turned 
into a virtually unrestricted blanket exemption.182 Schwartz uses the findings in 
the former to build up an argument that the exemptions may not protect against 
systemic risk but, to the contrary, may even amplify it.183 The first exemption, a 
‘safe harbour’ for derivatives was included into a bill which led to the enactment of 
the US Bankruptcy Code in 1978,184 and which, according to Schwartz, concurrently 
was used to maintain an industry pressure on the US Congress to keep derivatives 
under safe harbour regimes. Set for historical path dependence, policy makers 
allegedly became blindsided when historical justification served as justifications 
179 Darrell Duffie, David A Skeel Jr, ‘A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives 
and Repurchase Agreements’ (2012) Faculty Scholarship 386, 1, 5–10 <https://scholarship.law.upenn.
edu/faculty_scholarship/386> accessed 1 June 2019.
180 Ilya Beylin, ‘A reassessment of the clearing mandate: how the clearing mandate affects swap trading 
behavior and the consequences for systemic risk’ (2015–2016) 68 Rutgers U.L. Rev. 1143 1178–83.
181 For path dependence, subchapter 2.9.2.
182 Steven Schwartz, S Ori Sharon, ‘The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-dependence 
Analysis’ (2014) 71(3) Washington and Lee Law Review 1715.
183 Steven L Schwartz, ‘Derivatives and collateral: balancing remedies and systemic risk’ (2015) U. Ill. L. Rev. 
699. Mokal (n 177) in turn builds his argument partially on the findings of Schwartz, Sharon (n 182): ‘The 
process [of path dependence] began in 1978 when Congress accepted untested assertions by industry 
representatives about systemic domino risks in the commodities futures market’ 74. Mokal continues 
how ‘immunity apologists’ do not pay any recognition to the costs of the immunities which have been 
‘illuminatingly analysed within a path-dependence theory’ in Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 73–74; Stephen 
Adams, ‘Derivatives Safe Harbors in Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank: A Structural Analysis’ (March 3, 2014), 
also referring Schwarcz and Sharon (n 182) which, according to Adams, has ‘persuasively argued that 
the development of the safe harbors represents “path-dependent” legislation’, n 20. <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2348828> accessed 1 June 2019. 
184 PL 95–598 (HR 8200), PL 95–598, § 764(c), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2549; H.R. 8200 (95th): A bill to 
establish a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies
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for the extension of these safe harbours to bilateral close-out. Schwartz puts forward 
an important question of whether close-out netting actually reduces systemic risk.185 
The claim that the first amendment leading to the recognition of close-out netting 
was maybe unwarranted requires closer inspection. According to Edward J Janger, 
the motivation for the first safe-harbour, recognition of ipso facto clauses, netting, 
and enforcement of collateral, was to preserve the liquidity in the securities markets 
following a failure of a financial intermediary - even when it came at the expense 
of the failed intermediary.186 In other words, the preservation of systemic stability 
(discussed further in Chapter 6) was an important public-policy objective already 
at the end of the 1970s.
Allegedly, a ‘derivatives-industry representative’ who had, using the domino 
analogy of one failure leading to failure of other market participants, ‘argued that 
such an effect could occur because the commodities futures market is fragile’.187 
Schwartz and Sharon note that ‘[t]he initial exemptions-which were included in 
1977 in the bill that became the Bankruptcy Code-were promoted by an attorney 
with ties to the derivatives industry, Stuart D Root’.188 Several narrow exemptions 
were included in the bill which, according to Schwartz and Sharon, were backed 
with little evidence by the ‘derivatives-industry representative-only one court case’189 
and how this claimed industry representative: 
[d]id not explain in his testimony before the Senate, however, why 
the inability of a commodities broker to freely close out an insolvent 
customer’s account--or why a requirement that the broker seek court 
permission to close out that account-could cause the domino effect he 
warned against.190
The narrow exemptions were subsequently expanded in their scope.191 Schwartz 
and Sharon do not provide evidence as to what kind of sponsorship was offered to 
who and by whom. However, the clear implication is that Root was not giving his 
statement in his capacity as a legal expert, from which the testimonies were heard, 
but as an industry lobbyist. Assumedly Root, as an advocate, was also bound by the 
185 Schwartz (n 183) 702–04.
186 Janger (n 162) 2–4.
187 Schwartz (n 183) 703.
188 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1724, noting that Root was a practicing lawyer who had advised institutional 
investors concerning aspects of the bankruptcy laws, n 43, later on stating that ‘[t]he origin of the path 
dependence was the lobbyist-sponsored limited exemption’, 1737. 
189  Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975), to which Robert A Hudson 
refers to as ‘leading case’, Robert A Hudson, ‘Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market’ 
(1978) 58 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 28. In Geldermann, the court refers to earlier case-law. 
190 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1724–26. 
191 Schwartz (n 183) 702–04.
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rules and ethical standards of his Bar association. The evidence suggests that he was 
giving his statement in the capacity of a legal expert, from which the testimonies 
were heard - not as a lobbyist nor an industry representative. In the 1970s, there 
was considerable legal uncertainty as to the possibilities of a member of a clearing 
house to close-out a defaulting client, or in other words, there was ‘little if any case 
law which defines the duties and responsibilities of commodities brokers towards 
their customers’.192 The hearing was held at the end of 1970s, before there was 
hardly any bilateral OTC derivatives trading. During those times at the end of the 
1970s it was turbulent globally and volatile in the US for which reason there was 
plenty reasons for market participants to hedge risks.193 
The legal and systemic risk that a failure of an intermediary might pose is quite 
clearly acknowledged in the hearings by Root: 
If an FCM [a clearing member] is unable to limit its exposure to extreme 
price fluctuations through its inability to “closeout” a defaulting/
insolvent customer’s account, then there is a potential domino effect. 
This has been judicially discussed in Geldermann and Company, Inc. v. 
Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975) wherein the Court 
recognized the need for market stability or through a power to “close-
out” an account in a contractual liquidation provision. It is clear that 
the liquidation provision promoted the interest and protection of the 
commission merchants, their customers and the investing public as a 
whole. 194
The case referred to by Root, Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc195 concerned 
futures commodity trading on the Chicago Board of Trade, an old operator of a 
futures and options exchange and also a central counterparty since the mid-19th 
century,196 a volatile market situation, and a client who was ‘out-of-the-money’ in 
substantial amounts and had not posted enough collateral to its broker, who was 
a clearing member of the aforementioned exchange and central counterparty.197 
192 George J Sotos, Kevin F Bowen, ‘Commodities Regulation – The Proposed Suitability Standards for the 
Commodity Industry: Right Church, Wrong Pew’ (1976) 53 Chi.–Kent L. Rev. 289, 290. 
193 Stefan Gerlach, Srichander Ramaswamy, Michela Scatigna, ‘150 years of financial market volatility’ BIS 
Quarterly Review, September 2006, 80–81 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1632414> accessed 1 June 2019.
194 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, 
on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, November 28, 29 and December 1, 1977, 1221–22 <http://archive.org/stream/
bankruptcyreform1978unit/bankruptcyreform1978unit_djvu.txt> accessed 1 June 2019. 
195 Geldermann (n 189) 27.
196 Randall S Kroszner, ‘Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses’ (2000) 18(2), Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 157, 162–63.
197 Hudson (n 189) 28.
194
Transnational Contract: the ISDA Master Agreement 
Granted, the case did not involve a bankruptcy of a clearing member or automatic 
stay under the Bankruptcy Code, but the point is the systemic implications of having 
the right to contractually close-out a position, as stated in Geldermann: 
Investors or speculators who have failed to deposit sufficient 
maintenance margins may have insufficient financial resources to 
withstand substantial losses on the market and, if so, continued trading 
on that account is a financial risk for the commission merchant, and 
ultimately for the commodities exchange if the loss suffered by the 
commission merchant exceeds its capital account.198 
While the court ruling does not refer to ‘systemic risk’, the chain of events described 
by the court, where the inability of one market participant, caused by operational 
or financial problems, leads to other market participants unable to fulfill their 
obligations when due, is at the very core of the definition of ‘systemic risk’.199 Instead 
of contextualizing their argument, Schwartz and Sharon focus on the choice of 
words of Root, given in a public hearing, who had described a ‘potential domino 
effect’ and extrapolate from this statement how the argument evolved into ‘threat 
of market collapse’ in 1982 through path dependence.200 In Geldermann, the central 
legal question was that was the clearing member allowed to liquidate a customer 
account in accordance with the terms and conditions of their agreement and the 
exchange rules. It had, the court found, because of not having such right could 
pose a systemic risk. Later on, the Bankruptcy Code was amended accordingly. In 
bilateral close-out netting, the central question is whether an ipso facto clause can 
be enforced even if the Bankruptcy Code would normally limit the enforceability 
of all types of transactions. The central questions are essentially the same: can a 
contract or private rules, i.e. transnational law created by market participants in 
the course of trade, trump state legislation under certain circumstances, and if yes, 
what those circumstances are and what is the overriding public policy objective 
that justifies the exemption. 
Central counterparties, an old type of private regulatory mechanism (discussed 
further in Chapter 6) that allows derivatives to be cleared differently than in over-
the-counter derivatives trading, have strict policies on how they choose their 
198 Geldermann (n 189) 27 (emphasis added).
199 The European Central Bank defines ‘systemic risk’: [t]he risk that the inability of one participant to 
discharge its obligations in a system will cause other participants to be unable to fulfil their obligations 
when they become due. This could potentially result in significant liquidity or credit problems spilling over 
into other systems or markets, thereby threatening the stability of the financial system. […]. European 
Central Bank, ‘The Payment System: payments, securities and derivatives, and the role of the Eurosystem’ 
(2010) 128 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsystem201009en.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019.
200 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1724–1726; Schwartz (n 183) 703.
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members. The members of these private regulatory mechanisms have to be large 
financial institutions with sufficient capital, risk management systems, and expertise 
among others, because should anyone of them default, the default rules of a central 
counterparty require that the other members and eventually the CCP itself are 
liable for the liabilities of the defaulted clearing member.201 Should a customer of 
a clearing member default, something extraordinary would have had to take place 
in the financial markets.202 For this reason, the maintenance of financial stability 
can be argued to weight more than the interests of a single defaulted counterparty. 
The systemic risk a failure of one counterparty is clearly reflected in Geldermann 
where it is stated that ‘imposing requirements of demand and notification […] 
would violate the manifest purpose of the [contractual] liquidation provision’. The 
court ruled that the liquidation rules of the exchange permitting the liquidation of 
a customer account were enforceable.203 Furthermore, it is of general interest that 
the court notes how the commercial environment, ‘mores and business practices’, 
the risks and ‘needs of business’ are factors in assessing whether a private norm, in 
this case contractual liquidation provision created in the course of trade, could have 
more legal weight than enacted legislation on the basis that the former promotes 
a public policy objective of financial stability.204 
The Bankruptcy Code was subsequently amended in 1982, widening the 
exemptions for automatic stay, and in 1984, exempting repurchase agreements 
from the same.205 In 1990, the safe harbours introduced in the earlier amendments 
were extended to bilateral OTC derivatives transactions.206 Was it warranted for 
the OTC derivatives industry to claim that in bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives 
transactions the risks could be similar (mandatory stay and cherry picking) and, 
based on this, claim that allowing close-out netting should be extended to these 
transactions as well? With the benefit of hindsight and considering contemporary 
research, maybe it is questionable that the OTC derivatives industry engaged in a 
deliberate strategy to use established arguments as a justification for future safe 
harbours and even less warranted for regulators to accept such arguments.207 
201 Jon Gregory, Central Counterparties – Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC 
Derivatives (Wiley Finance 2014) 27–41, 181–84.
202 In the US financial crisis of 1907, CCPs successfully innovated their way through the crisis and played 
an important part in maintaining market confidence and mitigating panic bank runs through private 
solutions. Kroszner (n 196) 159–62.
203 Geldermann (n 189) 27.
204 Geldermann (n 189) 23.
205 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1727–29; Amicus Curiae (n 99); The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. clarified the legal status of bilaterally negotiated swap agreements 
that would not be characterized as securities, Amicus Curiae (n 99) 21–23.
206 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1729–31.
207 Schwartz, Sharon (n 182) 1730.
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The systemic implications or the actual systemic risk that a bankruptcy of a major 
dealer bank due to lack of recognition of bilateral close-out netting in the Bankruptcy 
Code posed at that time can only be speculated on. What is known now, and what 
was known then, is that the financial institutions were large already in 1984,208 
the OTC derivatives market was evolving and growing very rapidly during those 
times,209 and the legal risks arising from mandatory stay and cherry picking were 
real,210 which were recognized and assumedly analyzed by regulators, national and 
transgovernmental alike, as well as central banks.211 Many arguments can be made 
against the desirability of enforceability of bilateral close-out netting. The evidence 
suggests that the origins of close-out netting cannot be adequately explained through 
path dependence nor can it be said that the foundations of close-out netting would 
have been laid on a legally ‘shaky’ ground.
5.8 MARGINING AND FINANCIAL COLLATERAL 
5.8.1 REGULATORY RECOGNITION OF TRANSNATIONAL MARKET PRACTICE 
Collateralization and margining are used here interchangeably as techniques to 
reduce credit risk under any kind of derivatives transaction, both multilaterally and 
bilaterally cleared, in and out of exchanges. Put into a modern context, financial 
collateral flows ‘lie at the heart of any proper understanding of market liquidity, and 
hence of financial stability’. 212 It is financial collateral that ties nonbanks and banks 
together and form the ‘nuts and bolts of financial plumbing’ that find their written 
form in the standardized agreements of private trade organizations, including ISDA 
MA.213 
Margining is a method to control credit risk. In multilateral clearing, it has been 
used at least since the mid-19th century.214 Simply put, margining means covering of 
an out-of-money position with cash or securities. If Party A is out of the money 5 units 
on day 1 to Party B, Party A will transfer cash or securities to Party B as collateral. 
If Party A fails, Party B’s exposure is zero, as it already has collateral that covers its 
exposure. Since markets and prices move, Party B might be out-of-the-money on 
day 2 and thus obliged to transfer collateral to in-the-money Party A. Margining in 
208 James Barth, Moutusi Sau, ‘The Big Keep Getting Bigger: Too-Big-to-Fail Banks 30 Years Later’ 
(September 24, 2014) 1, 2 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510041> accessed 1 June 2019.
209 (n 19.)
210 Waldman (n 97), Nalbantian and others (n 84), Henderson (n 12); Cunningham (n 7).
211 Subchapter 5.6.1.
212 Manmohan Singh, ‘Collateral Reuse and Balance Sheet Space’ IMF Working Paper 2017 WP/17/113, 5.
213 ibid n 1, n 4, n 10.
214 Kroszner (n 196) 157; JW Markham, ‘Federal Regulaton of Margin the Commodity Futures Industry – 
History and Theory’ (1991) 64 Temple Law Review 59
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the OTC derivatives market was originally a non-mandatory market practice. This 
market practice achieved legal recognition and margin became known as financial 
collateral in the EU through the introduction and national transposition of the 
Financial Collateral Directive (FCD).215 The purpose of the FCD is to abolish local 
formalities relating to the creation of financial collateral arrangements, recognize 
title transfer and reuse of collateral, disapply national insolvency laws relating to 
the enforceability of close-out netting, and the effective enforcement of financial 
collateral.216 The legal recognition of margining and financial collateral arrangements 
precedes FCD. For example, France enacted a law in 1996 that facilitated the use of 
securities account pledges and ensured their legal recognition in French insolvency 
law. The new law was to offer ‘a flexible and new framework for more creative 
financial engineering in structured financings’.217 The FCD was introduced in an 
era when public financial regulation became more voluminous and more pervasive, 
whereas self-regulation backed by national legislation receded.218
Article 7 of the FCD requires Member States to recognize the enforceability 
of collateral arrangements ‘to ensure that a close-out netting provision can take 
effect in accordance with its terms’. Article 2 of the FCD defines ‘financial collateral 
arrangement’ as ‘a title transfer financial collateral arrangement or a security 
financial collateral arrangement whether or not these are covered by a master 
215 2002/47 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43 (FCD).
216 FCD Article 7:
 1. Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting provision can take effect in accordance with its 
terms:
 (a) notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation 
measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the collateral taker; and/or
 (b) notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or other disposition of or in 
respect of such rights.
 Article 8
 Member States shall ensure that a financial collateral arrangement […] may not be declared invalid or void 
or be reversed on the sole basis that the financial collateral arrangement has come into existence, or the 
financial collateral has been provided:
 (a) on the day of the commencement of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures, but prior to 
the order or decree making that commencement; or
 (b) in a prescribed period prior to, and defined by reference to, the commencement of such proceedings 
or measures or by reference to the making of any order or decree or the taking of any other action or 
occurrence of any other event in the course of such proceedings or measures;
 For English law perspective, Dermot Turing, Karen Lester, ‘Implementation of the EU Directive on 
Financial Collateral Arrangements in the United Kingdom’ (2005) 20 J.I.B.L.R. 65; for a more general 
EU member state perspective, Klaus Lober, Ewa Klima, ‘The implementation of Directive 2002/47 on 
financial collateral arrangements’ (2006) 21 J.I.B.L.R. 203. 
217 Stephane Mouy, Edward Nalbantian, ‘France Modernizes Collateralization and Netting’ (1996) 15 Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. 26, 28.
218 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Implementation of the ISD and CAD in national legal systems’ in Guido Ferrarini 
(ed), European Securities Markets – The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (Kluwer Law 
International 1998) 8–16.
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agreement or general terms and conditions’. In essence, collateralization benefits 
the in-the-money counterparty. If the out-of-the-money party defaults, the in-the-
money party benefits from having at least part of its position already covered with 
financial collateral either as the title holder or security holder. Financial collateral 
is used in two forms which are referred to as ‘variation margin’ (VM) and ‘initial 
margin’ (IM). While both share the same purpose of mitigating counterparty credit 
risk, they operate differently and often under different legal structures. Put simply, 
VM represents the running profit/loss of a derivative.219 This means that every 
moment, the value of the transaction changes. The ‘in-the-money’ party has a claim 
on the ‘out-of-the-money’ counterparty and conversely the latter must post VM to 
the former to cover this position. 
Historically, this daily valuation and transfer was not mandatory. Under current 
financial regulation, namely EMIR in the EU, VM must be exchanged daily or 
even intra-daily. If one party to a transaction defaults, the non-defaulting party 
will incur costs as it will have to re-establish its positions by entering into new 
transactions with a new counterparty. IM is meant to cover these as well as other 
related expenses. Post-GFC under EMIR, the exchange of VM, and gradually also 
IM, has become mandatory also in bilaterally-cleared OTC derivatives transactions. 
These rules have transgovernmental origins. The framework was laid out by the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and and the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The new rules have given rise to many legal 
risks in the OTC derivatives market. 220 
5.8.2 ISDA FACILITATED MARGINING IN THE OTC DERIVATIVES INDUSTRY
According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a US regulatory agency, 
in 2014:
Well-designed margin systems protect both parties to a trade as well as 
the overall financial system. They serve both as a check on risk-taking 
219 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Board of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ September 2013, 2(e), 8 
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD423.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
220 For the legal risks in uncleared derivatives, Barney Reynolds, Donna Parisi, ‘The effects of trans-Atlantic 
reform on margin for uncleared swaps: balancing the risks and benefits of uncleared swaps’ (2016) 
31 J.I.B.L.R. 59; Joseph Tanega J, Andrea Savi, ‘Central Clearing Counterparties for OTC-users: A 
Theoretical Framework’ (2017) 13 N.Y.U.J.L. 825, 847–55; for the legal risks in cleared derivatives, Jo 
Braithwaite, ‘The dilemma of client clearing in the OTC derivatives markets’ (2016) EBOR <http://eprints.
lse.ac.uk/64476/> accessed 1 June 2019; Simon Goldsworthy ‘Financial Collateral Arrangements in the 
Age of Uncleared Margin’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 390.
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that might exceed a party’s financial capacity and as a resource that can 
limit losses when there is a failure by a party to meet its obligations.221 
In the 1990s, margining was becoming increasingly commonplace in finance. In the 
OTC derivatives market the use of financial collateral became, while not mandatory, 
so commonplace in the early 1990s that ISDA found an incentive to standardize also 
the terms and conditions of margining into the ISDA MA architecture.222 Margining 
was born out of market demand, and its use developed into market practice. This 
development, in turn, called for contractual standardization. Originally, it was up to 
the counterparties to decide whether to use margin or not. By the end of the 1990s, 
given that margining was becoming so commonplace in the financial markets, it 
further evolved into a question of public policy and regulatory recognition. 223 The 
market, once transnational, became renationalised and fragmented along national 
jurisdictions which gave rise to legal uncertainties. 224 
At least from the early 1990s, while contractual netting in its various forms was 
starting to be recognized and promoted by regulators, market participants, both 
dealers and end-users, sought new ways to further mitigate credit risk through 
margining. In general, margining was becoming more commonplace in finance, OTC 
derivatives trading included. 225 It was important for market participants to be able to 
reuse the received collateral under an OTC derivative transaction as this alternative 
opened up new financing opportunities in the repurchase market where the same 
collateral could be used to raise cash in this market.226 However, these new collateral 
arrangements varied significantly from how collateral was traditionally understood 
in the form of pledges, mortgages, and charges that were used to create enforceable 
security interests. Unlike in debt financing, for example, at the commencement of an 
OTC derivatives transaction, creditor and debtor is unknown as it depends on the 
221 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, proposed rule, 
(2014) Vol. 79 Fed. Reg. at 59901.
222 Raul Oscar Elias, ‘Legal aspects of swaps and collateral’ (2001) 3 J.I.F.M. 232, 233. 
223 The European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the framework for financial markets: Action 
Plan, COM (1999)232, 11 May 1999, noting that ‘[t]here is a higher risk of invalidation of cross-border 
collateral arrangements and uncertainty as regards enforceability should the collateral provider become 
insolvent’ 8 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
224 Subchapter 3.6. For an earlier analysis of the transposition of the FCD in the UK and its implications 
on the ISDA MA provisions especially in relation to close-out netting, Anthony Fawcett, ‘The Financial 
Collateral Directive: an examination of some practical problems following its implementation in the UK’ 
(2005) 20 J.I.B.L.R. 295, 296; Look Chan Ho, ‘The Financial Collateral Directive’s practice in England’ 
(2011) 26 J.I.B.L.R. 151.
225 Daniel Cunningham, Thomas Werlen, ‘Derivatives and the Reduction of Credit Risk’ (1996) 15 Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. 35, 36, noting that the use of collateral was one technique out of many, 35, 36; Christian A Johnson 
‘At the Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?’ (1998–1999) 1, 47–49, 
n 2, n 254, n 256–263.
226 Christian A Johnson, ‘Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: It’s 3:00 P.M., Do You Know Where Your 
Collateral Is’ (1997) 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 949, 966, 969–71.
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market movements from which the transaction derives its value from. Depending on 
these movements, either one of the counterparties can be in-the-money or out-of-the 
money on each day before the maturity of the transaction. The particular nature of 
OTC derivatives gave rise to new types of legal risks.227 Market participants developed 
and used their own security agreements to facilitate collateral arrangements under 
their OTC derivatives transactions but as they were unstandardized, the negotiations 
required were slow.228 ISDA introduced separate collateral documentation known 
as Credit Support Annex (CSA) and Credit Support Deed (CSD) that formed a part 
of the existing master agreement architecture.
TABLE 2 Simplified Architecture of the ISDA Master Agreement 1992
CSA and CSD included provisions for how to determine the amount of collateral 
and how often it needs to be transferred, as well as whether the obligation concerns 
both parties or only one of the parties.229 From the beginning of collateralization, 
collateral could be in the form of currencies, government bonds, or some other type 
as agreed between counterparties.230 
The first CSA introduced by ISDA was the 1994 ISDA Credit Support Annex 
(New York law) that could be added to the existing ISDA MA architecture by way 
of reference to its Schedule. Essentially, the same contractual technique that had 
been used to expand the applicability of the ISDA MA architecture was now being 
227 Subchapter 4.7.3.
228 Johnson (n 226) 965.
229 Cunningham, Werlen (n 225) 36. 










used for collateralization. CSA formed a part of the single agreement structure.231 
The first ISDA Credit Support Annex was followed by the 1995 ISDA Credit Support 
Annex (Title Transfer) and the 1995 ISDA Credit Support Deed (Security Interest) 
both governed by English law. The English law version came out in two optional 
versions due to the English property laws that limited and restricted the rights of 
the collateral holder to reuse the financial collateral in specific situations. 232 Both 
English and US law CSAs are approximately 10 pages long, with approximately 7 
pages of standard terms and conditions and, similar to Schedule, 3 pages of optional 
provision that the parties can customize based on standardized language or other 
provisions that the counterparties can include to the collateral at their choosing.233 
In addition to facilitating the control of credit risk, CSA and CSD were to control 
the legal risks arising from English and other national laws especially in relation 
to the creation, perfection, and enforcement of collateral arrangements. These 
requirements arising from national property laws fitted poorly with the new fast-
paced trading environment where the only thing resembling anything tangible and 
physical was to be found from book-entries on computers and where collateral 
was to be reused quickly elsewhere.234 Within a few years, the recognition and 
ensuring the legal enforceability of security-interest based collateral arrangements 
was becoming increasingly a public policy objective in the EU.235
Through title transfer arrangement made under the CSA, a collateral taker could 
reuse the collateral. This right was subject to the obligation to return and replace 
the original collateral with a fungible collateral to which the same terms apply 
231 In the US, although standalone CSAs were used as separate contracts, it followed from the wording of 
the US Bankruptcy Code that (referring to a transfer of a collateral under a ‘swap agreement’) it would 
be safer to make the collateral arrangement a part of the master agreement architecture. Cunningham, 
Werlen (n 225) 6. 
232 Cunningham, Werlen (n 225) 35–36. 
233 Harding (n 12), Annex 1, ISDA Credit Support Annex (English law) and Annex 2 ISDA Credit Support 
Annex (New York law). Paragraph 13 (Elections and Variables) include provisions relating to, among 
others, issues such as what type of collateral can be used (cash, negotiable debt obligations), thresholds 
for transfer (the exposure must exceed certain threshold amount for the obligation to transfer collateral to 
become applicable), minimum transfer amounts (the exposure must exceed certain smaller threshold for 
the obligation to transfer collateral to become applicable), and dispute resolution. The dispute resolution 
provision requires the counterparties to settle their valuation disputes in a certain manner, and only if the 
dispute persists, the counterparties can seek court settlement. 
234 Raul Oscar Elias, ‘Legal aspects of swaps and collateral’ (2001) 3 J.I.F.M. 232, 237–42.
235 FCD, Recital (5) 
 In order to improve the legal certainty of financial collateral arrangements, Member States should 
ensure that certain provisions of insolvency law do not apply to such arrangements, in particular, those 
that would inhibit the effective realisation of financial collateral or cast doubt on the validity of current 
techniques such as bilateral close-out netting […]’ (emphasis added); FCD
 Recital (9)
 [t]he only perfection requirement which national law may impose in respect of financial collateral should 
be that the financial collateral is delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be 
in the possession or under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the collateral taker’s 
behalf […].
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as to the original. The CSA did not create a security interest in the underlying 
collateral, but instead was built on the idea that the legal title to the collateral was 
to be transferred. If the collateral taker reuses the collateral, the legal character of 
the collateral might change to a form not intended by the parties. 
The CSD combines elements of the English law fixed charge and common and 
civil law pledge to recognise the English law fixed charge as well as continental 
European security interest types. In short, like the CSA, the CSD operates as to first 
valuate all ongoing OTC derivatives transactions between the counterparties which 
determines a net replacement cost as if all transactions were terminated. In order 
to reduce the risk of the arrangement being recharacterized by courts as something 
else than a collateral arrangement, the transferee may not rehypothecate or reuse 
the financial collateral unless the counterparty defaults. Under the fixed charge, 
the collateral taker has only a partial interest in the collateral and not an outright 
ownership which remains with the collateral giver. If the collateral giver defaults, 
the collateral taker can claim any possible amount of collateral on the basis of its 
rights as a secured creditor.236 
For the present purposes, it is enough to understand that the out-of-the money 
counterparty transfers financial collateral to the in-the-money counterparty. Thus, 
the collateral represents the running profit/loss of a derivative.237 Upon counterparty 
default, the obligation to return the equivalent amount of collateral would then be 
converted to a monetary value that in turn would be used in the close-out calculation. 
The possibility for the collateral holder to reuse the collateral was ‘possibly the most 
significant’ aspect for using title transfer CSA.238 While the title transfer CSA allowed 
for more flexible financing for the collateral taker, English law gave legal effect 
to this arrangement, in cross-border contexts the use of financial collateral came 
with a legal risk. One legal risk was that of recharacterization of the title-transfer 
arrangement as a security interest or a pledge in other jurisdictions. This could mean 
that the title transfer CSA arrangement could be rendered unenforceable on the 
grounds of not complying with foreign property laws239 or invalidate the position 
of the creditor from a secured creditor (with a title to collateral) to an unsecured 
creditor in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding concerning its forcing counterparty.240 
236 Hval (n 87) 812–13; Paul C Harding, Christian Johnson, Mastering the ISDA Collateral Documents, (2nd 
edition, Pearson Education 2012) 38–39.
237 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Board of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ September 2013 <https://www.
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD423.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
238 Peter S Smedresman, Michael A Kenney, ‘Solving the Puzzle of Cross-border Securities Pledges’ (1996) 15 
Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 15, 19.
239 ibid 19. Choice of law rules are at the centre of these considerations. For an earlier practical example 
regarding the lex situs rule and perfection of immobilized or dematerialized securities, Hval (n 87) 10, 19–
22.
240 One example of this is the risk of overcollateralization, where the pledgor has transferred more collateral 
to the pledgee than was required and the pledgee is declared bankrupt while holding this excess collateral. 
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5.8.3 LEGAL RISKS IN FINANCIAL COLLATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
The legal risks of margining have been at the centre of regulatory attention dating 
back at least to the 1990s and have been exceedingly so since the GFC. However, 
the key legal definitions and concepts still vary across jurisdictions, regulators, 
and market participants.241 Much of the legal uncertainty concern how ‘reuse’ and 
‘re-hypothecation’ in margining are understood. The Financial Stability Board has 
identified the challenges for regulatory harmonization. First, there is regulatory 
variation as to how re-hypothecation is defined. Re-hyphotecation is ‘deeply 
correlated with securities and insolvency laws, as well as structures of markets 
[…] which are very different among jurisdictions’.242 Second, the differences 
in interpretation depend on the different public policy objectives of individual 
jurisdictions. Third, its meaning also depends on the functions of different financial 
intermediaries, and fourth, also on the other laws and regulatory regimes not related 
strictly to margining that may directly or indirectly affect the implementation of 
rehypothecation rules.243 Similarly, the French financial regulator Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers notes that ‘[t]here is no systematic distinction between ‘reuse’ 
and ‘rehypothecation’ in the currently available economic literature or data, when 
it is a question of collateral reuse, with or without transfer of ownership between 
parties’.244 For the purposes of this research, the right of reuse of collateral refers 
to the right of a secured party or a custodian to sell, pledge, rehypothecate, assign, 
invest, use, commingle, or otherwise dispose of posted collateral.
The use of financial collateral has always come with legal risks. Perhaps the 
most important source of legal uncertainty was that the application of lex situs 
The amount of collateral exceeding the amount that was actually required could be recharacterized as 
an unsecured debt meaning a delay in the recovery or losing of the excess amount in whole if the party 
holding the excess collateral would become bankrupt. This risk was acknowledged early on. Johnson 
(n 226) 992–93; the same risk persists today, Thomas Keijser, G Morton, Marcel Peeters, ‘Financial 
Collateral: From Private to Regulatory Law Reform’ in Thomas Keijser (ed), Transnational Securities 
Law (OUP 2014) paras 22.5–23.5; overcollateralization serves a commercial purpose, Markus Krebzs, 
Securitization and Structured Finance Post Credit Crunch: A Best Practice Deal Lifecycle Guide (Wiley 
2011) 73–74. 
241 BIS, Committee on the Global Financial System Bank for International Settlements, May 2013:
 [t]here is no clear standard, and different definitions of collateral assets exist among regulators, central 
banks and market participants. Moreover, the definition of a collateral asset differs depending on the 
purpose and the risk profile of the institution accepting the underlying asset, either as collateral or for 
investment purposes, 15; 
 [t]he terms rehypothecation and reuse of securities are often used interchangeably; they do not have 
distinct legal interpretations, 17 <https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs49.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
242 FSB, ‘Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Finance, Re-hypothecation and 
collateral re-use: Potential financial stability issues, market evolution and regulatory approaches, 25 
January 2017, 29 <https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Re-hypothecation-and-collateral-re-use.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
243 ibid 28–29.
244 Autorité des Marchés Financiers, ‘The Reuse of Assets – Regulatory and Economic Issues’ November 9, 
2016, 12.
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rule under which the applicable law is from where the security is located.245 
Technological advancement that allowed market participants to switch physical 
securities documentation first into immobilized form, and then to dematerialized 
form in electronic systems, did not make this task easier. Under the ISDA MA, a 
collateral could be split among three jurisdictions following the application of the 
lex situs rule: the law governing the (English law) CSA, the law of the jurisdiction 
where a court deems the collateral to be in, and the (bankruptcy) laws applicable 
to a defaulting counterparty.246 
In the early 2000s, the Commission went on to conclude that there was a 
demand for: 
[a]n effective and simple Community regime for the creation of 
collateral; providing limited protection of collateral arrangements 
from some rules of insolvency law, particularly those that would inhibit 
the effective liquidation of collateral or cast doubt on the validity of 
techniques currently used creating legal certainty with regard to cross-
border provision of collateral […]247 
Such legal risks stemmed typically from formal perfection requirements even for 
the type of collateral that is reused constantly, and the legal risk that in a case 
of insolvency of the counterparty, the collateral arrangement being treated as 
preferential treatment.248 As the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) was not 
a full harmonization directive,249 the market participants knew that national 
transposition would also bring legal uncertainty.250 Other legislation initiatives were 
made. The ‘place of the relevant intermediary’ rule (PRIMA) embodied in Article 9 
of the Settlement Finality Directive251, took the lex situs principle to a new level by 
recognizing that the location of the intangible asset is where the situs is determined 
by the law governing the account agreement between investor and intermediary. 
However, a private initiative conducted under the auspices of a public international 
245 Subchapter 3.6.
246 Hval (n 87) 14–15.
247 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph 
of Article 251 (2) of the EC Treaty concerning the Common Position of the Council on the adoption 
of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on financial collateral arrangements, 
SEC/2002/0278 final, no longer in force (emphasis added).
248 James Coiley, ‘New protections for cross-border collateral arrangements: summary and analysis of draft 
EU Directive on financial collateral’ (2001) 16 J.I.B.L. 119, 119–120. 
249 2002/47 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43.
250 Coiley (n 248) 123.
251 98/26/EC Directive of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems 
[1998] OJ L166/45 (Finality Directive).
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organization adopted a different approach. Under this approach, the governing law 
is determined by the law governing the relevant contract.252 PRIMA rule gives rise to 
legal risk and can be seen as outmoded in that it does not reflect actual commercial 
practices253 nor, put in another way, the lex mercatoria of book-entry systems.254 
This uncertainty relates among others to what constitutes ‘possession’ or ‘control’ 
of financial collateral under Article 2 (2) of the FCD and how they are interpreted 
in light of national transposition acts, as well as in the national legal orders.255 
Taxation of reused collateral can also be a source of legal risk as demonstrated in 
the following subchapter.
5.8.4 CASE STUDY: FINANCIAL COLLATERAL AND DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
The combination of transnational legal theory and court case analysis may produce 
results that can inform lawyers on how transnational markets operate, what is legal 
pluralism between private legal order and state legal order, and how and by which 
processes transnational law emerges and is enforced. In other words, understanding 
transnational contracts, their creators, and heterogenous users can bring aid in 
understanding one account and interpretation of ‘what is transnational law’.256 One 
interesting question is what happens when a civil law court applies the laws of its 
legal system to a case involving transnational contracts? Is the state legal system 
able to give legal weight to transnational norms? Or can it even acknowledge their 
existence? In a hypothetical scenario involving transnational elements, it would seem 
obvious from the outset that referring to terms unknown to the judiciary may not 
bring satisfactory results. In other words, appealing directly to transnational law 
or the transnational nature of contracts as a legal argument may be made in vain 
if the national legal order does not acknowledge even the concept. 
The preliminary ruling KHO 2012:112257 of the Finnish Supreme Administrative 
Court (SAC) suggests that transnational contracts do have legal weight but not 
252 Chapter 3 (n 265).
253 Roy Goode, Hideki Kanda, Karl Kreuzer, Hague Securities Convention – Explanatory Report 19–20 (2nd 
edition, 2017) <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d1513ec4-0c72-483b-8706-85d2719c11c5.pdf> accessed 1 
June 2019.
254 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law. 
Volume 2, Contract and Movable Property Law (6th edition, Hart Publishing 2016) 627–28, noting also 
how the PRIMA rule facilitated regulatory arbitrage regarding the choosing of the applicable law.
255 Elena Christine Zaccaria, ‘An inquiry into the meaning of possession and control over financial assets and 
the effects on third parties’ (2017) J.C.L.S. 1, 7–10; generally, Goode and others (n 253).
256 Joan Braithwaite, ‘Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: Evidence from the Derivatives Market’ 
(2012) 75 The Modern Law Review 779, 798, 804.
257 KHO 2012:112, docket 265/2/12, 12 December 2012.
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necessarily as stand-alone arguments. The case involved a transnational contract, 
ISDA MA, and one of the core areas of state sovereignty, taxation. This makes this 
case illustrative for the purposes of this research, thus it is described and analyzed 
in some detail.258 Underpinning the case is the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Finland, the highest appeal court in administrative cases where the lawfulness of 
lower administrative decisions may be challenged. The legal issue concerned the 
taxation of a collateral transfer under Finnish law executed under the ISDA Master 
Agreement architecture. 
The Finnish Act Laki elinkeinotulon verottamisesta (‘Act on Income from 
Professional Activities’, AIPA)259 Chapter 1 Section 4 stipulates that every type 
of income, cash or benefit of monetary value, earned from business activities is 
subject to a business income tax. AIPA Chapter 1 Section 5 further includes a non-
exhaustive list of types of business income that is subject to business income tax. As 
a general rule, all title transfers are by default subject to business income tax. AIPA 
does not recognize the concept of financial collateral but nevertheless title-transfer 
arrangements are recognized in Finnish law following the transposition of the 
Financial Collateral Directive through the Financial Collateral Act (FCA).260 Article 
6 of the Financial Collateral Directive stipulates that ‘Member States shall ensure 
that a title transfer financial collateral arrangement can take effect in accordance 
with its terms’. (emphasis added). FCA Section 5 explicitly recognizes the right to 
agree on an arrangement in which the collateral provider transfers securities or 
cash by way of title transfer. 
The Finnish tax authorities deemed the transfer of collateral between A and B 
to constitute the passing of ownership from one party to the other. Under national 
tax law, this interpretation effectively meant that collateral transfers were subject 
to business income tax under AIPA Chapter 1 Section 5, if the transferee reused 
a financial collateral. The Central Tax Board of Finland, a public body that issues 
preliminary rulings regarding taxation, consequently confirmed this view in its 
ruling. 261 The ruling is detailed in its background coverage of the legal nature 
and even the background of the ISDA MA architecture and the use of financial 
258 Anne Oravainen, ‘KHO 2012:112 – Vakuusluovutuksen verokohtelusta’ (2013) 7–8 Lakimies 1376. 
259 Laki elinkeinotulon verottamisesta, 1968/360, as amended.
260 Rahoitusvakuuslaki 11/2004, as amended, which is the national transposition act of FCD. It is noteworthy 
that FCD Article 6 sets an obligation for the Member States that are required to ‘ensure that a title transfer 
financial collateral arrangement can take effect in accordance with its terms’ - the terms in this case being 
the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement executed between Party A and B. If there are tax consequences 
for title transfer collateral arrangement, it is questionable if the arrangement can take effect with its terms 
the purpose of which is not to create a tax obligation for the counterparty. 
261 Keskusverolautakunta, Helsinki 23.11.2011, ennakkoratkaisu n:o 69/2011, 6 [Preliminary ruling of a tax 
appellate body - authors note].
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collateral in the OTC derivatives markets. Nevertheless, reuse equalled to taxable 
transaction.262
The decision was appealed in the Supreme Administrative Court. In its 
ruling, contrary to the decision of the tax authorities and the preliminary ruling 
of the Central Tax Board, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the 
arrangement differed from an ordinary type of taxable title transfer. Put simply, 
the title transfer does not extend to interests or yields of financial collateral - these 
belong to the collateral giver regardless of the title transfer - the purpose of which 
is provide for a guarantee of fulfillment contractual obligations. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Administrative Court emphasized that the arrangement followed the 
prevailing market practices, referred directly to the ISDA contractual architecture 
commonly used in the OTC markets, and the ratio of FCA in facilitating the use of 
financial collateral for the purpose of limiting credit exposure to the counterparty. 
The Supreme Administrative Court also emphasized that in the IFRS accounting, 
the collateral remains in the collateral transferor’s balance sheet despite the transfer 
of title.263 
As also noted by Anne Oravainen, the Supreme Administrative Court market 
practice outweighed tax considerations in a situation where tax, financial collateral, 
and market practice view the same set of facts from different perspectives. Legal 
certainty was also at stake for both market participants and the tax authorities, both 
having their own views on what decision would have been predictable and justified 
from the perspective of legal certainty.264 
Due to business secrecy, publicly available sources do not tell how the market 
participants subject to AIPA dealt with the situation. Some guidance can be found 
by reading the transnational contract itself. A Finnish counterparty, subject to AIPA, 
who was to be the in-the-money party and would receive financial collateral from its 
counterparty and then use this collateral elsewhere, would be subject to tax while 
not being able to reclaim the amount paid in taxes from its counterparty under the 
standard terms of the ISDA MA. However, such an ‘Affected Party’, in the parlance 
of the ISDA MA, would likely have the right to terminate the transactions affected 
by the tax ruling.265 Effectively, this would disadvantage some parties subject to 
this tax treatment in comparison to those who are not.
In essence, the legal question was about recharacterization of the title transfer 
arrangement on financial collateral. Regarding the facts of the case, two parties, 
A and B, had entered into an ISDA MA arrangement with the purpose of using a 
Credit Support Annex to facilitate the transfer of financial collateral between the 
262 ibid.
263 KHO 2012:112.
264 Oravainen (n 258) 1376.
265 Harding (n 12) 76-7, 232-3, 249-50; Chapter 4 (n 218).
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parties during the term of the contract. Put simply, should A owe to B 10 units of 
currency under their current position in derivatives transaction(s), A would have 
to post financial collateral (variation margin) to B for the same amount, and vice 
versa, to cover their respective positions.266 First, the collateral taker has the title of 
ownership to the transferred collateral, meaning that the collateral taker may reuse 
the received financial collateral as it sees fit instead of just holding the collateral. 
The right of reuse follows from the transfer of title, and in the transnational market, 
financial collateral is in circulation and reused constantly.267 Second, the collateral 
giver has the right to use various types of financial instruments to satisfy the collateral 
requirement, and, in other words, it is essentially not required to post a specific type 
of financial instrument. Third, financial instruments by their nature accrue yield, 
interest for bonds, and dividends for shares, prior to their maturity. The market 
standard is that when the collateral is held by either A or B, the title to this yield is not 
transferred to the collateral taker but the collateral taker is required to compensate 
the accrued yield to the collateral giver: the title of ownership concerns the financial 
instruments used as collateral, not the yield. The purpose of the collateral is to cover 
the position of the ‘in-the-money’ party, not to transfer the economic rights to the 
collateral which remains with the ‘out-of-the-money’ party. 
From a legal theoretical perspective, the case involved interactions between 
transnational law, supranational and national law. First, it involved transnational law 
in the form of IFRS accounting standards and the ISDA Master Agreement, as well 
as financial collateral itself, a private construct. Second, it involved a supranational 
element in the form of Financial Collateral Directive designed together with public 
and private regulators to bring, among other things, legal certainty to the financial 
markets.268 Third, it involved a national transposition law, the FCA, which needed to 
be weighed against another national law, the AIPA, which reflects the core element 
of national sovereignty, taxation. It may be inconsequential whether the Supreme 
Administrative Court would have been able to characterize the case as a matter 
of transnational law in verbatim. Referring directly to the transnational contract 
as a manifestation of market practice allowed for transnational law to have some 
legal weight over the interpretation of local tax authorities on the legal nature of 
financial collateral. However, this argument alone would probably not have sufficed 
to outweight the interpretation of the tax authorities, who based their argument 
on national tax law, but had to be accompanied with ‘hard law’, i.e. the national 
transposition act of the FCD which, in turn, has its origins in transnational law 





5.9 FINTECH THEN AND NOW: EVOLUTION DOES NOT STOP
Much of the description given in this chapter can be viewed merely as a historical 
account. The point of the chapter is to emphasize that many drivers affect how 
finance and law interact, and that we do not have foresight on evolution. In the 
1980s, ISDA was a driver for contractual simplification, not only intentionally, 
but also without premeditation. Those derivatives that became in demand were 
contractually standardized through industry co-operation and those products that 
remained more exotic, i.e. they were so bespoke in their economic substance that the 
product could ‘fit’ only to one or relatively few buyers.269 It was an industry driven 
largely by market demand for financial innovation that turned into identifiable 
products and product categories that had a somewhat identifiable life cycle and 
characteristics.270 
Importantly, from an evolutionary perspective, the more frequently a type of 
new derivative product was traded, the more incentive the market participants 
had to co-operate to agree on relevant definitions for this new product. First, this 
would mean that such definitions would have to be included in the confirmation 
of such trades. In other words, rather than including only the economic terms of a 
trade, the counterparties had to make longer confirmations (known as ‘long form 
confirmation’ referring to situations where the counterparties had not signed an 
ISDA MA271). This was the only way to include the new product descriptions and 
related terms and conditions to the ISDA MA architecture that did not yet recognise 
specific definition booklets that would allow the ISDA MA to be expanded to also 
cover new types of products. However, once the supply and demand for a new type 
of financial derivative continued to grow, it was for ISDA to step in and standardize 
commonly accepted definitions for each new class of derivatives products. This 
would allow market participants to again return to shorter confirmations (referred to 
as ‘short form confirmations’ where the counterparties had already signed the ISDA 
MA272) by utilising standardized sets of definitions for different product categories 
that could be incorporated into the ISDA MA architecture through reference.273 
269 Weber (n 118) 807.
270 Eli M Remolona, ‘The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets’ (Winter 1992–1993) FRBNY 
Quarterly Review 1, 33–34. <https://fraser.stlouisfedorg/files/docs/publications/frbnyreview/
pages/1990-1994/67192_1990-1994.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
271 Harding (n 12) 19.
272 ibid.
273 Weber (n 118) 807; Feder (n 35) 352–56. For an overview of the Definitions, Guylaine Charles, ‘The 
ISDA Master Agreement – Part I: Architecture, Risks and Compliance’ (2012) January–February, Pract. 
Compliance & Risk Mgmt 27. 
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Technological development has also contributed to the evolution of the ISDA MA 
architecture. In earlier days, automation of the trading process was limited given that 
there was no technology available to do so.274 Further along the line, ISDA adopted 
new technological standards to the ISDA MA architecture introduced first not only 
by specialized service providers, but also by major dealer banks such as J.P. Morgan. 
Technological advancement allowed for a quicker and more transparent form of 
electronic trading. Instead of trade calls, trades were made with on-screen access 
to bid and ask spreads with added features such as automatic trade execution. The 
trades were processed in a way that allowed the flow of all trade information to be 
freely and easily exchanged between counterparties regardless of the software or 
hardware they were using.275 
Competition in trading technologies and platforms was a large part of the business 
already by the late 1980s when 24-hour trading became a reality. Derivatives 
transactions could be executed in some time zone at any given time through 
interconnected clearing systems. The more the trades, the easier the trading.276 It 
is evident that technological progress has been fast since the 1980s and this progress 
has raised many questions about ethics and legal standards across different areas 
of finance. More recently, in the derivatives market, these questions have revolved 
at least around the question of ‘automated illegal activity’ of ‘autonomous artificial 
agents’ and how to address this plausible problem from a regulatory perspective.277 
Nowadays, new technologies are commonly referred to as ‘FinTech’, which is also 
an umbrella term to describe the emergence of a distinct business sector in financial 
technology. ‘Distributed ledger technology’ and ‘blockchain’ may offer responses 
to obligatory trade reporting of derivative contracts to trade repositories, a legal 
person that centrally collects and maintains the records of derivatives, for regulatory 
purposes.278 Distributed ledger technology may have profound implications also on 
the OTC derivatives market. At its core, distributed ledger technology has a computer 
protocol that has various uses across payment systems to financial reporting and 
compliance, to name only a few areas of application. It can be used to record and 
share the same information among its users in allegedly more reliable form and 
274 Andrew Parry, ‘ISDA/FpML for financial derivatives’ (2007) 22 J.I.B.L.R. 495, 497.
275 Umberto Cherubini, Giovanni Della Lunga, Structured Finance: The Object-Oriented Approach (John 
Wiley & Sons 2007) 277. 
276 Chris O’Malley, Bonds Without Borders: A History of the Eurobond Market (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 
2014) 171–75. For the impact of technology on the on-exchange futures trading and the emergence of 
electronic trading platforms, Ray McKenzie, ‘The Impact of Electronic Trading on the FX Market’ in 
Francesca Taylor, Mastering Derivatives Markets: A Step-by-Step Guide to the Products, Applications 
and Risks (4th edition, The Mastering Series, FT Press 2011) 215–21.
277 Gregory Scopino, ‘Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for Oversight of 
Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets’, (2015) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 439.
278 Alexis Collomb, Klara Sok, ‘Blockchain / Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): What Impact on the 
Financial Sector’ (2016) 103 Communications & Strategies 93.
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manner than is currently possible. Payments and post-trade processing are among 
the likely areas where this technology can be used, which could mean that existing 
processes may be enhanced rather replaced by FinTech.279 
For example, blockchain technology would allow for a greatly enhanced 
traceability of ownership in securities. On a practical level, the technology could 
enhance delivery-versus-payment systems in that it would allow buyers and sellers 
to ensure that the seller is indeed the legal owner of the securities being sold, 
and the buyer has the cash to buy them. As discussed earlier, settlement times 
traditionally vary between cash accounts and securities accounts. Distributed ledger 
technology would treat these account types as the same, or more precisely ‘to have 
on the same digital data infrastructure’, which would at least decrease the risk of 
having two sets of settlements between two account types with different settlement 
times. Essentially, and in theory, in the blockchain environment a trade would equal 
settlement, while in the traditional environment trade and settlement are two sets 
of processes with different legal implications.280 
Generally, this rapid growth in financial technology may ‘increase financial 
diffusion and industry evolution in a way that strains regulatory supervision and 
assessment’.281 While the concepts can be new, rapid technological advancement 
adopted and driven by the financial sector is by no means a new phenomenon as 
it can be verified to have been its characteristic feature at least from the 1970s. It 
would also seem that these new technologies and their implications are not generally 
well understood and their adoption can give rise to significant legal uncertainty. 
While international organizations, such as the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures that operates under the Bank for International Settlements and 
IOSCO and regional actors, such as European Securities Market Authority of the EU, 
have identified and sought to regulate these new areas, it may be that the national 
legal systems can exacerbate the legal risk as these technologies ‘by its very nature, 
transcends national borders and national legal frameworks’.282 In other words, 
transnational law can collide with legislation and regulation. The occurrence and the 
nature of such an event cannot be forecasted or even quantified with any precision. 
The same technology will likely have a significant impact on the financial market 
infrastructure generally and central counterparties specifically.283 The centrally 
stored data is used by regulators such as ESMA, national competent authorities, 
279 Imogen Garner and others, ‘FinTech: analyzing the changing nature of financial services’ (2016) 140 
C.O.B. 1, 2. 
280 Collomb, Sok (n 278) 6.
281 Christina Parajon Skinner, ‘Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation’ (2016) 94 N.C.L. Rev. 861, 874.
282 Garner and others (n 279) 6–7, 11–12. For an argument in favour of coordination through standard-
setting bodies such as IOSCO, Skinner (n 281) 922–25.
283 There is evidence that the techonology of CCPs are created by the large dealer banks. Paolo Saguato, 
‘The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When Skin in the Game is not Enough, the Remutualization of 
Clearinghouses’ (2017) 34 Yale J. on Reg. 601, 651–52.
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the European Systemic Risk Board, and the central banks of the European System 
of Central Banks to carry out their supervisory functions of regulatory oversight.284 
For example, such trade datasets have been used in assessing the behaviour of 
market participants and investors in a market situation involving credit default 
swap trading and the ISDA Master Agreement and the risk flows in the credit 
default swap market.285 The reporting obligation has been welcomed by regulators 
and academics alike in overcoming certain areas deemed problematic in the OTC 
derivatives market.286 However, regulators have also identified and addressed 
problems associated with the quality and availability of the data in some instances.287 
The impact of such new technologies to trade reporting and financial market 
infrastructure are outside the scope of this dissertation but it is assumed that this 
area will be met with regulation and reregulation.288
5.10 PRIVATE REGULATORY MECHANISMS: CREDIT DERIVATIVE 
DETERMINATIONS COMMITTEES 
5.10.1 THE ORIGINS AND REVOLUTION OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Technological advancement in risk management played an important part in this 
development as well as they ‘enhanced dramatically the perceived ability of large 
financial institutions to identify and quantify risks, leading to increased confidence 
in investment and hedging strategies that utilized data from those technologies’.289 
An important example of financial innovation, contractual standardization and yet 
another rapid market growth can be found from the early credit derivative markets. 
The first credit default swap290 has often been attributed to a transaction negotiated 
and executed in 1994 when JP Morgan, an investment bank, sold its $4.8 billion 
credit risk exposure towards Exxon, a large oil and gas company, facing a $5 billion 
law suit from the famous 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, to the European Bank of 
284 EMIR preamble (5), (41). 
285 Grzegorz Halaj, Tuomas A Peltonen, Martin Scheicher, ’How did the Greek credit event impact the credit 
default swap market? (2018) 35 Journal of Financial Stability, 136, 139; Marco D’Errico, Stefano Battiston, 
Tuomas A Peltonen, Martin Scheicher, ‘How does risk flow in the credit default swap market? (2018) 35 
Journal of Financial Stability, 53, 60. 
286 Paola Lucantoni, ‘Central counterparties and trade repositories in Post-trading infrastructure under EMIR 
Regulation on OTC derivatives’ (2014) 29(11) J.I.B.L.R. 681, discussing the information asymmetries 
between investors and their intermediaries, 687.
287 Financial Stability Board, ‘Review of OTC derivatives market reforms – Effectiveness and broader effects 
of the reforms’ (29 June 2017) 15–18; Ryan J Patrone, ‘Linking past and present: assessing the stability of 
Post-title vii derivatives markets’ (2015–2016) 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 459, 502.
288 Janet Austin, ‘Protecting Market Integrity in an Era of Fragmentation and Cross-border Trading’ (2014–
2015) 46 Ottawa L. Rev. 25.
289 Weber (n 118) 807.
290 Many others have claimed to have been the first, Taylor (n 276) 228.
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Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), a public financial institution established 
in 1991. EBRD, which had plenty of funds at its disposal, was willing to take this 
credit risk exposure in exchange for a yearly fee payable by J.P. Morgan.291 In the 
simplest of terms, if Exxon would default on its credit line towards JP Morgan, 
EBRD would cover this loss to the former. 
In addition, one important factor for executing this trade was that under the 
1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), the minimum capital adequacy requirements in 
force at that time, J.P. Morgan had to hold certain amount of loan-loss reserves in 
its own accounts against the risk of non-payment by Exxon. J.P. Morgan could have 
transferred the actual credit line, the loan, but as by law this would had required 
permission from Exxon, this was not an option given that it could have damaged 
the client relationship.292 In 1996, the Federal Reserve System of the US issued 
a statement that allowed financial institutions to reduce their regulatory capital 
requirements by transferring default risk from their balance sheet. By tailoring and 
structuring a then-exotic CDS with EBRD, J.P. Morgan could transfer the risk and 
relieve itself from the regulatory burden of holding loan-loss reserves for a risk to 
which it no longer had exposure.293 
From the regulatory perspective, CDS contracts remained an anomaly subject 
to regulatory arbitrage with one main question revolving around whether the credit 
risk weighting should be about the credit risk in the reference asset, like in the 
aforementioned credit line between J.P. Morgan and Exxon, or the credit risk of the 
counterparty.294 In the EU, from a capital treatment perspective, credit derivatives 
received lower risk weight under the Solvency Ratio Directive provided that the 
credit derivative was made for ‘hedging purposes’. To prove that it was, market 
participants were required to provide documentary evidence of a valid transfer of 
risk to regulators. Regulators in different jurisdictions had different criterias and for 
this reason, there was no level playing field for financial institutions in this regard.295
The market for CDS would grow rapidly during the following years creating 
an ever-increasing demand for contractual standardization, especially in regard 
to what event would require the protection seller to compensate the protection 
291 O’Malley (n 276) 149–50.
292 Kim (n 19) 347.
293 O’Malley (n 276) 149–50.
294 Burkhard Drees, Garry J Schinasi, Charles Kramer, ‘Modern Banking and OTC Derivatives Market: The 
Transformation of Global Finance and its Implications for Systemic Risk’ (2000) 203 Occasional paper/




Systemic-Risk.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
295 Federico Torzo, Peter Scherer, ‘The capital treatment of credit derivatives in Europe’ (1999) 14 J.I.B.L. 
144, 147–150; Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio 89/647/EEC for Credit 
Institutions, OJ L386, Council Directive 93/6/EEC of March 15, 1993, [1993] O.J. L141/1.
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buyers. The early contractual drafts ‘varied widely over a range from reasonably 
good to embarrassingly bad’.296 To meet this demand, in 1998 ISDA published a 
19-page ISDA Confirmation (Confirmation of OTC Credit Swap Transaction, Single 
Reference Entity, Non-Sovereign) that could be used either with the ISDA MA or 
as a standalone contract. Already before its official publication, market participants 
used the draft versions of the ISDA Confirmation.297 At that time, the innovation was 
that credit default swaps could help to achieve at least two central objectives from 
the perspective of financial institution which were: (i) the possibility to maintain 
good relationship with a borrower (selling of an asset would require the creditor 
to notify the borrower that it has transferred the loan to another entity) while; (ii) 
transferring the exposure, not the asset itself, to a party willing to take the credit 
risk in exchange for a fee through swap. The counterparties to a CDS transaction 
do not need, nor are expected to have, any relationship with the reference entity. In 
contrast to insurance, the parties executing the swap do not need to own the asset 
and prove a loss when the CDS is contractually triggered, i.e. a situation covered 
by a contractual term known as ‘Credit Event’ has occurred.298 
The innovation that tied the economic substance and legal considerations 
is that the occurrence of payment obligation depends on how a Credit Event is 
defined. The ISDA Confirmation included eight standardized definitions which 
the market participants could use as they saw fit.299 In addition, given that some 
of the Credit Events are more or less subjective (for example, default on a loan) 
whereas others are not (for example, bankruptcy filing date) and thus subject to 
potential disputes between the protection buyer and the protection seller, ISDA 
further added specifications beforehand to address this issue. 300 ISDA responded 
with the first version of standardized terms to this end and introduced the ISDA 
Credit Derivatives Definitions (1999),301 now in its 2014 version,302 which was at 
least a partial driver for the rapid growth of the emerging credit derivatives market 
and for the reduction of potential legal disputes, while common, concerning the 
same.303 Market participants identified many legal risks in credit derivative trading, 
296 Henderson (n 60) para 6.1.
297 For a comprehensive assessment of the range of CDS documentation, Henderson (n 60).
298 Taylor (n 276) 229, 234–35.
299 R Brent Jones, Thomas J Werlen, ‘ISDA Offers Standard Documents for Credit Swaps’ (1998) 17 Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. 21, 23, including a summary of credit events; Taylor (n 276) 227; For the process of how market 
events affect the definitions and how the amendment process is carried out between market participants, 
Ed O’Connell, Kristin Boggiano, ‘Understanding ISDA’s Credit Derivative Rules’ (2003) 22 Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. 23. 
300 Brent Jones, Werlen (n 299) 21, 23. 
301 O’Malley (n 276) 152.
302 ISDA news release, February 21, 2014 <https://www.isda.org/2014/06/30/2014-isda-credit-derivatives-definitions> 
accessed 1 June 2019.
303 Romain G Ranciere, ‘Credit Derivatives in Emerging Markets’ (2001) IMF Policy Discussion Paper, 
International Monetary Fund, 4–5, <https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/856.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
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one of which was that the transactions could be recharacterized as insider trading. 
Through contract standardization and innovation, parties could reduce this risk. 
The risk was that while being contractually allowed to call default at the point of 
Credit Event, insider trading laws could see this as insider trading by the buyer, 
the seller, or the reference entity, if the information allowing for the Credit Event 
to be ‘triggered’ was not publicly available on the market. For this reason, ISDA 
standardized a condition according to which a Credit Event could be ‘triggered’ 
only when the information leading to the same was publicly available from sources 
defined in the contract.304 
Regarding the question of why regulators failed to regulate the new market 
in the US, the answer was clear: prohibiting credit derivatives would not have 
curtailed the market but rather it would had developed outside the US. It was a 
public policy question of protecting the domestic financial industry from foreign 
competition in this emerging market.305 Considering the experiences from the 
eurobond markets, the argument is understandable. Once the use of credit swaps 
was allowed, it was no longer a matter of prohibiting the CDS market from emerging, 
but rather controlling it to the extent possible, perhaps counterintuitively, by not 
interfering, and by allowing the market to expand within the jurisdiction of the US 
regulatory agencies. Later amendments to existing laws, relaxation to position limits, 
and the enactment of new laws further clarified the legal status of OTC derivatives. 
This culminated in the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act306 
of 2000 that explicitly prohibited the SEC and CFTC from regulating the OTC 
derivatives markets. 307
The Discussion Paper also includes the list of market standard ISDA definitions used in sovereign credit 
events, 15–6, and an example timeline for physical or cash settlement, 17 < https://econ-papers.upf.
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Convergence’ (2010) 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 639, 659–61.
306 Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A (2000) (codified 
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307 Securities Exchange Commission <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml> accessed 
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5.10.2 TRANSNATIONAL CDS TRANSACTIONS 
Credit derivative may resemble insurance, but unlike in insurances, the protection 
buyer does not need to prove any loss or have any credit exposure to the reference 
entity. If credit swaps were to be characterized as insurances while the seller was 
not an authorized insurer, these products could potentially, if not likely, become 
unenforceable and their seller potentially subject to sanctions for unauthorized 
activity. Credit derivatives come in many forms and in economic terms they may 
be structured as a swap, an option, or their hybrid - swaption, but usually they are 
executed in the form of a swap. They fall within the ambit of ‘derivatives’ because 
credit derivatives derive their value from another instrument or product. 308 
TABLE 3
The basic idea of credit default swaps,309 needs to be explained in order to understand 
Credit Determinations Committees, an important evidence of the existence of both 
transnational law as well as an private regulatory mechanism. Party A (the ‘protection 
buyer’) is, for one reason or another, worried about the creditworthiness of Party X 
(the ‘reference entity’) which is in financial difficulties. If Party X is unable to perform 
308 Henderson (n 60) paras 5.1–5.10; Matthew C Turk, ‘The convergence of insurance with banking and 
securities industries, and the limits of regulatory arbitrage in finance’ (2015) 967 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 967, 
1046–1052; Paul U Ali, ‘Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitizations: Innovation and Fragility’ (2005) 
20 B.F.L.R. 293; David Benton, Patrick Devine, Philipp Jarvis, ‘Credit Derivatives Are Not Insurance 
Products’ (1997) 16 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 29.
309 Henderson (n 60) describes how ‘[t]hey [credit derivatives] have been blamed for the credit crunch, with 
little serious analysis and distressingly ill-informed and misleading public discussion’, para 5.1. 










(a ‘credit event’) under its loan agreement (a ‘reference obligation’), the credit event 
might be unfavourable to Party A. For a fee, Party B (the ‘protection seller’) offers 
to compensate Party A should the credit event occur.310 From the perspective of 
the protection seller, the motive may be in gaining an exposure (expecting, for 
example, Party X to find a way to conduct profitable business) or simply because 
Party A is willing a pay for a transfer of a type of risk to which the protection seller 
could not otherwise gain exposure to. To reduce disputes over its contents, ISDA 
standardized the aforementioned definitions.311 The basic terms of a credit default 
swap contract could include:
• The reference entity, i.e. Party X;
• The reference obligation, for example, a bond issued by a state;
• Credit event, i.e. the circumstances that ‘trigger’, i.e. give the protection buyer 
to demand payment or performance from the protection seller. In this case 
the trigger being the failure of Party X to pay the reference obligation; 
• Deliverable obligations, either physical or cash delivery.
Upon a credit event, the protection buyer transfers the reference obligation to the 
protection seller and receives a par payment from the latter (physical settlement) 
or, much more commonly, through cash settlement. Cash settlement is conducted 
in a private auction mechanism developed by ISDA in 2005.312 The auction will 
determine the auction settlement price. For example, if the price for the reference 
obligation is 8.5 cents on the dollar, Party A will receive 91.5 cents from Party 
B upon the occurrence of a credit event. Only certain market makers, i.e. large 
transnational dealer banks, are eligible to participate in the auction in which they 
place their bids on the reference obligation to determine the auction price. Cash 
settlement is favoured over physical settlement for practical reasons: If many CDS 
contracts with the same reference entity have been sold and a credit event occurs, a 
temporal spike in the demand of, and consequently the higher price on, the reference 
obligation followed by a credit event can be avoided.313
310 Example based on the terminology used in Heinz-Dieter Vogel, Christina E Bannier, Thomas Heidorn, 
‘Functions and characteristics of corporate and sovereign CDS’ (2013). Working Paper Series, Frankfurt 
School of Finance & Management, No. 203, 10–1 <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81547> accessed 1 June 
2019.
311 Moorad Choudhry, Structured Credit Products: Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitisation (2nd 
edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010) 21–22, 135.
312 Cash settlement became the transnational norm in the aftermath of the GFC. In 2008, Markit Group 
Limited, a private company, served as the auction administrator who set the specific terms of the auction 
based on documentation approved by ISDA. Justin Conway, Julia Lu Fu, ‘ISDA’s evolving auction 
methodology: cash settlement of loan credit default swaps’ (2008) 2 LFMR 495; Taylor (n 283) 233.
313 This is because there may be much more CDS sold than there are actual reference obligations in the 
market and if the protection buyers have to deliver physically such reference obligations, the prices for 
that reference obligation can increase greatly, Patrick Augustin, Marti G Subrahmanyam, Dragon Yongjun 
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5.10.3 TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN ACTION: GREECE SOVEREIGN  
DEBT DEFAULT REVISITED
The G20 agreed upon a framework of reforms for the OTC derivatives markets in 
2009.314 Transnational private regulation took a large step forward in the same 
year, but perhaps less visibly, especially with respect to CDS contracts. Among the 
most notable aspects of a new protocol created under the ISDA MA architecture 
was the creation of credit derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs). These 
Determinations Committees ‘were an innovative, truly global, private market dispute 
resolution mechanism for the CDS markets’.315 It was this particular ‘Private Sector 
Involvement’ mechanism created by ISDA, as coined by Yves Quintin, that would 
come to play a decisive role on Greek debt in 2012 discussed below. In Europe, 
the DC consisted of 15 financial institutions, ten dealer institutions, and five buy-
side institutions, from which public officials were excluded. In order to understand 
the Greek restructuring, it is necessary to know how these private regulatory 
mechanisms operate.316
Credit default swaps are typically executed under the ISDA MA architecture to 
which market participants have added a separate set of definitions known as the 
2003 ISDA Credit Derivative Definitions. Since 1998, ISDA has regularly used a 
method to address new contractual and legal issues through a private regulatory 
mechanism known as protocols.317 ISDA established a protocol known as ‘Big Bang 
Protocol’ and ‘Small Bang Protocol’ in 2009 which introduced the possibility for 
market participants to request the formation of a determinations committee to 
adjudicate a wide range of possible issues arising under CDS transactions. The 
Big Bang also added auction settlement provisions that establish the method for 
the valuation of the CDS through an auction. In this connection, CDS contracts 
became more transparent in their pricing, more standardized, and were pushed 
towards central clearing at the initiative of dealer banks themselves.318 Both the 
DC and the auction methodology are governed by a privately-created rulebook 
known as ISDA Credit Determinations Committees Rules, among other private 
Tang, Sarah Qian Wang, ‘Credit Default Swaps: A Survey’ (2014) 9 Foundations and Trends in Finance, 1, 
20–21, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532799> accessed 1 June 2019.
314 Chapter 6.
315 Colleen M Baker, ‘When Regulators Collide: Financial Market Stability, Systemic Risk, Clearinghouses, 
and CDs’ (2015–2016) 10 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 343, 371–72.
316 Yves Quintin, ‘Alis...da in wonderland or Greek tragedy? the dynamics of credit default swaps and the 
‘voluntary’ Greek debt restructuring of 2011/2012’ (2012) Int’l Bus. L.J. 277, 278–81; under the standard 
CDS documentation, market participants may also choose a law firm to decide whether a Credit Event has 
occurred or not. Paul N Watterson, Craig Stein, Kristin Boggiano, ’New Bullet LCDS Contract Replaces 
Cancellable Contract’ (2010) 6 Pratt’s J. Bankr. L. 327, 331. 
317 <https://www.ISDA.org//protocols/protocols–overview> accessed 1 June 2019.
318 Choudhry (n 311) 140–41.
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rulebooks.319 Effectively, a private trade organization has created private 
regulatory mechanisms that necessarily does not involve any lawyers acting in 
the capacity of a judge or an arbitrator.320 These private regulatory mechanisms 
are not even characterized as dispute settlement systems in the traditional sense, 
but as an ad hoc way of dealing with and finding a solution to or a price in 
certain pretedermined market occurrences. One such event took place when 
the Hellenic Republic (Greece) were to unilaterally insert retroactively so-called 
collective action clauses into its national debt instruments governed by Greek 
law in order to facilitate a restructuring of its public debt. One central question 
was whether this would constitute a Credit Event under the CDS contracts sold 
on Greek national debt.321 While many of the important aspects of the events 
cannot be revisited in this connection, it is worthwhile to describe how the private 
regulatory mechanisms involved operate.
Market participants protect themselves from sovereign default and national 
bailouts of domestic financial institutions by using credit default swaps.322 If the 
repayment of a distressed government debt is rescheduled or is otherwise reorganized, 
it has repercussions on the CDS market where the risk that a sovereign defaults on 
its debt are bought and sold.323 The combination of a developed country defaulting 
on its debt and its repercussions to the second-largest currency in the world, the 
euro, was ‘the largest episode in financial history’.324 The bondholders of the bonds 
issued by Greece were represented by a transnational organization, the Institute 
of International Finance (IIF), which negotiated directly with Greek officials. The 
largest dealer banks formed, and self appointed an independent steering committee 
to negotiate with both the IIF and Greece. The steering committee was a market 
innovation without legal representation or mandate. Its power derived only from 
the implicit consent of Greece and of the bondholders for this arrangement.325 In 
the absence of of other laws or regulations, market participants from the public 
319 ibid 392–97; Jacky Kelly, John Goldfinch, ‘Weapons of Less Destruction’ (2009) 28 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 36; 
Kenneth A Kopelman, Stephen C Tirrell, Christine L Ayotte-Brennan, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Credit 
Derivatives: ISDA Publishes 2009 Supplement and Protocol’ (2009) 5 Pratt’s J. Bankr. L. 319. 
320 Conway, Fu (n 312) 495.
321 Following the sovereign debt crisis of eurozone member states at that time, the insertion of collective 
action clauses was a way to avoid eurozone defaults and facilitate the rescheduling of public debt with 
private sector bondholders, among others. Allen & Overy Global Law Intelligence Unit, ‘Uses and Abuses 
of Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bonds’ (2013) 14 Bus. L. Int’l 269, 272; Michael Bradley, Mitu 
Gulati, ‘Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis’ (March 28, 2013) <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1948534> accessed 1 June 2019. 
322 Panayiota Koulafetis, Modern Credit Risk Management. Theory and Practice (Macmillan Publishers Ltd 
2017) 100–02.
323 ibid 107–09.
324 Philip R Wood, ‘How the Greek Debt Reorganisation of 2012 Changed the Rules of Sovereign Insolvency’ 
(2013) 14 Bus. L. Int’l 3, 6.
325 ibid 11–12.
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sector and private sector relied on fundamental principles of transnational law and 
private regulatory mechanisms.
In short, collective action clauses, while common in the terms and conditions 
of sovereign debt, are something that may be used to amend the existing terms 
and conditions of the debt instrument to a significant degree by changing: (i) the 
structure of how the debtors can exercise their voting rights; (ii) their ability to call 
default and demand premature payment of the bonds; and (iii) how and by whom 
any payments made by the debtor will be shared among its creditors.326 In the case 
of Greece, the first question was how would the collective action clause be used, 
and second, what would this mean under the terms and conditions of a wholly 
other financial instrument, credit default swaps that private investors had bought 
to protect themselves from the default of Greece. More specifically, after much 
speculation, the question was whether the collective action clause would be used to 
force the private bondholders to change their existing bonds to new securities issued 
by Greece and would this constitute a Credit Event. If deemed to have occurred, 
a Credit Event would have caused the sellers of CDS on Greek bonds to pay the 
CDS buyers. This, in turn, would depend on the interpretation of the ISDA MA 
definitions regarding the voluntariness or mandatoryness of the Greek restructuring 
of the bonds. The DC viewed that the bondholders had voluntarily agreed to the 
reduction in principal and its subordination to bonds held by the ECB. This led to 
two interlinked consequences. First, buy-side market participants assumed that 
their CDS contracts on Greece and other countries in financial trouble would turn 
out to be worthless, if the DC would make the same conclusion in other sovereign 
bonds. Second, it made it more difficult and more expensive for these countries to 
raise capital from the market for the same reason.327 
Many market participants had bought these CDS contracts from certain financial 
institutions to shield themselves, hedge their position, or to speculate, among other 
potential reasons, a potential default by Greece. To further complicate the matter, 
many of these investors were both CDS buyers as well as sovereign bondholders, 
thus raising questions about potential conflict of interest. In either case, should the 
actions of Greece constitute a Credit Event under the terms and conditions of the 
CDS contracts, these protection buyers would be compensated by the protection 
sellers in exchange for the Greek bonds, i.e. physical delivery. The market value 
of the bonds had depreciated owing to the inability of Greece to pay its debts.328 
326 Allen & Overy (n 321) 270–72.
327 Quintin (n 316) 277–78. 
328 Apparently, the fear was that since nobody seemed to have a clear picture of who was to pay to whom and 
how much, the net notional amount of the Greek CDS having been said to be approximatel 3.2 billion of 
Euros, and would the financial markets come to a halt as a result of credit event further escalating the 
financial turmoil in a turbulent sovereign debt market in the EU, Quintin (n 316) 278; a study finds that 
the credit event was well anticipated by market participants, Halaj and others (n 285).
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In the Greek case, a private regulatory mechanism, a determinations committee, 
was required to decide on behalf of its members whether the actions of Greece would 
constitute a credit event under the terms and conditions of the CDS contracts that 
would trigger the procedure outlined above. This, in turn, would first depend on 
how the European Central Bank (ECB) would walk on the tightrope of retaining its 
own credibility and not breaching its own obligation under its Charter and European 
Treaties not to bail-out a EU member state unable to repay its debt on the one hand, 
and on the other, to spare other member states from facing the same situation as 
Greece. The danger was that a cascade of sovereign defaults might endanger the 
whole Eurosystem.329 
After analyzing their options, Greece swapped its existing bonds for seemingly 
identical bonds with ECB and other bondholders. The ECB received new bonds 
which were unaffected by the swap in its principal amount and other terms, and 
the rest of the bondholders were given bonds with reduced principal and other 
unfavourable terms. As to its economic substance, the swap could have been 
interepreted to mean that the debt had been restructured. Under the CDS Definition, 
restructuring would generally constitute a credit event.330 However, the DC decided 
that as all creditors had voluntarily agreed to the bond swap, and hence had agreed 
to receive less than they were entitled to under the original bonds. Following the 
implementation of collective action clause by Greece through the enactment of a 
separate law, this policy measure was deemed not constitute a credit event by the 
DC.331 Later on, once the ECB had come through the crisis relatively unscathed 
and maybe the whole Eurosystem project as well, Greece did use collective action 
clauses in a manner that triggered a credit event. On 9 March 2012, the DC decided 
that a credit event had occurred under the CDS terms and conditions meaning 
that the protection sellers had to compensate the protection buyers for the loss in 
value of Greek bonds332 and also that a private auction would be held to determine 
the market value of the CDS pay-out. The auction process was a joint effort of the 
Determinations Committee, Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), a 
private financial services company headquartered in New York where the CDS 
contracts were cleared and settled, as well as Creditex Group Inc., a broker for credit 
default swaps, and IHS Markit, a service provider for market information and trade 
329 Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, ‘CDS zombies’ (2012) 13 E.B.O.R. 347, 378–80; Rainer Kulms, ‘Private 
creditors and sovereign default: from Argentina to Greece’ (2012) Annals Fac. L. Belgrade Int’l Ed 65, 80–
84, noting how ‘[t]he current Greek debt crisis highlights to what extent interference by the IMF or the 
EU may distort the price mechanism for sovereign bond contracting and restructuring’ 84.
330 Quintin (n 316) 287.
331 For a critical view, Quintin (n 316) 282–87.
332 Francesca Villata, ‘Remarks on the 2012 Greek sovereign debt restructuring: between choice-of-law 
agreements and new EU rules on derivative instruments’ (2013) 2 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato 
e processuale 325, 347–48. 
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processing. From a technical point of view, this particular case was considered to 
be an achievement in terms of market transparency and efficiency.333 
To summarize, the case of Greece clearly demonstrates the existence of private 
regulatory mechanisms and the de facto power they can hold in finance. DCs have 
a decisive role and control in interpreting the contractual terms of the ISDA MA. 
The decisions of DCs have a remarkable effect in politically sensitive markets - in 
this case, maybe to save the CDS market and itself from further sovereign regulatory 
intrusion.334 Generally, the benefits of such private settlement mechanisms and 
processes, such as the DC and auction methodology, do have their positive effects in 
that they reduce the operational complexity associated with CDS markets, provide 
market expertise and almost real-time resolution mechanisms, reduce costs of the 
parties involved by utilizing trading technologies, and enhance the standardization of 
CDS contracts to fit regulatory frameworks.335 On the other hand, many questions 
have been raised. What is the conflict of interest given that the CDS market is in 
the hands of relatively few market participants who also hold the decisive roles in 
the DCs? Some of the central questions that private mechanisms raise include: are 
DCs impartial; do they comply with their own rules; and who supervises them?336 
Post-GFC and due to a regulatory requirement, credit derivatives have generally 
become more standardized and thus eligible for central clearing. However, while 
this development is in line with public policy objectives, the very same major dealer 
banks in this concentrated market have holdings and representation in CCPs, among 
others, which has given rise to antitrust concerns and even litigation.337 
Through repeated interactions, market participants can create normative orders 
with their own private regulatory mechanisms. This is transnational law of finance 
in action. Transnational method focuses on these interactions and puts them into a 
legal theoretical structure. Like in the case of bilateral close-out netting, the interests 
of private market participants and regulators can become aligned and they can 
converge. The former need legal certainty as to ensure the enforceability of close-
out netting in their contracts and the latter need the same for the purposes of 
maintaining public policy of financial stability. Bilateral close-out netting began as 
333 For the Greek CDS Timeline <http://www.dtcc.com/news/2012/june/01/the-greek-cds-timeline-18-days-
in-march> accessed 1 June 2019.
334 Gelpern, Gulati (n 329) 389–90. 
335 Dan Awrey, ‘The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets’ (2014) 34 Rev. Banking & 
Fin. L. 183, 185–86.
336 ibid 186–87, 219–23; John Biggins, Colin Scott ‘Licensing the Gatekeeper? Public Pathways, Social 
Significance and the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees’ (2015) 6 TLT 370, 390–92. 
IOSCO did set up a task force to conduct research and a survey of the market participants relating to the 
possible conflict of interest issues in the DCs and CDS auction processes, IOSCO, ‘IOSCO Statement on 
the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees and CDS auction processes’ 10 October 2017 
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD581.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
337 Felix B Chang, ‘Second-generation monopolization: parallel exclusion in derivatives markets’ (2016) 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 657, 672–79.
223
a spontaneous market practice and gradually evolved into a transnational contract. 
Following regulatory recognition by international regulatory organizations, this 
transnational contract further evolved into being virtually mandatory. In time, the 
enforceability of bilateral close-out netting became codified into the legal orders 
of many nation states. The ISDA Master Agreement is one manifestation of the 
lex mercatoria of finance. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, 
regulators set their aim towards this contractual architecture. 
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6. THE REGULATION OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy of the Herstatt bank in the 1970s (discussed in Chapter 2) left 
a long regulatory legacy behind it. Financial regulation imposed by international 
organisations changed the banking industry in many respects, and Herstatt became 
the starting point of something referred to as transgovernmental financial regulation 
discussed in this Chapter. In contemporary research, the problems of financial 
regulation are acknowledged and widely discussed also among legal scholars. 
However, this does not seem to hinder imposing it. According to Philip R Wood, 
lawyers are the methaphorical priests and the law is the holy word of today.1 He 
continues, that ‘[T]he priests, with their fussy rules about ritual, never approached 
the triviality of much modern law. The main culprit is regulatory law’2 which, in 
turn, is ‘almost entirely a 20th century invention’.3 Of all the types of regulatory 
regimes, while many of them without a doubt are beneficial, ‘[p]robably the worst 
regulatory regime is financial regulation’.4 So far, the emphasis of this research 
has been on the description of how finance and law interact. This Chapter offers 
an example how transnational method may offer an observer the conceptual tools 
to identify what can happen when states take over a privately regulated area of 
finance, and what kind of regulatory legacy it can leave behind.
Wood summarizes the problems of regulatory law as follows. First, governmental 
regulators act both as the agent of the government, the executive, and a judicial 
tribunal. They reflect a tendency to disregard the separation of powers while 
contentrating power to the hands of a single governmental body. Second, regulators 
act both as the judge and the prosecutor, relabel de facto criminal sanctions as 
administrative penalties, and thus disregard the basic protections of criminal law 
from those regulated. Third, the rules ‘are usually extremely detailed, prescriptive, 
intricate, and subject to rapid change’. The regulatory codes are ‘enormous in size 
and disproportionate’, and the regulators have a tendency to regulate for the sake 
of regulation. Fourth, these same regulations can be applied extraterritorially with 
1 Philip R Wood, The Fall of the Priests and the Rise of the Lawyers (Hart Publishing 2016) 3. 
2 ibid 242.
3 ibid 243.
4 ibid 243; Schuyler Henderson refers to the regulatory response of the global financial crisis in relation 
to OTC derivatives as ‘a combination of ideology, an old-fashioned political power-grab and cynical 
manipulation of public opinion’, Schuyler Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (2nd edition, LexisNexis 
2010) xi.
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‘flimsy contacts with the regulating jurisdictions.’5 As much of this research has 
touched upon financial regulation, these claims warrant further investigation. 
Before going into financial regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market, it 
is necessary to investigate what is the public policy objective that financial regulation 
seeks to achieve and that it seeks to prevent.
6.2 FINANCIAL REGULATION AND FINANCIAL BOOMS AND 
BUSTS
Financial regulatory experts seem to agree that regulating finance is a hard thing 
to do. Creating regulation may be easy, but does it achieve what it is intended to 
achieve? As Frank Partnoy has summarized: 
[A]lthough there have been hundreds of financial crises, and centuries 
of research about them, scholars still understand very little about 
[financial] crises […] The 2007–08 GFC did not generate much 
consensus either; instead, created new puzzles.6 
James R Barth and others share the as Partnoy in admitting how regulating finance 
is an: 
[e]xtraordinarily hard thing to do. […] the economic and political 
ingredients are constantly changing as economies evolve, financiers 
innovate, lobbyists lobby, and older political constituencies weaken as 
new ones emerge.7 
Public policy responses to crisis have been varied in substance and in objectives. 
The regulatory response to the Global Financial Crisis depends on how one views 
its origins.8 For the avoidance of doubt, financial crises are not comparable to 
natural disasters for which nothing could be done. However, narratives behind 
public policies go often unchallenged and the ‘symbiotic relations between banks and 
governments’ are barriers to reforms.9 The debate over regulation is also polarized. 
5 ibid 244.
6 Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, Jennifer 
Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (CUP 2013) 69.
7 James R Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr, Ross Levine, Guardians of Finance – Making Regulators Work for Us 
(The MIT Press 2012) 22.
8 Xavier Freixas, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró, Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation 
(MIT Press 2015) 2–3. 
9 Anat R Admati, ‘The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking’ 
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On one hand, there are those for which everything should be regulated, as it is now, 
and anything to do with private viewed with outright suspicion. Conversely, there 
are those who are convinced that regulation may be well-intentioned, but they create 
adverse unintended consequences that warrant for minimal regulation.10 Be that as 
it may, the Herstatt case example discussed in subchapter 2.1.1 demonstrates that 
complex legal questions can be solved through transnational cooperation between 
the stakeholders in an orderly manner without virtually any financial regulation 
imposed from top-down. In addition, historical perspective is useful to keep in mind 
if one is to feed into the blame-game narrative. Certain types of OTC derivative 
products are attributed as significant catalysts in the global financial crisis of 2008. 
As the evidence tells, these products, credit derivatives, were not only permitted 
by regulatory authorities but the structuring of which was originally a joint effort 
between financial institution and a specialized financing company owned by and 
operating under the control of states, as discussed in Chapter 5. The use of these 
credit products was even recommended and incentivized by public regulators, and 
the source of over-indebtedness and the inevitable creation of toxic assets is at least 
to some extent a deliberate public policy and political choice emerging from at least 
from the late-1970s, as discussed in subchapter 2.11.4 and 2.11.5. 
Economic boom as a general term is often linked to assumed increased standard 
of living - built on perhaps unsustainable levels of debt - at artificially low interest 
rates set by central banks, high returns on leveraged investments fuelled by lax 
lending practices, infusion of foreign capital pushing the cost of capital even 
lower, and government policies that may favour all of the above. This is followed 
by the eventual economic bust following the over indebtedness of sovereigns and 
individuals in relation to their actual net worth when the past performance - built 
on debt - fails to meet the projections of future performance. 
There is nothing new in boom and bust cycles and the procyclical nature of 
banking. Governmental actors seek to address and prevent future bust phases with 
financial regulation made in haste perhaps to answer a public outrage and claim 
credit for quick and grandiose regulatory solutions. Some suggest that this is what 
happened also after the GFC.11 These regulations, in turn, seek to prevent a type of 
financial crisis that has just occurred. The problem is that none of the crises are the 
same. John C Jr Coffee has described this type of cycle as a ‘Regulatory Sine Curve’:
(2014) 43 The Journal of Legal Studies 35, 55–57.
10 Avinash D Persaud, Reinventing Financial Regulation – A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk 
(Apress 2015) 7.
11 Kenneth M Rosen, ‘Cooperation Before Consolidation in Investor Protection’ (2015–2016) 90 Tul. L. Rev. 
1211, 1221–21; Steven McNamara, ‘Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central 
Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives’ (2014) 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 209 <http://
scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol28/iss1/6237> accessed 1 June 2019. 
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[(1)] regulatory oversight is never constant but rather increases after a 
market crash and then wanes as, and to the extent that, society and the 
market return to normalcy, and (2) the public’s passion for reform is 
short-lived and the support it gives to political entrepreneurs who oppose 
powerful interest groups on behalf of the public also quickly wanes.12
Saul T Omarova notes and summarizes how the post-GFC anti-financial industry 
sentiment and the denying of the whole concept of self-regulation risks leading 
to unilateral top-down regulation which is bound to create ‘a never-ending spiral 
of rulemaking and rule evading’ in the form of regulatory arbitrage discussed in 
subchapter 3.5.3. A point worth repeating is that financial regulation is also an 
ideological battleground driven by narratives between proponents of uninhibited 
self-regulation from government intrusion and those that claim that self-regulation 
lacks legitimacy and accountability and thus strict government control is the only 
solution.13 Often the proponents of different views are not discussing the same topic, 
or they understand the key concepts differently. One important note is that self-
regulation is not deregulation, and promotion of self-regulation is not inherently 
incompatible from direct government regulation.14 
Law and economics tell that regulations can have a ‘placebo effect’. Like a 
placebo medicine, financial regulation can work on a patient who believes that 
a fake-medicine is real and has real effects. To draw an analogue, if people think 
that a law can produce the outcome it seeks to produce, they act in accordance 
with the law.15 However, placebo medicine is not supposed to contain harmful 
ingredients. The ethical concern is that laws and regulations can create incentives 
for people to act in a way that people otherwise would not act were they aware of 
the actual probability and magnitude of risks.16 Experts in financial regulation 
are allegedly ‘in fact often keen to keep the politics out of their cooperation and 
“get on with the job” without worrying much about national lobbies, negotiation 
mandates, and elusive package deals’.17 Especially in a financial crisis, the public 
12 John C Jr Coffee, ‘Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and 
Systemic Risk Perpetuated’ (2012) 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1029–30; Niamh Moloney, ‘Resetting the 
location of regulatory and supervisory control over EU financial markets: lessons from five years on’ 
(2013) 62 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 955.
13 Saule T Omarova, ‘Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-regulation’ (2011) 
159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411, 422–23, <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1014> accessed 1 June 2019.
14 ibid 424–45.
15 Amitai Aviram, ‘The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions’ (2006) 75 George 
Washington Law Review 54, 101, 138–40; Michael S Kirsch, ‘Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax 
Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy’ (2004) 89 
Iowa Law Review, 863, discussing the symbolic reassurance of the public through enacting legislation.
16 Amitai Aviram, ‘Bias Arbitrage’ (2007) 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 789
17 MAP Bovens, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy and Accountability in EU Governance’ in Paul’t Hart, Deirdre 
Curtin, Mark Bovens, The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit? (OUP 2010) 19–23. 
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opinion and perception of legitimacy that these networks have can turn negative. 
Reinforcement through repetition of positive narratives is a tool used to rebuild 
public opinion back to positive. In turn, should these ‘pathways of legitimation’ 
break down, public opinion can become negative regardless of the actual economic 
performance of a society.18 
Typically, financial crises share three characteristics: prolonged downturn 
in asset prices, declines in output, rise of unemployment, and following from 
the collapse in tax revenues, the high increase in public debt.19 The boom, deep 
depression, and recovery of the economies of Finland and Sweden in 1985–2000 
can serve as one example of what is meant by financial boom-bust cycles where 
the crisis in the financial sector spills over to real economy. These crises coincide 
with the liberalization era.20 Finland and Sweden are chosen as a case example 
since they both faced extensive institutional changes from the middle of the 1980s. 
Market liberalization was a gradual process both in Sweden and in Finland from 
‘no liberalization’, to ‘partial liberalization’, and finally to ‘full liberalization’.21 In 
addition, in a European context, the recessions that followed the boom-phase were 
particularly severe in these two countries.22 In finance, the boom-phase meant 
soaring rates in credit expansion, consumption, investments, and asset prices. In 
public policy, this meant lax fiscal policies and interest rate policies that sought 
to defend the pegged exchange rates. Regarding the effect on the real economy, 
inflation led to a gradual loss of foreign competition to which the answer of central 
banks was to keep interest rates high.23 A surge of newly available cheap credit 
made both consumers and corporations spend more than they otherwise would 
have.24 To add further to the crisis, Finland was severely affected by the collapse 
of exports to the Soviet Union.25 
18 Erik Jones, ‘Output Legitimacy and the Global Financial Crisis: Perceptions Matter’ (2009) 47 CMS 1085, 
1097.
19 Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth S Rogoff, ‘The Aftermath of Financial Crises’ (2009) 99 (2) The American 
Economic Review 466.
20 Jaakko Kiander, Pentti Vartia, ‘Lessons from the crisis in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s’ (2011) 38 
Empirica 53; For an analysis of the Eurozone crisis Post-GFC, Kaarlo Tuori, Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone 
Crisis – A Constitutional Analysis (CUP 2014) 61–78.
21 Graciela Laura Kaminsky, Sergio L Schmukler, ‘Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization 
and Stock Market Cycles’ (2008) 12 Review of Finance, Oxford University Press for European Finance 
Association 253, 287. 
22 Lars Jonung, Jaakko Kiander, Pentti Vartia, ‘The great financial crisis in Finland and Sweden – The 
dynamics of boom, bust and recovery, 1985–2000’ (2008) 350 Economic Papers, European Commission, 
December 2008, 3 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication13551_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2019.
23 Kiander, Vartia (n 20) 53, 54.
24 Jonung and others (n 22) 10–11.
25 Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia, ‘Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update’ (2012) WP/12/163 <https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12163.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; Luc Laeven, Fabian 
Valencia, ‘Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database’ (2008) IMF Working Paper WP/08/224, 39 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08224.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
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During the early phases of the boom period, market liberalization was still 
partial. Sweden and Finland fully liberated their capital accounts in 1989. As to 
the differences, Sweden liberated its domestic financial sector fully already in 
1985, in comparison to Finland that did the same in 1990. Sweden liberalized its 
stock markets fully in 1980, and Finland in 1990. Both countries had seemingly 
developed legal and social institutions, but they did not shield their economies 
from arguably unexpected and deep economic recession once international interest 
rates started to increase, output and asset prices collapsed, and the problems led 
to contagion in their respective domestic banking sectors and from there to the 
real economy. Defaults in the private sector led to contagion of these problems to 
financial institutions and the respective currencies of Finland and Sweden. While 
not an isolated issue, the fact that both countries had fixed exchange rates in force 
amplified the boom period and deepened the economic downturn and made their 
economic systems vulnerable to speculation on their respective currencies that 
further exacerbated the situation.26 
One of the many lessons of the boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden is that 
rapid credit expansion can fuel financial bubbles, and that ‘great crises come always 
as a surprise’. Large institutional shifts can cause economic turmoil in some, but not 
in other countries with similarly mature markets but with institutional preparedness 
to address the challenges of an internationally open banking sector that can be very 
different to a closed national banking sector.27 More generally, decisions made 
during a crisis are made under uncertainty, the optimal policy choice amid financial 
crisis ‘is almost impossible’, and lessons of the past may not offer much guidance 
for present or future problems.28 The debate over financial regulation follows the 
same cycle in that during a crisis there are strong calls for a complete rehaul of the 
whole financial system, and once the crisis seems to be over, the debate fades in 
a matter of months into oblivion.29 The general lessons are also useful to keep in 
mind in the design of any financial regulatory system. 
26 Jonung and others (n 22) 5–6.
27 Kiander, Vartia (n 20) 53, 55–56, 61–64.
28 Kiander, Vartia (n 20) 53, 67.
29 Persaud (n 10) Appendix A, ‘Sending the Herd off the Cliff Edge’, 236–37; Gustaf Sjoberg, ‘Handling 
systemically important banks in distress – some thoughts from a Swedish perspective’ (2011) 12 E.B.O.R. 
227, noting that ‘[o]ne of the main lessons learned from past Swedish history in this field [bank failures] is 
to legislate on the basis of experiences of a crisis before it is forgotten’ 230.
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6.3 RESEARCH ON TRANSGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Before laying out a working definition of transgovernmental organizations, it is 
necessary to summarize this research area to avoid unnecessary terminological 
confusion. Research on transgovernmentalism is about direct and repeated interaction 
between state entities on loosely-structured and unofficial transgovernmental 
networks.30 Janet Austin refers to these governmental entities as transnational 
regulatory networks.31 However, as public regulators ultimately derive their power 
from nation states, transgovernmental might perhaps be more descriptive and 
clearer since this definition does not include the word ‘transnational’. ‘Trans’, 
like in transnational law, is also in this context used to describe how something 
transcends state law and escapes traditional legal categorizations focusing on state-
made laws and regulations. In transnational law, is the private normativity created 
through repeated interactions that espaces the traditional categorizations, and in 
transgovenrnmental, it is the unclear legal status of state-created organizations 
that nevertheless play an important role in contemporary financial regulation. 
Transnational law is here reserved for private normativity and spontaneous 
emergence of privately created law. ‘Transgovernmental’ is a term used here to 
describe semi-autonomous institutions and their horizontally integrated rule-making 
networks which are de-coupled from states to some immeasurable degree.32 In other 
words, research on transgovernmentalism focuses especially on the interactions 
and cooperation between public or quasi-public regulators that derive their powers 
from states but not through international treaties under public international law. 
Transgovernmental studies do not seem to focus on private normativity but maybe 
they should.
Transgovernmental studies come in different shapes, forms, and names, 
perhaps understating the importance of private actors in the creation of both 
public regulation and private self-regulation. In the categorization put forward in 
subchapter 1.3, transgovernmental studies might be most conveniently seen as 
part of administrative transnational law that focuses on state actors but where the 
existence of private normativity is at least acknowledged. For example, Jan Wouters 
and others have noted how ‘[i]nternational regulatory activity takes place in a great 
variety of forums and in many different forms, which are often poorly understood, 
30 Kal Raustiala, ‘Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law’ (2002) 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 
1, 5; Chris Brummer ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’ (2010) 98 California Law Review 327.
31 Janet Austin, ‘The Power and Influence of IOSCO in Formulating and Enforcing Securities Regulations’ 
(2015) 15 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 1.
32 Craig Scott, ‘“Transnational law” as proto-concept: three conceptions’ (2009) 10 German L.J. 859; Neil 
Craik, Debora Van Nijnatten, ‘“Bundled” Transgovernmental Networks, Agency Autonomy and Regulatory 
Cooperation in North America’ (2015–2016) 41 N.C. J. Int’l L. 491. 
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and how ‘even private organisations’ have contributed to this development.33 It might 
be an understatement to say that private actors and organizations have contributed 
to the development of international regulatory activity as discussed in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5. However, while leaving the concept of ‘international regulatory activity’ 
open to input also from private organizations, private normativity can be left to the 
sidelines and viewed with suspicion as is all (too) common. For example, the interests 
of a trade organization, such as International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 
Inc. (ISDA), can be seen as directly confrontational with the interests of consumers. 
The former allegedly weakens consumer protection with strategic ‘market protection 
rhetoric’, i.e. in highlighting their own expertise, and ‘harmonization rhetoric’, 
i.e. in arguing in favour of industry self-regulation or against tighter local public 
regulations. It is difficult to draw a direct connection between the OTC derivatives 
industry, the playground of transnational actors, and private consumers. Nor it is 
clear what is the connection between consumer protection and the rhetoric used 
by ISDA when it was lobbying the Russian Federation for the legal enforceability 
of OTC derivatives as well as legal recognition of bilateral close-out netting and 
financial collateral in its legal system.34 To summarise Chapter 5, lobbying has 
indeed been an important part of reaching legal certainty for bilateral close-out 
netting in many jurisdictions. Its stated objective was to reduce legal risks, and 
through risk, systemic risk, that might especially arise from national insolvency 
laws. It was state organizations that sanctioned and came to require the use of 
close-out netting provisions in transnational financial contracts which are also used 
by states themselves. 
Trade organizations play an important role in public policy formation and should 
be understood better. As summarized by Dan Juma, the system of international 
financial regulation is highly complex, over- and underlapping, fragmented universe 
of actors comprising ‘public, private, inter-governmental, nongovernmental and 
transnational, as well as national actors, each engaged in whole or in part in 
standard setting, monitoring, cooperation and surveillance’.35 In his three-part 
categorization, there are first international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Bank of International Settlements. Second, there are international 
standard setting, policy making, and coordination bodies such as the Financial 
Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Third, there are 
33 Jan Wouters, Andreas Follesdal, Ramses A Wessel (eds), Multilevel Regulation and the EU: The Interplay 
between Global, European, and National Normative Processes (Brill 2008) 1.
34 Caroline Bradley, ‘Financial Trade Associations and Multilevel Regulation’ in Jan Wouters and others (n 
33) 73, 92–9, 94, n 110. 
35 Dan Juma, ‘Tempering services liberalization with regulation: The World Trade Organisation and the 
international financial architecture’ (2011) 14 Int’l Trade & Bus. L. Rev. 247, 250–51.
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international non-governmental/self-regulatory bodies such as the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.36 
To continue with the challenges of public financial regulation, over-eagerness to 
regulate may come at the expense of the actual effectiveness of regulation. At worst, 
financial regulation may be fundamentally flawed.37 Public financial regulation 
can be un-enforced by the authorities and become outdated dead letters through 
simple and never-ending market evolution, i.e. technological and legal innovation 
as discussed in Chapter 3 and 5. It has been long acknowledged that business 
can be driven by regulatory arbitrage,38 which, despite its negative connotations, 
can be seen a feature of modern banking created by financial regulation itself.39 
Furthermore, differences in the underlying assumptions of the public policy 
objectives behind financial regulation may lead to a serious disagreement between 
state supervisory agencies themselves that may create additional risks for the 
financial system.40 It has also been stated that regulators, claiming to be neutral 
and in the best position to decide on international regulation, are in fact driven by 
domestic politics.41 The public policy objectives that legitimize financial regulation 
need to be summarized.
6.4 PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
Financial regulation lacks clarity of purpose and priority, and its objectives can be 
said to be vague, subjective, and even contradictory. 42 What is known and what 
is important for understanding the nature of finance is that financial instruments 
can transmit systemic risk in the interlinked financial system. It is transnational 
contracts that interlink different financial markets as is described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
As noted by Gregory Shill, regulators, legal scholars and the market themselves can 
lack even the vocabulary to describe this phenomenon, let alone having mechanisms 
to somehow manage it.43 This is quite worrysome and remarkable at the same 
36 ibid 251.
37 Eilís Firan, ‘Where in the World is the EU Going?’ in Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G Hill, John 
C Coffee, Jr, Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2013) 5–6.
38 Julia Black, ‘Paradoxes and Failures: New Governance Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75 
Mod. L. Rev. 1037, 1044; Subchapter 3.5.3
39 Joseph Tanega, ‘Securitisation disclosures and compliance under Basel II: a risk-based approach to 
economic substance over legal form: Part 1’ (2005) 20 J.I.B.L.R. 617, 623; Subchapter 2.1.3.
40 Yulia Guseva, ‘Destructive collectivism: Dodd-Frank coordination and clearinghouses’ (2015–2016), 37 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1693, 1696–1700.
41 Ahmed Sanaa, ‘The Politics of Financial Regulation’ (2015) 11 Socio-Legal Rev. 61.
42 Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
Volume 3 (6th edition, Hart Publishing 2016) 492, 499–503.
43 Gregory Shill, ‘Boilerplate Shock: Sovereign Debt Contracts as Incubators of Systemic Risk’ (2014–2015) 
89 Tul. L. Rev. 751, 759.
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time given that there has been ample and publicly available evidence at least since 
the 1960s about these interlinkages discussed under the auspices of transnational 
law, as discussed in chapter 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
What is the public policy, what it aims to achieve, and to who should such 
mechanisms apply and towards whom, especially considering that every individual 
regime of transnational private regulation is different, on the transnational plane?44 
What does even ‘being accountable’ mean besides positively qualifying a given state 
of affairs or the performance of an actor?45 No doubt states have the capability to 
re-regulate private regulatory mechanisms that have ‘lifted off’ from state legal 
systems, or perhaps more descriptively have become transnationalised, and which 
occasionally ‘touches down’ on state by the seeming necessity to recourse to state 
law and legal institutions.46 
Public policy objectives, such as the reduction of systemic risk, enhancement 
of financial stability, and micro- and macroprudential regulation has been at the 
centre of the public policy debate since the GFC.47 Their meaning is obscure. There 
is a lack of coherence in the very core concepts like ‘financial stability’,48 ‘systemic 
risk’,49 and ‘macroprudential’,50 which are all referred to in the G20 declaration 
as something that regulators should focus their efforts on and which serves as a 
justification for financial regulation. Hilary Allen has noted that neither the central 
international organizations nor local legislations define ‘financial stability’ although 
the promotion of financial stability is their shared public policy goal.51 To add further 
44 Deirdre Curtin, Linda Senden, ‘Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: Chimera or 
Reality’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 163, 181. 
45 Hart and others (n 17) 33. 
46 Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and juridical touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private 
International Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Colum. J. Transnationa L. 209.
47 Robert Hockett, ‘The macroprudential turn: from institutional ‘safety and soundness’ to systematic 
‘financial stability’ in financial supervision’ (2014–15) 9 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 201 
48 Benjamin Geva, ‘Systemic risk and financial stability: the evolving role of the central bank’ (2013) 28 
J.I.B.L.R;
49 Pawel Smaga, ‘The Concept of Systemic Risk’ (2014) Systemic Risk 
 Centre Special Paper No 5, The London School of Economics and Political Science, August 2014 2 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61214/1/sp-5.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019; according to one definition, systemic 
risk is a combination of an unexpected operational disruption of global finance which translates into a 
clear and unacceptable threat to the affected political systems clouded by many uncertainties. Allegedly, 
‘transnational coordination’ is still in its infancy. Helmut Willke, Eva Becker, Carla Rostásy, Systemic 
Risk. The Myth of Rational Finance and the Crisis of Democracy, 43, 230 (Campus Verlag 2014); Chapter 
5, (n 199).
50 Bezhad Gohari, Karen E Woody, ‘The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential 
Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?’ (2014–2015) 40 J. Corp. L. 403, noting that 
‘macroprudential policy is decidedly opaque’, 409–12; Piet Clement, ‘The term “macroprudential”: origins 
and evolution’ (2010) BIS Quarterly Review, March; Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia ‘Systemic Banking 
Crises: A New Database’ IMF Working Paper, WP/08/224 < https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1003h.
pdf> 409–12. 
51 Hilary J Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”? The need for some common language in international 
financial regulation’ (2013–2014) 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 929, 932–935. Allen also suggests the adoption of 
a wide definition of ‘financial stability’ that also covers emerging markets in addition to nations with 
developed financial sectors, 947–48.
234
The regulation of the OTC derivatives market after the Global Financial Crisis
legal uncertainty rising from this incoherence, there are considerable cultural 
differences and divergence in national interests when the authorities exercise their 
powers under applicable financial regulation. The regulators are unlikely to co-
operate due to inherent incentive distortions.52 Allen continues:
It is too early to know whether and to what extent the post-crisis 
reforms to the global financial architecture will work. Measured by its 
outputs, the modifications appear to be making the financial system 
safer, but there are, nonetheless, many structural and procedural 
tensions boiling beneath the surface.53
The essence of micro-prudential supervision, however, is that it offers a legal 
frame work for enforceable risk management and capital adequacy rules that 
should provide a level playing field for market participants. These issues were 
emphasized earlier in financial regulation, where now it is more about macro-
prudential supervision.54 Microprudential regulation has been said to have failed 
due to lack of the latter. Macro-prudential focuses on the reduction of systemic risk, 
among many other widely varying public policy objectives.55 
6.5 THE NARRATIVE OF UNREGULATED OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET
One characteristic narrative, in addition to the OTC derivatives industry having 
been unregulated or deregulated which at least contributed to if not was entirely 
blame for the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–9 is that regulatory agencies are 
prone to regulatory capture. This refers to a process through which the regulated, 
transnational financial institutions and transnational corporations, end up 
controlling the regulatory agencies. Through this process, the regulated themselves 
play an important role in shaping regulatory networks through lobbying, among 
others.56 From a legal perspective, however, when looking at the evolution in the 
52 Katia D’hulster, ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision: Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information 
Sharing between Home and Host Supervisors’ (2011) World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
5871 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/172321468325263744/text/WPS5871.txt> accessed 1 
June 2019.
53 Michael S Barr, ‘Who’s in charge of global finance?’ (2013) 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 971, 1016.
54 Dalhuisen (n 42) 479–480.
55 Freixas and others (n 8) 493–98.
56 Ernesto Dal Bó, ‘Regulatory Capture: A Review’ (2006) 22 Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 203, 204–07; Barth 
and others (n 7) 7 referring to literature sources build on ‘on the path breaking research by Edward 
Kane […] on incentive conflicts in financial regulation’, n 13; For incentive conflicts within the financial 
industry, Jonas Prager, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007/8: Misaligned Incentives, Bank Mismanagement, 
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over-the-counter derivatives market through legal journals, narratives such as the 
regulatory capture and monstrously unregulated over-the-counter markets seem 
quite distant. 
Kevin L Young has dubbed this concern as a transnational regulatory capture 
narrative which, while often repeated and assumed to be true, is not always supported 
by empirical evidence. More often the narrative amounts to unsubstantiated claims 
suggesting that private sector influence is systematic, consistent, and leads to 
weakening of regulatory standards.57 Young claims that much research takes this 
narrative as given without proper evidence. The problem of many studies is that the 
underlying assumption is that regulations have been captured while disregarding the 
variation of how many times transnational lobbyists have actually been successful.58 
Nor was there evidence to be found of regulatory capture in the three case studies 
of his own. Despite ‘transnational private sector lobbying campaigns’, also involving 
ISDA, towards the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) during the 
design of the Basel II Accord between 1998–2004, the BCBS either refused these 
arguments (Case study 1: internal credit risk models), adopted much more stringent 
capital requirements in direct opposition to the claims of the lobbyists (Case Study 
2: internal ratings), and adopted stringent regulatory requirements that benefitted 
some technologically more advanced financial institutions over their competitors 
(Case study 3: Pillar I capital charge). Followed by this evidence, Young concludes 
that the BCS uses the private sector information, and engages in direct talks 
with transnational entities, but it is highly selective and acts as an independent 
in its decision making.59 In each case, the BCBS chose the regulatory alternative 
most opposed by the trade associations. It is Case Study 3 that warrants further 
investigation. Why would an expert of a private financial institution believe more 
stringent and costlier regulation is better? Was it a concern over financial stability 
or something else? The answer might lie in the creation of an additional regulatory 
cost on purpose when it is relatively cheaper to comply with a regulatory requirement 
in comparison to competitors. Following this logic, the more intrusive and complex 
the regulation, the better for some. 
Case Study 3 of Young’s research suggests that the transnational lobbyists, 
including ISDA and another trade organization known as the Institute of 
And Troubling Policy Implications’ (2012) Department of Economics, New York, <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2094662> accessed 1 June 2019. Prager concludes, 40: 
 While misaligned incentives play a dominant role in the minds of economists […] as appealing as this 
narrative might be in explaining the financial crisis of 2007–2008 – at best it was supportive rather than 
primary; Chapter 3 (n 26); Chapter 3 (n 217).
57 Kevin L Young, ‘Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying 
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International Finance (the IIF), launched ‘extensive transnational lobbying 
campaign to oppose the explicit “Pillar 1” capital charge for operational risk’ that 
effectively would require banks to develop internal procedures to manage one 
particular type of risk. The counterargument of the trade organizations was that 
this was unnecessary and costly, contrary to industry best practices, and even 
slowed the innovation of risk management. As is usual, the counterarguments 
were backed with information-rich industry studies. The IIF even established 
a separate working group consisting of 40 large transnationally active banks to 
justify its position. The BCBS did not cave in. What is noteworthy is that the 
ranks of the IIF began to crumble when an informal group of experts was formed 
under the IIF that was in favour of the BCBSs’ position. This smaller group came 
from a much more advanced group of 10 transnational financial institutions than 
the rest of the group in terms of their operational risk management practices. 
Viewing the regulatory cost as a relative competitive advantage - it would cost 
more for the smaller competitors to comply with the capital charge - over their 
competitors, it was in this small groups favour to align with the view of the BCBS, 
which in turn benefited from the input of an ‘impartial’ expert group in reaching 
its regulatory objective. ISDA and the IIF was unable to veto BCBSs’ position.60 
Before summarizing the findings of others, it is worthwhile to see what the actual 
view and regulatory response of those regulated was. 
6.6 PRIVATE RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
In the aftermath of the GFC, the large dealer banks formed a policy group known 
as the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (the Policy Group) to provide a 
private sector response to the credit crisis with the stated intention of complementing 
a similar type of efforts carried out by official bodies by offering a set of policy 
precepts and recommendations that should be pursued as a package as the viability 
of one of these recommendations depends on the other.61 The Report acknowledged 
that the common interest of mitigating systemic risk should trump the interests 
of individual institutions while also noting that in a competitive marketplace, the 
common interest should be pursued collectively rather than voluntarily by individual 
60 ibid 677–79; Persaud (n 10) 247–49: 
 Complexity is the avenue of capture […] Big banks can more easily carry the cost of sophisticated internal 
risk assessment than banks that are small, new, or operating in developing countries […] Basle II will 
amplify the credit cycle and add to instability – a particular hardship for small companies and developing 
economies.
61 The Report of the CRMPG III, ‘Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform’, August 6, 2008, 15 <http://
www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. The Policy Group members are listed 
in Exhibit I and the members of the Working Groups in Exhibit II.
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institutions.62 The Report stressed that high-risk complex financial instruments 
should be sold only to sophisticated investors and that the sell-side should ensure 
that themselves as well as that their counterparties qualify as such.63 The Report 
also urged that private initiative should complement official oversight in creating 
and offering industry-wide practices shared by market participants and that primary 
supervisory bodies should engage and comment directly their views to the largest 
market participants in continuous meetings about financial risks and their capability 
to absorb them if so required.64 
Many of the recommendations of the Report touch upon the use of the ISDA 
MA architecture as well as the use of central counterparties which is why they are 
briefly summarized. The Report stresses the importance of adherence to ‘industry 
standards’ and refers to the ISDA Master Agreement in particular, and the role 
ISDA in achieving many of the recommendations. First, it recommends that dealer 
institutions should consider limiting their trades with counterparties that do not 
adhere to standards relating to, among other things, settlement and valuation.65 
Second, the Report urges for the further standardization of the ISDA CSA with 
the objective of reaching effective dispute resolution provisions for valuations 
disputes.66 Third, it calls for active engagement in a technique referred to as ‘trade 
compression’ and that ‘major market participants to aggressively pursue their use’.67 
Fourth, the Report recommends that auction mechanisms should be incorporated as 
the market standard mechanism to the ISDA architecture.68 The report also urges 
dealers to engage in periodic simulated close-out situations and stress scenarios 
as well as to identify legal risks that might arise in connection with close-out.69
Overall, the Report equates ISDA MA architecture with the concept of market 
standard. It also reflects, albeit in a transparent and open manner, the viewpoint 
and interests of its drafters, assumedly the larger dealer banks. However, the 
Report identifies the asymmetry between sell-side and buy-side and that the 
latter has concerns about many of the issues recommended in the Report. For 
example, the Report strongly promotes the use of close-out amount introduced 
(and discussed in subchapter 5.2.5) in the ISDA MA 2002. This approach gives the 
non-defaulting party wide discretion in determining the replacement cost of the 
62 ibid V–7, 15.
63 ibid V–19–20.
64 ibid V–7–8, 14, 29.
65 ibid V–14, 32
66 ibid V–11, 33
67 ibid V–14. Trade compression is a technique that allows the reduction of the number of trades and total 
notional amount in central clearing. Jon Gregory, Central Counterparties – Mandatory Clearing and 
Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC Derivatives (Wiley Finance 2014) 130–31.
68 (n 61) V–16, 34.
69 (n 61) V–18, V–20, 34
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terminated transactions as long as the result of the determination is ‘commercially 
reasonable’. As discussed in Chapter 5, it has been most often for courts of either 
England or the State of New York that will ultimately decide whether the close-out 
was carried out properly and in accordance with their respective laws. While the 
Policy Group recommends the wide adoption close-out amount approach (discussed 
in subchapter 5.2.5), especially among dealers, it also recommends that sell-side 
and buy-side representatives should form a working group under the auspices of 
ISDA to address this issue and agree on standardized mechanisms, in a form of 
best practices or contractually, and reconcile on differing views on the valuation 
parameters in producing a close-out procedure that would be deemed ‘commercially 
reasonable’.70 
6.7 OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATION AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
6.7.1 TRANSGOVERNMENTAL REGULATORS TAKE THE STAGE
According to Joost Pauwelyn and others, public international law and formal treaty-
making has been increasingly in retreat and has become stagnant at least since the 
2000s. Both the number and quality of international treaties has decreased. Instead 
of treaties that require consent, states rely more on informal law-making because 
it is perceived as, among other reasons, a more flexible method for cross-border 
cooperation.71 Transgovernmentalism has naturally been at the centre of attention 
also in the post-GFC regulatory environment of the OTC derivatives market.72 Post-
GFC, transgovernmental networks, especially the G20, are the de facto originators of 
regulation of OTC derivatives trading.73 The G20 is a global ‘club’ of 19 economically 
powerful states and the EU. ‘Club’ means that the G20 holds no legal foundation, 
stable procedural rules, nor a permanent secretariat.74 The history of the meetings 
dates back to the 1960s when the first informal meeting of the more economically 
powerful states was held to discuss international financial cooperation. Issues that 
70 (n 61) V–18, V–19, 124.
71 Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A Wessels, Jan Wouters, ‘When structures become shackles: stagnation and 
dynamics in international lawmaking’ (2014) 25 Eur. J. Int’l L. 733; Andrew T Guzman, ‘The design of 
international agreements’ (2005) 16 E.J.I.L. 579, 591–94.
72 Tessa White, ‘From the group of twenty to the group of two: the need for harmonizing derivatives 
regulation between the United States and the European Union’ (2015) 78 Law & Contemp. Probs. 301. 
73 Jan Wouters, Sven Van Kerckhoven, Jed Odermatt, ‘The EU at the G20 and the G20’s Impact on the EU’ 
in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The 
Legal Dimension (OUP 2013) 266–67.
74 Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: economic and scientific policy, The 
European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora, Paper 1: The G20, 12–13 
 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/542207/IPOL_STU(2015)542207_EN.pdf 
> accessed 1 June 2019. 
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transcended national borders, transnational that is, were on its agenda from its 
early beginnings. The G-10, a smaller club of economically powerful nation states, 
established also the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1974.75 Due 
to the informality of these meetings, existing members could invite new members 
to participate as they saw fit,76 but during the 1990s broadening the membership 
base became an issue among its existing members.77 Following the financial crisis 
in Asia in 1998 and the GFC in 2008, the G20 further cemented its role in global 
economic governance.78 
Today, while the G20 summits have no formal institutional relationship with 
its ministerial, the latter is likely directed and subordinate to the summits. It 
employs many other ad hoc bodies and generally, the organizational structure of 
the G20 is unclear. This club does not sit well with the definition of an ‘international 
organisation’ as it is not treaty based under public international law. The definition 
of organization is itself unclear in this context, and the G20 lacks a separate 
international legal personality to begin with.79 For this reason, it is referred to as 
transgovernmental regulator.
In the context of the regulation of the OTC derivatives market, the G20 is de 
facto a club of two, the US and the EU. The policy choices they make affect the 
choices made in 3rd states globally.80 This is largely because the largest transnational 
financial institutions are located in the US and in the EU.81 The EU has considerable 
representation and voting power over those powerful EU member states that are also 
members of the G20. The large EU member states represented in the G20 might 
in turn be inclined to exercise their power over smaller EU member states, which 
lack representation, via G20.82 Due to the ‘lack of in-house expertise, own financial 
resources and enforcement capacity, [the G20 is] dependent on the expertise of 
numerous international organizations and standard-setting bodies to develop and 
75 Juha Jokela, ‘The G-20: a pathway to effective multilateralism?’ EU Institute for security Studies 
European Union Chaillot Papers, April 2011, 12–13.
76 Peter Holcombe Henley, Niels M Blokker, ‘The Group of 20: A Short Legal Anatomy from the Perspective 
of International Institutional Law’ (2013) 14 Melb. J. Int’l L. 550 
558–63.
77 Jokela (n 75) 15.
78 Jokela (n 75) 27, 35; transgovernmental organizations can also be categorized as part of global 
governance the meaning of which can be summarized as: 
 ‘some kind of an umbrella term for various organised attempts to manage problems that are deemed as 
global and an effort to achieve coordinated measures in order to accomplish global objectives’ in Jaakko 
Husa, Advanced Introduction to Law and Globalisation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 36–37.
79 Henley, Blokker (n 76) 582–87.
80 White (n 72). 
81 John Welling, ‘In defense of the dealers: why the SEC should allow substituted compliance with the 
European Union for security-based swap dealers?’ (2016–2017) 85 Fordham L. Rev. 909, 939–40, n 283. 
82 Wouters and others (n 73) 261.
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implement G20 commitments’.83 While yielding much power, ‘[t]he G20 does not 
have a stable legal foundation based on traditional legitimacy concepts’.84 
The G20 established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009, the FSB set 
up a separate OTC Derivatives Working Group in 2010, which in turn published 
several progress reports on the implementation of OTC derivatives regulations in 
different jurisdictions.85 The FSB issues non-binding recommendations, which have 
been criticized for being too imprecise leading to further problems. Local regulators 
implement the recommendations in an inconsistent manner, even when they take 
the recommendations into account in good faith.86
According to the Charter of the Financial Stability Board Article 23 the Charter 
‘is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations’.87 FSB is said to lack any 
formal power over its members and, due to the lack of these powers, it focuses on 
surveillance, peer review, and promotion of international standards.88 As noted by 
Chris Brummer, The Charter leaves ‘little indication of just how the FSB would do its 
work’. More fundamentally, questions arose as to the legitimacy of the organization, 
since it was not a formal international organization, and, equally important, 
not all countries are represented by it.89 Many other similar organizations, for 
example, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),90 and The International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO),91 are the ‘coordinators’ if not 
the de facto originators of financial regulation.92 For example, G20 has delegated 
responsibilities to IOSCO, the origins of which go back to the 1970s like that of 
the Basel Committee, which in turn releases soft-law instruments in the form of 
83 Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department (n 74) 13.
84 Rolf H Weber, ‘Legitimacy of the G20 as Global Financial Regulator’ Society of International Economic 
Law, Online Proceedings Working Paper No. 2012/13, 9–10 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2088315> accessed 1 June 2019.
85 GA Walker, ‘International Financial Instability and the Financial Stability Board’ Directorate General for 
Internal Policies Policy Department A: economic and scientific policy (2013) 47 Int’l Law. 1, 24–25, n 207.
86 Kathryn Collard, ‘Advantages of a co-regulatory OTC derivatives regime’ (2014–2015) 46 Geo. J. Int’l L. 
877, 890–901.
87 Charter of the Financial Stability Board <https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-
revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
88 Stephany Griffith, Eric Helleiner, Ngaire Woods (eds), ‘Special Report – The Financial Stability Board: An 
Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance’ (2010) The Centre for International Governance 
Innovation
 <https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/fsb_special_report_2.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
89 Chris Brummer, ‘Introductory Note to the Financial Stability Board Charter’ (2012) 51 Int’l Legal Materials 
828. 
90 Eilis Ferran, Kern Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? The special case of the European Systemic 
Risk Board’ (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 751. The ESRB, established in the aftermath of the GFC, is an expert body 
without legal personality and with no binding powers, but ‘[i]n principle the ESRB’s lack of formal power 
need not prevent it from acting in a credible and authoritative manner’ 753, 764.
91 IOSCO is also a transgovernmental regulatory body that is not based on a treaty instrument under 
public international law which renders its legal nature ‘quite unclear’, Antonio Marcacci ‘IOSCO and the 
spreading of a US-like regulatory philosophy around the world’ (2014) 25 E.B.L. Rev. 759, 760–61.
92 Anu Arora, ‘The global financial crisis: a new global regulatory order?’ (2010) 8 J.B.L. 670, 678–79.
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memorandum of understandings and principles accompanied with guidelines to 
their interpretation. The member states of IOSCO then incorporate these policies 
into their own laws. The member states will ultimately decide whether to adopt a 
particular policy as IOSCO cannot force countries to adopt recommendations, by 
definition.93
The emergence of concepts like informal international lawmaking process that 
‘usually occur in a loosely organized network or forum rather than a traditional 
international organization’94 outside formal treaties and public international law 
are common. Deemed too slow and ineffective, states replace formal treaty-making 
with soft-law, i.e. with ‘quasi-legal instruments that have no legal force, such as 
non-binding resolutions, declarations, and guidelines created by governments and 
private organizations’, which become adopted and followed possibly due to network 
effects.95 As discussed, these processes do not take place under public international 
law. In the context of the EU, such non-binding instruments find their way to 
supranational level in the form of directives and regulations that in turn are either 
transposed to national legal orders or are directly applicable in the Member States. 
This is how the central public regulations in OTC derivatives trading, European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)96 and the Dodd-Frank Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act97 came into fruition, through G20 initiative. 
6.7.2 NARRATIVE BEHIND THE TRANSGOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION
Already at the outset of the GFC, it was apparent that it would require an easily 
understandable narrative for the public that would warrant for the public regulation 
of the OTC derivatives market. Choosing one narrative over the other could easily 
displace a legal scholar to the seat of policy advocate instead of a more neutral 
observer. According to Adam J Levitin, three narratives could be identified after 
the GFC. First, there was the ‘easy money looking for trouble’ narrative, where 
the combination of low interest rates, surplus investment funds especially from 
abroad, investors looking for high revenues, especially in the housing market, and 
the securitization of these assets. Second, there was the regulatory narrative or 
93 Austin (n 31) 1–4, 14–15.
94 Sanderijn Duquet, Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A Wessel, Jan Wouters, ‘Upholding the rule of law in informal 
international lawmaking processes’ (2014) 6 H.J.R.L. 75, 82. For the concept of ‘informal international 
law making’, Joost Pauwelyn ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research 
Questions’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking 
(OUP 2012) 13.
95 Bryan Druzin, ’Why does Soft Law have any Power anyway?’ (2016) Asian Journal of International Law 1.
96 648/2012 Regulation (EU) of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1–59. 
97 Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173.
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two complementing regulatory narratives, explaining the crisis through ideologically 
driven policy of deregulation or the poor design of regulation that predisposed 
regulators to regulatory capture. 98 Third, the ‘Frankenstein narrative’ was that 
the poorly understood financial innovations outran both the market and regulation 
and these products were connected to the GFC. All of the above can be placed under 
a more general ‘Greed’ narrative that is more general in its application. Levitin 
concludes his analysis with a statement that analysis of a multi-causal process like 
the GFC cannot be in an intellectually defensible way explained through any single 
narrative.99 Here it is important again to remind, as noted by Gabriel V Rauterberg 
and Andrew Verstein, ‘Private or poor regulation, however, is not deregulation […]’, 
and how ‘proposals [for new regulation] must be justified as superior to existing 
regulation rather than simply superior to no regulation’.100 If anything, the evidence 
begs the question of who actually captured what.
Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr has described in great detail many of the areas seen 
as problematic in the banking industry.101 The industry’s legislative efforts to 
‘undermine Dodd-Frank’ are summarized,102 as are recent financial scandals,103 
‘revolving doors’, the growth of the industry, compensation packages, and ‘cultural 
capture’.104 As to lobbying, Wilmarth notes that the industry helped to elect certain 
politicians that opposed the Dodd-Frank and refers to a number of financial industry 
and other magazine articles apparently as an introduction to the topic,105 as well 
as in great detail the campaign contributions directed for certain politicians.106 
In the US, ISDA has required that financial regulators produce stringent cost-
benefit analysis on new regulations as is required by the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The tactic has been used by the industry earlier and in other areas than 
finance. The problem of this understandable requirement is that it might be more 
98 Adam J Levitin, ‘The Crisis without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 63 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 1002; in contrast, Jonathan Lindenfeld, ‘The CFTC’s Substituted Compliance Approach: An 
Attempt to Bring about Global Harmony and Stability in the Derivatives Market’ (2015) 14 J. Int’l Bus. & 
L. 125; Dan Awrey ‘Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (2012) 2 
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 235, 237, n 6, n 7.
99 Adam J Levitin, ‘The Crisis without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 63 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 999; Prager (n 56).
100 Gabriel V Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein, ‘Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC 
Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform’ (2013-2014) Va.J. Int’l L. 9, 17, 
30.
101 Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr, ‘Turning a blind eye: why Washington keeps giving in to Wall Street’ (2012–2013) 




105 ibid n 7, n 8, n 13, n 15. Similarly, Lucy McKinstry, ‘Regulating a Global Market: The Extraterritorial 
Challenge of Dodd-Frank’s Margin Requirements for Uncleared OTC Derivatives & A Mutual Recognition 
Solution’, (203) Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 776, 778, n 2.
106 Wilmarth (n 101) 1317.
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difficult to calculate the benefits than it is to calculate the costs of a regulation. 
This might create a systematic bias against governmental regulatory action.107 The 
critical counterargument is that the financial industry does not itself perform a 
reasonable cost-benefit analysis on the benefits of avoiding or mitigating a financial 
crisis through regulation.108 It might be that it is because it is impossible to do such 
a calculation. Jeffrey N Gordon summarizes the problem of making cost-benefit 
analysis in finance as follows:
[F]or the financial sector, the system that generates costs and benefits is 
not a natural system but rather a system constructed by the pattern of 
financial regulation itself and by the subsequent processes of adaptation 
and regulatory arbitrage. We simply do not have the foresight to 
forecast how that system will evolve.109
Was there justified reasons to oppose public financial regulation on the OTC 
derivatives market post-GFC? Perhaps not unexpectedly, the major trade 
organizations thought there were. As summarized by Lucy McKinstry, the financial 
industry: 
[h]ighlighted the practical dangers of divergence, including duplicative 
registration requirements, potential overlap and conflict in regulatory 
requirements for market participants in foreign jurisdictions, 
discriminatory rules against certain foreign participants, as well as 
more general concerns of protectionism, fragmentation, and regulatory 
arbitrage.110 
6.7.3 THE REGULATORY RESPONSE: EMIR AND THE DODD-FRANK
Following the narrative unregulated OTC derivatives markets and that public 
regulation in the OTC derivatives market is warranted, the Group of Twenty, the 
G20, gave its famous declaration urging for the regulation of the OTC derivative 
industry and request for the Financial Stability Board, an international organization 
operating under the G20, and its members to assess how to do this111 that led to 
107 Howard A Latin, ‘Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking under Uncertainty’ (1982), 
6 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 187, 188–89.
108 Wilmarth (n 101) 1308–17.
109 Jeffrey N Gordon, ‘The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation’ (2014) 43 The 
Journal of Legal Studies, 351, 352–53.
110 McKinstry (n 105) n 224.
111 G20 Leaders Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24–25, 2009: 
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the enactment of the Dodd-Frank,112 its Title VII or the ‘Wall Street Transparency 
and Accountability Act of 2010’ being of particular interest here,113 in the US, and 
in the EU, EMIR alongside other less-central regulatory initiatives for the purposes 
of this research. 
In 2013, the CFTC and the European Commission issued a joint statement on how 
‘the rules in place pursue the same objectives and generate the same outcomes […] 
As a result of the joint collaborative effort, in many places, final rules are essentially 
identical… […]’.114 Both the Dodd-Frank and EMIR are notoriously lengthy, 
complex, and subject to regulatory arbitrage.115 The regulators soon identified 
the problems in the cross-border coordination of EMIR and the Dodd-Frank as, 
although similar, their simultaneous application ‘of each other’s requirements could 
lead to conflicts of law, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty’.116 
Christian Johnson describes the Dodd-Frank as follows:
[T]he amount and complexity of rulemaking that has been required 
of the CFTC and the SEC is both breathtaking and inconceivable. […] 
The difficulty in drafting all of the rules and regulations to implement 
the Dodd-Frank statutory requirements appears to have been poorly 
understood by policymakers and regulators. […] The energy required 
to digest and understand all of this detail and complexity is mind-
boggling and suggests that the CFTC may ultimately have entered 
into an exercise of futility, creating so many requirements and rules 
that assessing compliance may become impossible. This onslaught of 
detailed rules and regulations is difficult enough for US swap dealers, 
 ‘[a]ll standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, 
where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end 2012 at the latest’ 9, 
 <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html> accessed 1 June 2019 (emphasis 
added).
112 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 111–123, 801–
814, 124 Stat. 1376, 1393–1412, 1802–22 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.) (Dodd-Frank Act).
113 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012).
114 CFTC Release Number 6640–13, ‘The European Commission and the CFTC reach a Common Path 
Forward on Derivatives’ July 11, 2013 < https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13 > 
accessed 1 June 2019.
115 Dodd-Frank Act currently runs to 848 pages, and once completed, no one seems to know when this 
will be, the page amount could be as high as 3 000 pages. The EU rulemaking response, primary and 
secondary rulemaking aggregated, is likely even higher, Stan Maes, Dimitrios Magos, Miquel de la Mano, 
‘Bank Structural Reform and Too-big-to-fail’ in Andreas Dombret, Patrick S Kenadjian (eds), Too Big to 
Fail III: Structural Reform Proposals: Should We Break Up the Banks (Institute for Law and Finance 
Series, volume 16, Walter De Gruyter, GmbH, 2015). The relative cost impact of compliance depends 
on the size of the entity, Kerry G Kounadis, ‘Legal and compliance aspects of ‘financial regulatory 
overshooting” on non-financial entities: the case of European Market Infrastructure Regulation’, 
(2015) 30 JIBLR 228; White (n 72) 322–24, arguing in favour of further regulatory harmonization and 
transgovernmental networks as a way to prevent regulatory arbitrage, 331–32. 
116 CFTC (n 114).
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complete with legions of lawyers, compliance officers, and executives, to 
navigate. It becomes a nightmare for their US customers to understand. 
One can only imagine how foreign swap dealers and foreign customers 
must view the Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms.117
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) itself is a highly complex organization 
with a staff of over 4000 persons. The SEC routinely interacts with self-regulatory 
organizations118 which would suggest that it is not outruled that there have been 
many opportunities to engage in the type of behavior demonstrated in the case-
study of Young discussed in subchapter 6.5 Echoing the findings made by Young, 
Yulia Guseva warns, among many other issues that if those regulated capture the 
regulators, the Dodd-Frank may serve the purposes of some of the financially strong 
private entities over their competitors. Information favouring the few may have 
become integrated into the regulations.119 Considering the amount and content of 
regulations alone introduced in the aftermath of the GFC, it will be extremely hard 
to know if and how and by whose initiative this occurred. 
Claims have been made as to the unconstitutionality of the Dodd-Frank in 
many aspects, including due process, right to contract, and discrimination, to 
name only a few. As summarized by Michael IC Nwogugu the Dodd-Frank ‘is 
not only operationally, politically and economically deficient but also many parts 
of [Dodd-Frank] are unconstitutional and should be substantially modified’.120 
Unclear regulatory powers may lead to a well-known phenomenon referred to as 
‘regulatory collisions’, or turf wars among regulators. Colleen M Baker notes these 
as the unintended consequences of the post-financial crisis reforms. Apparently, 
this time the possibility of such a collision is unique in its systemic implications. 
Regulatory collision can occur in three relations: horizontally between public 
regulators and among private regulators; between public and private regulatory 
regimes; and vertically between public regulators that have mandated private market 
regulators. While perhaps well intentioned, the regulations may very well prove to 
be a source of now-latent systemic risk, given that the regulatory environment in 
which both private and public entities operate is ‘chaotic’. There are no regulatory 
mechanisms, while critical, for preventing such regulatory collisions.121 
117 Christian Johnson, ‘Regulatory arbitrage, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and Dodd-Frank: the implications of 
US global OTC derivative regulation’ (2013–14) Nev. L.J. 542, 566–67. 
118 Kenneth M Rosen, ‘Cooperation before Consolidation in Investor Protection’ (2015–2016) 90 Tul. L. Rev. 
1211, 1217–18.
119 Guseva (n 40) 1709.
120 Michael IC Nwogugu, ‘Un-Constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Act’ (2015) 17 Eur. J.L. Reform 185, 201–
211.
121 Colleen M Baker, ‘When regulators collide: financial market stability, systemic risk, clearinghouses, and 
CDS’ (2015–2016) 10 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 343, esp. 346–7, 350, 357. Baker offers three case studies of 
potential collisions, one between domestic regulators, one between transnational private regulators, and 
one between private market regulators operating under a public mandate, 362–71, 377–82, 383.
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6.7.4 PRIVATE REGULATORY MECHANISM BECOMES MANDATORY: THE CASE OF 
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING
Central counterparties are a relatively old form of private regulatory mechanism 
with its own private rules created by private market participants to facilitate trading 
in financial instruments. While it is not necessary for the purposes of this research 
to go into detail about central counterparty clearing – OTC derivatives transactions 
are still bilateral contracts centrally cleared or not – it is worth noting that the 
ISDA Master Agreement is still in use and forms the contractual architecture both 
in central counterparty clearing and in non-central counterparty clearing.122 The 
difference between the two is essentially about how the OTC derivatives are cleared, 
bilaterally or multilaterally. Both clearing types have their benefits and downsides.123 
It is worth noting that central counterparties are one type of private normativity and 
a private regulatory mechanism. Since the GFC, the default management carried 
out by central counterparties have become perhaps the most important mechanism 
given their systemic importance to the financial markets. Default management is 
a complex part of an already complex industry and in many respects, financial 
regulation in itself can contribute to legal risks.124 Historically, CCPs have been used 
first in futures markets but later on generally in exchanges, and post-GFC also in 
the OTC derivatives markets.125 There is a long history and experience dating back 
to at least the end of the 19th century in the US on the important role that central 
counterparties hold in market turmoil as a private regulatory mechanism to reduce 
systemic risk and the risk of cascading bank failures through collateral arrangements 
and mutualization of risk.126 Development and enforcement of private standards 
and rules generally and the standardization of contractual terms have also formed 
a part of central clearing from its modern beginnings.127 
Stephen J Lubben notes that the most central element of the Dodd-Frank is that 
standardized OTC derivative trades must be cleared through a central counterparty. 
However, the Dodd-Frank did not originally make a provision for the failure of 
a central counterparty that was now required to handle a multi-trillion-dollar 
OTC derivatives market. He raises the most obvious question that since central 
counterparty clearing does not make risk disappear, only transforms it, and that 
122 Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Market in the Remaking: Over-the-Counter Derivatives in a New Age’ (2017) 
11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 309, 309.
123 Gregory (n 67) 36–39.
124 Jo Braithwaite, ‘Central Counterparties (CCPs) and the law of default management’ (2017) 17 J.C.L.S. 291.
125 Randall S Kroszner, ‘Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses’ (2000) 18(2), Journal of 
Financial Services Research 157, 162–65.
126 ibid 164, [t]his credit risk structure helps to reduce the likelihood of a failure of one party causing failures 
among others, thereby addressing public regulators’ concerns about ``systemwide’’ risk.
127 Randall S Kroszner, ‘Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives 
Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, Part 2: The Role of Central Banks in Money 
and Payments Systems’ (1999) 31 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 596, 600.
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central counterparties are public companies now handling a multi-trillion OTC 
derivatives market, is the next bailout going to be that of a central counterparty, 
and, indirectly, financial institutions?128 Furthermore, the existence of bailout 
mechanisms for CCPs with public money could create an incentive for CCPs to 
‘shirk risk management responsibilities’. The more confident a government bailout, 
the riskier the behaviour might be. In comparison to futures markets, the OTC 
derivatives products are more complex, which could further exacerbate the risk of 
CCP clearing.129 
From the perspective of regulators, the public policy objective was to strike a 
balance between containment of financial risk associated especially with credit swaps 
‘without suffocating the enormous market in such derivatives’.130 The regulators 
believe that higher capital requirements and sufficient collateralization and its 
protection could have prevented or at least reduced the systemic impact that the 
insolvencies caused to the financial markets in the GFC. Mandatory CCP clearing 
would offer better risk management procedures in comparison to traditional OTC 
derivatives trading. In addition, the regulators could drive OTC derivatives trading 
towards CCP clearing by imposing higher capital charges for non-cleared derivatives. 
Lastly, mandatory clearing could help to reduce the informational advantage of 
the large dealers over their smaller rivals. This is because CCP trading is more 
transparent as CCPs can disclose information on transactions on a daily-basis. 
CCP clearing also brings the benefit of perhaps more effective default mechanisms. 
While there were many other reasons, these are the central arguments on why 
regulators opted for mandatory central counterparty clearing for standardized OTC 
derivatives.131 
It has been argued that this policy choice could create a new type of systemic risk. 
It might have been a better alternative to let the market participants choose whether 
to clear their products in a central counterparty or not.132 On the one hand, clearing 
obligation can be avoided by structuring transactions as more complex than they 
would have been without financial regulation, and on the other, clearing obligation 
can lead to further standardization which brings regulatory benefits.133 There is 
128 Stephen J Lubben, ‘Failure of the clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s fatal flaw?’ (2015–2016) Va. L. & Bus. 
Rev., 127, 128, n 7, 131; Christian Chamorro-Courtland, ‘The trilliondollar question: can a central bank bail 
out a central counterparty clearing house which is “too big to fail”?’ (2011–2012) 6 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & 
Com. L. 433. 
129 Ryan J Patrone, ‘Linking past and present: assessing the stability of Post-title vii derivatives markets’ 
(2015–2016) 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 459, 499–501.
130 Anupam Chander, Randall Costa, ‘Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Global Legal 
Convergence’ (2010) 10, Chi. J. Int’l L., 639, 672–73.
131 ibid 673–77; Gregory (n 67) 44–46.
132 Hester Peirce, ‘Derivatives clearinghouses: clearing the way to failure’ (2015–2016) 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 589. 
133 Ilya Beylin, ‘A reassessment of the clearing mandate: how the clearing mandate affects swap trading 
behavior and the consequences for systemic risk’ (2015–2016) 68 Rutgers U.L. Rev. 1143 1151, 1163; 
Sean J Griffith, ‘Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives 
Regulation’ (2013–2014) 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1291, 1344–45.
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significant variation across jurisdictions in the way assets of customers, i.e. those 
who have to buy the clearing service from a clearing member, are protected in the 
event of clearing member default. In addition, at least in the US, those customers 
who trade in the futures market are in a more vulnerable position in comparison 
to those in the cleared OTC derivative market.134 Central counterparties are an 
example of private normativity, private regulatory mechanisms, and the interactions 
between finance and law.
6.7.5 LIVING WILLS OF LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The Dodd-Frank required the larger financial entities (systematically important 
financial institutions, or SIFIs) to prepare mandatory reorganization and resolution 
plans to monitor, reduce, or even prevent financial crisis (known as ‘living wills’). 
Nizan Pakin’s findings are partially summarized. While the Dodd-Frank required 
SIFIs to have them, neither the regulations nor legal literature existed regarding 
what the living wills were supposed to include. Regulatory requirements for real-
time databases and simulations to internal guidelines and financial recovery plans 
started to emerge.135 As predicting the future is hard, the simulations based on past 
events are unlikely to protect against future events.136 The cross-border element in 
an insolvency event of a financial institution would render the living wills ‘unlikely 
to work in most cases’, the failure of a large transnational corporation would further 
add to this complexity, and on ‘top of the cake’, there is the increased risk that in 
an insolvency event, national regulators ‘will be primarily focused on protecting 
their national interests, a very alarming possibility, as such gamesmanship would 
have a negative effect on reducing global systemic risk’.137 
As noted by Scott Farrell, in a similar tone, the complexity of the jurisdiction 
in a cross-border insolvency is one thing, and the lack of logic another, given 
that in the event of a major failure, the participants affected ‘are likely to be 
systemically important institutions in their home economies as well’.138 Following 
the regulatory measures, including the Dodd-Frank, the too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions became considerably larger and the market much more concentrated 
134 Christian Chamorro-Courtland, ‘Collateral damage: the legal and regulatory protections for customer 
margin in the U.S. derivatives markets’ (2016) 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 
135 Nizan Pakin, ‘The Case Against Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills: Contingency Planning Following the 
Financial Crisis’ (2013) 9 (1) Berkeley Bus.L.J. 29, 35–36.
136 ibid 75.
137 ibid 80–82 (emphasis added).
138 Scott Farrell, ‘Too important to fail: legal complexity in planning for the failure of financial market 
infrastructure’ (2014) 29 J.I.B.L.R. 461, 467.
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through industry consolidations139 as well as due to apparent deregulatory or 
reregulatory initiatives taken in the US.140 It was known already at the outset 
that the regulatory requirements might disproportionately favour large financial 
institutions.141 According to Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, the Dodd-Frank 
does not address the central vulnerabilities in the shadow banking system although 
some of its elements were at the heart of the GFC. Some central elements were left 
out of the new regulations and it is uncertain whether any agency has jurisdiction 
to act over them.142
6.7.6 SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE AND EQUIVALENCE
The Dodd-Frank was largely criticized from the outset by foreign governments for 
its real burdens and uncertain benefits.143 The Dodd-Frank includes a so-called 
substituted compliance rule. Under this exemption, foreign market participants 
could comply with Dodd-Frank by complying with their local regulations that are 
sufficiently equivalent to Dodd-Frank. By 2014, the regulators had not issued exact 
procedures on how to achieve substituted compliance.144 In order to be eligible 
for substituted compliance, market participants needed to qualify as a ‘Non-US 
Person’.145 Market participants are subject to legal uncertainty as to the applicability 
of the Dodd-Frank to their operations given the complexity of the calculations 
required to determine whether they are ‘US persons’ or ‘Non-US Persons’.146 The 
CFTC and the SEC adopted different definitions of what constitutes an US person, 
which in turn might have led market participants to move some of their business 
elsewhere to other jurisdictions.147 
139 James Barth, Moutusi Sau, ‘The Big Keep Getting Bigger: Too-Big-to-Fail Banks 30 Years Later’ 
(September 24, 2014) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510041> accessed 1 June 2019.
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141 Mariusz Szpringer, Wlodzimierz Szpringer, ‘Law and Economics of Central Counterparties (CCP) – 
Selected Issues of Regulation and Competition Concerning Financial Market Infrastructure’ (2016) 27(5) 
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143 Andrew W Keller, ‘Dodd-Frank’s Impact on Derivatives Participants in Asia’ (2014) 13 Asian Bus. Law. 35, 
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In the EU and under EMIR, substituted compliance is known as ‘equivalence’.148 
The application of equivalence rules resulted in further confusion among market 
participants as to what rules are applicable or not to their operations. Without legal 
certainty, the provisions could mean that market participants would have to comply 
with both the US and the EU regulatory regimes.149 Mauricia Salazar concludes 
that while the implementation of cross-border recognition rules is a good idea 
the ‘lack of details fails to promote the G20’s goals’, and that both the CFTC and 
the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) ‘have provided a false sense of 
security for market participants-when in fact more due diligence on behalf of market 
participants is currently needed to properly comply’. As to further consolidation 
among regulators, Salazar points out that ‘one sole governing body that oversees 
the entire global OTC derivative market is a ludicrous and certainly improbable 
solution’.150 It is hard to disagree with this statement. Even if the rules were the 
same, there would be the issue of divergence in the enforcement of these rules 
among different regulators. In other words, it is not enough to have substituted 
compliance in place if the level of enforcement of these regulations differs between 
jurisdictions.151
The idea of ‘equivalence’ and ‘mutual recognition’ has a long problematic history 
beyond EMIR and Dodd-Frank. Within the EU, ‘equivalence’ is known as ‘mutual 
recognition’ which essentially means giving effect to home jurisdiction regulation 
in the host jurisdiction. For example, a financial institution that has its place of 
incorporation in one EU member state would only have to comply with the rules 
of this member state even if the financial institution has operations in other EU 
member states. Originally in the mid-1980s, equivalence was based on minimum 
harmonization, home country supervision, and complementary host country 
supervision.152 Once it had become clear that EU member states intentionally 
stimulated regulatory arbitrage themselves by not, for example, supervizing their 
national industries prudently in accordance with the EU rules, the Commission 
pursued more regulatory harmonization. In the financial sector, this policy objective 
was pursued with the so-called Lamfalussy process in 2001.153 Post- GFC, the 
harmonization objective was further pursued with the so-called de Larosiere Report 
148 EMIR Article 13(2). 
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in 2009.154 However, national financial supervisors are still national in character. 
Regulatory fragmentation ‘provides incentives to national financial supervisors 
to compete via lax supervisory standards and practices’.155 This deficiency in 
the regulatory framework is to be overcome with more supervisory cooperation, 
regulatory convergence, and collaborative mechanisms. These measures include, 
among others, a new memorandum of understanding, new colleges and networks 
of financial supervisors, and ‘reflexive governance […] that promotes learning from 
diversity’. These objectives are to be reached in cooperation with transgovernmental 
organizations such as the FSB.156 
While the Dodd-Frank and EMIR are similar in many respects as they are based 
on the same G20 declaration, they are in many respects different on key issues. In 
his comparative analysis between the Dodd-Frank and EMIR, Levon Garlsian notes 
that one out of many issues that could undermine the effectiveness of the Dodd-
Frank and EMIR, and the ‘substituted compliance’ and ‘equivalence’, is that these 
two regulations define ‘derivative’ in a completely different manner which ‘inevitably 
leads to further distinctions in the overall derivatives market regulation’.157 Without 
being able to identify the regulatory rationale, Garslian notes that the definition of 
‘derivative’ already divides the regulatory powers in the US, where the SEC, which 
is the regulatory agency in charge of regulating ‘security-based swaps’ and CFTC, 
which in turn is charge of regulating ‘swaps’. The definitions are ‘remote from 
the standard market and finance practices’.158 In the US, the regulatory powers 
between the CFTC and SEC are unclear.159 Both agencies have the authority to 
grant further guidance as to what constitutes ‘substituted compliance’. CFTC issued 
one interpretive Guidance in 2012,160 which the agency has subsequently amended 
several times. By 2016, the CFTC had not published a final rule on the matter. The 
SEC publishes its own rules on ‘security-based swaps’.161
Are things clearer on the other side of the Atlantic in terms of legal certainty or 
the lack thereof? On 14 February 2014, roughly one and a half years after the entry 
into force of EMIR, and over thirty years after the emergence of the OTC derivatives 
market as discussed in Chapter 5, ESMA approached the European Commission 
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by a letter drawing attention to ‘an issue that could have a significant detrimental 
effect on the consistent application of’ EMIR’. The main issue was: 
The different transpositions of MiFID across Member States mean 
that there is no single, commonly adopted definition of derivative 
or derivative contract in the European Union, thus preventing the 
convergent application of EMIR.162 
In its response, while not addressing the central question put forward by ESMA, 
the Commission put forth an argument that further regulations, definitions, and 
guidelines were warranted under the then upcoming MiFID II Directive.163 MiFID 
I, the Directive that includes the definition of a derivative,164 was the outcome of a 
highly politicized process.165 Already at the time of this process, Europe’s financial 
centres were ‘being flooded by directives from Brussels’ leading to ‘regulatory fatigue’ 
often without legal certainty. In 2007, there was a clear demand for regulators to 
‘settle the ambiguities by agreeing on [MiFID] definitions - and rapidly’. 166 
A brief analysis suggests that if the understanding of ‘derivative’ was unclear 
after the transposition of MiFID I, it is unclear after the transposition of MiFID 
II. A side-by-side comparison of MiFD I and MiFID II, Annex I, Section C, (4)-
(10), the section where the definition of derivative is to be found, reveals that the 
only changes to the definition financial instrument in regards to derivatives was 
that one part of a sentence was put into parenthesis, (4) and (5); a reference to 
organized trading facilities was included and deletion of ‘wholesale energy products 
traded on an OTF that must be physically settled’ from the definition of one type 
of commodity derivatives (6); a typological change and deleting one part of the 
definition of commodity derivative that read ‘a having regard to whether, inter alia, 
they are cleared and settled through recognized clearing houses or are subject to 
162 ESMA/2014/184 <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-184_letter_to_
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regular margin calls’ (7); deletion of one part of the definition of derivatives relating 
to ‘economic statistics’ (10); and inclusion of emission allowances to the definition 
of a financial instrument (11).167 
The legal uncertainties have repercussions far outside the US and the EU. The 
Dodd-Frank and EMIR have ‘extraordinary jurisdictional reach over any transaction 
that involves a US or EU entity’. The benefits of this reach are unclear unlike its 
negative effects.168 More generally, ‘[c]onsidering the complex and dynamic nature 
of the financial system, regulators’ efforts to prevent the next financial crisis will 
likely be in vain’.169 The same applies to EMIR. ESMA had not by 2016 issued final 
rules on the extraterritorial scope of EMIR, only guidance drafts. 170 As summarized 
by Jeremmy Okonjo from the viewpoint of emerging markets, the extraterritorial 
reach of the EMIR is bound to conflict with emerging market securities laws. The 
EU’s impact assessment171 does not even address the problem of conflict between 
EMIR and third country legislation, the duplication and conflict of regulations will be 
‘detrimental to developing OTC derivatives markets’, can undermine the sovereignty 
of third countries, the equivalence rules of EMIR do little to mitigate this problem, 
and overall, it does not satisfy proportionality doctrine.172 Furthermore Okonjo 
notes that the cost of compliance is asymmetrical, disfavouring market participants 
in the emerging markets. He raises the question of whether the regulatory costs are 
proportionate to its perceived benefits, and ultimately suggests that they are not.173 
The compliance costs could act as a deterrent for market participants, and this was 
not addressed in the regulatory assessment of the EU. Justifiably worrying that the 
compliance costs could reduce the capital flows to emerging markets and affect their 
developing OTC derivatives markets, he concludes that ‘[i]t is unlikely that the US 
and EU would take into account third-country concerns, as both jurisdictions are 
accountable to their respective domestic constituencies only’. 174 Now, the OTC 
derivatives market are publicly regulated.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
7.1 WHAT IS TRANSNATIONAL LAW?
Transnational law is law and it can be studied with a transnational legal method. 
Transnational method helps to identify and name private normativity that transcends 
the boundaries of states and existing categories of law. In this research, transnational 
law was constructed as a transnational legal order, a structure that offers a mental 
map for answering the question of what transnational law is. The finding is that 
studying law from thi s perspective is not first and foremost a normative statement 
that would seek to contradict or to challenge the supremacy of state law but to 
complement existing categorizations of legal research that focuses on state-made 
law. Of course, transnational method produces scientific results which in turn can 
be used to shape public policies. Transnational method focuses on and emphasizes 
private normativity as a potential source of law. In this research, the decisive 
qualification has been the enforceability of norms arising from private normativity 
in the eyes of the state. This method tells that market practices can evolve and 
through interactions, find their way into state-made legislation. Private normativity 
and the normative order can further be constructed to a form of a transnational 
legal order which helps to identify and categorize transnational phenomena. These 
types of legal theoretical constructs originate at least from the 1960s. Transnational 
method has a long intellectual tradition and it offers a sound theoretical framework 
for studying private normativity, private regulatory mechanisms, and bottom-up 
law-making processes and their interactions with states. 
Transnational law was and is also a descriptive umbrella term. Under the 
umbrella term, one can describe, criticize, theorize, and conceptualize phenomena 
in a scholarly manner that makes the cumulation of knowledge possible. The 
observable elements of transnational law, such as transnational contracts, remain 
in existence regardless of the legal theoretical perspective of the observer. It could 
be that transnational method is the only legal theoretical method that captures the 
ontology of private normativity since ‘black-letter’ law tells little about their origins 
and how transnational law operates. Pinpointing the private origins of normativity 
and calling the processes that lead to the emergence of transnational law does not 
in any way insulate the phenomena from criticism. Quite the contrary, it is essential 
that the ontology of what is being criticized is first understood to the extent possible. 
Regardless of the type of occurrence, from natural disasters to financial crises, that 
has repercussions on any given financial market, it is often reflected in a transnational 
contract in which it finds a contractual solution to an unexpected event. Significant 
market events can even lead to the formation of private regulatory mechanisms, as 
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it happened in the credit default swap market where private credit determinations 
committees hold exclusive power over the interpretation of the transnational 
contractual terms. Such private regulatory mechnanisms can and have played a 
decisive role in the largest financial turmoil that was witnessed in the debt crisis of the 
Hellenic Republic in 2012. These private rules and normativities are a manifestation 
of the lex mercatoria of finance. From a transnational standpoint, state legislation, 
financial regulation, and transnational law are in constant interaction with each 
other. What court praxis indicates is that when transnational law and state law clash, 
for example, the local public policy reflected in legislation somehow interferes with 
the contractual intent of the contracting parties, state law holds supremacy over 
transnational law. The interaction between financial regulation and transnational 
law is much more difficult to analyse. It has become even more difficult during an 
era of transgovernmental financial regulation. Nevertheless, financial regulation is 
a driver for the emergence of transnational law and financial and legal engineering, 
which, in turn, have a long history of eroding the practical significance of local 
legislation and financial regulation, such as exchange controls. 
In this research, much of transnational law is about the interactions between 
private normativity and financial regulation. In this respect, the interactions between 
private trade organizations, such as the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, Inc., and international regulators, such as the Basel Committee are 
particularly interesting. More currently, quasi-public organizations, referred to as 
transgovernmental organizations, that derive their existence from the Group of 20 
(G-20), a club of economically powerful nations, should be of particular research 
interest. The regulations deriving from the G-20 have been much criticized in legal 
literature and can give rise to legal risks which in turn can turn into systemic risk. 
Generally, financial regulation might almost reflect systemic thinking, leading 
to path dependence, where the first reaction, almost like a reflex, is to control 
through regulation and regulate from top-down in greatest of detail every aspect 
of finance even when, and although, the outcomes of interference can be unknown. 
Transgovernmental regulation led to divergence in the OTC derivatives market in 
that these regulations are in any case applied locally by local financial regulators. 
The public policy objectives of maintaining financial stability and reducing systemic 
risk are ambiguous concepts. 
7.2 TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN PRACTICE
The emergence of the eurobond market as well as the OTC derivatives market 
can be explained by applying transnational legal method. This method offers a 
theoretical framework that is capable of identifying supply and demand for financial 
and legal innovation, the facilitative role some states played in enhancing private 
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normativity, private regulatory mechanism, and the transnationalisation of law. 
What transnational law theory can suggest is that the emergence of the eurobond 
market in the 1960s was not the outcome of top-down public policy seeking to 
transnationalise finance. Rather, it was the outcome of bottom-up law-making 
spontaneously created by various market participants. The transnationalisation 
process of eurobonds and the eurodollar market began autonomously from states 
out of supply and demand for US dollars. States were involved in these repeated 
interactions, but more in the capacity of facilitators or market participants rather 
than as regulators. The financial markets during the 1960s were tightly regulated 
as well as restrictive and could be characterized as even outright hostile towards 
the free movement of capital. The US policy makers of that time saw the outflow 
of US dollars as a public policy problem, in terms of US balance of payments, and 
sought to curb this development through taxation. 
Within a few years, structures for repatriation of US dollars back to the US were 
facilitated through offshore financial centres. The promotion of free capital flows 
was not on the agenda after the Second World War but to the contrary, these flows 
were to be regulated locally by nation states as well as by the emerging international 
organizations. Yet, the eurobond market and subsequently the eurocurrency market 
not only flourished but evolved at a rapid pace because market participants saw a 
need to raise capital from the international bond markets as well as for exchanging 
foreign currencies. This market created a demand for legal certainty which could 
be found through financial and legal engineering. It would be decades later when 
these transnationalised markets would become subject to renationalization through 
directives, like in the EU. The legal orders, reflecting the codification ethos of the 19th 
century, of the EEC member states are riddled with legal and regulatory obstacles 
rendering the free movement of capital subject to many forms of control and legal 
uncertainties. 
Under exchange controls, free movement of capital was forbidden without the 
prior approval of local central banks directly or indirectly through the use of other 
administrative obstacles, often in the form of mandatory charges, fees, or taxes that 
made foreign investing more unattractive than investing locally. However, even 
when the progress towards free movement of capital was gradual, the seeming 
paradox is that the 1960s and 1970s were also the decades when the largest debt 
equity market in the world emerged, surged, and served as the base structure of 
rapid expansion of transnational banking. The OTC derivatives trading, as a form 
of private normativity through repeated interactions, soon eroded the practical 
relevance of then existing financial regulations at least in the US and gave rise to 
a new type of financial regulation that facilitated further transnationalisation of 
finance. Post the global financial crisis of 2008, the outcome of the interactions 
between transnational law and financial regulation are largely unknown. Given the 
fact that booms and bust phases are inherent in finance and that the regulatory 
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responses address and can only address past problems, it is only a question of time 
when the next financial crisis occurs. The regulatory framework might have become 
much riskier given its opacity when compared to the transnational insolvency of 
the Herstatt bank in the 1970s where the legal challenge was overcome not through 
regulation but negotiation between the parties concerned. While past events do 
not tell about the future, it can be assumed that once the next financial crisis hits, 
it will only lead to a similar regulatory reaction as it has so far which, in turn, can 
potentially be used for the benefit of some market participants over the other.
7.3 SOURCES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF FINANCE
Transnational law can be found in ‘black-letter’ from transnational contracts and 
court praxis concerning the same. In the OTC derivatives market, market participants 
often rely on and favour the expertise of courts and the legal certainty provided 
by their legal systems. Market participants favour English-American common law 
for historical and practical reasons as well as for the simple reason that major 
transnational financial institutions hold a strong presence in England and the US. 
The reason for this is also historical, since it was England that originally offered the 
favourable regulatory environment - in relative terms - for the eurobond market.
Transnational law can also be found from state-enacted legislation. It is a 
demonstrable fact that much of the legislation currently in force in the EU member 
states concerning the enforceability of bilateral close-out netting originates from 
private normativity and market practices which can be said to have evolved into 
transnational customary law already in the 1980s. However, the facilitative role that 
states have played in recognizing and in providing legal certainty for transnational 
law has also led to fragmentation and legal risks through renationalization of finance. 
This is the case, for example, for the exchange of financial collateral where legal 
risks are prevalent also in part because of financial regulation that may not reflect 
actual market practices. 
In the OTC derivatives market, market participants often rely on and favour the 
expertise of courts and the legal certainty provided by their legal systems. This is true 
also in complex transactions where some courts and national legal orders apparently 
can provide more legal certainty in comparison to other jurisdictions or other forms 
of dispute resolution. The popularity of English law cannot be explained that English 
courts would somehow directly apply and enforce market practices and would thus 
‘rubber stamp’ transnational law over national legislation. Rather, the relationship 
between market participants and the courts, and respectively transnational law and 
national law, is best characterized as a form of interaction. English courts observe 
industry practices in their interpretation and application of the national law and, 
in turn, market participants amend transnational contracts accordingly.
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Cases and court rulings concerning transnational contracts are followed very 
closely by the industry practitioners. Trading can be negatively affected by many 
unforeseen events. For this reason, transnational contracts include terms and 
conditions that could be characterized as private regulatory mechanisms. In the 
case of divergence between commercial perceptions of market participants and 
the English courts, ISDA can amend the terms of the standardized ISDA Master 
Agreement architecture, as can the market participants themselves in their respective 
transactions. Many laws have been amended to facilitate trading in the financial 
sector, including the OTC derivatives market. Through standardization, transaction 
lawyers have developed a shared language as early as the 1980s, if not much earlier. 
The usual structure of a transaction has involved and continues to involve more 
or less the same legal questions, especially regarding the enforceability of financial 
contracts in and out of counterparty insolvency. 
7.4 REFLECTIONS
A functional rather than formal understanding of ‘law’ is required to ensure 
that private normativity is recognized, and its ontology is properly understood. 
Transnationalisation can be also described as a form of evolution and also through 
the concept of path-dependence which has many descriptive uses in and outside 
law. Given its spontaneous ontology and pragmatic solution-based approach 
across millions of individual transactions, individual cases and fact patterns do not 
necessarily interact well with codified, territorial, and monopolistic state law and 
financial regulation that divides international flows of capital into separate pieces 
across jurisdictional lines. Much of the work of lawyers involves ensuring strict 
compliance with state laws. From time to time, financial transactions do end up 
in a dispute and if they are not solved in private negotiations, market participants 
will have to seek remedies from courts. Alternatively, market participants can rely 
on private regulatory mechanisms to settle various questions.
If transnational law cannot even be conceptualized, then neither can the potential 
problems associated with it. Those shunning the proponents of the concepts used in 
this research, from modern lex mercatoria to transnational law as a manifestation 
of private normativity, for challenging the exclusivity of state when it comes to law 
creation are unknowingly the best and first line of defence for those who might 
enjoy and reap the benefits of unjust transnational laws. If private normativity and 
spontaneous norm creation is disregarded or mischaracterized, the whole scholarly 
discussion on transnational law can be led far away from the academic roots which 
were and are about acknowledging private normativity and the evolutionary aspects 
of law. The cumulation of knowledge can become very challenging if transnational 
law is seen as an ideological battleground. Fortunately, misleading narratives re-
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defining trasnnational law as something else can be identified with relative ease 
once their existence is acknowledged. 
All market participants, from individual consumers to states, from startups to 
large transnational corporations, operate in an environment that is unpredictable. 
Risk is at the core of any profit seeking. The members of different communities 
adapt to their environment and create laws that shield them and the trade itself from 
at least those risks that are identifiable and controllable. Whereas states engage in 
black-letter law making, private market participants form trade organizations and 
private regulatory mechanisms. States can be a risk not only to market participants 
but on a systemic scale to the whole financial system. This is especially the case 
when it comes to financial regulation, the objectives of which are generally cloudy. 
Nevertheless, finance, through repeated interactions and innovations, tends to 
evolve over its legal and regulatory frameworks.
After the Second World War, the world saw the emergence of transnational 
corporations and financial institutions operating in their own transnational sphere 
fuelled first by eurobonds and subsequently by eurodollars. This development 
was spontaneous in that the actions were controlled and directed internally by 
autonomous actors. The literary evidence suggests that eurobonds were not issued 
to engage in politics nor to engage in academic debate over what is transnational 
law. They did so to finance their operations, whatever it was for any given actor. 
Transnational law was and is about legal scholars identifying such issues. It is 
questionable whether academic or political debate of that time concerning the 
transnationalisation of business and finance had any impact on this development. 
Market participants were and are in the market to raise capital for their respective 
businesses where and how they saw/see fit to produce products or services, whatever 
they were/are, for which there was/is apparently a market demand. If national laws 
and regulations were an obstacle, they could be rendered inapplicable by financial 
and legal innovation. State laws can be also facilitative, and when they are, market 
activity has a tendency of moving to such jurisdictions. The driver behind this is 
legal certainty rather than the absence of or laxity of legislation and regulations. To 
typify financial and legal engineering as something outright illegal, or at the very 
least socially harmful, can easily lead scholarly analysis astray. This is problematic 
since attempts to limit transnationalisation processes locally backfire easily in a 
transnational financial market. It is important that neither practicing lawyers nor 
legal scholars handicap themselves by adhering to overly-simplistic narratives.
We do not have a foresight on evolution. Transnationalisation of eurobonds in 
the 1960s was a spontaneous development, together with at least some coordinated 
planning and gradual institutionalization, but also a sum of coincidents. So was 
the birth of international financial regulation in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of 
Herstastt bank in the 1970s and transgovernmental regulation post global financial 
crisis of 2008. Interactions are constantly in motion, and no one can predict the 
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future. No one predicted the rise of eurobond and eurodollar markets in the 1960s 
or the OTC derivatives market decades later in the 1980s. No one can predict the 
impact of distributed ledger technologies in finance now. No one can predict the 
technologies that do not exist yet and their impact on financial stability, whatever 
its meaning. The spontaneous emergence of new techniques, revived old techniques, 
and the following spontaneous norm creation is inherent in human action. When 
private normativity needs to be critically assessed, and in the author’s view should 
be subject to the most critical assessment, like any other source of power, the 
substantive autonomy and power, if any, of different stake holders vis-à-vis other 
stake holders in the private rule-making process is the relevant question to be 
asked – not whether transnational law is ‘law’ or not. 
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